JUDGMENT :- Ashim Kumar Banerjee, J. Backdrop: The appellants filed a suit against the respondent in relation to a Public Charitable Trust known as Rai Soorejmull Jhunjhunwala Bahadur’s Charitable Fund/Trust. In relation to the management of the said Trust, suit was filed in 1970 that stood disposed of by decree dated December 3, 1979 wherein parties to the said suit filed a Terms of Settlement; Court accepted the terms and decreed accordingly. By virtue of the decree one Jagadish Prasad became the principal trustee being the eldest male member of the family as claimed by the appellants. Jagadish died on January 20, 2000. The appellant No. 1 claiming to be the eldest male descendant in the family was claiming the post of principal trustee that the respondents denied. Appellant filed the suit against the respondents inter-alia claiming for a declaration, he was the principal trustee and the respondents No. 1 and 2 ceased to be the trustee by virtue of their resignation. In the alternative, they should be removed from the post of trustee. The appellants alleged, the respondent No. 1 and 2 misappropriated the funds of the Trust whereas the respondent No. 4 could not have been the trustee of the Trust or the principal trustee thereof. Reading of the plaint would depict, the plaintiffs in the suit never claimed the same being instituted under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the instance of the plaintiffs, the learned interlocutory Judge passed orders giving interim protection in the aid of the suit. The respondents made an application for dismissal of the suit alleging, the plaint did not disclose any cause of action. The application was presumably under Order VII rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The respondents also prayed, the suit could not have been initiated under Section 92 and the leave, if any, granted, should be revoked and/or cancelled. The learned single Judge by judgment and order dated October 6, 2010 appearing at pages 423-432 of the paper book allowed the said application and dismissed the suit. His Lordship observed, the prayers made in the plaint were nothing but vindication of personal right that could not come within the scope of Section 92. The learned single Judge by judgment and order dated October 6, 2010 appearing at pages 423-432 of the paper book allowed the said application and dismissed the suit. His Lordship observed, the prayers made in the plaint were nothing but vindication of personal right that could not come within the scope of Section 92. However, while making such observation His Lordship observed as follows: “It shall not be understood that entire plaint does not contain allegation as required under Section 92 of the Code, but no relief under the said Section is asked with reasonable degree of seriousness against any of the defendants qua trustees. It is true the relief for furnishing accounts which comes within the purview of Section 92 subsection (2) of Clause (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure has been asked for against first and second defendants. But the suit is brought in such a manner and the cause of action has been pleaded in such complex mixing that it is difficult to segregate the allegation contained in the plaint for separate trial for the other reliefs which do not come within the purview of Section 92. His Lordship concluded the judgment by observing as follows: “On consideration of the facts and circumstances of this case in totality I am of the view that the present suit which is filed for obtaining relief under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be maintained. Leave obtained from this Hon’ble Court is an inappropriate action. Hence leave granted by this Court is revoked. I am of the view that the suit is also bad for misjoinder of causes of action which cannot be spilted for a proper trial by reason of the fact that same are adversely inconsistent and contradictory. As it is already held that if the suit is not essentially within the purview of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure there is no disclosure of cause of action. Hence, the suit is barred under Order 7 Rule XI of the CPC.” Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred the instant appeal that we heard on the above mentioned dates. Contentions: Mr. Hence, the suit is barred under Order 7 Rule XI of the CPC.” Being aggrieved, the appellants preferred the instant appeal that we heard on the above mentioned dates. Contentions: Mr. Jishnu Saha learned counsel appearing for the appellants placed Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and contended, once the learned Judge observed, the plaint also disclosed cause of action with regard to Section 92 His Lordship should not have dismissed the suit. He distinguished two Supreme Court decisions that the learned Single Judge relied upon the case reported in All India Reporter 1972 Volume-59 Supreme Court Page-246 (Harendra Nath Bhattacharya and others Vs Kaliram Das) and 2008 Volume 4 Supreme Court Cases Page-115 (Vidyodaya Trust Vs Mohan Prasad R and Others). Drawing our attention to various paragraphs of the said decisions, Mr. Saha would contend, the facts would completely differ, particularly when, the learned Judge came to a conclusion, plaint did disclose cause of action akin to Section 92. Mr. Saha also distinguished the Apex Court decision in the case of Sugra Bibi Vs. Hazi Kummu Mia reported in 1969 All India Reporter Volume-56 Supreme Court page-884 cited by the respondent before His Lordship. He would contend, the facts would differ however; the proposition of law would rather support the appellant. He particularly relied on paragraph 5, 7, 8 and 9 to support his contention. Mr. Saha lastly contended, learned Judge held the suit bad for misjoinder of cause of action that did not have any legal support, rather the provisions of Order I Rule 1 and 2 would ex facie suggest otherwise. Mr. Saha relied on the following decisions: 1. Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati and another Vs Ramji Tripathi and another reported in All India Reporter 1974 Supreme Court page-2141. 2. Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji Vs. Ishwarlalthai Narsibhai and others reported in 1952 All India Reporter Supreme Court page-143. 3. R.M. Narayana Chettiar and another Vs. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar and others reported in 1991 Volume-1 Supreme Court Cases page-48. Per contra, Mr. P.K. Das learned senior counsel being assisted by Mr. Swarnendu Ghosh would contend, Section 92(2) would have a prerequisite to maintain a suit under the said provision. The plaint, on a combined reading, would not support presence of those requisites. Combined reading of the plaint would ex facie suggest a dispute interse the trustees that could not be brought within the ambit of Section 92. Swarnendu Ghosh would contend, Section 92(2) would have a prerequisite to maintain a suit under the said provision. The plaint, on a combined reading, would not support presence of those requisites. Combined reading of the plaint would ex facie suggest a dispute interse the trustees that could not be brought within the ambit of Section 92. He referred to the observation of B.K. Mukherjee in his Tagore’s law lecture on Section 92 in this regard. Mr. Das once again placed the prayers of the plaint to show, the principal grievance of the plaintiffs was against the trustees vindicating the personal right that would not in any way affect the public interest or could not inspire the members of the public to join that would be the prerequisite of Section 92. Resuming his argument on the next day Mr. Das would contend, the plaintiffs could file a suit of the like nature under Section 14 of the Religious Endowments Act 1963 where any person interested in any religious establishment may, without joining as plaintiff any of the other persons interested therein, sue before the Civil Court, the trustees, for any misfeasance or breach of trust or neglect of duty. He also relied upon the commentary of V.K. Varadachari on Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments to show the prerequisites of Section 92 and the suits that would be outside the scope of the said provision. Mr. Das relied on the following decisions: 1. Indu Bhusan Sen and another Vs Kiron Chandra Sen and Others reported in All India Reporter 1940 Calcutta page-36. 2. Venugopala Naidu and Others Vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities and Others reported in 1989 Supplementary 2 Volume-2 Supreme Court Cases Page-356. 3. Mahesh Tulswan Vs. Rajendra Kumar Banka reported in 2011 Volume-2 Calcutta High Court Notes page-169. 4. Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji Vs. Ishwarlalthai Narsibhai and others reported in 1952 All India Reporter Supreme Court page-143. 5. R.M. Narayana Chettiar and another Vs. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar and others reported in 1991 Volume-1 Supreme Court Cases page-48. Our View: Section 92 sub-sections 1 and 2 are relevant for the present purpose. 4. Pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji Vs. Ishwarlalthai Narsibhai and others reported in 1952 All India Reporter Supreme Court page-143. 5. R.M. Narayana Chettiar and another Vs. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar and others reported in 1991 Volume-1 Supreme Court Cases page-48. Our View: Section 92 sub-sections 1 and 2 are relevant for the present purpose. Sub-section 1 would inter-alia provide, in case of breach in Public Charitable Trust where Court’s intervention was necessary for administration the Advocate General or two or more persons having interest in the Trust could bring an action in Court with the leave for the following purpose: a) Removing any trustee; b) Appointing a new trustee; c) Vesting any property in a trustee; [(cc) directing a trustee who has been removed or a person who has ceased to be a trustee, to deliver possession of any trust property in his possession to the person entitled to the possession of such property;] d) Directing accounts and inquiries; e) Declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust. f) Authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; g) Settling a scheme; or h) Granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require. Sub-section 2 would provide, save what was provided in the Act of 1963, no suit claiming any relief specified in sub-section 1, could be brought except in conformity with the provisions of sub-section 1. On a combined reading of the aforesaid two provisions, in case of a public Trust two or more persons with the leave of the Court may bring a suit alleging mismanagement of the Trust for appropriate administration through Court, exception would only be in case of eventualities under Section 14 of the said act 1863. In the instant case admittedly the Trust had a public flavour. Two persons brought the suit initially against the principal trustees. Hence, the requisite was fulfilled. Let us now consider whether the prayers would conform to the requirement. The principal prayers for declaration that the plaintiff 1 was the principal trustee, were admittedly outside the scope of Section 92. However, the charge of defalcation would squarely come within the ambit His Lordship observed so. In such event, it could not be said that suit would wholly be outside the scope of Section 92. The principal prayers for declaration that the plaintiff 1 was the principal trustee, were admittedly outside the scope of Section 92. However, the charge of defalcation would squarely come within the ambit His Lordship observed so. In such event, it could not be said that suit would wholly be outside the scope of Section 92. Let us now consider the precedents cited at the bar. Although several decisions were cited we feel, four or five decisions would be relevant for the present purpose. Mr. Das heavily placed reliance on three Apex Court Decisions. In the case of Pragdasji (supra), the Apex Court observed, in a suit framed under Section 92, the plaintiff could claim relief within the four corners of the said section and not otherwise. Their Lordships considered the situation where the plaintiff alleged, defendants were denying the character of the Trust. The Apex Court observed, the plaintiff was entitled to such declaration that would deal with the existence of the public Trust. However, when the plaint would not disclose any cause of action such relief could not be given. This decision would have no relevance. In the case of R.M. Narayana Chettiar (supra), the suit was filed under Section 92 for framing a scheme of Public Charitable Trust. Question arose whether the leave could be given under Section 92 without notice being given to the defendants. The Apex Court held, in absence of a notice the suit could not be held to be not maintainable if it disclose cause of action otherwise. However, it would have been proper to give a notice prior to grant of such leave. In the case of Vidyodaya Trust (supra) the object of Section 92 was elaborately discussed. The Apex Court held, no individual should take benefit from the said suit brought under Section 92. Their Lordships observed, in the suit against public trust, if on analysis of the averments contained, in the plaint it transpires that the primary object behind the suit was vindication of individual or personal rights of some persons an action under this provision would not lie. If in a given case, notice has not been given and leave has been granted, it is open to the Court to deal with an application for revocation and pass necessary orders. If in a given case, notice has not been given and leave has been granted, it is open to the Court to deal with an application for revocation and pass necessary orders. However, the Apex Court was of the view, primary object of the suit should be looked into and not the so-called vindication of public right to give the suit a representative look. The Apex Court concluded as follows: “To put it differently, it is not every sit claiming reliefs specified in Section 92 that can be brought under the section; but only the suits which besides claiming any of the reliefs are brought by individuals as representatives of the public for vindication of public rights. As a decisive factor the Court has to go beyond the relief and have regard to the capacity in which the plaintiff has sued and the purpose for which the suit was brought. The Courts have to be careful to eliminate the possibility of a suit being laid against public trusts under Section 92 by persons whose activities were not for protection of the interests of the public trusts. In that view of the matter the High Court was certainly wrong in holding that the grant of leave was legal and proper. The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The appeal is allowed but without any order as to costs.” The earlier decisions of the Apex Court were discussed and/or dealt with in the decision of Vidyodaya Trust (supra). We thus deal with the controversy in the light of the observations made by their Lordships in Vidyodaya Trust (supra) that would squarely bind us. If we read the plaint as a whole we would find, the plaintiff No. 1 would intend to vindicate his right so derived from the consent decree passed in the earlier suit. He made allegations for misappropriation however, his allegations would relate to authority of the defendant to act as principal trustee. If we squarely apply the ratio in the case of Vidyodaya Trust (supra), in the present case which we are bound to, we would have no other option but to support the decision of the learned single Judge. The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There would be no order as to costs.