JUDGMENT Iqbal Ahmed Ansari, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 21-01-2003, passed, in Sessions Case No. 208(K) of 2001, by the learned Sessions Judge (FTC No. 1), Kamrup, Guwahati, convicting the accused-appellant, under Sections 447, 427 and 302 IPC, and sentencing him, for his conviction under Section 302 IPC, to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, suffer simple imprisonment for a period of six months and also to undergo, for his conviction under Section 447 IPC, simple imprisonment for one year, and, further, undergo, for his conviction under Section 427 IPC, simple imprisonment for a period of one year, all the sentences having been directed to run concurrently. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be described as under:- (i) On 05-01-2001, at about 9.30 p.m., accused Manoj Das entered into the house of Bipul Medhi, broke one bicycle, one almirah and also damaged the walls of the house, because Bipul Medhi's wife, Rina Medhi, had lodged a case against the accused for having eloped a girl. Petrified and alarmed by the manner in which the accused had behaved, Rina Medhi (PW3) and her family came to the house of her brother, Sarbeswar (since deceased). While Rina Medhi was reporting to her relatives as to what the accused had done, the accused came running to Sarbeswar's courtyard, where Sarbeswar was present and gave a blow by means of a Jowar (fishing spear), on Sarbeswar. The said spear hit the head of Sarbeswar. The accused, having extracted the Power, threw the same towards Anjali Kalita, wife of Sarbeswar, but Anjali was, fortunately, not injured. Immediately after having hit and injured Sarbeswar as described hereinbefore, the accused ran away; but he was caught by his co-villagers and beaten. Because of having been beaten by his co-villagers, the accused, too, sustained injuries. (ii) Injured Sarbeswar was taken to Chhaygaon Police Station and, then, to Goberdhan Hospital, Chhaygaon. As the doctors expressed their inability to provide adequate treatment to Sarbeswar, injured Sarbeswar was taken to local medical college hospital, where Sarbeswar died on 06-01-2001, on the following day of the occurrence. On 06-01-2001, Chandradhar Das @ Kalita (PW1), who is younger brother of Rina Medhi (PW3), lodged a written Ejahar. As the doctors expressed their inability to provide adequate treatment to Sarbeswar, injured Sarbeswar was taken to local medical college hospital, where Sarbeswar died on 06-01-2001, on the following day of the occurrence. On 06-01-2001, Chandradhar Das @ Kalita (PW1), who is younger brother of Rina Medhi (PW3), lodged a written Ejahar. Treating the said Ejahar as First Information Report (in short, 'FIR'), Chhaygaon Police Station Case No. 2/2010, under Sections 448 /326 /307 /427 IPC, was registered against the accused. Before, however, the said Ejahar was lodged, Bipul Medhi informed Kukurmara Patrol Out Post, on 05-01-2001, at about 11.00 p.m., that Manoj Das had been caught and found by the villagers and that police should go immediately. Having made GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, in this regard, and having informed Chhaygaon Police Station, the Investigating Officer (PW11) rushed to the place of occurrence after. Having found Manoj Das in injured condition, police brought him to Chhaygaon Police Station and provided him treatment. (iii) Before, however, the police could visit the house of Sarbeswar, he had already been taken to Chhaygaon Police Station. During the course of investigation, the police visited the place of occurrence, held inquest over the said dead body and seized, amongst others, some broken panels of almirah alleged to have been broken by accused Manoj Das and on completion of investigation, laid charge-sheet, under Sections 447 /427 /302 IPC, against the accused-appellant. 2. At the trial, when charges, under Sections 447, 427 and 302 IPC, were framed against the accused-appellant, he pleaded not guilty thereto. 3. In support of their case, prosecution examined altogether 14 (fourteen) witnesses. The accused was, then, examined under Section 313 Cr. P.C. and, in his examination aforementioned, he denied that he had committed the offences, which were alleged to have been committed by him, the case of the defence being that of denial. No evidence was adduced by the defence. 4. Having, however, found the accused guilty of the offences charged with, learned trial Court convicted him accordingly and passed sentence against him as mentioned above. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences passed against him, the accused, as a convicted person, has preferred this appeal. 5. We have heard Mr. BK Singh, learned counsel for the accused-appellant, and Mr. KA Mazumdar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 6. Aggrieved by his conviction and the sentences passed against him, the accused, as a convicted person, has preferred this appeal. 5. We have heard Mr. BK Singh, learned counsel for the accused-appellant, and Mr. KA Mazumdar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam. 6. Referring to the case of Kashiram and others-vs.-State of M.P., reported in (2002) 1 SCC 71 , Mr. BK Singh, learned counsel, has submitted that in the case at hand, even if the evidence of prosecution is believed in its entirety, the accused-appellant had acted in self-defense inasmuch he has been seriously injured, but the prosecution witnesses are wholly silent with regard to the injuries, which the accused-appellant had sustained. Thus, the prosecution's case, according to Mr. Singh, learned counsel, suffers from suppression of material facts. 7. Referring to, and relying upon, the case of Laxmi Singh and Others-vs.-State of Bihar, reported in (1976) 4 SCC 394 , Mr. Singh, learned counsel, submits that in the case at hand, since the prosecution has presented before the Court a colourised version of the occurrence and has not disclosed the real version of the occurrence, the learned trial Court ought to have acquitted the accused by according him, at least, benefit of doubt. 8. In support of his above submissions, Mr. Singh, learned counsel, also points out that the accused-appellant was produced, on 07-01-2001, before the Judicial Magistrate and the order, which was passed, on 07-01-2001, by the Judicial Magistrate, clearly reveals that the accused-appellant was found injured and needed immediate treatment and when the evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to explain as to how the accused came to be injured, the accused-appellant was entitled to be acquitted. 9. Further submission of Mr. Singh, learned counsel, is that the Investigating Officer (PW11) has clearly deposed that he had been informed by Bipul Medhi (PW6), at Kukurmara Police Patrol Post, on 05-01-2001, at about 11.00 p.m., that Manoj Das (i.e., the accused-appellant) had been caught and confined by the villagers and that the police should go immediately and, having entered this information in the form of GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, and, after informing Chhaygaon Police Station, on telephone, the Investigating Officer claims to have rushed to the place of occurrence. However, GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, points out Mr. However, GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, points out Mr. Singh, was not proved at the trial and it is, therefore, not discernible from the evidence on record as to what PW6 had, admittedly, informed the said police, at the police patrol post, making the police machinery move. 10. While considering the above submissions made on behalf of the accused-appellant, it needs to be pointed out that we have very minutely scanned the evidence on record and we find that apart from the fact that the accused did not take any plea of self-defense, such a plea is not discernible from the evidence on record inasmuch as the specific case of the defence, as put in the form of suggestion to PW1, who has been examined as one of the eye witnesses to the occurrence, is that Sarbeswar and his family members had beaten Manoj and Manoj was running away to save his life, but he was chased by them with spear in their hands and that Sarbeswar entered into the house of Prafulla Bora to take shelter there and, at that time, when the prosecution witnesses was scuffling with Manoj, the spear struck into the head of Sarbeswar and thereby Sarbeswar sustained injury. This defence versions, as reflected from its suggestion offered to PW1, which, of course, has been denied by PW1, is that while the prosecution witnesses were scuffling with the accused-appellant, the spear, which the relatives of Sarbeswar were holding in their hands, had stuck into the head of Sarbeswar and Sarbeswar sustained injury on his head. 11. Thus, the defence case was not of self-defense, but of Sarbeswar having sustained injury accidently. Even to PW4, widow of deceased Sarbeswar, the defence suggested that they were the ones, who had scuffled with accused Manoj and that accused Manoj was beaten by them. Thus, the plea of self-defense, which the accused-appellant is, now, seeking to take, cannot be made available to him. 12. Though Mr. Even to PW4, widow of deceased Sarbeswar, the defence suggested that they were the ones, who had scuffled with accused Manoj and that accused Manoj was beaten by them. Thus, the plea of self-defense, which the accused-appellant is, now, seeking to take, cannot be made available to him. 12. Though Mr. BK Singh, as we have already indicated above, has submitted that the prosecution's case suffers from suppression of material facts inasmuch as they have not disclosed that the accused-appellant had also sustained injuries, we notice that the unchallenged evidence of the Investigating Officer is that on 05-01-2001, at about 11.00 p.m., Bipul Medhi (PW6) came to the said patrol post and verbally informed the police about Manoj Das having been caught and confined by villagers and that having made, as already pointed out above, GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, in this regard, and having also informed Chhaygaon Police Station, when the Investigating Officer came to Amtala village looking for accused-appellant, he found the accused-appellant in nearby jungle in injured condition, brought him out and the people, who had gathered there, told him (PW11) that Manoj Das, on that very day, at about 10.00 p.m., had killed Sarbeswar by means of a Jowar due to his long standing rivalry with the latter. 13. In the face of the above evidence on record, it cannot be said that prosecution had suppressed the fact that the accused-appellant was found by the police in injured condition. In fact, the order, dated 07-01-2001, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, which Mr. BK Singh has referred to, states that the accused, on being produced before the Judicial Magistrate, was found to have injuries on his right leg, which was caused because of the assault by the members of the public and the Judicial Magistrate directed, therefore, the Jail doctor to provide immediate treatment to the accused. Thus, the order, dated 07-01-2001, aforementioned, too, reflects that the accused-appellant had been beaten by the members of the public and the fact that the accused-appellant had sustained injuries on his person, was never suppressed by the prosecution. 14. Notwithstanding what we have indicated above, it is still required to be determined if the accused-appellant had committed offences, which he stands convicted of. 14. Notwithstanding what we have indicated above, it is still required to be determined if the accused-appellant had committed offences, which he stands convicted of. While considering this aspect of the case, we cannot ignore the fact that the prosecution did not prove the contents of GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, which the Investigating Officer has spoken of. 15. Considering the fact that it was the information, reduced into writing in the form of GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, which formed in the present case, the basis of investigation inasmuch as the police machinery swung into action on the basis of the information as stood recorded in GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, aforementioned, it was incumbent, on the part of the prosecution, to prove, at the trial, the contents of the GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, so that the Court could have known as to what information had been given, first, in point of time, to the police with regard to the occurrence, which became the subject matter of the trial of the accused-appellant. 16. Coupled with the above, it was also imperative, on the part of the learned trial Court, to find out if the name of the present accused-appellant had figured as assailant on the night of the occurrence itself and if not, then, what the explanation was and how far such explanation was plausible and convincing. This Court, while exercising the appellate jurisdiction, finds that legally sustainable approach, as indicated hereinbefore, has not been adopted by the learned trial Court. 17. We must bear in mind that a trial judge is not merely a recording machine of evidence. A trial judge is not a mere umpire. He must participate in the trial and he must remain alive to the developments, which take place at a trial. The duty of the trial Judge is neither to convict the accused nor to acquit him; his mission shall be to reach, and should always remain to reach the truth and, for that purpose, it must examine such witnesses, whose evidence is necessary for just decision of the case and with this object in view, or, in other words, in order to reach the truth, he must illicit all such evidence as may be relevant and necessary without, however, doing anything, which may impair, or seen to have impaired, his impartiality; or else, Section 311 Cr. PC would become redundant and Section 165 of the Evidence Act would be set at naught. A trial Judge shall not allow himself to be led by such evidence, which is either not complete or not intelligible. 18. In the case at hand, the learned trial Court committed serious error in not bringing, on record, the contents of the GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, and, then, deciding the case in accordance with law. 19. In a case of present nature, one has to keep in mind the scope of Section 311 Cr. P.C., its aims and objectives. For the purpose of a clear comprehension of what Section 311 aims at conveying, imperative it is that the provisions, embodied in Section 311, are carefully taken note of. Section 311 is, therefore, reproduced below: Section 311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present: Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. 20. A patient reading of the Section 311 Cr. P.C. clearly shows that this Section is divided into two parts. While the word, used in the first part, is, "may", the word used, in the second part, is, "shall". It would, therefore, logically follow that the first part of Section 311 Cr. P.C. is permissive in nature and gives a discretion to a Criminal Court to act, at any stage, of enquiry, trial or other proceeding, in one of the three ways, namely, (1) to summon any person as a witness, or (2) to examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or (3) to recall and re-examine any person already examined. 21. The second part of Section 311 is, however, mandatory in nature and casts an obligation on the Court (i) to summon and examine or (ii) to recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the 'just decision of the case'. 22. 21. The second part of Section 311 is, however, mandatory in nature and casts an obligation on the Court (i) to summon and examine or (ii) to recall and re-examine any such person if his evidence appears to be essential to the 'just decision of the case'. 22. The language, employed in Section 311, clearly shows that this Section is couched in widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any manner. However, the winder the power, more cautious shall be the exercise thereof. No exercise of power, in a judicial proceeding, can be arbitrary and, more so, the power to call or recall a witness. 23. Whereas the first part of Section 311, as already indicated above, gives a discretion to the Court to call, recall and re-examine any person as a witness, the second part of this Section does not really give any discretion to the Court; rather, it clarifies that if a Court forms the view, in the facts of a given case, that the evidence of the person, who is sought to be called, recalled or re-examine, is essential to the 'just decision of the case', it would be mandatory for the Court to call, re-call or re-examine a person as a witness. This mandatory exercise of power can also be to obtain fresh evidence provided that the Court forms a view, as indicated hereinbefore, that bringing of such fresh evidence on record is essential to the 'just decision of the case'. 24. Though the law requires the parties to produce, before the Court, the best available evidence, the fact remains that even in a criminal trial, prosecution as well as defence has the right to choose their witness or witnesses and also as to what evidence they would adduce. Nonetheless, they are bound to adduce the best available evidence. The Court has no power to compel either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness. This embargo, placed on the powers of the Court, i.e., the limitation of not directing either the prosecution or the defence to examine any particular witness as their witness, is sought to be balanced by the legislature with the help of the provisions contained in Section 311 inasmuch as the legislature has, with the help of Section 311, empowered the Criminal Court to call, recall or re-examine any person as witness. The only rider, which Section 311 attaches to the exercise of this power, is that a criminal court cannot call, recall or re-examine any person, as witness, unless examination of such a person is, in the opinion of the Court, essential for a 'just decision of the case'. 25. If, however, the Court is of the view that evidence of a particular witness is necessary for reaching a 'just decision of the case', the Court, either on its own or on the application of any of the parties concerned, call, recall or re-examine any witness as long as it does not cause prejudice to any of the parties concerned or does not give an undue advantage to any of such parties. 26. This kind of power, which Section 311 vests in a court, is not peculiar to the criminal law inasmuch as similar provisions have been made even in respect of civil courts in the form of Order X, Rule 2, Order X, Rule 14 and Order XVIII, Rule 17. Even Section 165 of the Evidence Act recognizes court's power to put any question to any witness, at any time, which appears to the Judge as necessary for just decision of the case or in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant facts. 27. Because of the lapses with which the trial of the accused-appellant suffered from, we are of the considered view that the case needs to be remanded back to the learned trial Court so that complete evidence becomes available on record for the purpose of determining the guilt or otherwise of the accused-appellant. 28. In view of the above, this appeal partly succeeds. The conviction of the accused-appellant and the sentences, which have been passed against him, are hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the learned trial Court for recalling the Investigating Officer or if he is no longer alive, then, to call the present In-Charge, Kukurmara Out Post, along with GD Entry No. 77, dated 06-01-2001, and, upon bringing on the record contents of the said GD Entry, dispose of the case in accordance with law. 29. 29. During the pendency of the trial, the accused-appellant shall be kept detained in the present custody and he shall not be allowed to go on bail and depending upon the conclusion, which the learned trial Court may, eventually, reach as regards the guilt or otherwise of the accused-appellant, the question of enlarging the accused, on bail, or otherwise, or setting him at liberty shall be decided. 30. Before parting with this appeal, this Court makes clear that it has not consciously entered into the discussion of the veracity or otherwise of the evidence, which stands adduced by prosecution as well as by defence, so that the learned trial Court remains free and unfettered to come to its own logical conclusion as regards guilt or otherwise of the accused-appellants. 31. Send back the LCR with a copy of this judgment and order. With the above observations and directions, this appeal stands disposed of.