ORDER In this writ application petitioner has challenged a communication dated 08.12.2012 issued by the Chief Returning Officer, Patna University Students’ Union Election-2012 and now received, as contained in Annexure-1, by which, in pursuance of the orders of this Court passed in CWJC No.22513 of 2012, he has been informed that his nomination for the post of President of Patna University Students’ Union has been rejected on the ground of ‘disciplinary action’. 2. Earlier, after notification containing schedule of election of Patna University Students’ Union was issued, petitioner had filed his nomination to contest the election for the post of President. When the list of candidates, whose nominations were found valid, was published, he did not find his name amongst the candidates for the post of President. It appeared to him that, presumably, his nomination had been rejected on the ground of FIR lodged by the University administration against him earlier. Hence he moved this Court through CWJC No.22513 of 2012 in which he took the ground of discrimination with a plea that, whereas his nomination was presumably rejected on the ground of pending FIR against him, nomination of other candidates against whom also FIR had been registered earlier and cases were pending investigation, had been accepted as valid for election on different posts. However, since he had not received a formal communication intimating him the reasons for rejection of his nomination, this Court, by order dated 07.12.2012, vide Annexure-3, disposed of the writ application with a direction to the Returning Officer to serve on the petitioner order rejecting his nomination paper. It was also directed that, if it was true ‘that other FIR accused, may be registered at the instance of informant who has no connection with the University, have been permitted to contest the election for the post of President of the Students’ Union, to reconsider the order in the case of the petitioner rejecting the nomination paper of the petitioner and to permit him to contest the election.’ Pursuant to this order of the Court, petitioner has been served with the impugned communication informing that his nomination has been rejected on the ground of ‘disciplinary action.’ Thereafter election has been held and respondent no.8 has been declared as successful for the post of President of the Students’ Union. 3. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Students’ Union election is being held in the light of Lyngdoh Committee report, extract of which is annexure-8 with the writ application, and procedure laid down therein. He submitted that in the report some qualifications have been laid down for a candidate to contest the election for the post of the President of the Students’ Union. He referred to para 6.5.7 of the said report which reads as follows :– “The candidate shall not have a previous criminal record, that is to say he should not have been tried and/or convicted of any criminal offence or misdemeanor. The candidate shall also not have been subject to any disciplinary action by the University authorities.” 4. He submitted that the petitioner had no criminal record, is not facing any trial, has not been convicted in a criminal case and has not been subjected to any ‘disciplinary action’ by the University authorities. He submitted that, in view of the said Lyngdoh Committee report, the University had also deleted the word ‘FIR’ from the code of conduct laid down for the election which was also reported in the newspapers, vide Annexure-4. He submitted that, when petitioner came to know that his nomination had been rejected, he had filed an application before the Grievance Redressal Committee of the University, vide Annexure-6, which rejected it. Thereafter, he had filed his appeal before the Appellate Authority, i.e., the Vice-Chancellor, vide Annexure-7. However, having failed to get his grievance redressed, he had filed the earlier writ application. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Principal of the Law College, where petitioner is enrolled, has given a certificate that no ‘disciplinary action’ was pending against him. He submitted that petitioner has never received any show cause notice which could show that any ‘disciplinary action’ had been initiated against him. Hence, he submitted that rejection of nomination of petitioner was clearly arbitrary. 6. When this matter was taken up by a Bench of this Court on 07.01.2013, it appeared to the Court that in the earlier writ application ‘it was contended that he is not an accused in any F.I.R. and presumably on which ground his nomination paper had been rejected.’ Hence the Court had directed the University to consider his representation which was rejected by the impugned communication on the ground that there was ‘disciplinary action’ against him. Learned counsel for the petitioner on that date questioned the election itself on the ground that the reason for rejection of the nomination paper was non est as there was never any ‘disciplinary action’ taken against him. In the circumstances, this Court, by order passed in this case of that day, direct the University to produce original records with regard to the ‘disciplinary action’ and the file containing the impugned order dated 08.12.2012. Accordingly, the matter was adjourned for two weeks. 7. When the matter was heard on 15.01.2013 by this Court, learned counsel, Mr.Abhinav Srivastava, who appeared for the University, produced the original records. He showed from the records that, as many as four FIRs had been registered with the police in which petitioner was an accused and the matters were under investigation. He submitted that all these FIRs have been instituted in respect of petitioner’s activities as a students’ leader. He submitted that these FIRs had been instituted at the instance of the Proctor with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor alleging breach of discipline and other acts of omissions and commissions by the petitioner which were prejudicial to the functioning of the University. He referred to clause C of paragraph 1 of Statute no.27 containing ‘Duties, Powers and Functions of the Proctor’ and as approved by the Chancellor, vide letter dated 31.05.1985. The said clause C reads as follows:– “Without prejudice to the powers vested in the Vice-Chancellor or the Principal of a College or the head of University Department or Institute, but subject to approval of the Vice-Chancellor, the Proctor shall have power to (i) fine a student for breach of discipline (ii) suspend a student and prohibit him from entering the premises of the department or college or institution or hostel or other places of residence extending up to about of one month, or (iii) order legal action to be taken against a student.” 8. Mr.Srivastava submitted that the Proctor is empowered under the Statute, subject to general supervision and control of the Vice-Chancellor, for maintenance of discipline amongst the students of the University in the entire University and its institutions and campus. He submitted that the above referred clause C provides for three possible alternative actions by the Proctor against a student, subject to approval of the Vice-Chancellor, if he is found to be in breach of discipline. He submitted that the above referred clause C provides for three possible alternative actions by the Proctor against a student, subject to approval of the Vice-Chancellor, if he is found to be in breach of discipline. He submitted that, apart from taking action at the University level, one of the actions contemplated in the clause is a legal action against the student, which obviously includes institution of an FIR, if the act of the student is found to be a criminal offence. He submitted that the Proctor had made necessary enquiries in the matter and had taken the approval of the Vice-Chancellor and thereafter had instituted the FIRs against the petitioner from time to time for his specific activities. He submitted that all the three alternative possible actions against a student, as provided in the said Clause C, has to be treated as covered within the expression ‘disciplinary action’. Hence, the nomination paper of the petitioner was rightly rejected, as the Lyngdoh Committee also lays down any pending ‘disciplinary action’ against a candidate as a disqualification. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in reply, submitted that since no show cause had been issued to the petitioner and he had not received any communication with regard to initiation of a disciplinary proceeding, it cannot be accepted that any ‘disciplinary action’ had been taken against him. In the circumstances, rejection of nomination of the petitioner was on non est ground and, therefore, the same has to be held illegal and quashed. He submitted that this vitiates the entire action. Hence, so far as election of the President of the Students’ Union is concerned, the same has to be set aside and the University has to be directed to hold a fresh election for that post. 10. Having considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties and materials referred to and relied upon by them, this Court finds that learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced his arguments treating the term ‘disciplinary action’ as understood in service jurisprudence with all its nuances which requires a show cause notice, framing of charge, service of charge memo with documents and list of witnesses, formal order of initiation of disciplinary proceeding, holding of proceeding, submission of report, a second show cause notice, if necessary, and final orders. In the opinion of this Court, this line of submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct. In the opinion of this Court, in the matters of enforcing discipline amongst the students of a University, the disciplinary action need not be strictly in the manner in which it is contemplated in service jurisprudence. The above referred Statute 27 prescribes ‘Duties, Powers and Functions of the Proctor’ and empowers the Proctor, subject to approval and control of the Vice-Chancellor, to take ‘disciplinary action,’ after due enquiry, against the students for any breach of discipline. This action includes imposition of fine, suspension of student and prohibiting him from entering into premises of the Department, College, Institution, Hostel or other places for a fixed period as well as any legal action also, which will obviously include institution of an FIR, if the act and/or omission of a particular student is found to be constituting a criminal offence. In the circumstances, this Court finds that institution of the four FIRs against the petitioner, from time to time, for his activities in connection with the functioning of the University, was ‘disciplinary action’ by the Proctor in respect of indiscipline acts of the petitioner as a student of the University. It may be that, had the FIRs been instituted by any 3rd person not connected with the University in any manner and not in respect of his activities in connection with the functioning of the University, petitioner may not have been held debarred from contesting the election. But in the present case, the FIRs had been instituted by the Proctor, with the approval of the Vice-Chancellor, in respect of petitioner’s activities in connection with the functioning of the University. As such the same has to be treated as ‘disciplinary action.’ Since the nomination of the petitioner was rejected on the ground of pending ‘disciplinary action’ against him, this Court finds the action of the respondent University as legal and valid. Even otherwise also, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, petitioner does not deserve the reliefs prayed for by him in this application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and does not deserve the exercise of discretion by this Court in his favour. 11. As a result, this Court does not find any merit in the writ application and the same is dismissed.