JUDGMENT Abhinava Upadhya,J.: - Rejoinder affidavit filed today is taken on record. 2. Heard Sri Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri Anurag Khanna, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.3 and Sri Ramendra Pratap Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1. 3. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has come up to this Court challenging the order dated 4.9.2006 passed by the trial court allowing the application for impleadment of respondent no.3 M/s International Recreation Park Private Ltd. filed under O.1 R.10 CPC and the order of the revisional court passed in the revision filed against the order of the trial court dated 22.1.2008. 4. The facts of the case in brief are that the petitioner who is plaintiff in suit no.853 of 1986 filed the same for injunction restraining the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority( NOIDA) from interfering in the possession of the suit property. The petitioner claims that the said property was leased out to Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) vide lease deed dated 18.2.1986 and the IOC subleased the property in favour of the petitioner and by virtue of aforesaid sub lease, the petitioner is continuing in possession on the property in question where he has established a go-down for storing the products of IOC. The petitioner claims himself also to be the distributor of the IOC. In the aforesaid suit respondent no.3 filed an application under O.1 R.10 CPC for being impleaded as a necessary party on account of the fact that the disputed property has been leased out by the NOIDA to respondent no.3 vide lease deed dated 5.2.2003 for establishment of an amusement park upon an area approximately 142 acres, the disputed property being within the area leased out to respondent no.3 renders respondent no.3 a necessary party in the aforesaid suit. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the disputed plot is opposite of sector 16 A whereas the property leased out to respondent no.3 is in sector 38 A and these two are distinct plots and, therefore, the respondent no.3 is not a necessary party in a suit for injunction filed against the NOIDA. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the disputed plot is opposite of sector 16 A whereas the property leased out to respondent no.3 is in sector 38 A and these two are distinct plots and, therefore, the respondent no.3 is not a necessary party in a suit for injunction filed against the NOIDA. The trial court upon the affidavit filed by the NOIDA has recorded a finding that the disputed plot falls within the area leased out to respondent no.3, that is, sector 38 A. Learned counsel for the petitioner , however, has further stated that assuming without admitting that the said property falls within the property leased out to respondent no.3, such a transfer being pendente lite will be hit by the provisions of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision in the case of Sanjay Verma Vs. Manik Roy AIR 2007 SC 1332 wherein it was held that an application under O.1 R.10 CPC filed by the subsequent transferee in a suit for specific performance and such transfer being made without the leave of the court cannot claim impleadment in view of the doctrine of lis pendens . Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court of which I was also a member in the case of Smt. Manju Gupta Vs. District Magistrate, Allahabad 2012 Vol.8 ADJ 588 which has lucidly defined the scope of O.1 R.10 CPC. Para 23 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: "23. Shri Saurabh Raj Srivastava, has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Mumbai International Airport Private Limited (Supra), the Apex Court in the said case has laid down that the discretion to either allow or reject the application of the person claiming to be the proper party depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party merely because he is a proper party. Following propositions were laid down by this Court in para Nos.22 to 25 of the aforesaid case: 22. "Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order I of Rule 10 (2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. Following propositions were laid down by this Court in para Nos.22 to 25 of the aforesaid case: 22. "Let us consider the scope and ambit of Order I of Rule 10 (2) CPC regarding striking out or adding parties. The said sub-rule is not about the right of a non party to be impleaded as a party, but about the judicial discretion of the Court to strike out or add parties at any stage of a proceeding. The discretion under the sub-rule can be exercised either suo moto or on the application of the plaintiff or the defendant, or on an application of a person who is not a party to the suit. The Court can strike out any party who is improperly joined. The Court can add anyone as a plaintiff or as a defendant if it finds that he is a necessary party or proper party. Such deletion or addition can be without any conditions or subject to such terms as the Court deems fit to impose. In exercising its judicial discretion under Order 1 Rule 10(2) of the Code, the Court will of course act according to reason and fair play and not according to whims and caprice. 23. This Court in Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. Vs. Invest Import reiterated in SCC p.96, para 20 the classic definition of' 'discretion' by Lord Mansfield in R. v. Wilkes (ER p.334) that 'discretion' when applied to Courts of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, 'but legal and regular'. 24. We may now give some illustrations regarding exercise of discretion under the said sub-rule. 24.1. If a plaintiff makes an application for impleading a person as a defendant on the ground that he is a necessary party, the Court may implead him having regard to the provisions of Rules 9 and 10 (2) of Order I. If the claim against such a person is barred by limitation, it may refuse to add him as a party and even dismiss the suit for non-joinder of a necessary party. 24.2. If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. 24.2. If the owner of a tenanted property enters into an agreement for sale of such property without physical possession, in a suit for specific performance by the purchaser, the tenant would not be a necessary party. But if the suit for specific performance is filed with an additional prayer for delivery of physical possession from the tenant in possession, then the tenant will be a necessary party in so far as the prayer for actual possession. 24.3. If a person makes an application for being impleaded contending that he is necessary party, and if the Court finds that he is a necessary party, it can implead him. If the plaintiff opposes such impleadment, then instead of impleading such a party, who is found to be a necessary party, the Court may proceed to dismiss the suit by holding that the applicant was a necessary party and in his absence the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief in the suit. 24.4. If an application is made by a plaintiff for impleading someone as a proper party, subject to limitation, bona fides etc., the Court will normally implead him, if he is found to be a proper party. On the other hand, if a non-party makes an application seeking impleadment as a proper party and Court finds him to be a proper party, the Court may direct his addition as a defendant; but if the Court finds that his addition will alter the nature of the suit or introduce a new cause of action, it may dismiss the application even if he is found to be a proper party, if it does not want to widen the scope of the specific performance suit;or the Court may direct such applicant to be impleaded as a proper party, either unconditionally or subject to terms. For example, if 'D' claiming to be a co-owner of a suit property, enters into an agreement for sale of his share in favour of 'P' representing that he is the co-owner with half share, and 'P' files a suit for specific performance of the said agreement of sale in respect of the undivided half share, the Court may permit the other co-owner who contends that 'D' has only one fourth share, to be impleaded as an additional defendant as a proper party, and may examine the issue whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the agreement in respect of half a share or only one fourth share; alternatively the Court may refuse to implead the other co-owner and leave open the question in regard to the extent of share of the vendor-defendant to be decided in an independent proceeding by the other co-owner, or the plaintiff; alternatively the Court may implead him but subject to the term that the dispute, if any, between the impleaded co-owner and the original defendant in regard to the extent of the share will not be the subject matter of the suit for specific performance, and that it will decide in the suit, only the issues relating to specific performance, that is whether the defendant executed the agreement/contract and whether such contract should be specifically enforced. 25. In other words, the Court has the discretion to either to allow or reject an application of a person claiming to be a proper party, depending upon the facts and circumstances and no person has a right to insist that he should be impleaded as a party, merely because he is a proper party." 5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for respondents no.2 and 3. 6. The main objection against the impleadment of respondent no.3 in the aforesaid suit is that respondent no.3 is not a necessary party on two grounds, firstly, that the property in dispute does not fall within the area which has been leased out to respondent no.3 and secondly, such transfer being made during the pendency of the suit would be barred by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. So far as the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, a finding has been recorded by the court below that the NOIDA itself in its counter affidavit has stated that the disputed land falls within the area which has been allotted to respondent no.3. No material has been brought to the fore to indicate otherwise. Secondly, so far as the question of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon a decision in the case of Sanjay Varma (Supra) which case was specifically with regard to a suit pending for specific performance of an agreement to sell. In a suit for specific performance a claim is made by the plaintiff for transfer of land in his name upon an agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant and in case during the pendency of the suit, the defendant transfers the land to some other person, right of the plaintiff would get frustrated sofaras his right is concerned and, therefore, the leave of the court is necessary to be obtained before such transfer and in the absence of such leave, such transfer is made at the own risk of the transferee. In the present case it is not disputed that the land belongs to the NOIDA and the petitioner was merely a sub-lessee of the IOC. The lease in favour of the IOC was executed by the NOIDA on 18.2.1986. The term of the lease was for a period of two years. Clause 13 of the lease provided that the lease can be determined by the NOIDA upon certain period of notice. It is not disputed between the parties that the lease deed in favour of the IOC itself was determined by the NOIDA on 4.8.1986. The petitioner being merely a sub lessee cannot have a better right than the original lessee and the original lease having been determined by the NOIDA and the said property having been transferred in favour of respondent no.3, in my view, the respondent no.3 has a valid interest and right over the property in question and, therefore, a necessary party to join the proceedings. 7. 7. After considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and the respondents and perusing the orders impugned, I find that the decisions relied upon by Sri Srivastava in the cases of Sanjay Verma (Supra) and Smt. Manju Gupta (Supra) do not come to any aid of the petitioner. 8. Therefore, the trial court committed no error in impleading respondent no. 3 as defendant. The revisional court has also affirmed the order of the trial court. 9. In this view of the matter, I find no error in the orders of the court below to merit any further consideration by this Court . 10. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed.