JUDGMENT : A.I.S. Cheema, J. 1. Appellant original accused No.1 (hereinafter referred as "accused") has been prosecuted in Sessions Case No.88 of 2010, held before Extra Joint Adhoc Additional Sessions Judge, Jalna and he has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (for short "I.P.C.") and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay a fine Rs.5000/(Rupees Five Thousand), & in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years; under Section 498A of I.P.C. to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.1000/(Rupees One Thousand), & in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one year. His brother Ramprasad Shivdas Lomte and sisterinlaw Arunabai Ramprasad Lomte (original accused Nos. 2 and 3) were acquitted. 2. The conviction has been imposed for committing murder of wife by accused Dnyaneshwar, namely, Vijaymala (hereinafter referred as "victim") by burning her on 18th October, 2007 and for having had subjected her to cruelty, as covered under Section 498A of I.P.C. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, can be stated to be as under: About six months before incident of 18th October, 2007, accused Dnyaneshwar was married to the victim. She went to stay at the native place at Uswad and soon with the accused started residing at Aurangabad. Just before the incident the couple had come back and was residing at the home at Uswad. Accused No.2 Ramprasad and accused No.3 Arunabai were residing separate from the couple and even landed property had been partitioned. The accused, in the short period of matrimonial life, subjected the victim to cruelty and was telling her that he does not like her. He was also suspecting her character. He had demanded Rs.50,000/(Rupees Fifty Thousand) to purchase a vehicle and had also beaten her at times. On the day of incident, accused poured kerosene on the person of victim, while accused No.2 Ramprasad set her on fire and accused No.3 Arunabai closed the door of the house. The victim was taken to Rural Hospital, Mantha and at the time of admission, history of the incident was given, of accidental burns due to fall of chimney i.e. kerosene lamp. Due to severe burn injuries, the victim was shifted to Civil Hospital, Jalna on the same day. The victim was taken to Rural Hospital, Mantha and at the time of admission, history of the incident was given, of accidental burns due to fall of chimney i.e. kerosene lamp. Due to severe burn injuries, the victim was shifted to Civil Hospital, Jalna on the same day. There, one A.S.I. Chandanse, recorded statement of the victim and she gave statement of burning herself due to quarrel between the couple. Relatives of the victim, her cousin brother PW1 Ramesh Gore, brother PW3 Munjaji Gore and mother PW6 Ahilyabai, reached the hospital. Victim told them about the accused persons causing burn injuries to her. On 20th October, 2007, PW9, Naib Tahsildar, Tulshiram Gaikwad, recorded dying declaration of the victim, wherein she blamed the accused Nos. 1 to 3 for causing burn injuries to her. The dying declaration was sent from Jalna to Police Station, Mantha and on 21st October 2007, at 3.40 p.m., F.I.R. No.120 of 2007 was registered, under Section 307, 498A read with 34 of I.P.C. Vijaymana (victim) passed away in the morning of 23rd October, 2007 at 5.30 a.m. Inquest panchnama was drawn on 24th October, 2007 and postmortem was conducted at the Civil Hospital, Jalna. Thereafter PW10 P.I. Vikas Nikkam from Police Station, Mantha, conducted spot panchnama at about 2.00 p.m. and collected incriminating articles like (a) aluminium "ketli" i.e. container of 2 litres capacity smelling of kerosene, (b) small "chimney" i.e. lamp smelling of kerosene, (c) match box and (d) kerosene mixed and plain mud. Statements of witnesses were recorded and the accused came to be arrested on 25th October 2007. On 6th November 2007, the articles collected from the spot, were sent to Chemical Analyzer through PW8, Police Constable, Ramdas. Chargesheet was filed. Trial was held and the accused No.1 got convicted. 4. Aggrieved by the conviction, present Appeal has been filed, raising various grounds. We have heard learned counsel for the Appellant-accused as well as the learned A.P.P. and we have gone through the record. UNDISPUTED FACTS 5. Going through the evidence and record, regarding certain facts there is hardly or no dispute. They can be stated as follows: (a) The marriage of accused and victim took place about six months before 18th October, 2007. Thereafter for short time they stayed at native place Uswad and then had shifted for residence to Aurangabad. Accused Nos. UNDISPUTED FACTS 5. Going through the evidence and record, regarding certain facts there is hardly or no dispute. They can be stated as follows: (a) The marriage of accused and victim took place about six months before 18th October, 2007. Thereafter for short time they stayed at native place Uswad and then had shifted for residence to Aurangabad. Accused Nos. 2 and 3 were staying separately from the couple, at Uswad. (b) Victim did suffer burn injuries on 18th October 2007, at about 10.00 a.m. when the couple had come back to Uswad. She was immediately taken to Rural Hospital, Mantha and initial treatment was done there. She was, then shifted to Civil Hospital, Jalna and while she was under treatment at Civil Hospital, Jalna, she died due to the burn injuries on 23rd October 2007, in the early morning. She had sustained about 95% burn injuries. (c) On the day of incident, in the morning, couple had a quarrel. UNNANTURAL DEATH 6. The inquest panchnama Exhibit 45 has been admitted, which shows that victim had 95% burns. There is evidence of PW4 Dr. Vijay Kumar Inge, who has stated that on 24th October 2007, between 9.00 a.m. to 10.00 a.m., he had carried out postmortem on the dead body of the victim. He gave opinion that the person had died due to shock due to 95% superficial to deep burns. He accordingly, prepared postmortem report Exhibit 35. There is hardly any cross-examination of the doctor. However, the doctor gave an opinion that after 48 hours from the burn, septicemia starts and after development of septicemia, the physical condition of the patient starts deteriorating. We will refer to this opinion of the doctor, later. Here it is sufficient to conclude that the prosecution has established that victim died an unnatural death. THREE VERSIONS, HOW VICTIM GOT BURNT 7. On record, there are three versions as to how the victim suffered the burn injuries. (a) First version is that the victim suffered accidental burns. This can be seen from the evidence of PW5 Dr. Amit Pedgaonkar. THREE VERSIONS, HOW VICTIM GOT BURNT 7. On record, there are three versions as to how the victim suffered the burn injuries. (a) First version is that the victim suffered accidental burns. This can be seen from the evidence of PW5 Dr. Amit Pedgaonkar. On 18th October 2007, he was medical officer at Rural Hospital, Mantha and soon after the incident which took place at 10.00 a.m., he had received the victim at the hospital at about 11.25 a.m. The injury certificate recorded by him, mentions that the history narrated by the patient was accidental burns due to fall of chimney on head. (b) The second version is that accused No.1 poured kerosene on the victim, accused No.2 set her on fire and accused No.3 closed the door of the house. This version comes from the dying declaration recorded by PW9 Tulsiram Gaikwad and the oral statements made by victim to her cousin brother PW1 Ramesh, her brother PW3 Munjaji and her mother PW6 Ahilyabai. Thus murder has been alleged. (c) The third version is that the victim herself poured kerosene on herself and caused burn injuries to her person. This comes on record from the evidence of PW2 Prakash Deshmukh. The other evidence is in the form of dying declaration, recorded by A.S.I., S.N. Chandanse at Exhibit 63, that victim herself poured kerosene on herself and burned due to the quarrel. Now, the question is, as to which of these versions is true. ACCIDENTAL BURNS? 8. The version of accidental burns as stated to PW5 Dr. Amit, has been discarded by the learned trial Court, giving various reasons. Going through the record, it can be seen that when the incident was taking place, PW2 Prakash had already reached the spot to whom immediate statement given by the victim was of causing burns herself. It appears that then the accused No.1 Dnyaneshwar along with accused No.2 Ramprasad, took the victim to the Rural Hospital at Mantha. Thus, at that time, accused had the opportunity to influence the victim and at the time of admission, she appears to have told PW5 Dr. Amit that she got accidentally burned due to fall of chimney. It appears that then the accused No.1 Dnyaneshwar along with accused No.2 Ramprasad, took the victim to the Rural Hospital at Mantha. Thus, at that time, accused had the opportunity to influence the victim and at the time of admission, she appears to have told PW5 Dr. Amit that she got accidentally burned due to fall of chimney. Even the first written dying declaration recorded at the Government Hospital, Jalna, Exhibit 63, which was recorded between 3.00 to 3.30 p.m., mentions that her husband and accused No.2 Ramprasad (referred by her as "BHAYA") had brought her to the hospital. Endorsement in Medical Certificate Exhibit 37 is of history given as accidental burns due to fall of chimney on head. This can be discarded as Inquest Panchnama Exhibit 45 and Postmortem report Exhibit 35, both show that although face had burn injuries, hair had not burnt. If chimney had fallen on the head, hair would have burnt. Considering the overall evidence available on record, the version that the victim suffered accidental burns, does not inspire confidence and the evidence on this count, needs to be ignored. IS IT MURDER? 9. The prosecution has tried to prove that the accused committed murder of his wife by burning her. Now, this version of the State needs to be examined. Unnatural death is proved. If it was caused by Accused, he would be liable for culpable homicide and murder. 10. To prove that the accused burned his wife, prosecution had examined PW1 Ramesh, PW3 Munjaji and PW6 Ahilyabai, to prove what can be said to be oral dying declarations. All these three witnesses have stated that on coming to know that the victim has got burnt, they had reached the hospital on the same day and they claim that Vijaymala told them about accused No.1 putting kerosene on her person and accused No.2 setting her on fire by using match stick and accused No.3 closing the door of the house. Question is, whether this evidence is inspiring confidence. Question is, whether this evidence is inspiring confidence. It is glaringly on record that although the evidence of these witnesses shows that on the same day, on coming to know about the incident of fire, they had soon reached the hospital and Vijaymala told them what they claim, still none of these persons appear to have told this, either to the doctor or the police, at the hospital on 18th October 2007 or 19th October 2007. They did not file any F.I.R. It is only on 20th October 2007, official of Police Station Kadim gave letter Exhibit 52 to PW9 Tulsiram Gaikwad, a Naib Tahsildar, at 7.40 p.m. and claimed that statement of the victim had already been recorded by police but brother of the victim had given application and so statement of the victim is to be recorded. Even at that time, it does not appear that these witnesses had filed any complaint, so as to register the offence. Evidence of PW3 Munjaji, the brother of victim shows that on receiving the information about the burning, he had reached Mantha in the afternoon at 12.00 O'clock. In fact PW3 Munjaji and PW6 Ahilyabai, both claim that they reached Vijaymala when she was still at the dispensary at Mantha and the oral statement to them was made by Vijaymala, at Mantha itself. PW3 claims that Vijaymala wanted to be taken to big hospital and so he had shifted her to Civil Hospital, Jalna. Thus, according to PW3 and PW6, they were with the victim from about 12.00 O'clock noon of 18th October 2007 till her death. Inspite of her own blood relations reaching her and taking her to the hospital at Jalna, the first written dying declaration Exhibit 63 recorded at Jalna at about 3.00 p.m., given by the victim, was of she burning herself. These, PW1, PW3 and PW6 do not appear to have been agitated by such statement given by the victim on 18th October 2007. Two days later (obviously as an after thought), they seem to have moved the police at Police Station, Kadim to get recorded another dying declaration, leading to police giving letter to Naib Tahsildar PW9 Tulsiram Gaikwad, which letter is at Exhibit 52. 11. Two days later (obviously as an after thought), they seem to have moved the police at Police Station, Kadim to get recorded another dying declaration, leading to police giving letter to Naib Tahsildar PW9 Tulsiram Gaikwad, which letter is at Exhibit 52. 11. The second written dying declaration Exhibit 53, recorded on 20th October 2007, which is heavily relied on by the prosecution, needs to be considered, whether it can be said to be duly recorded and if the same inspires confidence and can be basis for conviction. 12. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to principles governing the recording and use of dying declarations. 13. Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the matter of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 Supreme Court Cases, Page 710, observed in Para 3 as under: "3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise." (Emphasis supplied.) 14. In the matter of Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 9 S.C.C. Page 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to earlier Judgments and observed in Para 22 as under: "22. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise." (Emphasis supplied.) 14. In the matter of Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi, (2010) 9 S.C.C. Page 1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to earlier Judgments and observed in Para 22 as under: "22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that: (i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The Court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the Court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration." 15. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the Court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration." 15. In another matter dealing with multiple varying or contradictory dying declarations, and where the case related to burning of wife, observations (in the matter of Shudhakar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 7 Supreme Court Cases, Page 569), show that it is settled principle of law that prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt while the defence has to prove its case on touchstone of preponderance and probabilities. 16. Keeping the principles in view, second written dying declaration Exhibit 53 now is to be considered. Evidence of PW9, Naib Tahsildar Tulsiram Gaikwad is that after receiving the letter Exhibit 52, he went to the Civil Hospital, Jalna and gave a letter to the medical officer. This letter has not been proved. PW9 claims that he made enquiry, whether the patient in question is in a condition to give her dying declaration. In his presence the doctor examined the patient and told him that the patient is in a condition to give her dying declaration. He has further deposed that he then went to the patient Vijaymala and recorded her dying declaration. He claims that the original dying declaration was preserved by him at the Tahsil Office. He produced the same from a sealed envelope and the document has been proved at Exhibit 53 and the envelope at Exhibit 53A. The witness has referred to the copy of the dying declaration as "xerox copy" although it is carbon copy. He refers that he gave the copy to police. Police registered the offence on the basis of the copy which has been proved at Exhibit 54. 17. The version given by the victim in Exhibit 53 can be stated to be as under: Victim claimed that she is resident of Uswad, TqMantha, DistNanded; she is aged 19 years and was making truthful statement, that on 18th October 2007, in the morning at about 10.00 O'clock she was at her residential house and her husband Dnyaneshwar and Ramprasad (Bhaya) and Arunabai (sisterinlaw) all these three persons beat her and poured kerosene on her person and burned her. Her husband says that he does not like her and was always beating her and asking her to bring Rs.50,000/( Rupees Fifty Thousand) from her brother and so saying, was troubling her. At Jalna, in the hospital she had been brought by her husband and her Bhaya, namely, Ramprasad and they admitted her in the hospital. More than this, she did not want to say anything. 18. Dying declaration to the above effect was recorded at Exhibit 53 by PW9 between 8.10 to 8.25 p.m. Learned counsel for the accused has referred to the evidence of PW9 to claim that the witness did not get an endorsement of the doctor recorded, before recording the dying declaration. He has compared Exhibit 53 with Exhibit 54. On Exhibit 53 in the left hand column, there is endorsement of Dr. S.B. Mhaske to the effect that the patient is conscious, oriented, to give oral statement and that the statement is recorded during 8.00 to 8.25 p.m. on 20th October 2007. Learned counsel for accused is comparing this endorsement in the left hand column of Exhibit 53 with the carbon copy, Exhibit 54 and it is rightly pointed out that the carbon copy does not bear such endorsement in the left hand column. In Exhibit 54, rather in the left hand column, there is endorsement regarding registration of crime. The cross-examination of PW9 Naib Tahsildar, Tulsiram, shows that the doctor had "orally" told him that the patient is in a condition to give her dying declaration. Thus, before recording statement, no written endorsement was taken from the doctor. In fact even after recording the dying declaration, if the endorsement of doctor was immediately taken, is doubtful. In the cross-examination, the Naib Tahsildar, PW9, was confronted with Exhibit 54 that it does not bear endorsement of the doctor regarding condition of the patient. PW9 explained that while making copy of the original dying declaration and issuing the same to the police concerned, doctor was not with him and therefore on the "xerox copy" of the dying declaration of the patient, on Exhibit 54, there is no endorsement of the doctor about condition of the patient. This explanation cannot be accepted. PW9 himself is aware that Exhibit 54 is only a carbon copy, as at another place he admitted that on Exhibit 54, the carbon copy of dying declaration, there is thumb impression of the victim. This explanation cannot be accepted. PW9 himself is aware that Exhibit 54 is only a carbon copy, as at another place he admitted that on Exhibit 54, the carbon copy of dying declaration, there is thumb impression of the victim. Exhibit 54 is carbon copy as far as regards the portion of dying declaration, but has thumb impression of the victim in original as well as endorsement of PW9 of "SAMAKSH" i.e. "before me" and signature with date of this witness in original. If carbon copy was there, there is no question of going and getting copy made somewhere else for the police. If immediately on recording of the dying declaration, doctor was available and endorsing Exhibit 53, the carbon could have been maintained and endorsement taken. Even if carbon had been removed, if PW9 was signing in original on the carbon copy and also taking thumb impression in original of the patient, he could have taken the endorsement of the doctor also, before giving the carbon copy to the police for registering the offence. In Exhibit 54 time recorded is 20.10 to 20.25 hours. It appears, later when Doctor endorsed Exhibit 53 and in endorsement mentioned that the statement was recorded during "8.00 to 8.25 p.m. on 20.10.2007" quietly in body of Exhibit 53 overwriting was done and "20.10" was converted to "20.00". This remained to be done in Exhibit 54. Going through the evidence, it is doubtful, whether before, during and after recording of the dying declaration, the doctor was there to ensure that the patient was in fact in a condition to make dying declaration. In any case, said Dr. Mhaske has also not been examined by the prosecution and it cannot be said that the endorsement of the doctor regarding condition of the patient, has been duly proved. It has to be remembered that the victim had suffered 95% burn injuries. The incident had taken place on 18th October 2007 at 10.00 a.m. and on 20th October 2007 by 08.10 p.m. when the second dying declaration was being recorded about 58 hours were over, by which time, septicemia may have started, if the evidence of PW4 Dr. Vijay Kumar is recalled. To repeat, PW4 Dr. Vijay Kumar has deposed that after 48 hours from the burn septicemia starts and after development of septicemia, the physical condition of the patient starts deteriorating. Vijay Kumar is recalled. To repeat, PW4 Dr. Vijay Kumar has deposed that after 48 hours from the burn septicemia starts and after development of septicemia, the physical condition of the patient starts deteriorating. In the circumstances, it is doubtful if the victim was in the correct physical condition to give the dying declaration Exhibit 53. The document Exhibit 53 does not have any endorsement that the same was read over and explained to the victim before taking her thumb impression. PW9, Tulsiram Gaikwad has further admitted that he has not recorded the dying declaration in question and answer form. He also admits that he did not ask the questions to the patient/victim, to ascertain her physical and mental condition. Attention of victim was not drawn to her earlier statement Exhibit 63 which was to the contrary. 19. PW3 and PW6 had been with the patient since the afternoon of 18th October 2007 and were in a position to influence her. 20. The trial Court discussed the evidence to show that accused Nos.2 and 3 had no concern with the illtreatment of Vijaymala and even PW2 Prakash, who had reached the spot immediately, had not referred to the presence of accused Nos.2 and 3 at the time of incident. The trial Court, thus, did not believe the evidence regarding involvement of accused Nos.2 and 3 in the incident and even observed (in para 23 of the Judgment) that the dying declaration recorded by the Naib Tahsildar pertaining to the accused Nos.2 and 3 appears to be just like tutored by mother and brothers of the deceased. Surprisingly, the trial Court relied on the same dying declaration to convict accused No.1. If the evidence of PW2 Prakash is kept in view, it is apparent that accused Nos.2 and 3 were residing separate and when the incident was still unfolding, he had reached the spot. He did not refer to the presence of accused Nos.2 and 3. The prosecution has not disowned PW2 Prakash or his evidence. It is quite apparent that wrongly accused Nos.2 and 3 were involved for the charge of murder. It does appear that the victim was tutored to state in Exhibit 53 that accused Nos.2 and 3 had beaten her and along with accused No.1, poured kerosene on her person and burned her. It is quite apparent that wrongly accused Nos.2 and 3 were involved for the charge of murder. It does appear that the victim was tutored to state in Exhibit 53 that accused Nos.2 and 3 had beaten her and along with accused No.1, poured kerosene on her person and burned her. The evidence of PW1, PW3 and PW6 about victim making such oral dying declarations to them, also is not reliable and deserves to be rejected. When it is apparent that there was tutoring regarding involvement of accused Nos.2 and 3, the evidence does not inspire confidence even as regards accused No.1. For such reasons, in the facts and circumstances of this matter, the dying declaration Exhibit 53 does not inspire confidence and deserves to be rejected. SELF INFLICTED BURNS 21. Now, evidence regarding the third version that the victim poured kerosene on herself and burned herself, needs to be considered. In this regard, evidence of PW2 Prakash now needs to be examined. Spot panchnama Exhibit 46, in the sketch, shows that this witness is immediate neighbour of the accused, with a common wall in between and a common courtyard on the west. Naturally he was the first to get attracted. Evidence of PW2 Prakash is that he heard shouts of victim and rushed towards the house of accused and noticed that the accused was throwing water on victim and trying to extinguish her fire. He asked her how she got burnt and victim told him that she burnt herself on account of trouble from husband (see Marathi version). At that time Accused was outside the house and was then called in. Then a vehicle was brought and victim was taken to hospital. Then there is dying declaration Exhibit 63. The prosecution was not fair when such dying declaration was kept back and steps were not taken to bring on record this document. The prosecution did not call A.S.I. Chandanse who recorded such statement of the victim between 3.00 to 3.30 p.m. on 18th October 2007 itself. There is an endorsement in the margin of Exhibit 63 that the patient is in a condition to give statement. The endorsement though in Marathi, should be of the doctor. Prosecution did not call such doctor also. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, stated that he wanted to examine A.S.I. Chandanse, as defence witness. The endorsement though in Marathi, should be of the doctor. Prosecution did not call such doctor also. The accused, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, stated that he wanted to examine A.S.I. Chandanse, as defence witness. It appears that in the trial Court, accused made efforts to summon A.S.I. Chandanse, but his presence could not be secured. Accused filed application Exhibit 62. The application was under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The document had been filed in the Court by the prosecution, but surprisingly, accused wanted the State to say whether it admits or denies the document. It is interesting that A.P.P. endorsed on application Exhibit 62 that "the statement recorded by A.S.I. Chandanse" is not acceptable to the prosecution. Thus, the State was disowning its own document, recorded by its own officer. Apparently, the accused wanted to rely on the document and the trial Court directed that the document may be marked exhibit. 22. If the contents of Exhibit 63 are perused, the victim stated to the following effect: She has been admitted in the casualty ward of Government Hospital, Jalna. She is resident of Uswad and does agricultural work. Place of her parents is at Amboda, Tq Mantha. Her father's name is Himatrao Gore, who has passed away. Her brother is Munjaji and mother is Ansabai. She got married about six months back. Her parents in-law are dead. She has four sisters-in-law, who are already married and staying at their matrimonial homes. She has Bhaya (brother-in-law), namely, Ramprasad. Since her marriage, her husband Dnyaneshwar has always been telling her that he does not like her and abuses her and also beats her. On that day of 18th October 2007, in the morning at about 9.00 to 9.30 a.m. from the point of cooking, there was "KURBUR", i.e. murmuring, that she should not cook for him (i.e. the husband) and he will do his own cooking. On this count, there was exchange of words. She got angry because of all this and poured kerosene on herself and by match stick, burned herself by putting fire to her clothes. When she started burning, she started shouting and her husband, Bhaya, after putting water on her and extinguishing the fire, had put her in Jeep and for treatment brought her to Government Hospital, Jalna where she was still taking treatment. When she started burning, she started shouting and her husband, Bhaya, after putting water on her and extinguishing the fire, had put her in Jeep and for treatment brought her to Government Hospital, Jalna where she was still taking treatment. Suitable action should be taken against her husband Dnyaneshwar. Exhibit 63 was recorded soon after the incident when, as per record, accused as well as PW3 and PW6 had just brought victim to Hospital at Jalna and scope for tutoring was neutralized. The recording of such statement is vaguely referred to in letter Exhibit 52 given later on 20th October 2007 to Naib Tahsildar. PW10 P.I. Vilas has also deposed that he had received statement of deceased recorded by P.S.I. Chandanse. Thus initially both sides accepted this position to be true till evening of 20th October 2007 when Naib Tahsildar was moved. 23. The statement Exhibit 63, read with evidence of PW2 Prakash, shows that on day of incident the victim got agitated from a petty matter and took the extreme step of putting fire to herself. The learned trial Court has wrongly discarded the evidence of PW2 Prakash and Exhibit 63. In para 22 of its Judgment, the trial Court accepted that the two are quite similar but entered into the exercise of comparing words and has ultimately ignored the evidence on this count. The spot panchnama shows that the House No.234 has been divided between accused No.1 Dnyaneshwar and his brother Ramprasad, accused No.2. The house was like a "PADIT WADA", i.e. dilapidated house. Inside the room of the accused, there was "CHUL" for cooking i.e. mud hearth. Naturally, there was aluminium kettle or container, having capacity to store kerosene. There was also a chimney or a lamp lying on the spot with the cap somewhere else. Even this chimney, lamp was having smell of kerosene. It appears that the floor was of mud, as PW10 P.I., Vilas collected sample of simple mud and mud smelling of kerosene, from the spot. Although it appears that there were articles like cooler and fan in the house and so electricity must be there, still looking to the facts that the cooking was on "CHUL", mud hearth, easy availability of kerosene on the spot, was there. In the circumstances, it appears that victim reacted suddenly, to cause burn injuries to herself. 24. Although it appears that there were articles like cooler and fan in the house and so electricity must be there, still looking to the facts that the cooking was on "CHUL", mud hearth, easy availability of kerosene on the spot, was there. In the circumstances, it appears that victim reacted suddenly, to cause burn injuries to herself. 24. In the cross-examination of PW3 Munjaji, it was suggested to him that his sister burnt herself on her own. The witness denied this suggestion. However, this shows that the defence of the accused is that the victim burnt herself. Even in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., the accused stated that on the day of incident, between him and Vijaymala (victim) there was quarrel and she herself poured kerosene on herself and burnt herself and when he saw people going towards his house, he also went and he put out the fire and in Jeep took her to hospital. Keeping the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in view in the matter of Shudhakar supra, that defence has to prove its case on touchstone of preponderance and probabilities, when evidence of PW2 is read with the above statement recorded, it can be said that the defence has discharged its responsibility. No doubt the evidence of writer of Exhibit 63 and doctor endorsing the document could not be brought on record by the accused and the document is not proved in the strict sense, but keeping in view the fact that such police officer was basically witness of the prosecution and prosecution has kept back the witness, the benefit of doubt should go to the accused. Even if Exhibit 63 is ignored, evidence of PW2 Prakash, read with explanation in statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is also sufficient for accused to explain. It needs to be held that the defence has proved its case on touchstone of preponderance and probabilities. 25. Charge brought against the accused and for which trial has been held, is only under Section 498A and Section 302 of I.P.C. No alternative charge of abetment to suicide, under Section 306 of I.P.C. was brought. Apart from this, it is now well settled that in a household, between husband and wife, in natural course, there can be some differences of opinion. Natural wear and tear cannot be treated as abetment to commit suicide. Apart from this, it is now well settled that in a household, between husband and wife, in natural course, there can be some differences of opinion. Natural wear and tear cannot be treated as abetment to commit suicide. If one of the partner overreacts so as to burn himself or herself, the other partner cannot be stated to have committed abetment. Looking to evidence of PW2 Prakash, the victim had merely stated to him that she got burned herself on account of trouble from husband. Although this witness is immediate neighbour, he has deposed that victim earlier never told him about ill-treatment caused to her. In Exhibit 63, the only thing she stated was that her husband was telling her that he does not like her and used to abuse and beat her. She mentioned that there was some "KURBUR" i.e. murmuring, by the accused on the day of incident that she should not cook for him and he himself would cook for him. Due to this there was "SHABDIK BOLCHAL", i.e. oral exchange of words. She got angry and reacted by putting kerosene on her person and setting herself on fire. There is no material that on 18th October, 2007 there was any grave act of accused or he actively instigated or assisted the victim to commit suicide. The conduct of the accused in immediately putting water on her and extinguishing fire and then taking her to the hospital, shows that he did not want that she should cause such harm to herself. 26. In the matter of Suvarnasingh Tiratsingh Dhanjal vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2006 Cri. L.J., Page No.185, it was the case of abetment to commit suicide under Section 306 and there was charge under Section 498A of I.P.C. also. The Hon'ble Court discussed the evidence of that matter and found that even though the prosecution had proved the case of cruelty and harassment as contemplated under Section 498A, still there was nothing to justify more active role played by accused No.1 of instigation to commit suicide. In the present matter also there is no sufficient material regarding abetment to commit suicide. 27. Section 498A of I.P.C. reads as under: "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. In the present matter also there is no sufficient material regarding abetment to commit suicide. 27. Section 498A of I.P.C. reads as under: "498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand." 28. Regarding cruelty, PW1 Ramesh More has deposed that after marriage for one month the victim was treated well but after one and half month, when she had come, she disclosed to him that the accused used to make allegations that she does not behave properly at the matrimonial home. He claims that he had talked with the accused and accused had undertaken to treat her well and promised not to harass her. PW3 Munjaji refers to the victim coming back to place of her parents three days after marriage and then accused again taking her and that they were later on residing at Aurangabad. Thus, in the initial days there does not appear that there was any problem. He says that at that time he was staying at Pune and before Pola festival his mother informed that the accused has brought Vijaymama(victim) and he is not ready to accept her for cohabitation. According to him, he went to his village (Amboda Kadam) and victim told him that her husband used to beat her by suspecting her chastity. His evidence is that he took up the matter and immediately accused took the victim, promising that he will not illtreat her. According to him, he went to his village (Amboda Kadam) and victim told him that her husband used to beat her by suspecting her chastity. His evidence is that he took up the matter and immediately accused took the victim, promising that he will not illtreat her. He has deposed that fifteen days thereafter, he had gone to see the victim at Uswad and at that time she said that the accused is again ill-treating her and beating her and was saying that she should bring Rs. 50,000/ (Rupees Fifty Thousand) for purchasing Jeep and that if she fails to do so, he will cut her hands and legs. This witness claims that the accused had also, on telephone, demanded Rs. 50,000/(Rupees Fifty Thousand). Cross-examination of PW3 shows that financial condition of the accused was better than him. He was controverted with his statement to the police to record that he had not told them about receiving of telephone call from his mother before Pola festival and also that he had not told that accused had promised that he will not ill-treat or harass the victim. Omissions are proved on this count. Similarly, omission is proved regarding the evidence that accused had said that he is not afraid of police and will continue to ill-treat the victim. Then there is evidence of PW6 Ahilyabai. She is mother of the victim. It is not in her evidence that on earlier occasion the accused had brought the victim and had declared that he does not want to cohabit with her (as has been deposed to by PW3). She does not claim that she had made any phone call to PW3 to come and intervene. Even regarding the ill-treatment, she has deposed that it is her son who had told her that the victim told her son that her husband ill-treats her. Thus, this evidence of hers is hearsay. 29. The substance of above discussion is that regarding alleged ill-treatment, oral evidence of PW's 1, 3 and 6 is scanty. The evidence is sufficient only to raise suspicion that things were not alright. As regards demand deposed to by PW3, statement Exhibit 63 of victim, does not refer to any such demand, although it refers to earlier conduct of abusing and beating as the wife was not liked. 30. The evidence is sufficient only to raise suspicion that things were not alright. As regards demand deposed to by PW3, statement Exhibit 63 of victim, does not refer to any such demand, although it refers to earlier conduct of abusing and beating as the wife was not liked. 30. The evidence inspiring confidence, is of PW2 Prakash, that the victim during the course of incident, told him that on account of trouble from husband she burned herself. This evidence read with Exhibit 63, which has already been discussed, shows that there was indeed some conduct of accused, which was agitating the victim. If Exhibit 63 is kept in view, the conduct of the accused all the time telling her that he does not like her or abusing or beating her, must be treated to be "cruelty" under Section 498A of I.P.C. Although such conduct may fall short for abetment to commit suicide, but it can be sufficient conduct which would amount to cruelty of such a nature that the wife may cause grave injury to herself. Relying on the evidence discussed, offence under Section 498A of I.P.C. must be held to be proved and conviction on that count needs to be maintained. 31. In the matter of Aman Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in II (2005) DMC, Page No.207, it was a case under Section 498A and 306 of I.P.C. It was observed that only because cruelty was there or beating took place fifteen days before the death, the same did not amount to abetment and although conviction under Section 306 was not maintainable, the evidence could be relied on to hold the accused guilty under Section 498A of I.P.C. 32. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Amalendu Pal alias Jhantu vs. State of West Bengal, reported in A.I.R. 2010 S.C., Page No.512, observed in Para 24 and 26 as under: "24. The perpetration of physical torture on the deceased on the day prior to the date of the incident which led the deceased to commit suicide is the prosecution case all throughout. It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the appellant had played any active role either in instigating or aiding the commission of suicide by the deceased for denying to accept Anita as the wife of the appellant. It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the appellant had played any active role either in instigating or aiding the commission of suicide by the deceased for denying to accept Anita as the wife of the appellant. Anita, the second wife of the appellant was brought by the appellant to his house about three months prior to the date of the incident of suicide by the deceased and, therefore, bringing of the second wife to the house by the appellant cannot be said to have either incited or facilitated the commission of suicide by the deceased. It is also not the case of the prosecution as disclosed from the evidence led which we have scrutinised very minutely. The aforesaid contention, in our considered opinion, is farfetched and is not established by the facts of the present case. After carefully assessing the evidence on record we find that there is no direct evidence to show that the appellant had by his acts instigated or provoked the deceased to commit suicide and has not done any act which could be said to have facilitated the commission of suicide by the deceased." "26. From the evidence of record available before us, we find that the prosecution witnesses have in their testimonies stated that the deceased was tortured both physically and mentally by the appellant for the first time after his marriage with the deceased when he was refused permission for marriage with said Anita by the deceased. On having been refused the permission for his second marriage with Anita, the appellant again, after a few days requested the deceased to accede to his request for marriage with Anita, which request was again refused by the deceased. Consequent to the said position and due to the adamant position taken by the deceased, cruelty was meted out to her by the accused which fact is sufficiently proved from the evidence on record. Therefore, we find no reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the trial Court and the High Court as far as Section 498A, IPC is concerned." 33. Therefore, we find no reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the trial Court and the High Court as far as Section 498A, IPC is concerned." 33. Keeping in view the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering the evidence in the present matter although it appears that offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. has not been proved and although defence has been taken that the victim herself caused burns to herself due to cruelty, we are not resorting to section 306 of I.P.C. also but find that the evidence is sufficient to hold the accused guilty under Section 498A of I.P.C. 34. We have considered the period in jail undergone by the accused as under trial and as convict. We are taking note of the facts of cruelty as proved in this matter as well as conduct of accused when incident took place. Keeping all this in view, although we are proceeding to convict the accused under Section 498A of I.P.C., we propose to impose sentence only to the extent of period already undergone. 35. For the above reasons, the Appeal is partly allowed. (A) The conviction and sentence for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C. imposed on the Appellant-accused Dnyaneshwar, is set aside. Fine on this count, paid by him, be returned to him. (B). The conviction under Section 498A of I.P.C. is maintained and the Appellant-accused Dnyaneshwar is sentenced to rigorous imprisonment already undergone. Sentence of fine on this count as imposed by the trial Court, is maintained. As per record, the fine has already been paid. (C). The Appellant-accused Dnyaneshwar may be released, if not required in any other offence.