JUDGMENT : Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. The appeal arises from an order of a learned Single Judge dated 20 March 2013 on a Chamber Summons that was taken out by the Appellant during the course of execution proceedings which were initiated in pursuance of a decree in terms of an arbitral award. The Chamber Summons contained the following two prayers: (a) That the attachment levied pursuant to the Warrants of Attachment both dated 10 December 2010 (annexed as Exhibits 1 and 1A to the affidavit in support of this Chamber Summons) in the Execution Application taken out by the Claimant on the Respondent's immovable and movable property details whereof are mentioned in Schedule annexed hereto be raised forthwith; (b) that the correct amount due and payable under the Decree by the Respondent to the Claimant be determined by this Hon'ble Court.” Prayer (a) was worked out by an order dated 5 January 2011 passed by R.Y.Ganoo, J. on the statement of the Appellant that the Appellant will deposit in Court a sum of Rs.6.10 crores of which the Respondent would be entitled to withdraw Rs.4 crores in part satisfaction of the decretal amount. When prayer (b) came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge, the Court was of the view that the amount due and payable under the decree would have to be worked out in the execution application and that parties may proceed before the Commissioner for Taking Accounts. The learned Single Judge held that the Respondent would have calculated the amount of the decree and the Commissioner for Taking Accounts would have to accept the amount and that it was not the function of the Court to determine the exact amount upon the judgment debtor calling upon the Court to determine. The judgment debtor is in appeal. 2. Briefly stated, the facts are that an arbitral award was made on 22 March 2004 by which the Respondent, which was the claimant, was ordered to pay an amount of Rs.3.20 crores together with interest at the rate of fifteen per cent per annum “from the date of this award till the payment of that amount or till the date of the decree whichever is earlier”. The award which was governed by the Arbitration Act, 1940 was made a rule of the court on 14 November 2005 by a learned Single Judge, while rejecting the petition that was filed by the Respondent under Section 30 of the erstwhile Act. The judgment of the learned Single Judge was confirmed by the Division Bench. While disposing of a Special Leave Petition, the Supreme Court by its order dated 3 February 2009 (Special Leave Petition (C) No.1268 of 2007)held that there was no manifest error or perversity. However, on the issue of interest, the Supreme Court directed that the amount awarded shall carry interest since the date of the payment of the amount or till the date of the decree “whichever is later”. On behalf of the Appellant in these proceedings, it was contended before the Supreme Court that the amount for which the Respondent was held to be entitled by the arbitral tribunal was lying in deposit in the High Court. This was disputed on behalf of the Respondent and the Supreme Court clarified that it was not entering upon this controversy in those proceedings. 3. Following the order of the Supreme Court, the Respondent filed an execution application on 27 January 2010 and an attachment was levied. The Appellant took out a Chamber Summons for raising the attachment and for a determination by the Court of the correct amount due and payable under the decree. The basis of the application inter alia was that a suit had been instituted by the Appellant for specific performance of the development-cum-sale agreement with the Respondent and that in a motion that was taken out therein, the Appellant has been directed by the Court on 8 February 1990 to deposit an amount of Rs.20 crores. According to the Appellant, the Respondent had been permitted to withdraw an amount of Rs.2.50 crores initially, and in proceedings before the Supreme Court thereafter, the Respondent (who was the claimant) was permitted to withdraw 50% out of the amount of Rs.17.49 crores deposited by the Appellant in this Court against furnishing a bank guarantee which was to carry interest at 13% per annum. Following this the Respondent withdrew an amount of Rs.8,74,50,000/- against a bank guarantee. Following this the Respondent withdrew an amount of Rs.8,74,50,000/- against a bank guarantee. According to the Appellant, upon the award which decreed the claim of the Respondent in the amount of Rs.3.20 crores, the Appellant's Advocate by a letter dated 13 April 2004 called upon the Respondent to adjust a sum of Rs.3.20 crores with interest at the rate of 15% per annum out of the sum of Rs.8.75 crores which was already withdrawn and to pay back to the Prothonotary and Senior Master the balance of Rs.5.80 crores together with interest at 13% per annum with effect from the date on which the amount was withdrawn by the Respondent till the date on which the sum would be paid back by the bankers of the Respondent to the Prothonotary and Senior Master. The Appellant stated that whereas property worth more than Rs.150 crores had been attached, the decretal amount on the showing of the Respondent was Rs.6.01 crores. The affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons further stated that Canara Bank had upon the discharge of the guarantee deposited in Court an amount of Rs.13.99 crores. On the basis of these pleadings, the Chamber Summons was moved. Initially, when the Chamber Summons came up before the learned Single Judge on 5 January 2011, a statement was made on behalf of the Appellants that they were prepared to deposit an amount of Rs.6.10 crores in Court and would allow the Respondent to withdraw an amount of Rs.4 crores subject to which the attachment should be raised. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent stated that the Respondent had no objection to such an order being passed in terms of prayer clause (a). Hence, prayer clause (a) was disposed of in terms of the directions that (i) The Appellant shall deposit Rs.6.10 crores by 21 January 2011; and (ii) Upon deposit, the Respondent shall be paid by the Prothonotary and Senior Master a sum of Rs.4 crores without security or bank guarantee towards part satisfaction of the decretal amount covered by the arbitral award. The Chamber Summons was adjourned for considering prayer clause (b). 4. Thereafter, when the Chamber Summons came up before the learned Single Judge on 20 March 2013, the Court was of the view that prayer clause (b) was “most wondrous and alegal”. The Chamber Summons was adjourned for considering prayer clause (b). 4. Thereafter, when the Chamber Summons came up before the learned Single Judge on 20 March 2013, the Court was of the view that prayer clause (b) was “most wondrous and alegal”. The learned Single Judge held that the correct amount which is due and payable under the decree would have to be worked out in the course of execution; the parties would to have proceed before the Commissioner for Taking Accounts; that the executants would have calculated the amount of the decree and the Commissioner for Taking Accounts would have to accept the amount and it was not the function of the Court to determine the exact amount, upon the judgment debtor calling upon the Court to determine. It is this order disposing of prayer clause (b) which is now called into question in appeal. 5. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant submits that in pursuance of the interim directions which were issued in the suit for specific performance filed by the Appellant, the Appellant deposited an amount of Rs.20 crores of which an amount initially of Rs.2.50 crores was withdrawn by the Appellant followed by a further withdrawal of Rs.8,74,50,000/- against the furnishing of a bank guarantee to cover the amount together with interest. According to the Appellant, the decretal amount of Rs.3.20 crores together with interest at the rate of 15% per annum is more than adequately covered by the aforesaid amount which was deposited by the Appellant and that is how the Appellant by its Advocate's letter dated 13 April 2004 had actually sought a refund of the balance which had been deposited. Counsel submitted that in these circumstances, it is for the executing Court to quantify the amount due and payable under the decree and to decide correctness of the claim of the Appellant of adjustment and it was manifestly improper for the learned Single Judge to relegate the Appellant to the Commissioner for Taking Accounts. Moreover, it was submitted that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that it was not the function of the Court to determine the exact amount that is due and payable under the decree and that the Commissioner for Taking Accounts would have to accept the amount as calculated by the executant. 6. Moreover, it was submitted that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that it was not the function of the Court to determine the exact amount that is due and payable under the decree and that the Commissioner for Taking Accounts would have to accept the amount as calculated by the executant. 6. On the other hand, it has been urged on behalf of the Respondent that Order 21 Rules 1 and 2 make a specific provision for the mode of payment of the money due under a decree; for the payment out of Court to the decree-holder and to the certification by the executing Court of the adjustment or satisfaction of the decree. Hence, it is urged that an uncertified payment of money or adjustment which is recorded by the Court under Order 21 Rule 2 cannot be recognised by the executing Court. Reliance was sought to be placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain (1997) 1 SCC 373 ). While considering the rival submissions, it must, at the outset, be noted that under the award of the arbitral tribunal, an amount of Rs.3.20 crores has been awarded to the Respondent on which interest, as clarified by the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 3 February 2009, is to be payable on the awarded amount from the date of the award till the payment of that amount or till the date of decree whichever is later. It is not in dispute that in the suit for specific performance which was filed by the Appellant, the Appellant was directed to deposit an amount of Rs.20 crores of which initially an amount of Rs.2.50 crores was permitted to be withdrawn by the Respondent. Subsequently, a further amount of Rs.8,74,50,000/-was permitted to be withdrawn against the furnishing of a bank guarantee by the Respondent to cover the amount withdrawn and interest at 13% per annum. It is not in dispute that Canara Bank has deposited in Court a sum of Rs.13.99 crores on behalf of the Respondent which is so stated in paragraph 21 of the affidavit of the Appellant in support of the Chamber Summons dated 28 December 2010. It is not in dispute that Canara Bank has deposited in Court a sum of Rs.13.99 crores on behalf of the Respondent which is so stated in paragraph 21 of the affidavit of the Appellant in support of the Chamber Summons dated 28 December 2010. The Appellant has drawn the attention of the Court to the fact that the Respondent had categorically stated before this Court that in the event that the arbitral tribunal held that an amount lesser than Rs.20 crores was payable to the Respondent, the Respondent shall return the amount to the Court. This statement was made in paragraph 6 of the affidavit in support of Notice of Motion 3001 of 1998 on behalf of the Respondent and was reiterated thereafter in a further affidavit dated 14 February 1991 in the Notice of Motion. This is also reiterated by the Respondent in Ground (nn) of Appeal 716 of 1991 as well as in Ground (pp) of Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) 16775 of 1991. Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, provides in Rule 1 the mode for paying money due under a decree. Under Order 21 Rule 1(1) all money payable under a decree has to be paid: (a) by deposit into the executing Court; (b) out of Court, to the decree-holder through postal money order, bank, or by any other mode wherein payment is evidenced in writing; or (c) otherwise, as the Court, which made the decree, directs. Under sub-rule (2) where any payment is made under clause (a) or clause (c) of sub-rule (1), the judgment debtor is required to give notice to the decree-holder either through the Court or directly to him by registered post, acknowledgement due. Sub-rules (4) and (5) stipulate the date on which interest shall cease to run. Order 21 Rule 2 refers to a situation where money payable under a decree is paid out of Court or a decree of any kind is “otherwise adjusted” in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, in such an event, the decree-holder has to certify the payment or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree and the Court has to record the same. Under Rule 2(2), the judgment debtor may also inform the Court of such payment or adjustment and apply to the Court to issue a notice to the decree-holder to show cause why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified. If after the service of such notice, the decree-holder fails to show cause why the payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, the Court shall record the same accordingly. Under sub-rule 2-A of Rule 2, the payment or adjustment shall not be recorded at the instance of the judgment debtor unless (a) the payment is made in the manner, provided in rule 1; or (b) the payment or adjustment is proved by documentary evidence; or (c) the payment or adjustment is admitted by, or on behalf of, the decree-holder in his reply to the notice given under sub-rule (2) of Rule 1, or before the Court. Rule 2(3) provides that a payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid shall not be recognised by any Court executing the decree. 7. The expression “or the decree of any kind is otherwise adjusted” has been held by the Supreme Court in Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain, (1997) 1 SCC 373 ) to be of wide amplitude. The Supreme Court has observed as follows: “Order 21 Rule 2 applies to a specific set of circumstances. If any money is payable under a decree, irrespective of the nature of decree, and such money is paid out of court, the decree-holder has to certify such payment to the court whose duty it is to execute the decree and that court has to record the same accordingly. Similarly if a decree, irrespective of its nature, is adjusted in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree-holder, the decree-holder has to certify such adjustment to that court which has to record the adjustment accordingly. If the payment or adjustment is not reported by the decree-holder, the judgment-debtor has been given the right to inform the court of such payment or adjustment and to apply to that court for certifying that payment or adjustment after notice to the decree-holder. Then comes sub-rule (3) which provides that a payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded under sub-rule (1) or (2), shall not be recognized by the court executing the decree. Then comes sub-rule (3) which provides that a payment or adjustment which has not been certified or recorded under sub-rule (1) or (2), shall not be recognized by the court executing the decree. The words “or the decree of any kind is otherwise adjusted” are of wide amplitude. It is open to the parties namely, the decree-holder and the judgment debtor to enter into a contract or compromise in regard to their rights and obligations under the decree. If such contract or compromise amounts to an adjustment of the decree, it has to be recorded by the court under Rule 2 of Order 21. It may be pointed out that an agreement, contract or compromise which has the effect of extinguishing the decree in whole or in part on account of decree being satisfied to that extent will amount to an adjustment of the decree within the meaning of this Rule and the Court, if approached, will issue the certificate of adjustment. An uncertified payment of money or adjustment which is not recorded by the court under Order 21 Rule 2 cannot be recognised by the executing court. In a situation like this, the only enquiry that the executing court can do is to find out whether the plea taken on its face value, amounts to adjustment or satisfaction of decree, wholly or in part, and whether such adjustment or satisfaction had the effect of extinguishing the decree to that extent. if the executing court comes to the conclusion that the decree was adjusted wholly or in part but the compromise or adjustment or satisfaction was not recorded and/or certified by the court, the executing court would not recognise them and will proceed to execute the decree.” The judgment of the Supreme Court would thus indicate that even in a situation where a payment or adjustment is not reported by the decree-holder, the judgment debtor has to inform the executing court of such payment or adjustment and can apply to that Court for certifying the payment or adjustment after notice to the decree-holder. However, an uncertified payment of money or adjustment which is not recorded by the Court under Order 21 Rule 2 cannot be recognized by the Court. However, an uncertified payment of money or adjustment which is not recorded by the Court under Order 21 Rule 2 cannot be recognized by the Court. It is for the executing Court to determine as to whether the plea which is taken on its face value, amounts to adjustment or satisfaction of decree, wholly or in part, and whether such adjustment or satisfaction had the effect of extinguishing the decree to that extent. The executing Court would not recognize an adjustment or satisfaction which has not been recorded or certified. 8. In view of this clear position in law, the learned Single Judge was, in our view, in error in not appreciating the legal position and in holding that the only remedy of the parties was to move the Commissioner for Taking Accounts. The learned Single Judge seems to have proceeded on the basis that the executant would have to calculate the amount of the decree and the Commissioner for Taking Accounts would have to accept the amount and that this was not the function of the Court to determine. This, with respect, misses the central aspect of the jurisdiction of the executing Court because when a plea is raised before the executing Court of an adjustment of the decree, it is for the executing Court to determine that issue. Prayer clause (b) in the Chamber Summons may have been inartistically worded when, it called upon the Court to determine the correct amount under the decree. However, the case of the Appellant is clearly set out in the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons. The affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons makes it abundantly clear that the contention of the Respondent is that the decretal amount of Rs.3.20 crores together with interest is more than met by the deposit which has been effected by the Appellant. Whether this is so, as a matter of fact, has to be determined by the executing court. The jurisdiction of the executing court cannot be abdicated to the Commissioner for Taking Accounts. The latter is an officer of the Court and is subject to the authority of the Court. The learned Single Judge has not adjudicated upon the issue of adjustment at all. Questions in execution have to be decided by the executing court. The jurisdiction of the executing court cannot be abdicated to the Commissioner for Taking Accounts. The latter is an officer of the Court and is subject to the authority of the Court. The learned Single Judge has not adjudicated upon the issue of adjustment at all. Questions in execution have to be decided by the executing court. In order to enable the executing Court to do full and complete justice in the course of execution proceedings, we are of the view that the ends of justice would be served if the Appellant is permitted to amend prayer clause (b) of the Chamber Summons and to make a specific prayer in terms of the provisions of Rules 1 and 2 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This would be clarificatory in nature since the essence of the contention of the Appellant is already set out in the affidavit in support of the Chamber Summons. Upon such a request for amendment being made, we would leave it open to the learned Single Judge to consider the prayer for amendment. To facilitate this exercise, we set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 20 March 2013 in so far as it disposes of the Chamber Summons with reference to prayer clause (b). We grant liberty to the Appellant to move an application for amending prayer clause (b) before the learned Single Judge and in the event that such an application is made, we leave open all the rights and contentions of the parties in regard thereto. On the request of Learned Counsel for the Respondent, we clarify that all the rights and contentions of the parties, including on the question of limitation, are kept open. 9. The appeal is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.