JUDGMENT : F.M. Reis, J. 1. The above Appeal challenges the Judgment and Decree dated 31.03.2005, whereby the suit filed by the Appellants was dismissed as not maintainable and without jurisdiction. 2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that the Appellants filed Special Civil Suit no. 151 of 2001 with an application for temporary injunction in the Court of the learned Civil Judge,Senior Division at Margao, inter alia, seeking a direction to the Respondents to withdraw from the acquisition at Agonda, Canacona, of the suit plots bearing nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 including the open space of 4,441 square metres, which form part of survey no. 142/3 or for a Decree against the Respondents for payment of a sum of Rs. 1,20,00,000/- besides relief of injunction restraining the Respondents from inter alia carrying out any construction in the suit property. It is the case of the Appellants that they are the owners in possession of a property known as “DOVORNIAMOL”, situated at Mudchel, Agonda, Canacona Taluka, surveyed under no. 142/3 totally admeasuring an area of 30,200 square metres which is otherwise enrolled in matriz records under no,. 483. It is further their case that the Appellants had made a project for development of the said survey no. 142/3 for sub-division into plots for housing construction and, according to them., they had obtained the final NOC from the Town & Country Planning Department as approved by letter dated 17.09.1982 for plot nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 9 and 10. Earlier the final N.O.C. in respect of plot nos. 4, 5 and 6 was granted on 14.03.1981. According to the Appellants, plan for sub-division of the said survey no. 142/3 and the Sanad of Conversion was issued by the Collector of Goa dated 30.04.1980 for an area of 9,709 square metres and later by the Chief Town Planner on 30.04.1980 addressed to the local Panchayat. It is further the contention of the Appellants that the area covered by plot nos. 7 to 14 was initially marked for 9,709 square metres which was converted by the said sanad but, however, for suitability sake during the preparation of the site plan for development an extra area of 403 square metres had to be added for plot nos. It is further the contention of the Appellants that the area covered by plot nos. 7 to 14 was initially marked for 9,709 square metres which was converted by the said sanad but, however, for suitability sake during the preparation of the site plan for development an extra area of 403 square metres had to be added for plot nos. 7 to 14 and an area of 4,441 square metres was reserved on the site plan as an open space pending conversion by the Collector for plot nos. 7 to 20. It is further their contention that the area for acquisition now covers an area of 4,228 square metres from the said free space and plot nos. 8 to 13 being 5869 square metres besides land from property surveyed under no. 142/2 having an area of 240 square metres as also the open space. Thereafter, the total area demarcated by the Respondent no.2 was only the area surveyed under no. 142/3 belonging to the Appellants. It is further their case that development of the property by the Appellants was at an advanced stage and even some plots were sold from the suit land and some purchasers had even constructed their residential houses therein. It is further their case that on account of financial constraints, the Appellants decided to sell to Shri Krishna Raikar plots of land bearing nos. 11 and 12 at a low rate of Rs.300/-per square metre but as they were not finally approved by the Town & Country Planning Authority, the Appellants had to exchange the said plots with plot nos. 8 and 9 by taking advance of Rs.1,25,000/-. It is further their case that the Appellants had also constructed a compound wall around the said area of the plot nos. 8 to 13 including the open space incurring a substantial expenditure of a sum of Rs.3,50,000/-. It is further their case that the suit land is situated on the side of the main road going from Canacona to Khola which is fast developing. It is further their contention that in December, 1993, the local MLA and Sports Minister, approached the Appellant no. It is further their case that the suit land is situated on the side of the main road going from Canacona to Khola which is fast developing. It is further their contention that in December, 1993, the local MLA and Sports Minister, approached the Appellant no. 2 and offered to buy the suit land for Rs.175/- per square metre but, however, he was informed that the Appellants were negotiating the sale of the said portion of the property with some other Company for developing the whole area of 30,200 square metres of survey no. 142/3 for a price of Rs.650/- per square metre. It is further their case that after receiving such information, the said local Minister threatened that he will acquire the said land for less than Rs.50/-per square metre. It is further their case that they signed an Agreement with a Company known as M/s. Arvind Realtors for a sum of Rs.1,20,00,000/-for developing and selling the said portion of the property. The local MLA wanted to join as partner in the said development on the promise that he would give Government facilities and he was informed that an Agreement was already signed for development of the said plots. It is further their case that the local MLA also wanted to purchase the said plots for a low price which was not accepted by the Appellants. Thereafter, acquisition was sought on behalf of the Director of Sports & Youth Affairs, under instigation of the said local Minister of the said portion of the property. The said acquisition was notified in the Government Gazette dated 22.09.1995 proposing to acquire the suit plot which was challenged by the Appellants by filing a Writ Petition bearing no. 134/1997 before this Court and the notification was set aside by Order dated 25.06.1997. Another fresh notification was thereafter issued at the instigation of the local Minister on the local newspaper of August 1997 to acquire the suit plots. The Notification was again challenged by way of Writ Petition no. 224 of 1998 which was not allowed by this Court by its Order dated 24.08.1998 on technical grounds. The said M/s. Arvind Realtors also raised an objection to the said acquisition by sending a representation to the Land Acquisition Officer who did not consider the said representation upon pressure of the Minister. 224 of 1998 which was not allowed by this Court by its Order dated 24.08.1998 on technical grounds. The said M/s. Arvind Realtors also raised an objection to the said acquisition by sending a representation to the Land Acquisition Officer who did not consider the said representation upon pressure of the Minister. A representation was also made to the Chief Minister with regard to the said acquisition by the Appellant nos. 1 and 2. A legal notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was sent on 07.09.2001 calling upon the Government to take appropriate steps and departmental action for de-acquisition of the said suit plots forming part of survey no. 142/3 or otherwise withdraw the same under Section 48(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is further their case that the claim put forward by the Appellants is outside the scope of the Land Acquisition Act and, as such, filed the suit seeking the said reliefs against the Respondents. 3. The Respondents filed their written statements contending, inter alia, that the property referred to is acquired by the Government by an Award dated 16.02.2000 and after the acquisition, the Collector had also given possession of the property admeasuring an area of 10,090 square metres under survey nos. 142/2 and 142/3 to the department on 22.06.2000 and a compensation of a sum of Rs.7,25,520/-was deposited for payment to the interested parties on 09.03.2000. It is further their case that Sections 53 and 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, bars the jurisdiction of the Court. It is further their case that the property surveyed under no. 142/2 admeasuring an area of 240 square metres is also part of the acquisition and said land is not part and parcel of the property surveyed under no. 142/3 belonging to the Appellants. It is further contended that the ground was opened after complying with the formalities and allegations made against the Minister are baseless and without any substance. It is further their case that the acquisition was in the interest of the public and the Government cannot withdraw from the said acquisition in respect of the said property. 4. After framing the issues, the evidence of the Appellants was recorded but, however, the evidence of Pw.1 remained uncontroverted. Thereafter, the learned Judge framed two points for determination whilst passing the impugned Judgment. 4. After framing the issues, the evidence of the Appellants was recorded but, however, the evidence of Pw.1 remained uncontroverted. Thereafter, the learned Judge framed two points for determination whilst passing the impugned Judgment. The first point for determination was whether the suit was maintainable and the second was whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit and grant the reliefs. The learned Judge after examining the pleadings of the parties and the material therein, came to the conclusion that considering the objects of the proceedings in land acquisition cases they cannot be challenged in a suit by relying upon a Judgment of this Court reported in 2004(4) ALLMR 64 in the case of Bappasaheb Kishanrao Gaikwad vs. State of Maharashtra. Consequently, the learned Judge found that there is no need to go into the merits of the claim of the Appellants. The learned Judge however noted that the Appellant no. 1 challenged the Notification which was set aside by an Order dated 25.06.1997 by this Court but the Respondents were directed to take steps as per law considering that the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was not held properly. Thereafter, a fresh notification was issued and the objections of the Appellants were considered afresh by the Land Acquisition Officer. The learned Judge also noted that the Petition filed by the Appellants challenging the said notification was however rejected by this Court by Order dated 24.08.1998. The learned Judge further found that reliefs sought were also adjudicated by this Court in the said Petition and, as such, such exercise is an abuse of the process of law. The learned Judge as such dismissed the suit. 5. Shri Kholkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, has assailed the impugned Judgment as, according to him, the learned Judge was not justified to dismiss the suit as being not maintainable as the Appellant have not been paid any compensation. Learned Counsel further pointed out that on legal advise, the Appellants were forced to file the present suit and, in the interest of justice, it would be appropriate to permit the Appellants to file proceedings for enhancement of compensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned Counsel as such submits that directions may be given to the Land Acquisition Officer to entertain such reference as, otherwise, it would lead to failure of justice to the Appellants. Learned Counsel as such submits that directions may be given to the Land Acquisition Officer to entertain such reference as, otherwise, it would lead to failure of justice to the Appellants. Learned Counsel further pointed out that the Respondents have assessed the compensation at a very meagre amount and, as such, not permitting the Appellants to file a reference under Section 18 of the said Act, would lead to unjust enrichment on the part of the Respondents. Learned Counsel has taken us through the impugned Judgment and pointed out that the learned Judge has erroneously dismissed the suit as, according to him, the Appellants were entitled to claim the compensation in the suit. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel has relied upon the Judgment reported in AIR 2008 (NOC) 2831 (A. & P.) in the case of P. Chandrasekhat Reddy, vs. District Collector, Mahabubnagar & anr. and AIR 2005 (NOC) 459 (Madras), in the case of Airport Director, International Airport Authority of India, Chennai vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. 6. On the other hand, Shri Noorani, learned Addl. Government Advocate appearing for the Respondent nos. 1 and 2, has disputed the said compensation. Learned Addl. Government Advocate pointed out that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, is a self contained Act and, as such, it was incumbent upon the Appellants to file an application for enhancement of compensation in accordance with the provisions therein. Learned Addl. Government Advocate further pointed out that in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, the suit itself was not maintainable and, as such, the learned Judge has rightly dismissed the suit filed by the Appellants. 7. Upon hearing the learned Counsel and on perusal of records, the following point fro determination arises in the present First Appeal: POINT FOR DETERMINATION (i) Whether the suit filed by the Appellants challenging the acquisition was maintainable before the Civil Court? 8. The Apex Court, in the Judgment reported in AIR 1995 SC 1955 in the case of State of Bihar vs. Dhirendra Kumar & Ors., has observed at para 2A thus: “2-A. The question is whether a civil suit is maintainable and whether ad interim injunction could be issued where proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act was taken pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9 of the Act and delivered to the beneficiary. The provisions of the Act are designed to acquire the land by the State exercising the power of eminent domain to serve the public purpose. The State is enjoined to comply with statutory requirements contained in Section 4 and Section 6 of the Act by proper publication of notification and declaration within limitation and procedural steps of publication in papers and the local publications envisaged under the Act as amended by Act 68 of 1984. In publication of the notifications and declaration under Section 6, the public purpose gets crystallised and becomes conclusive. Thereafter, the State is entitled to authorise the Land Acquisition Officer to proceed with the acquisition of the land and to make the award. Section 11-A now prescribes limitation to make the award within 2 years from the last date of publication envisaged under Section 6 of the Act. In an appropriate case, where the Government needs possession of the land urgently, it would exercise the power under Section 17(4) of the Act and dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereon, the State is entitled to issue notice to the parties under Section 9 and on expiry of 15 days, the State is entitled to take immediate possession even before the award could be made. Otherwise, it would take possession after the award under Section 12. Thus, it could be seen that the Act is a complete code in itself and is meant to serve public purpose. We are, therefore, inclined to think, as presently advised, that by necessary implication the power of the civil court to take cognizance of the case under Section 9 of CPC stands excluded, and a civil court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of the validity or legality of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, except by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. So, the civil suit itself was not maintainable. When such is the situation, the finding of the trial court that there is a prima facie triable issue is unsustainable. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to the Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction.” 9. In another Judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1997) 11 SCC 250 in the case of S. P. Subramanya Shetty & Ors. Moreover, possession was already taken and handed over to the Housing Board. So, the order of injunction was without jurisdiction.” 9. In another Judgment of the Apex Court reported in (1997) 11 SCC 250 in the case of S. P. Subramanya Shetty & Ors. vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., the Apex Court has observed at para 4 thus : “4. In view of the settled legal position that the notification had become final and the proceedings had attained finality, the civil suit was not maintainable. This Court has repeatedly held that a civil suit relating to acquisition proceedings is not maintainable and by implication, cognizance under Section 9 CPC is barred. The Court cannot issue mandatory injunction against the State to denotify the acquisition under Section 48. Therefore, the question of granting an injunction against the authority from proceedings in accordance with the law does not arise. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to grant injunction. The Court cannot compel the Government to withdraw the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. It is for the Government to consider the same on merits keeping in mind subservience of public interest. In view of the fact that notification was upheld by this Court and has become final, the Government cannot retract from the steps taken.” 10. Considering the said Judgments of the Apex Court, we find that the learned Trial Judge was justified to come to the conclusion that the suit filed by the Appellants itself is not maintainable. The main reliefs sought by the Appellants is essentially to direct the de-notification of an acquisition which has attained finality pursuant to the proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act. The Apex Court in the said Judgment in the case of S. P. Subramanya Shetty & Ors. vs. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., (supra), has clearly held that such relief cannot be granted in a Civil Suit for the reasons stated therein. There is no dispute that the procedure as prescribed under the said Act have been duly complied with by the Respondents. In fact, whilst disposing of the said Writ Petition challenging the said acquisition, this Court did not find favour with the contentions of the Appellants that the notification under Section 6 of the said Act was vitiated. There is no dispute that the procedure as prescribed under the said Act have been duly complied with by the Respondents. In fact, whilst disposing of the said Writ Petition challenging the said acquisition, this Court did not find favour with the contentions of the Appellants that the notification under Section 6 of the said Act was vitiated. The claim for damages put forward by the Appellants is not on the ground that the Collector had refused to adjudicate upon the claim put forward by the Appellants. It is not the contention of the Appellants that at the time when such claims could be raised in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, such damages were not foreseen at that time. In case the Appellants were aggrieved with the compensation which was offered in the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the said Act of 1894, it was incumbent upon them to seek a reference in terms of the said Act within the time prescribed therein and not file a suit for these reliefs. The claim for compensation in the suit are matters which come within the purview of the said Act which the Appellants could have raised in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and, as such, there is no question of filing a suit to claim such reliefs. When the Act provides a complete mechanism and create a specific forum for determination of the amount payable as compensation, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly ousted. When the jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Courts as provided under the said Land Acquisition Act, 1894, such jurisdiction is exclusive. The Land Acquisition Act creates a special jurisdiction and provides a special remedy to claim compensation and, as such, it would not be reasonable to hold, when the Legislature having provided a special remedy under the Land Acquisition Act, that such remedy is optional for the parties either to apply for reference under Section 18 or to institute a suit in the ordinary Court. Hence, in order that the Court can exercise its jurisdiction to determine the compensation, such jurisdiction can be exercised only on the basis of a reference under Section 18 of the said Act of 1894 made by the Collector and not by a suit. Hence, in order that the Court can exercise its jurisdiction to determine the compensation, such jurisdiction can be exercised only on the basis of a reference under Section 18 of the said Act of 1894 made by the Collector and not by a suit. As such, the learned Judge was justified to come to the conclusion that the reliefs sought by the Appellants were not maintainable in a Civil Suit. 11. The provisions of Section 36(2) of the Act as claimed by the Appellants would not be applicable to the facts of the present case as this is not a case where the possession was taken for temporary occupation, which would otherwise entitle a party for compensation. In the present case, the process of acquisition in terms of the Land Acquisition Act has been duly complied with and possession has also been taken in due process of law and, as such, the title of the land has vested upon the Respondent no. 1. In such circumstances, the learned Judge was justified to pass the impugned Judgment and dismiss the suit as being not maintainable. The Appellants themselves have pursued a wrong remedy and, as such, the question of permitting the Appellants to seek a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act in this suit, does not arise at all. The Judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants in the case of P. Chandrasekhat Reddy, vs. District Collector, Mahabubnagar & anr. (supra) and in the case of Airport Director, International Airport Authority of India, Chennai vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (supra) , are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. The directions issued, in any event, were in a Writ Petition challenging such acquisitions which is not the case in the present proceedings. The Appellants have opted to file a Civil Suit and, as such, the law applicable to such proceedings would have to be considered whilst disposing of such Civil Suit. Hence, in this Civil Suit, the Appellants cannot be given any such liberty as sought to be contented by Shri Kholkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, as the remedy resorted to by the Appellants in filing the Civil Suit is held to be untenable. The point for determination is answered accordingly. 12. Hence, in this Civil Suit, the Appellants cannot be given any such liberty as sought to be contented by Shri Kholkar, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellants, as the remedy resorted to by the Appellants in filing the Civil Suit is held to be untenable. The point for determination is answered accordingly. 12. In view of the above, we find no merits in the above Appeal which is accordingly dismissed with no Orders as to costs.