Judgment : R.M. Borde, J. 1. Heard. Admit. Appeal is taken up forthwith and heard finally by consent of learned Counsel for the appellant, learned Assistant Government Pleader for Respondent No.3 and Shri Sandeep Deshmukh, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.4. In spite of service of notice to Respondents No.1 & 2, they remained absent. 2. The appellant is taking exception to the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.8682 of 2011, decided on 07.08.2012, confirming the order dated 13.10.2011, passed by the School Tribunal in Appeal No.38 of 2010. 3. The appellant herein claims that he was appointed as an Assistant Teacher with effect from 15.06.1985. He acquired training qualification i.e. B.Ed. on 21.05.1986. The appellant contends that Respondent No.4 came to be appointed as an Assistant Teacher on 15.06.1987 and at the time of his appointment, he was holding training qualification. In the seniority list published for the period between 1986 to 2008, appellant has been shown as senior to Respondent No.4. It is further contended that there was change effected in respect of date of appointment of Respondent No.4 as 16.06.1986. However, appellant was shown as senior to Respondent No.4. Respondent No.1Institution published seniority list of the teachers for the year 20092010 wherein Respondent No.4 is shown as senior to the appellant. The Management issued an order of promotion of Respondent No.4 appointing him as Head Master. The proposal for approval to the promotion of Respondent No.4 as Head Master was approved by the Education Officer. The appellant challenged his supersession and promotion of Respondent No.4 as Head Master by presenting an appeal to the School Tribunal. However, the appeal presented by appellant came to be dismissed on 13.10.2011. 4. Respondent No.4 admitted the fact that appellant was appointed as an untrained teacher on 10.06.1985 and that he acquired training qualification on 21.05.1986. Respondent No.4 also acquired training qualification on the same date. However, According to Respondent No.4, appellant was appointed as primary Assistant Teacher on 10.06.1986 with effect from 15.06.1986, which was a Sunday. Respondent No.4 also came to be appointed as Primary Assistant Teacher on 10.06.1986 with effect from 16.06.1986. According to Respondent No.4, his date of birth is 01.01.1957, whereas, date of birth of the appellant is 05.11.1960. 5. However, According to Respondent No.4, appellant was appointed as primary Assistant Teacher on 10.06.1986 with effect from 15.06.1986, which was a Sunday. Respondent No.4 also came to be appointed as Primary Assistant Teacher on 10.06.1986 with effect from 16.06.1986. According to Respondent No.4, his date of birth is 01.01.1957, whereas, date of birth of the appellant is 05.11.1960. 5. It is the contention of Respondent No.4 that since both i.e. appellant as well as Respondent No.4 have been appointed on the same date i.e. 16.06.1986, Respondent No.4, being senior in age, has been rightly promoted to the post of Head Master. 6. We have heard arguments advanced by learned Counsel for respective parties. 7. Learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.4 contends that the Letters Patent Appeal presented by the appellant is not maintainable. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of KanhaiyalalAgrawal and others Vs. Factory Manager, Gwalior Sugar Company Ltd., reported in (2001) 9 SCC 609 , it is contended that if the High Court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226, Letters Patent Appeal would be maintainable, but if the jurisdiction is exercised under Article 227, Letters Patent Appeal will not be maintainable. It is contended that in the instant matter, jurisdiction is invoked by the learned Single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution and as such, Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable. 8. In the reported judgment, it is further clarified that where the facts justify filing of petition both under Article 226 and Article 227 and the petition so filed is dismissed by the Single Judge on merits without stating under which provision, the petition is decided, the appeal, against such order, is maintainable. Having regard to the judgment of the Supreme Court, it has to be held that instant appeal is maintainable since the learned Single Judge has not clarified in the judgment in respect of invocation of jurisdiction either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. 9. In the similar fashion, reliance has also been placed on the judgments of this Court in the matter of MansaramSampat Patil & others Vs. Sambhu Harchand Chaudhary & others, reported in 2004 (4) Mh.L.J. 1105; and in the matter of Laxmibaiw/o Laxminarayan Zawar Vs. Jalgaon Merchant Cooperative Bank Ltd. & others, reported in 2011(3)Mh.L.J. 428. 10. 9. In the similar fashion, reliance has also been placed on the judgments of this Court in the matter of MansaramSampat Patil & others Vs. Sambhu Harchand Chaudhary & others, reported in 2004 (4) Mh.L.J. 1105; and in the matter of Laxmibaiw/o Laxminarayan Zawar Vs. Jalgaon Merchant Cooperative Bank Ltd. & others, reported in 2011(3)Mh.L.J. 428. 10. In this context, reliance can be placed on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the matter of AdvaniOerlikon Ltd. Vs. Machindra Govind Makasare & others, reported in 2011 (2) Mh.L.J. 916 . The Full Bench, in paragraph no.20 of the judgment, has observed thus: “20 Upon this discussion, we now proceed to answer the questions formulated in the order of reference: Re :2 : It is not a correct proposition in law that jurisdictional errors or errors resulting in miscarriage of justice committed by subordinate Courts/Tribunals can only be corrected by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. The writ of certiorari can be issued under Article 226 of the Constitution where the subordinate Court or Tribunal commits an error of jurisdiction. Where the subordinate Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it or fails to exercise jurisdiction, that error of jurisdiction can be corrected. Moreover when the Court or tribunal has acted illegally or improperly suchas in breach of the principles of natural justice, the writ of certiorari is available under Article 226. Re :3 : Where the facts justify the invocation of either Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution to correct a jurisdictional error or an error resulting in a miscarriage of justice committed by authorities subordinate to this Court, there is no reason or justification to deprive a party of the right to invoke the constitutional remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. Re :4 : It is open to the Court while dealing with a petition filed under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution or a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent arising from the judgment in such a petition to determine whether the facts justify the party in filing the petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. Re :5 : The cause title, the averments and prayers in the petition can be taken into account while deciding whether the petition is one under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution. Re :6 : If the petitioner elects to invoke Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution and the facts justify such invocation, a Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge would be maintainable even though the Single Judge has purported to exercise jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution. The fact that the learned Single Judge has adverted only to the provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution would not bar the maintainability of such an appeal. The true test is whether the facts justify the invocation of Articles 226 and 227 and this has to be determined on the facts of each case having due regard to (i) the nature of the jurisdiction invoked; (ii) the averments contained in the petition; (iii) the reliefs sought; and (iv) the true nature of the principal order passed by the Single Judge. The true nature of the order passed by the Single Judge has to be determined on the basis of the principal character of the relief granted. The fact that an ancillary direction has been issued under Article 227 of the Constitution would not dilute the character of an order as one with reference to Article 226. What has to be ascertained is the true nature of the order passed by the Single Judge and not what provision is mentioned while exercising this power.” 11. On perusal of the cause title of the writ petition, it does appear that the writ petitioner has invoked jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 227 of the Constitution and that the learned Single Judge, while inquiring into the matter, has not confined himself to Article 227 alone and further that since there is an error committed by the learned Single Judge, which has resulted in denying justice to the appellant, we are of the considered view that the Letters Patent Appeal presented by the appellant shall have to be held maintainable. 12. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that there is no dispute that the appellant has been appointed as Assistant Teacher since 10.06.1985. 12. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that there is no dispute that the appellant has been appointed as Assistant Teacher since 10.06.1985. It is also not disputed that at the time of appointment of appellant, he was not possessing training qualification and he passed B.Ed. examination on 21.05.1986. 13. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has invited our attention to the photostat copy of the Service Book placed on record. On perusal of the entries recorded in the Service Book, it is evident that the appellant has been appointed as an Assistant Teacher since 10.06.1985. There is an entry recorded in respect of appellant’s acquisition of training qualification on 21.05.1986. The appellant has been awarded pay scale prescribed for trained teacher and an entry in that regard has been signed by the Head Master on 14.06.1986. The entry in respect of fixation of pay has been verified by the Accounts Officer, Education Department and it is recorded that the appellant has been held eligible to receive revised pay scale of trained teacher i.e. Rs.1400 to 2600/since 01.06.1986. Thus, the case put up by the appellant that he was initially appointed as untrained teacher and that he acquired training qualification on 21.05.1986 and since the date of acquisition of his training qualification, he shall be deemed to be a trained teacher, deserves acceptance. On scrutiny of the service record also, it does appear that the appellant has been held eligible to the pay scale prescribed for trained teacher since 01.06.1986. 14. That, so far as Respondent No.4 is concerned, there is no dispute that he has been appointed on 16.06.1986 and on the date of his appointment, he was holding training qualification. The Tribunal as well as the School Tribunal proceeded to hold that the appellant became trained teacher from 16.06.1986 when his date of appointment is shown as 15.06.1986 and that Respondent No.4 was appointed on 10.06.1986 with effect from 16.06.1986 as trained teacher. It is recorded by the learned Single Judge that considering the fact that Respondent No.4 is senior in age, he is rightly considered to be senior than the appellant. 15. It is a matter of record that the appellant was appointed as an Assistant teacher from 15.06.1985 as untrained teacher. After acquisition of training qualification i.e. since 21.05.1986, he became a trained teacher. 15. It is a matter of record that the appellant was appointed as an Assistant teacher from 15.06.1985 as untrained teacher. After acquisition of training qualification i.e. since 21.05.1986, he became a trained teacher. As has been recorded above, the appellant has been held eligible to receive pay scale prescribed for trained teacher sine 01.06.1986 i.e. prior to appointment of Respondent No.4. 16. In this context, guidelines, prescribed under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 in respect of fixation of seniority of teachers in the Schools, are required to be taken into consideration. A graduate or post graduate degree holder having training qualification is included in category “C”, whereas, untrained Graduate or holder of equivalent qualification is included in category “F”. Note 4 of Schedule “F” provides that the categories mentioned in the Schedule represent the ladder of seniority and have been mentioned in descending order. Thus, a teacher included in category “C” shall obviously be senior to a teacher classified in category “F”. The appellant, at the time of his appointment, since holding training qualification, was liable to be included in category “F” and on acquisition of the training qualification that is on 21.05.1986 he moves upwards in category “C”. In the instant matter, as date of appointment of Respondent No.4 is 16.06.1986, much later than that of acquisition of training qualification and inclusion of appellant in category “C”, Respondent No.4 could not have been considered as senior to the appellant. 17. It was contended before the Tribunal as well as before the learned Single Judge that the appellant was issued order of appointment appointing him as trained teacher since 15.06.1986 and as a result of issuance of order appointing him as trained teacher on 15.06.1986, his seniority has to be reckoned from the date of his appointment. The submission made on behalf of Respondent No.4 is devoid of substance for the reason that on perusal of the Service Book of the appellant, it transpires that service rendered by the appellant is continuous without there being any break in the service. The Service Book of the appellant, which has been verified by the competent authority i.e. Accounts Officer of the Education Department, records that the appellant has acquired training qualification on 21.05.1986 and his pay has been fixed as trained teacher in the pay scale of Rs.1400 to 2600/on 01.06.1986. The Service Book of the appellant, which has been verified by the competent authority i.e. Accounts Officer of the Education Department, records that the appellant has acquired training qualification on 21.05.1986 and his pay has been fixed as trained teacher in the pay scale of Rs.1400 to 2600/on 01.06.1986. Thus, the contention of Respondent No.4 that there is order appointing Respondent No.4 as trained teacher since 15.06.1986 and that his seniority shall be reckoned from that date, is devoid of substance. The services rendered by the appellant are continuous one and theory of issuance of fresh appointment order appears to have been evolved to defeat claim of the appellant. 18. The learned Single Judge, referring to the judgment delivered by the Full Bench in the matter of VaijnathTatyarao Shinde Vs. Secretary and others, reported in 2006 (6) Bom.C.R. 804 , to which, one of us was party (R.M.Borde, J.), has recorded in paragraphs no.9 and 10 of the judgment, thus: “9 I have given anxious consideration to the rival submissions of the parties, perused the grounds in the petition, perused the impugned judgment. It is not necessary to go into the details of the facts since the controversy raised by the petitioner is in respect of appointment of respondent No.4 to the post of Head Master (By promotion) in the respondent No.2 School. The Full Bench of this Court in case of VaijnathTatyarao Shinde (supra), held that, for appointment to post of Head Master (by promotion) of a primary school, seniority of teacher is to be counted from date he acquires educational and training qualifications. Seniority cannot be counted from date of initial appointment and continuous officiation of devoid of requisite qualification as prescribed in Schedule B. (Emphasis supplied). 10. Therefore, the services which are rendered by the petitioner prior to acquiring requisite educational and training qualification, need not be considered. In the present case, it is an admitted position that the petitioner and also the respondent No.4 have acquired B.Ed. i.e. requisite qualification on 21st May, 1986. Therefore, this date is the crucial date for reckoning the seniority of the teacher for the purpose of appointment to the post of Head Master (by promotion). In the present case, it is an admitted position that the petitioner and also the respondent No.4 have acquired B.Ed. i.e. requisite qualification on 21st May, 1986. Therefore, this date is the crucial date for reckoning the seniority of the teacher for the purpose of appointment to the post of Head Master (by promotion). The contention of the petitioner that he was appointed in the year 1985, prior to the appointment of the respondent No.4 has been gone into by the School Tribunal and the tribunal has rightly held that the seniority of the teacher is required to be reckoned from the date of acquiring educational and training qualifications. Therefore, in case of the petitioner and also the respondent No.4, the date of acquiring requisite qualification is 21st May, 1986. Therefore, in view of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court, the earlier period in which the services are rendered by the petitioner is of no use for reckoning the seniority of the teacher for the purpose of appointment as Head Master (by promotion). 19. The learned Single Judge overlooked the fact that Respondent No.4 has entered service only on 16.06.1986 and his acquisition of training qualification along with appellant on 21.05.1986 is of no consequence. The question of reckoning seniority of an employee arises only after issuance of order of appointment in favour of such employee. The seniority of an employee has to be reckoned with reference to his date of appointment and only the factum of date of acquisition of training qualification, overlooking the date of appointment, cannot be taken into consideration. In our considered view, interpretation put by the learned Single Judge in respect of ratio laid down by the Full Bench, in the judgment cited supra, is erroneous. The issue referred for consideration before the Full Bench, was thus: For promotion to the post of Head Master of a Primary School, whether seniority of the teacher is to be counted from the date of initial appointment, or from the date of acquisition of educational and training qualification? 20. While answering the issue, it has been observed by the Full Bench, in paragraph no.9, thus: “9 In this view of the matter, we hold that for a valid appointment of a primary school teacher, a person must possess educational so also the training / teaching qualification. 20. While answering the issue, it has been observed by the Full Bench, in paragraph no.9, thus: “9 In this view of the matter, we hold that for a valid appointment of a primary school teacher, a person must possess educational so also the training / teaching qualification. No person can be legally appointed who does not hold training qualification. Hence, service rendered as an untrained teacher will not qualify for being counted to determine seniority.” The Full Bench proceeded to conclude that for appointment to the post of Head Master (by promotion) of a primary school, the seniority of the teacher is to be counted from the date he acquires educational and training qualifications as prescribed under ScheduleB of the M.E.P.S. Rules. The seniority cannot be counted from the date of initial appointment and continuous officiation devoid of requisite qualification as prescribed in Schedule-B. 21. Applying the ratio laid down by the Full Bench to the case in hand, services rendered by the appellant from 10.06.1985 as untrained teacher till the date of acquisition of training qualification by him i.e. 21.05.1986, cannot be reckoned. However, his services are to be reckoned from the date of acquisition of training qualification i.e. 21.05.1986 onwards. Considering the fact that appellant is deemed to be trained teacher from the date of acquisition of training qualification by him as well as by extending the pay scale prescribed for trained teacher in the pay scale of Rs. 1400 to 2600/from 01.06.1986, he ought to be considered as senior to Respondent No.4 since Respondent No.4 has entered services only on 16.06.1986. The learned Single Judge has committed serious error in considering the period of acquisition of training qualification by him i.e. Respondent No.4 prior to the date of his appointment (Respondent No.4’s appointment). In the nutshell, although both – appellant and Respondent No.4 have acquired training qualification on 21.05.1986, having regard to the date of entry of Respondent No.4 in service i.e. 16.06.1986, the appellant ought to be considered as senior to Respondent No.4. 22. For the reasons recorded above, appeal presented by the appellant deserves to be allowed and same is accordingly allowed. 22. For the reasons recorded above, appeal presented by the appellant deserves to be allowed and same is accordingly allowed. The order dated 13.10.2011, passed by the School Tribunal, Latur in Appeal No.38/2010 as well as judgment and order dated 07.08.2012, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No.8682/2011, are quashed and set aside and appeal presented by the appellant to the School Tribunal shall be deemed to have been allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. 23. Learned Counsel for Respondent No.4 makes a request for staying operation and implementation of this order for the period of six weeks to facilitate the Respondents to avail of appellate remedy. Learned Counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently opposes the prayer for suspension of effect and operation of the order. 24. Considering the request made on behalf of Respondent No.4, operation and implementation of the order, passed in the instant Letters Patent Appeal, shall stand stayed for the period of six weeks from today.