JUDGMENT Saeed-Uz-Zaman Siddiqi,J. By means of the instant writ petition the petitioner has sought for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 15.05.2006 and 19.07.2006, passed by opposite party nos.2 and 3, as contained in Annexure Nos.1 and 2 respectively and further a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding opposite parties to release the salary and arrears of salary to the petitioner treating him to be in service up to 31.01.2006 on the date of superannuation notwithstanding the impugned orders dated 15.05.2006 and 19.07.2006. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was initially appointed to the post of Routine Grade Clerk in the year 1971 and was promoted as Godown Keeper in the year 1982. He was again promoted to the post of Senior Godown Keeper and ultimately as Warehousing Superintendent; the petitioner was posted as Warehousing Superintendent from 1994 to 2000; the godown of the opposite parties was rented to M/s Trimurti Fertilizers under the instructions of then Regional Manager without execution of formal agreement. The said tenant defaulted to pay rent with effect from May, 1986 for which explanation of the petitioner was called for by the opposite parties which was rejected by opposite party no.3 and special adverse entry/censure was awarded to the petitioner on 11.12.1996 and departmental enquiry was also instituted against the petitioner and a charge-sheet dated 30.05.1998 was issued. Supplementary charge-sheet dated 19.01.2000 was also issued to the petitioner. The petitioner was held guilty and the the petitioner was ultimately dismissed vide order dated 09.05.2001. The petitioner filed writ petition no.3057 (SS) of 2001 in which the dismissal order was set aside vide judgment and order of this Court dated 01.02.2006 and the matter was remanded back to the Enquiry Officer to enquire the matter after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The opposite party no.3 passed impugned order dated 15.05.2006 as contained in Annexure No.1, by which the petitioner was reverted to the lower rank and it was also observed that since the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation and the petitioner has not served with the opposite parties with effect from 09.05.2001 to 31.01.2006 and, as such, he is not entitled to any salary regarding that period. It was further directed that the damages caused to the opposite parties to the tune of Rs.81,217.50 paise be recovered. It was further directed that the damages caused to the opposite parties to the tune of Rs.81,217.50 paise be recovered. The petitioner preferred an appeal which was also rejected vide order dated 19.07.2006, contained as Annexure No.2. Hence, this writ petition has been preferred. 3. The General Manager filed his counter affidavit in which it was mentioned that in compliance of the directions of this Court dated 01.02.2006 in writ petition no.3067 (SS) of 2001 a fresh enquiry was held and the petitioner was provided opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The enquiry report dated 29.03.2006 has also been filed along with the counter affidavit. The petitioner was also afforded opportunity of personal hearing following the principles of natural justice and after considering each and every aspect of the enquiry impugned order dated 15.05.2006 was passed against which the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal before the Appellate Authority and same was also decided on merits. It was further submitted that the petitioner only obtained proforma of contract on the letter pad of the tenant but the petitioner failed to get the agreement executed with the tenant regarding terms and conditions of lease though, the petitioner was duty bound to do so and, as such, is remained negligent which caused financial loss to the opposite parties. It was further submitted that the agreement was not signed due to connivance of the petitioner. A supplementary charge-sheet was also served upon the petitioner; the appointing authority has taken a lenient view and has reverted back the petitioner though he was liable to be dismissed from services. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. The only point argued before this Court by learned counsel for the petitioner is that since the petitioner has attained the age of superannuation no departmental enquiry can be initiated against him. Admittedly, the petitioner attained the age of superannuation on 01.02.2006 and the judgment was passed by this Court in earlier writ petition no.3067 (SS) of 2001 on that very date but this fact was not brought to the notice of this Court by the petitioner that he has attained the age of superannuation. It is also true that there is no provision of the opposite parties that a departmental enquiry can be initiated/continued after the date of superannuation. 4. It is also true that there is no provision of the opposite parties that a departmental enquiry can be initiated/continued after the date of superannuation. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhagirathi Jena v. Board of Directors, O.S.F.C. & ors. (1999) 3 SCC 666 , in which it has been observed: - "In view of the absence of such provision in the abovesaid regulations, it must be held that the Corporation had no legal authority to make any reduction in the retiral benefits of the appellant. There is also no provision for conducting a disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the appellant and nor any provision stating that in case misconduct is established, a deduction could be made from retiral benefits. Once the appellant had retired from service on 30.6.95, there was no authority vested in the Corporation or continuing the departmental enquiry even for the purpose of imposing any reduction in the retiral benefits payable to the appellant. In the absence of such authority, it must be held that the enquiry had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to full retiral benefits on retirement." 5. On the other hand learned counsel for opposite parties has relied upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of City Montessory School v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 2009 (14) SCC 253 , in which following observations have been made: - "A judgment rendered by a court of law in particular a consent order, it is trite, must not only be construed in its entirety but also having regard to the pleadings and conduct of the parties. A party consenting to an order cannot be permitted to resile therefrom while retaining the benefit obtained therefrom." 6. In view of the authorities, as mentioned above, and in view of the fact that the petitioner did not brought it to the notice of this Court while deciding the earlier writ petition that he has attained the age of superannuation, he cannot claim the benefit of superannuation because enquiry was directed by this Court on the date the petitioner attained the age of superannuation and, as such, it is crystal clear that the petitioner is ultimate beneficiary of the said judgment otherwise he was a dismissed employee on the date he attained the age of superannuation. 7. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the law laid down by Division Bench of this Court in U.P. State Ware Housing Corp. v. Brish Bhan Singh & anr. (2011) 2 UPLBEC 1643 , in which this Court relied upon the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhagirathi Jena's case (supra), but this low does not help the petitioner as the enquiry has been reinitiated on the directions of this Court where the petitioner did not bring to the notice of this Court that he has attained the age of superannuation. Now, the petitioner is estopped from challenging the impugned order of which the petitioner is ultimate beneficiary. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & ors. AIR 2012 (SC) 364 , in which following observations have been made: - "In Manak Lal (Supra), this Court held that alleged bias of a Judge/official/Tribunal does not render the proceedings invalid if it is shown that the objection in that regard and particularly against the presence of the said official in question, had not been taken by the party even though the party knew about the circumstances giving rise to the allegations about the alleged bias and was aware of its right to challenge the presence of such official. The Court further observed that waiver cannot always and in every case be inferred merely from the failure of the party to take the objection. "Waiver can be inferred only if and after it is shown that the party knew about the relevant facts and was aware of his right to take the objection in question." Thus, in a given case if a party knows the material facts and is conscious of his legal rights in that matter, but fails to take the plea of bias at the earlier stage of the proceedings, it creates an effective bar of waiver against him. In such facts and circumstances, it would be clear that the party wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable order from the official/court and when he found that he was confronted with an unfavourable order, he adopted the device of raising the issue of bias. The issue of bias must be raised by the party at the earliest. (See: M/s. Pannalal Binjraj & Ors. The issue of bias must be raised by the party at the earliest. (See: M/s. Pannalal Binjraj & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1957 SC 397 ; and Justice P.D. Dinakaran (Supra)) In M/s. Power Control Appliances & Ors. v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448 this Court held as under: - "Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights.... It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim... It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as involved in laches. ........ The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the defendant......" Inaction in every case does not lead to an inference of implied consent or acquiescence as has been held by this Court in P. John Chandy & Co. (P) Ltd. v. John P. Thomas, AIR 2002 SC 2057 . Thus, the Court has to examine the facts and circumstances in an individual case. Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a right. It involves conscious abandonment of an existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such a waiver, a party could have enjoyed. In fact, it is an agreement not to assert a right. There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived, is fully informed as to his rights and with full knowledge about the same, he intentionally abandons them. (Vide: Dawsons Bank Ltd. v. Nippon Menkwa Kabushihi Kaish, AIR 1935 PC 79 ; Basheshar Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan and Anr., AIR 1959 SC 149 ; Mademsetty Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1405 ; Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 SC 933 ; Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh & Anr. v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation Ors., (1992) Suppl 1 SCC 5; M/s Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim, AIR 2001 SC 2062 ; and Kirshna Bahadur v. M/s Purna Theatre & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 4282 ). This Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 233 considered the issue of waiver/acquiescence by the non-parties to the proceedings and held: "In order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. This Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Dr. Hakimwadi Tenants' Association & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 233 considered the issue of waiver/acquiescence by the non-parties to the proceedings and held: "In order to constitute waiver, there must be voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right. The essence of a waiver is an estoppel and where there is no estoppel, there is no waiver. Estoppel and waiver are questions of conduct and must necessarily be determined on the facts of each case....... There is no question of estoppel, waiver or abandonment. There is no specific plea of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, much less a plea of abandonment of right. That apart, the question of waiver really does not arise in the case. Admittedly, the tenants were not parties to the earlier proceedings. There is, therefore, no question of waiver of rights, by Respondents 4-7 nor would this disentitle the tenants from maintaining the writ petition." Thus, from the above, it is apparent that the issue of bias should be raised by the party at the earliest, if it is aware of it and knows its right to raise the issue at the earliest, otherwise it would be deemed to have been waived. However, it is to be kept in mind that acquiescence, being a principle of equity must be made applicable where a party knowing all the facts of bias etc., surrenders to the authority of the Court/Tribunal without raising any objection. Acquiescence, in fact, is sitting by, when another is invading the rights. The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create rights in other party. Needless to say that question of waiver/acquiescence would arise in a case provided the person apprehending the bias/prejudice is a party to the case. The question of waiver would not arise against a person who is not a party to the case as such person has no opportunity to raise the issue of bias." 8. The impugned order as contained in Annexure No.1 relate to reversion and withholding of salary for the period the petitioner did not work on the principle of "no work no pay". The order further directs that the loss caused to the Corporation due to non-payment of rent by the lessee amounting to Rs.81,217.50 paise be recovered from the petitioner. The impugned order as contained in Annexure No.1 relate to reversion and withholding of salary for the period the petitioner did not work on the principle of "no work no pay". The order further directs that the loss caused to the Corporation due to non-payment of rent by the lessee amounting to Rs.81,217.50 paise be recovered from the petitioner. This portion of the order is bad in the eyes of law as the amount of rent due to a tenant can well be recovered by the Corporation from the tenant and the opposite parties did not resort to any legal means to recover it from the tenant. A liability which can legally be fastened upon a person cannot be fastened to a retired employee of the Corporation itself nor the said amount can be recovered from the retiral dues or the pension of the petitioner. This aspect has not been considered either by the Enquiry Officer or by the Appellate Authority it its legal perspective. In result, writ petition deserves to be allowed on that score alone. 9. Accordingly, writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned order as contained in Annexure Nos.1 and 2 are quashed only in as much as it relate to recovery of Rs.81,217.50 paise from the petitioner. Remaining punishment regarding reduction in rank and non-payment of salary for the period of absence is confirmed.