Ritu Raj Awasthi, J.— We have heard learned counsel for review-petitioner as well as Mr. Mohd. Askari All, respondent in person and perused the pleadings of review petition. 2. This review petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated 16.7.2010 in Writ Petition No. 6644 (MB) of 2010; Mirza Mohd. Askari All v. State of U.P. Thru Ziladhikari, Lucknow & Another passed by a Division Bench in which one of us (Justice Ritu Raj Awasthi) was a member. 3. The review petition has been filed by U.P. Shiya Central Wakfs Board through its Chief Executive Officer and Wakfs Sajjaidia Kadeem Wa Jadeed through its Mutawalli Molana Kalve Jawabad Naqvi on the ground that the writ petition was filed without impleading the review-petitioner, U.P. Shiya Central Wakf Board as a party, although in para 7 of the writ petition respondent-petitioner had himself stated that the land in question belongs to the Wakf. In fact, the order dated 16.7.2010 was obtained by playing fraud before the Court. The said Wakf land is situated at Gata No. 246, 247 known as Wakfs Sajjaidia Kadeem Wa Jadeed, Gram Para, Alam Nagar, Lucknow. The revenue authorities had issued Khatauni from Fasti Year 1408 to 1413 by which it has been shown as Wakf land. 4. The writ petition was filed challenging the notice dated 10.12.1996 issued to Syed Kabey Abid. There is no relation between Syed Kaley Abid and respondent-petitioner. The petitioner had also not explained the delay in filing the writ petition after lapse of 14 years. 5. The property in question is still in possession of Wakf and maintained by Wakf Mutawalli. The Wakf Board has developed a colony and constructed 380 flats, dormitory, community center and college. The flats were allotted to the allottees about five years back. The respondent-petitioner is fully aware about these facts that the Wakf Board has established a colony on the land in question. The respondent-petitioner and his father had not raised any objection regarding the construction of the colony and had not claimed any ownership over the said land. 6. The respondent-petitioner in response to notice issued to him has filed counter affidavit and submitted that review petition is not maintainable. There is no mistake or error apparent on the face of record. 7. 6. The respondent-petitioner in response to notice issued to him has filed counter affidavit and submitted that review petition is not maintainable. There is no mistake or error apparent on the face of record. 7. It is submitted that re-hearing the matter for changing the earlier decision and then correcting the same do not tall within the ambit of review jurisdiction. The review jurisdiction cannot be used as appellate jurisdiction. 8. It is also submitted that the review-petitioner was not a party in writ petition and has no right to file the instant review petition. 9. It is submitted by Mr. Mirza Mohd. Askari Ali, respondent in person that he is a Shiya Muslim. The review petition has been filed with the intention to grab his ancestral property. He is the legal heir of late Syed Sajjad Ali Khan, s/o Nawab Jafar Ali Khan who was the original owner of the land in question which is evident from Intikhab, Khasra/Kahatauni for the year 1332, copies of which are annexed as Annexure Nos. CA-I, CA-II and CA-III to counter affidavit. 10. It is also submitted that a First Information Report has been lodged on the basis of order passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Vth, Lucknow in Criminal Misc. Case No. 54 of 2010 filed under Section 156 (3) Code of Criminal Procedure against the illegal grabbing of land in question, however, the police has not completed its investigation till date and no report has been submitted in the Court so far. 11 . We have considered the submissions made by the parties' counsel and gone through the record. 12. It appears that Writ Petition No. 6644 (MB) of 2010 was filed by respondent-petitioner claiming following reliefs: @ Hindi @ 13. The writ petition was disposed of on the first date, with the consent of parties' counsel, under the impression that the proceedings were initiated under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the land which was declared surplus, the possession of the same has not been taken over. During pendency of proceedings Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1946 has been repealed and Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Repeal Act, 1999 provides for abetment of the legal proceedings. The order dated 16.7.2010 passed by the Division Bench for convenience is reproduced below: "Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing counsel. During pendency of proceedings Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1946 has been repealed and Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Repeal Act, 1999 provides for abetment of the legal proceedings. The order dated 16.7.2010 passed by the Division Bench for convenience is reproduced below: "Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing counsel. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is being disposed of finally. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that proceedings have been initiated under Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 and the land, which has been declared. surplus, the possession of the same has not been taken over. During the pendency of the proceedings, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 was repealed and Section 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Repeal Act, 1999 provides for abatement of the legal proceedings. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the Apex Court in the case of Pt. Madan Swarup Shronya, Public Charitable Trust vs. State of U.P. and others [J.T. 200(3) S.C. 391] has held that if possession has been taken over by the State Government then the proceedings under the Act will not above but if the possession has not been taken over the proceedings on shall abate. We make it clear that the word possession means actual physical possession. Hence if actual physical possession has been taken over the proceedings shall not abate otherwise they will abate. He submits that in view of the aforesaid legal position, the writ petition may be allowed as the proceedings initiated as stated abated. Learned Standing Counsel does not dispute the aforesaid facts. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the writ petition is allowed. Opposite parties pare directed not to disturb the peaceful possession of the petitioner over Khasra No. 246 and 247 situate in village Para, Pargana, Tehsil and District Lucknow, declared as surplus land under the provisions of section 10(3) and 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976 and further to correct revenue records on necessary steps being taken by the petitioner in that respect." 14. In the writ petition, the respondent-petitioner had himself shown the land in question as Wakf property. The impugned notice dated 10.12.1996 was issued to Syed Kabey Abid and it was not issued to respondent-petitioner or his family members. Mr. In the writ petition, the respondent-petitioner had himself shown the land in question as Wakf property. The impugned notice dated 10.12.1996 was issued to Syed Kabey Abid and it was not issued to respondent-petitioner or his family members. Mr. Syed Kabey Abid has not been shown as related to respondent-petitioner in any manner. The writ petition also does not disclose any reasons for filing it after a delay of approximately 14 years. 15. It is to be noted that the review-petitioner, Shiya Central Wakf Board was not impleaded as a party in the said writ petition, although the respondent-petitioner had shown the land in question as Wakf property. 16. Though the property in question as Wakf property is being disputed by respondent, however, in the revenue records i.e. Khatauni from Fasli Year 1408 to 1413, copies of which are annexed with the review petition, it has been shown as Wakf property. The respondent-petitioner in the counter affidavit on the basis of certain revenue records pertaining to Intkhab of the year 1332 has claimed ownership and title over the land in question, however, we are not required to decide the ownership or title over the land in question in the present proceedings. 17. The writ petition was filed challenging the notice dated 10.12.1996 issued to one Syed Kabey Abid. The said notice was issued under Section 10 (5) of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 for declaring it surplus. 18. The lodging of First Information Report on the basis of some order passed in the proceedings under Section 156 (3) Code of Criminal Procedure would not, in any manner, establish the right of petitioner over the land in question, particularly when the police investigation is still pending and no report has been submitted by the police so far. We are of the view that the writ petition in the facts and circumstances of the case filed by respondent-petitioner was not maintainable as it has not disclosed complete and correct facts and also did not implead necessary parties. 19. It is to be noted that while admitting the review petition, the operation of the order under review was put in abeyance. 20. So far as the maintainability of review petition is concerned, suffice is to mention that any person aggrieved whether a party to the writ petition or not can file review petition. 21. 19. It is to be noted that while admitting the review petition, the operation of the order under review was put in abeyance. 20. So far as the maintainability of review petition is concerned, suffice is to mention that any person aggrieved whether a party to the writ petition or not can file review petition. 21. In the case of Ram Janam Singh v. State of U.P. and Another; (1994) 2 Supreme Court Cases 622, the Apex Court had the occasion to consider the scope of review by a party, who although being a necessary party was not impleaded in the proceedings before the Writ Court. It was observed by the Apex Court that any person affected by the judgment of the High Court has a right to file a review petition before the High Court or file a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court. The relevant observations made in this regard are in para 8 of the judgment which on reproduction reads as under: "8. The appellant, admittedly, was not impleaded as a party to the said writ application, but as he is directly affected like many other officers, who had entered into the State Civil Service before the respondent, filed the connected special leave petition challenging the validity of the judgment aforesaid. In view of the fact that the appellant had entered into Civil Service of the State Government before the respondent, it is not in dispute that he is affected in the matter of seniority by the impugned judgment. It was held by this Court in the case of Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P.1 that a writ application in which the necessary parties likely to be affected have not been impleaded, the High Court should not proceed with such writ application without insisting on such persons or some of them in representative capacity being made respondents. It was further held that if petitioner refuses to join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-rejoinder of necessary parties. Admittedly, none was impleaded even in a representative capacity. But it can be urged on behalf of the respondent that he had not sought any relief against any individual. It was further held that if petitioner refuses to join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-rejoinder of necessary parties. Admittedly, none was impleaded even in a representative capacity. But it can be urged on behalf of the respondent that he had not sought any relief against any individual. He had sought the intervention of the High Court to declare Rule 3(1) of 1973 Rules and Rule 3(b) of 1980 Rules as ultra vires so far they made applicable the benefit of those rules to only specified class of persons and restricted to others who were similarly situated. As such respondent was not required to implied private respondent, (sic appellant), who might be affected by the verdict of the Court. Even if this stand is accepted, can it be said that persons who have been affected by the judgment of the High Court in the connected writ application cannot challenge the correctness thereof either by filing a review petition before the High Court or by filing a special leave petition before this Court? According to us, the answer is in negative. The appellant has a locus standi to challenge the said judgment although he was not a party to the same and the special leave petition filed on his behalf cannot be rejected on that ground. The delay in filing the special leave petition has also been fully explained in the facts and circumstances of the case, which is condoned." 22. In the case of National Housing Coop. Society Ltd v. State of Rajasthan and Others: 2005 (12) Supreme Court Cases 149, the Apex Court held that the review petition filed by a party not impleaded in appeal before the High Court, even though the special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court was dismissed in limine, was still maintainable. A person not party to proceeding has right to file a special leave petition as well as application for review, even on dismissal of special leave petition by a non-speaking order and the High Court can still be moved by way of review. 23. In the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd, v. Rajendra Singh and Others; (2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 581, it has been held by the Apex Court that review can be invoked by a party complaining fraud or misrepresentation, having no alternative remedy. 23. In the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd, v. Rajendra Singh and Others; (2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 581, it has been held by the Apex Court that review can be invoked by a party complaining fraud or misrepresentation, having no alternative remedy. The relevant paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15 & 16 are reproduced below: "12. No one can possibly fault the Insurance Company for persistently pursuing the matter up to this court because they are dealing with public money. If they have discovered that such public fund, in a whopping measure, would be knocked off fraudulently through a fake claim, there is full justification for the Insurance Company in approaching the Tribunal itself first. At any rate the High Court ought not have refused to consider their grievances. What is the legal remedy when a party to a judgment or order of court later discovered that it was obtained by fraud? 13. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagnnath (dead) by Lrs. & ors. ( 1994 (1) SCC 1 ) the two Judges Bench of this Court held: Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal- observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a nullity and nonest in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree- by the first court or by the highest court-has to be treated as a nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings. 14. In Indian Bank v. Satyam fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. ( 1996 (5) SCC 550 ) another two Judges bench, after making reference to a number of earlier decisions rendered by different High Courts in India, stated the legal position thus: Since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court and also amounts to an abuse of the process of Court, the Courts have been held to have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by fraud practised upon that Court. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order. 15. Similarly, where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order. 15. It is unrealistic to expect the appellant company to resist a claim at the first instance on the basis of the fraud because appellant company had at that stage no knowledge about the fraud allegedly played by the claimants. If the Insurance Company comes to know of any dubious concoction having been made with the sinister object of extracting a claim for compensation, and if by that time the award was already passed, it would not be possible for the company to file a statutory appeal against the award. Not only because of bar of limitation to file the appeal but the consideration of the appeal even if the delay could be condoned, would be limited to the issues formulated from the pleadings made till then. 16. Therefore, we have no doubt that the remedy to move for recalling the order on the basis of the newly discovered facts amounting to fraud of high degree, cannot be foreclosed in such a situation. No court or tribunal can be regarded as powerless to recall its own order if it is convinced that the order was wangled through fraud or misrepresentation of such a dimension as would affect the very basis of the claim." 24. Looking to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the review petition deserves to be allowed, it is hereby allowed. 25. The order dated 16.7.2010 passed in Writ Petition No. 6644 (MB) of 2010 is hereby recalled. 26. The writ petition being not maintainable, as observed above, is dismissed. _____________