JUDGMENT Both the appeals are as between the same parties and in relation to the same properties. Hence, they are disposed of through a common judgment. 2. The appellant is the owner of house bearing No. 54-8-9, Isukathota, Visakapatnam. The 2nd respondent is the neighbour on the southern side. The appellant is said to have got the property through inheritance from his father. According to him, on the eastern side of his house, Sri G. Appanna and P. Venkata Rao have their houses and there is no open place, much less, a public lane between the houses of those two persons and that of the appellant. 3. On account of the disputes with the 2nd respondent, her sisters are said to have closed her access to the road on the northern side, shown in the green shade in the plaint plant. It was alleged that by using her clout with the officials of the Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation, the 1st respondent (for short 'the Corporation'), the 2nd respondent has got the compound wall demolished and laid the road, for providing access to the house of the appellant. With these pleadings, the appellant filed as No. 1285 of 1999 in the Court of II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam, against the respondents for restoration of the compound wall and for perpetual injunction. Subsequently, the relief of mandatory injunction was prayed for, by seeking amendment of the plaint. 4. The appellant felt acts of interference by the respondents on account of the interim order passed in as No. 1285 of 1999, being vacated in a CMA. Therefore, OS No. 1716 of 1999 was filed with a prayer to grant perpetual injunction in respect of a small portion of the land; coconut trees and underground drainage. The averments in the plaint in the suit were almost repetition of the one, in OS No. 1285 of 1999, and in addition to that, certain developments, which took place during the pendency of the first suit, were mentioned. 5. The Corporation filed written statement. It has put the appellant, to strict proof of the facts, pleaded by him, in the plaints. 5. The Corporation filed written statement. It has put the appellant, to strict proof of the facts, pleaded by him, in the plaints. It was pleaded that about 20 families, which are residing on the southern side of the house of the appellant were suffering on account of absence of any access to the road on the northern side, and accordingly, the Corporation issued notice dated 13.5.1999 to the appellant. It was also mentioned that he was required to submit the documents for payment of compensation for the acquired land, and that the road was formed on 15.5.1999. Reference was made to OS No. 2513 of 1999 and WP No. 11541 of 1999, filed by the neighbour of the appellant, by name, G. Appanna. It was stated that those cases were disposed of, leaving it open to the Corporation to undertake negotiations with the owners of the land. WP No. 18611 of 2000 filed by the appellant is also said to have been disposed of with similar directions. Ultimately, they prayed for dismissal of the suit. 6. The 2nd respondent filed a separate written-statement. It was stated that she approached the District Legal Services Authority along with the residents of the locality, and that on the instructions issued by the authority, the Mandal Revenue Officer conducted local inspection and submitted reports. She stated that the 1st respondent has undertaken work on the basis of the report submitted by the District Legal Services Authority and the Mandal Revenue Officer. She has also pleaded that once the road was laid and the compound wall was demolished, no relief can be granted in the suit. 7. The trial Court clubbed both the suits and recorded common evidence. Through a common judgment dated 11.10.2006, it decreed both the suits. The 2nd respondent filed AS Nos. 329 and 330 of 2006 in the Court of IX Additional and District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Visakhapatnam, against the judgment and decrees in the suits. Through a common judgment dated 19.9.2011, the lower appellate Court allowed the appeals. Hence, these two second appeals. 8. Sri S. Rajan, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the respondents did not dispute the ownership of the appellant over the land in question and in a highhanded manner, the compound wall was demolished and road was laid by the 1st respondent. Hence, these two second appeals. 8. Sri S. Rajan, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that the respondents did not dispute the ownership of the appellant over the land in question and in a highhanded manner, the compound wall was demolished and road was laid by the 1st respondent. He contends that the trial Court had referred to extensive oral and documentary evidence before it, and arrived at the conclusion, that there was no legal basis for the Corporation to lay the road. He submits that the 1st respondent did not file any appeal, and it is only the 2nd respondent, that preferred the appeals against the decrees passed by the trial Court. Learned Counsel further submits that when the authority, which laid the road, had reconciled to the decrees, there was absolutely no basis for the lower appellate Court in reversing the common judgment, at the instance of the 2nd respondent. 9. Sri N. Subba Rao, learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent, on the other hand, submits that the road was laid for the convenience of the public, and the trial Court committed errors in decreeing the suits. He contends that the Corporation has undertaken various steps in accordance with law, and even offered to pay compensation, and in that view of the matter, the suits filed by the appellant did not merit consideration. 10. Learned Standing Counsel for the 1st respondent-Corporation has also advanced arguments, opposing the appeals. 11. Though two separate suits were filed by the appellant, for all practical purposes, the relief claimed therein is in relation to the same grievance, viz., interference by the respondents with the suit schedule property, demolition of the compound wall, and making construction of road over part of the land. The 2nd respondent did not claim any right over the land, much less any easement. The entire activity over the land of the appellant was undertaken by the 1st respondent. On the basis of the pleadings before it, the trial Court framed two issues in as No. 1285 of 1999, viz. (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? In OS No. 1716 of 1999 only one issue was framed, viz., Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? 12. (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mandatory injunction as prayed for? (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? In OS No. 1716 of 1999 only one issue was framed, viz., Whether the plaintiff is entitled for permanent injunction as prayed for? 12. The evidence before the trial Court comprised of the depositions of PW1, and Exs.A1 to A31, on behalf of the appellant, and depositions of DWs.1 to 4, and Exs.B1 to B20, on behalf of the respondents. The suits were decreed through a common judgment. In the appeals preferred by the 2nd respondent, the lower appellate Court framed the following points for its consideration: 1. "Whether there is alternate way for the D2 and other 20 families to reach the Northern side of municipal road as shown in the plan? 2. Whether the D1 followed due process of law in acquiring the suit property as ordered by the Hon'ble High Court? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the reliefs of mandatory and permanent injunctions? 4. Whether the suit for mere mandatory injunction and permanent injunction is maintainable as against the land acquisition proceedings? 5. Whether the civil Court is having jurisdiction to question the very acquisition proceedings initiated by the D1?" 13. Through common judgment, the lower appellate Court has allowed the appeals. 14. On hearing the learned Counsel for the respective parties, this Court finds that the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration: (a) Whether in a suit for perpetual and mandatory injunctions, filed by plaintiff, the defendants can claim the right of passage, on the ground that there is no alternative way, otherwise than through counter-claim; (b) Whether the appellate Court can express its view as to the legality of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, when no notifications were issued thereunder and when no relief is claimed in that behalf; and (c) Whether a local authority can lay road across the land of a private property, without acquiring it, in accordance with law. 15. The appellant apprehended that the respondents may interfere with the possession of his property to provide access to the 2nd respondent, to the road on the northern side. Therefore, a suit for the relief of perpetual injunction was filed. 15. The appellant apprehended that the respondents may interfere with the possession of his property to provide access to the 2nd respondent, to the road on the northern side. Therefore, a suit for the relief of perpetual injunction was filed. As a matter of fact, the neighbours on the eastern side of the appellant were also apprehensive, and one of them filed a suit. Even while the suit was pending, the compound wall was demolished and C.C. road was laid. That necessitated the amendment of the plaint in the suit, to incorporate the prayer for mandatory injunction, and for restoration of the compound wall. 16. The record discloses that the 2nd respondent had a passage towards the southern side, but the same was closed, on account of a dispute with her sisters. Then she started her efforts to get access to the road on the northern side, across the land of the appellant. It is not even mentioned that the appellant has occupied any public lane, or he has blocked the access thereto. The 2nd respondent has approached the District Legal Services Authority and Revenue Officials, and they are said to have got the area inspected. Everybody felt that, if at all access is to be provided to the 2nd respondent and other neighbours, the land of the appellant must be acquired. 17. There is nothing on record to disclose that any proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, or the Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, which applies to the Corporation, were initiated. Notice was issued to the appellant requiring him to receive compensation. That is said to be on the basis of negotiations. A negotiation can be said to have fructified, if only both the parties have agreed upon a common formula. Though the letter addressed by the Special Tahsildar (LAO), Visakhapatnam, and a letter addressed by the Municipal Commissioner to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam, were filed as Exs.B3 and B5, and a copy of the pay order, for a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs was filed as Ex.B4, it is not even mentioned that any acquisition has taken place, in accordance with law. It is only when a piece of land is acquired as per law and compensation is paid, that the land would vest in the Government, or the local authority, as the case may be. 3 lakhs was filed as Ex.B4, it is not even mentioned that any acquisition has taken place, in accordance with law. It is only when a piece of land is acquired as per law and compensation is paid, that the land would vest in the Government, or the local authority, as the case may be. For all practical purposes, the Corporation came under pressure, exerted by the 2nd respondent, demolished the wall and laid the road, even while the suit was pending. The trial Court took exception to the manner in which, the Corporation acted and decreed the suits. 18. Obviously because the Corporation realized that the steps taken by it are contrary to law, it did not prefer appeals against the decrees. It is only the 2nd respondent that preferred the appeals. The points framed by the lower appellate Court have already been extracted. The first point is in relation to the entitlement of the 2nd respondent to have access, across the land of the appellant on the ground that herself and other neighbours do not have any alternative way. The point was clearly outside the scope of the suit Even if it is the fact that the 2nd respondent did not have any alternative access, it would not constitute a basis for laying road, across the land of the appellant At any rate, there was no counterclaim or independent suit by the 2nd respondent, claiming right of access, across the land of the appellant. Therefore, the very framing of the point No. 1, by the trial Court was perverse and clearly outside the scope of the suit, that gave rise to the appeal. 19. Be that as it may, the lower appellate Court answered this point against the 2nd respondent, as under, "Instead of removing the obstruction in the passage existing to the north of the property of DW4, the D1 officials demolished the compound wall of PW1 and occupied his site and formed C.C. Road. So, the point is answered against the appellant/D2". 20. This answer ought to have resulted in dismissal of the appeal itself, once it is held that there was no justification for the demolition of the compound wall. However it has allowed the appeal on the basis of some other discussion. This Court is of the view that the very approach of the lower appellate Court was defective. 20. This answer ought to have resulted in dismissal of the appeal itself, once it is held that there was no justification for the demolition of the compound wall. However it has allowed the appeal on the basis of some other discussion. This Court is of the view that the very approach of the lower appellate Court was defective. Hence, the first question framed by this Court is answered in favour of the appellant. 21. The lower appellate Court has discussed points 2 to 5 together. It has framed a point, as to whether the Corporation followed due process of law in acquiring the suit property. That was not even the contention of the Corporation. Except stating that a demand draft was kept ready, it did not make any reference to the proceedings under any enactment. Even if the negotiations were to have taken place, the question of acquisition would have arisen, if only an agreement was arrived at between the parties. The appellant has been opposing the effort of the Corporation throughout. Except making an observation, that the Corporation initiated acquisition proceedings, it did not indicate as to how the proceedings have commenced or culminated. Instead, it has found fault with the appellant in filing the suit, without seeking the relief of declaration. The confused state of mind of the lower appellate Court is evident from the following passage: “........ When the D1 initiated the Land Acquisition proceedings as directed by the Hon'ble High Court, PW1 again questioning the very propriety of the acquisition proceedings in this suit without asking for the relief of declaration is bad in law. On the other hand, when the matter is seized by the High Court in the form of writ petition, the lower Court or to that matter this Court cannot grant any relief to PW1 in this suit that too the relief of permanent and mandatory injunctions. PW 1 shall agitate for his rights before the Hon'ble High Court, about very acquisition proceedings on the ground that the acquisition was made for not public purpose etc. In view of the above discussion, all the points are answered against the PW1/plaintiff”. 22. The maximum that occurred on the part of the Corporation was that, a letter was addressed to the District Collector for initiation of land acquisition proceedings, and a schedule was prepared for that. That, in turn, was marked as Ex.B6. In view of the above discussion, all the points are answered against the PW1/plaintiff”. 22. The maximum that occurred on the part of the Corporation was that, a letter was addressed to the District Collector for initiation of land acquisition proceedings, and a schedule was prepared for that. That, in turn, was marked as Ex.B6. Beyond that, there is no final step. Still, the lower appellate Court proceeded to pronounce upon the validity of the acquisition proceedings. Hence, the second point is also answered in favour of the appellant. 23. Coming to the third point, it needs to be observed that the only basis for the Corporation to undertake the work of demolition of compound wall of the appellant and laying of C.C. road was, the so-called necessity of the local residents. Being a public authority, it could certainly have acquired the property and then taken further steps. The justification pleaded by the respondents in laying the road was that, even while the suit was pending, a notice was issued to the appellant by offering a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs, as compensation. Unless the appellant consented for that, there was no basis for the Corporation to proceed on the assumption that the land is vested in it. It hardly needs any mention that, howsoever pressing a public necessity may be, the Government, or its agencies cannot undertake any work upon any private property, unless it was acquired in accordance with law, or the owner thereof has given his consent. Admittedly, none of these two ingredients are present in the instant case. Accordingly, the third point is answered in the negative. 24. In view of the same, the second appeals are allowed, and the common judgment rendered by the lower appellate Court and the decrees passed in AS Nos. 329 and 330 of 2006 are set aside. 25. The miscellaneous petitions filed in the second appeals shall also stand disposed of. 26. There shall be no order as to costs.