JUDGMENT V. Dhanapalan, J. 1. The wife of the detenu Kutty Rajendran @ Rajendran is the petitioner in this habeas corpus petition, and she has challenged the order of detention passed by the third respondent in Cr.M.P.No.6/BM/2013(E1), dated 30.01.2013, branding the detenu as "Black Marketer". 2. The detaining authority has relied on an adverse case registered in Crime No.111 of 2012 on the file of Civil Supplies Criminal Investigation Department, Pollachi, for an offence under Section 6(4) of TNSC (RDCS) Order, 1982 r/w Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The ground case alleged against the detenu is one registered on 02.01.2013 by the Sub Inspector of Police, Civil Supplies Criminal Investigation Department, Pollachi in Crime No.3 of 2013 for an offence under Rule 6(4) of TNSC (RDCS) Order, 1982 r/w Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 3. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for respondents 2 and 3 as well as the learned Senior Central Government Standing Counsel for the first respondent. 4. Though several grounds are raised, the learned counsel for the petitioner mainly focussed his argument on the ground of delay in considering the representation dated 12.02.2013. According to him, though the representation was received by the Government on 15.02.2013 and remarks were called for on 19.02.2013, the remarks were received by the Government only on 01.03.2013 and hence there was a delay of seven days in considering the representation and on this ground alone, the order of detention is liable to be quashed. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor gave the details of the dates regarding the manner in which the representation was considered. According to him, the representation dated 12.02.2013, was received by the Government on 15.02.2013, and it was rejected on 13.3.2013, and the same was served on the detenu on 20.3.2013. 6. It appears that the representation dated 12.02.2013 sent by the detenu, was received by the Government on 15.02.2013, and thereafter, parawar remarks were called for from the Collectorate on 19.02.2013 and the same was received by the Government only on 01.3.2013. Thereafter, the file was submitted to the Additional Secretary on 06.3.2013, and subsequently, it was placed before the Minister for Food on 08.3.2013, and ultimately, the representation was rejected on 13.3.2013 and the rejection letter was sent to the detenu on the same day. Thereafter, the file was submitted to the Additional Secretary on 06.3.2013, and subsequently, it was placed before the Minister for Food on 08.3.2013, and ultimately, the representation was rejected on 13.3.2013 and the rejection letter was sent to the detenu on the same day. We find that parawar remarks were called for from the Collectorate on 19.02.2013, and it was received by the Government only on 01.3.2013. In between these two dates, two days were holidays. Even after deducting those two days, there had been a delay of seven days in sending parawar remarks, which remained unexplained. We are of the view that the delay in considering the representation affects the right of the detenu, violating Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Hence the order of detention is vitiated and liable to be set aside. 7. At this juncture, it is relevant to refer the decision of the Apex Court in Sk. Rashid v. State of West Bengal (AIR 1973 SC 824): "4. .... The question requiring consideration by this Court is the effect of this explanation for the delay on the part of the State Government in considering the petitioner’s representation, on the validity of his detention. It is undoubtedly true that neither the Constitution nor the Act expressly provides for consideration of a detenu’s representation by the State Government within any specified period of time. The constitutional requirement of expeditious consideration of the petitioner’s representation by the State Government has, however, been spelt out by this Court from clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution. This clause reads: “22. (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.” The use of the words “as soon as may be” is important. It reflects the anxiety on the part of the framers of the Constitution to enable the detenu to know the grounds on which the order of his detention has been made so that he can make an effective representation against it at the earliest. It reflects the anxiety on the part of the framers of the Constitution to enable the detenu to know the grounds on which the order of his detention has been made so that he can make an effective representation against it at the earliest. The ultimate objective of this provision can only be the most speedy consideration of his representation by the authorities concerned, for, without its expeditious consideration with a sense of urgency the basic purpose of affording earliest opportunity of making the representation is likely to be defeated. This right to represent and to have the representation considered at the earliest flows from the constitutional guarantee of the right to personal liberty — the right which is highly cherished in our Republic and its protection against arbitrary and unlawful invasion." 8. The Principle laid down by the Apex Court in the decision cited supra is that the inordinate delay in the disposal of the representation would definitely amount to breach of the constitutional imperative and the same would render a continued detention impermissible and illegal. As far as the case on hand is concerned, we have already pointed out that there is inordinate and unexplained delay of seven days in considering the representation of the detenu and as such, the same would vitiate the impugned order of detention. 9. In the result, the impugned detention order passed by the third respondent, detaining the detenu namely, Kutty Rajendran @ Rajendran, S/o.Paulsamy, made in Cr.M.P.No.6/BM/2013 (E1), dated 30.01.2013, is quashed and the habeas corpus petition is allowed. The above named detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, unless his custody is required in connection with any other case.