Judgment :- 1. This Second appeal is focussed animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 18.9.2006 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge Fast Track Court-V, Chennai, in A.S.No.551 of 2005 reversing the judgment and decree dated 31.12.2003 passed by the III Assistant City Civil Court, Chennai, in O.S.No.1235 of 2000, which was one for declaration and for permanent injunction. 2. The parties are referred to hereunder according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. A r'esume of facts abslutely necessary for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus: (a) The respondent herein, as plaintiff, filed the suit seeking the following reliefs: "i) For a declaration declaring that the defendant has got no right of access over the passage measuring 3' X 76 feet running into from South to North from Ayyavoo Naidu Street to the plaintiff suit property more fully described in the schedule hereunder; ii) for consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendant his men, servants, agents or any other person or persons claiming through her from having any access over the passage at the western side of the house of suit property namely the passage measuring 3' X 76' feet running into from South to North from Ayyavoo Naidu Street to the plaintiff's suit property morefully described in the schedule hereunder' iii) for a mandatory injunction directing the defendant to close the opening and the door caused and put up by the defendant in the Western side wall of his property in between the house and gate in the middle of the passage, and iv) to pay costs of the suit." (extracted as such) on the main ground that he purchased the suit property from one Vinayagam, vide sale deed-Ex.A4 dated 17.5.1991, who in turn purchased the suit property from one Chandra, vide sale deed-Ex.A3 dated 1.10.1981. The recitals in the sale deed-Ex.A2 dated 10.12.1980 in favour of Chandra would unambiguously and unequivocally exemplify and demonstrate that the defendant-Thiruvengadam, who happened to be one of the vendors under it, should not have any ingress and egress through the suit passage; however, violating the same, he opened a door way abetting the suit passage and thereby violated the rights of the plaintiff. (b) Per contra, the defendant filed the written statement challenging and impugning the averments in the plaint, which succinctly and precisely would run thus: The defendant was the owner of certain extent of property, including the common suit passage and the same was sold to one T.S.Chandra vide sale deed-Ex.A2 dated 10.12.1980, wherein, the suit passage was specified and discribed as common passage, measuring 76 feet lengthwise and 3 feet breadthwise and in the sale deed executed in favour of Chandra, it was only mentioned as a common passage and not exclusive passage for Chandra alone or for Chandra's transferees. The negative prayer in the plaint cannot be granted. Accordingly, the defendant would pray for the dismissal of the suit. (c) Whereupon issues were famed. Up went the trial, during which, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and marked Exs.A1 to A16. On the defendant's side one Sekar was examined as D.W.1 and no document was filed on his side. (d) Ultimately, the trial Court dismissed the suit, as against which, the appeal was filed. Whereupon, the first appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree of the trial Court and decreed the original suit. 4. Challenging and impugning the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court, the defendant preferred this second appeal on various grounds. 5. My learned predecessor formulated the following substantial question of law: "Whether the decision of the lower appellate Court below is right when the plaintiff sought for a negative prayer?" (extracted as such) 6. Indubitably and indisputably, the suit property here is a passage measuring 3 feet width and 76 feet length. It is sandwiched by the house of Kuppuammal on the West and the house of Thiruvengadam-the defendant on the East. The house of Palani-the plaintiff is situated to the North of the passage. In fact, the said suit passage is leading from Ayyavoo Naidu Street towards North and reaches the house of the plaintiff-Palani. 7. The learned counsel for the plaintiff would without mincing words candidly and categorically submit that the plaintiff being the purchaser of the property from Vinayagam, who had derivative title from Chandra, admits that Kuppuammal-the original owner of the entire property therein, could use the passage along with the plaintiff-Palani, but Thiruvengadam-the defendant cannot use the passage as a common passage by opening aperture in his wall abetting the common passage. He would place reliance exclusively on the following recitals in the sale deed-Ex.A2 dated 10.12.1980: "The vendors do hereby assure that the third vendor shall not construct or put up any structures or fittings or the doors, windows obstructing the path way." Accordingly, the learned counsel would submit that Thiruvangadam-the defendant, after committing himself in black and white in Ex.A2-the sale deed dated 10.12.1980, cannot veer round and take a plea quite antithetical to what he committed himself, as aforesaid. 8. Whereas, the learned counsel for the defendant-Thiruvengadam in a bid to torpedo and pulverise the averments as put forth on the side of the plaintiff would pyramid his argument, which could succinctly and precisely be set out thus: Originally the entire area belonged to Kuppuammal who sold part of her property in favour of Thiruvengadam-the defendant and his relatives and the said Thiruvengadam and others jointly executed a sale deed in favour of Chandra alienating part of the property which they purchased from Kuppammal. According to the learned counsel for the defendant-Thiruvengadam, reserved his common right of passage over the suit passage and accordingly, the recitals in the aforesaid documents should be interpreted and not in the way that was canvassed by the plaintiff. 9. At this juncture, I recollect the maxim 'Verba genaralia generaliter sunt intelligenda – General words are to be understood generally. 10. A plain reading and poring over of those recitals extracted supra would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that Thiruvengadamthe defendant voluntarily and volitionally without any compulsion or whatsoever undertook not to have any opening abetting the said common passage. In such a case, violating the mandate as contained in Sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, he cannot take up a plea as he took in his written statement. 11. No doubt, the learned counsel for the defendant-Thiruvengadam in a bid to shoot down and mincemet the plea of the plaintiff, would try to canvass the point that even though the above recitals would demonstrate and display that it is the exclusive passage of Chandra, yet Kuppuammal while alienating the property in favour of Thiruvengadam and others, she referred to it only as a common passage. For which, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, as has been pointed out by me supra, admits that late Kuppammal had the right of ingress and egress, but not Thiruvengadam, who already committed himself in black and white that he would not make any opening in his wll abetting the suit passage. 12. Not to put too fine a point on it, I am of the considered view that the first appellate Court was right in holding that Thiruvengadam-the defendant was estopped as well as prevented from making any opening abetting the suit passage. A fortiori, a right to a passage can validly be surendered in favour of another by virtue of a document. 13. The contention on the side of the defendant that there was a negative prayer, in my opinion, is neither here nor there. Even though the prayer is worded in negative langugage, yet that is in respect of declaring the right of the plaintiff to have ingress and egress through the passage at his convenience to the exclusion of the defendant and the plaintiff intended that it should not be interfered with by Thiruvengadam-the defendant, by making any opening or aperture in is wall abetting the suit passage. There is nothing under the law that a prayer should not be worded by using such a negative language. As such, the trial Court was wrong in understanding the true purport of the prayer, but the first appellate Court au fait with law and au courant with facts correctly decided the lis, warranting no interference in second appeal. 14. In the result, the second appeal is dismissed. However there is no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is dismissed.