JUDGMENT 1. Heard finally, by consent of the parties. 2. The present Appeal from Order is filed by the Appellant-original Plaintiff-Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (for short, “BPCL”) as the learned Judge of the City Civil Court, Greater Mumbai, pending the Suit for specific performance, dismissed the Notice of Motion, on 5 September 2013, whereby the prayers were to appoint the Court Receiver and injunct the Respondent-original Defendant from selling, transferring, alienating and/or disposing of and/or parting with possession or creating any third party rights or interest in the Suit property. 3. The basic document is a minutes of the meeting dated 14 March 2001 recording the discussion between the parties and the same also signed by the respective representatives/authorized persons. The basic terms are recorded and noted, but not treated as a concluded contract even by the learned Judge. The usual contentions of failure to perform their respective obligations are made, raised and discussed. The agreement is conditional and/or concluded, is again a matter of discussion. 4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant basically contended that the parties, the price and the properties are clearly mentioned in the written minutes signed by the respective representatives. This just cannot be overlooked at this stage of the proceedings. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Defendant however, contended that the terms itself show, it was conditional and subject to the completion of the formalities including the approval by the Appellant's Management. Admittedly, no amount whatsoever paid and/or received pursuance to the discussion, as it was specifically agreed that the full sale price would be paid upon execution and registration of sale deed in a form approved by the BPCL. Immediately, on 31 March 2001, referring to the discussion, inquiry was made about the title deed of the site. The next letter was of 19 January 2002, where the Respondent expressed inability to sell an additional part of 1300 sq. ft. The first part remained intact even at this stage. But, after this discussion, no further steps taken by either of the parties. 5. Admittedly, the Appellant was in possession of the Suit property in pursuance to the lease agreement with the Respondent. The litigation was pending for eviction/possession of the property. ft. The first part remained intact even at this stage. But, after this discussion, no further steps taken by either of the parties. 5. Admittedly, the Appellant was in possession of the Suit property in pursuance to the lease agreement with the Respondent. The litigation was pending for eviction/possession of the property. The Appellant by letter dated 26 March 2004, apart from lease issue intimate to the Respondent the approval of the Management to purchase the property therefore, the demand was made of the Conveyance executed by Liberty Oil Mills in favour of the Respondent. The Respondent by letter dated 23 November 2004 apart from dealing with the issue with regard to the lease and arrears and release and termination of it, asked for arrears of the rent that too without accepting the case and without discussing anything about the sale transaction. 6. The Appellant, therefore, filed the Suit for specific performance based upon the agreement sometime in 2005 though the alleged agreement is dated 14 March 2001. No such Notice of Motion taken out against the Respondent in the year 2005. The Respondent filed their written statement on 24 August 2005 and specifically denied the agreement and/or any contract to sell the property in question. In the meantime, the issue with regard to the possession, as well as, the arrears of rent of the property went up to the Supreme Court against order dated 27 April 2011. The order of possession was maintained even by noting the submission referring and revolving around the present Suit for specific performance. The issue of termination of tenancy, therefore concluded by the High Court. 7. In Special Leave Petition (SLP) filed by the Appellant, while dismissing the same, the Supreme Court directed that the Suit in question be expedited. The statement is made that the ground with regard to the Suit in question also raised in the SLP. However, only the time was granted to vacate the premises by 31 December 2012, which was subsequently extended for further three months. The possession, in view of above, handed over by the Appellant-Plaintiff to the Respondent. 8. The Defendant in view of the specific defence so raised in the written statement filed in the year 2005, as there was no injunction and/or any order of any kind against them, to create or to transfer the property, they executed the agreement to sell the property. 8. The Defendant in view of the specific defence so raised in the written statement filed in the year 2005, as there was no injunction and/or any order of any kind against them, to create or to transfer the property, they executed the agreement to sell the property. The Appellant filed Notice of Motion on 18 July 2013 and filed an affidavit in support of the same. On 31 July, 2013, as the matter was listed for hearing, and based upon the affidavit an ex-parte ad-interim relief was granted in favour of the Appellant by the trial Court. The Respondent appeared and contested the Motion and pointed out on affidavit that the property has already been transferred on 23 July 2013. The Motion was heard on 31 July 2013. The Appellant's affidavit also acknowledged the transfer as they noted the public notice of the property in question. It is specifically mentioned that the possession of the premises also handed over to one Madhuban Motors Private Limited, on 23 July 2013 apart from the receipt of consideration of Rs.2 crores, which is recorded along with the acknowledgement letter of possession. 9. The learned Judge considering the nature of agreement between the parties, held that the prima facie there is no concluded contract, the principle of balance of convenience and equity in view of the facts as recorded, also go in favour of the Respondent and against the Appellant. 10. Whether the agreement is conditional and/or concluded though prima facie observations are made, still it cannot be adjudicated at this stage in favour of the Appellant. But at the same stroke, the Suit for specific performance and the discretionary powers of the Court to conclude and/or pass final order for or against the party just cannot be overlooked. 11. The Appellant-Plaintiff admittedly were in possession of the property till they vacated, pursuant to the order passed by the Supreme Court in December 2012. The Respondent's case and their stands in view of the written statement so filed in the year 2005 was clear. Mere possession by the Appellant itself cannot be the reason not to move such protective motion even in the year 2005 itself. They have not done so. On the contrary, for the tenancy issue, the aspect of pendency of the Suit of specific performance raised and discussed even upto the Supreme Court stage. Mere possession by the Appellant itself cannot be the reason not to move such protective motion even in the year 2005 itself. They have not done so. On the contrary, for the tenancy issue, the aspect of pendency of the Suit of specific performance raised and discussed even upto the Supreme Court stage. The issue of handing over the possession was once concluded, no protection granted based upon the Suit for specific performance pending, even by the High Court, as well as, by the Supreme Court. 12. This also means, there was no interim order of any kind against the owner of the property to deal with the same. The Respondent therefore, if entered into an agreement and handed over the possession to the third party, the Notice of Motion so taken out now, based upon the agreement of the year 2001 even if any, in my view, creates no equity in favour of the Appellant, apart from delay at every stage of the proceedings, including the issue of filing of the Suit in the year 2005, though the agreement is of the year 2001. The aspect of prima facie case, balance of convenience and of irreparable injury, in my view, is not in favour of the Appellant in view of the above position on record. 13. The issue with regard to the transfer of property, pending the litigation even if any, revolving around Sections 52 to 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, (for short, T.P. Act) apart from the allegations of defaults of either of the parties, unless adjudicated finally, that itself cannot be the reason to accept the case of the Appellant-Plaintiff for such order as prayed in the Motion. The agreement of sale and the handing over of the possession of the property immediately, apart from the receipt of part payment and considering the provisions of Section 53-A of the T.P. Act, and as the third person/party admittedly not joined, as interest has been created in favour of the third party, just cannot be overlooked by the Court. The contract was conditional and/or concluded unless adjudicated finally and even if concluded, the Court can pass final appropriate Judgment/order in the Suit for specific performance. Therefore, in view of the above reasons, I see there is no case made out to interfere with the order. 14. The Appeal from Order is dismissed, so also the Civil Application. The contract was conditional and/or concluded unless adjudicated finally and even if concluded, the Court can pass final appropriate Judgment/order in the Suit for specific performance. Therefore, in view of the above reasons, I see there is no case made out to interfere with the order. 14. The Appeal from Order is dismissed, so also the Civil Application. There shall be no order as to costs. There shall be no order as to costs. 15. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant submitted to extend the status quo order granted by this Court on 27 September 2013 for further four weeks. The same is accordingly continued for four weeks from today.