B.D. Agarwal, J. This appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(u) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter, referred to as 'CPC', in short) is directed against the judgment and order dated 21.07.2011, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Tinsukia, in Title Appeal No. 11 of 2010. Since the appellant was not a party in the appeal a separate application under Order 22 Rules 10 and 11, read with Order 1 Rule 8(5), read with Section 151 CPC has also been filed by the appellant, which is registered as Misc. Case No. 3095 of 2011. Since the Misc. Case is connected with the main appeal, this judgment will dispose of the appeal as well as the Misc. Case. 2. I have heard Sri R.L. Yadav, learned counsel, for the appellant as well as Sri P.J. Saikia, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. Respondent No. 2 has not turned up, despite being notified by this Court. 3. The factual background of the appeal is that the respondent No. 1, namely, Sri Laxmipat Duggar @ Jain, was a tenant under the respondent No. 2 with respect to a residence-cum-shop premises. The respondent No. 2, who is the father of the appellant, filed Title Suit No. 45 of 2004 (subsequently renumbered as Title Suit No. 23 of 2007) in the Court of Munsiff at Tinsukia in the capacity of landlord for ejectment of respondent No. 1. The suit was decreed in favour of the landlord on 07.05.2010. The said decree was challenged in the Court of learned Civil Judge, by the tenant being Title Appeal No. 11 of 2010. The appeal has been disposed of by way of remanding the suit to the trial Court for fresh disposal after framing an additional issue to the following effect: Whether the defendant is entitled to protection under Section 5 of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955? 4. The aforesaid judgment of remand is under challenge by one of the sons of the plaintiff/respondent No. 2 on the ground that the tenanted property devolved upon him by way of a family settlement that took place in the year 2000 and now he has stepped into the shoes of the landlord of the tenanted premises. 4. The aforesaid judgment of remand is under challenge by one of the sons of the plaintiff/respondent No. 2 on the ground that the tenanted property devolved upon him by way of a family settlement that took place in the year 2000 and now he has stepped into the shoes of the landlord of the tenanted premises. It may be mentioned here that the family settlement was also challenged by the father of the appellant by way of filing a separate suit being Title Suit No. 66 of 2006. The suit was dismissed in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Tinsukia. The dismissal decree was challenged in the High Court in RFA No. 31 of 2008. The appeal, filed by the father of the appellant, was dismissed on 26.08.2010. However, the tenancy appeal was filed earlier by the tenant without impleading the son of the landlord (appellant herein) since the tenant was not a party in the family settlement suit. 5. Sri Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that after the disposal of the tenancy appeal by way of remand of the suit the father is not interested to pursue the matter, since the suit property has devolved upon the appellant. Hence, the appellant should be given the leave to challenge the impugned order. 6. The respondent No. 1 is resisting the admission of the appeal by way of giving the leave of the Court under Order 22 Rule 10. Sri Saikia, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submitted that there is no provision of second appeal under Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereinafter 'Rent Act') and, as such, the appellant could have filed a revision application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India instead of appeal. Referring to the judgments of this Court rendered in Ramesh Chandra Basak v. Deo Narayan Prasad; 1984 GHC 37, and Ranjit Kumar Dey v. Krishna Gopal Agarwala; : 2004 (2) GLT 435, Sri Saikia submitted that the final orders and decrees passed by the appellate Court under the rent Act are not appealable in the High Court as regular second appeal. Sri Saikia, learned counsel further submitted that from the evidence on record it is apparent that there was a family partition in the year 2000, whereas the ejectment suit was filed in the year 2004 and, as such, Order 22 Rule 10CPC will not be applicable. Sri Saikia, learned counsel further submitted that from the evidence on record it is apparent that there was a family partition in the year 2000, whereas the ejectment suit was filed in the year 2004 and, as such, Order 22 Rule 10CPC will not be applicable. According to the learned counsel, under Rule 10 Order 22 a person can continue a suit if the title of the suit property is received by him/her on assignment, creation or devolution of any interest in the suit property, with the leave of the Court. According to the learned counsel, since the interest of the appellant in the suit property had accrued before filing of the ejectment suit the aforesaid provision is not applicable. The learned counsel also submitted that the spirit of Section 100 would have equal force for filing a second appeal under Section 104 CPC against the final order in an ejectment suit under the Rent Act, 1972. Sri Saikia also contended that Order 43 Rule 1(u) signifies that an appeal against an order would lie to the same Court where decree of the appellate court can be challenged. According to the learned counsel, since the decree of the appellate court is not appealable in the form of second appeal in the High Court the present appeal under Order 43 is also not maintainable. 7. In reply to the aforesaid contentions, Sri Yadav, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment is not a final decree, which can be challenged either by way of filing a second appeal or a revision application. According to the learned counsel, the impugned judgment is out and out an order under Order 41 Rule 23A CPC and, as such, an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(u) CPC is maintainable. 8. As noted earlier, the ejectment suit was initially filed in the court by the father of the appellant under the provisions of the Rent Act, 1972 on the ground of defaulter without impleading the appellant as a defendant. The plaintiff did not implead the appellant (his son) in the suit though the suit property fell in the share of the appellant during the family settlement and since the father was taking care of the suit the son (appellant) also did not think it necessary to implead himself in the suit or in the appeal. 9. The plaintiff did not implead the appellant (his son) in the suit though the suit property fell in the share of the appellant during the family settlement and since the father was taking care of the suit the son (appellant) also did not think it necessary to implead himself in the suit or in the appeal. 9. The rent law does not prescribe any special procedure of trial. It may also be put on record that in Assam there is no special Court/Tribunal to deal with the ejectment suits. Besides this, Section 2 of the Rent Act defines the word "Court" as a Court of ordinary civil jurisdiction. In view of this definition of the Court, the suits are being entertained by ordinary Civil Courts having jurisdiction over the tenanted premises and the procedure of trial as laid down under Civil Procedure Code are being followed. In fact, the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 have actually taken note of the applicability of Section 100 CPC to declare that no regular second appeal is maintainable in the High Court against a final judgment/decree of the first appellate Court. 10. Apparently, Section 100 provides for filing of regular second appeal in the High Court against a final decree passed by an appellate Court and Section 104 deals with appeals against certain orders passed by appellate Courts, as enumerated under Order 43. Similarly, the second appeal is maintainable under Order 42, whereas, appeals against orders are maintainable under Section 104 CPC read with Order 43, albeit procedure of hearing would be the same as provided under Order 41. 11. The admitted position is that the first appellate court has not finally decided the appeal of the tenant. It has simply remanded back the suit to the trial Court by way of framing an additional issue. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, there is a specific finding by the trial Court that the provisions of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 are not applicable. In fact, the suit was decreed under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. 12. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, there is a specific finding by the trial Court that the provisions of the Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955 are not applicable. In fact, the suit was decreed under the provisions of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. 12. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, in view of the aforesaid findings the direction of the appellate Court that an additional issue should be framed as to whether the defendant is entitled to protection under Assam Non Assam Non-Agricultural Urban Areas Tenancy Act, 1955, is nothing but an otiose and also a direction dehors to the facts of the case and findings of the trial Court. 13. Order XLI Rule 23A is to the following effect: 23-A. Remand in other cases- Where the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the case otherwise than on a preliminary point, and the decree is reversed in appeal and a re-trial is considered necessary, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers as it has under rule 23. 14. Apparently, the appeal has not been finally decided on merit. Since the suit has been remanded back to the trial Court, I hold that the impugned judgment is ex-facie an order under Order 41 Rule 23A CPC, which is appealable under Order 43 Rule 1(u). Hence, the appeal is treated under Section104, read with Order 43 Rule 1(u) CPC and I hold that the appeal is maintainable in the High Court. Similarly, since the appellant is the son of the original plaintiff and in view of assertion of the appellant, that the suit property devolved upon him in view of the family settlement and the judgment of the Court in Title Suit No. 66 of 2006, he has a right to challenge the impugned judgment and also to defend his interest in the suit. 15. Resultantly, the prayer to grant leave to file this appeal is also allowed. In the result, the appeal also stands allowed. 16. The impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The appellant is allowed to file a petition in the appellate Court to implead him as one of the respondents, whereupon, the parties shall be heard afresh and an appropriate order shall be passed. The stay order stands vacated. 17. In the result, the appeal also stands allowed. 16. The impugned judgment is hereby set aside. The appellant is allowed to file a petition in the appellate Court to implead him as one of the respondents, whereupon, the parties shall be heard afresh and an appropriate order shall be passed. The stay order stands vacated. 17. Both the parties are directed to appear in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Tinsukia, on 25.02.2013 and receive further order(s). After the dictation of this judgment, Sri Saikia, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 raised an issue that instead of disposing the appeal on the aforesaid terms it would be proper to admit the appeal and the same may be heard on merit on some other day. Since I have not dealt with the facts of the case and, more particularly, merit of the appeal no formal admission of the case is necessary. The objection is overruled. The appeal stands disposed of at the admission stage itself. __