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2013 DIGILAW 220 (JHR)

Siban Mahato v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.

2013-02-12

APARESH KUMAR SINGH

body2013
ORDER Heard counsel for the parties. 2. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the impugned order dated 20.4.2006, by which, the respondents have admitted that the petitioner's correct date of birth is 10.8.1946 as recorded in Form-B instead of 1.7.1944 as recorded in N.E.I.S records under the respondents, which was however made the basis of his forced retirement on 30.6.2004. The respondents have however accepted the correct date of of birth as 10.8.1946 and offered the petitioner to rejoin his service, however with a condition that he would not claim salary for the period in which he was out of service. The petitioner is primarily aggrieved by the later part of the order by which though he has been directed to rejoin his service but the salary for the period for which he had been forced to be out of service have been denied to him apparently for no fault of his. 3. According to the petitioner he was a permanent employee of M/s BCCL posted at Gondudih Colliery as Line Mazdoor and his Personal Number is 02484293. Subsequently, as per his date of birth recorded in form -B as 10.8.1946, he ought to have retired on 31.8.2006 after completing 60 years. He was however made to retire on 30.6.2004 by the order contained in Annexure-1 itself by treating his date of birth as 1.7.1944. On representation of the Union, the respondents realized their mistake and by way of Annexure-2 dated 20.4.2006 directed the petitioner to resume his service, however with the aforesaid conditions. The petitioner has relied upon the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Deobrat Sahay Vrs. Coal India Limited, Kolkata & others reported in 2011(2) J.C.R. 344 (Jhr). As per the said judgment, according to the petitioner the meaning of “dies-non” has been interpreted and it has been held that in only three circumstances which are being indicated hereunder the period can be treated as “dies-non” which are :- (a) where any official remains absent from duty without prior permission. (b) while on duty, in office, any official has left the office, without prior permission; and (c) when the official remains in office but, refuses to perform the duties assigned to him. 4. (b) while on duty, in office, any official has left the office, without prior permission; and (c) when the official remains in office but, refuses to perform the duties assigned to him. 4. Counsel for the petitioner submits that in the instant case neither the petitioner was absent from duty without prior permission nor he left duty without prior permission or he refused to perform duty assigned to him while remaining in office. Therefore, such conditions should not be imposed on resumption of duties is only due to admitted fault of the respondents. Petitioner, however chose not to join his service and retired on 31.8.2006 during the pendency of the writ application, which subsequently has already been brought on record by way of amendment by which petitioner has claimed post retiral dues. 5. The sole ground to oppose the prayer of the petitioner by the respondents is that in any event the petitioner has not contributed to the organization for the period for which he remained out of service, may be on account of such discrepancy in the date of birth. As such he should not be allowed to get salary without actually performing his duty for the said period. 6. I have heard counsel for the parties at length and gone through the relevant materials including the impugned order. The facts which has been narrated herein above makes out an admitted case that the petitioner was made to retire on an early date on 30.6.2004(Annexure-1) issued by the respondents by wrongly treating his date of birth as 1.7.1944. On realization of such mistake they offered him to resume his service after almost 18 months treating his correct date of birth as 10.7.1946. However, the respondents imposed a condition that he would not make any claim for the arrears of the pay for such period of “dies-non”. It however appears from the judgment relied upon by the petitioner and the fact of the case that the period for which the petitioner remained out of service was no fault of his since, neither he absented from duty without permission nor refused to perform his duty still in office. However, the petitioner admittedly could not perform his duties though on account of fault of the respondents. Any salary or emoluments paid to the petitioner are in lieu of service rendered by him. However, the petitioner admittedly could not perform his duties though on account of fault of the respondents. Any salary or emoluments paid to the petitioner are in lieu of service rendered by him. In this case he was prevented to perform his duty by illegal act of the respondents. 7. Counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon a judgment rendered by Division Bench of this Court in the case of Fatik Chandra Dutta Vrs. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & ors. reported in 2005(1) J.C.R. 411 (Jhr) and submitted that in such circumstances, after quashing of the arbitrary and illegal order of premature retirement, this Court directed the said petitioner to be reinstated with all consequential benefits including arrears of salary for the period in which he was forced to remain out of service. 8. In these circumstances, respondents are also directed to pay the salary of the petitioner for the period from 30.6.2004 till 20.4.2006, when the offer of resumption of duty was made to him. However, petitioner had not joined the said post and retired while pursuing the present writ application preferred against the impugned order (Annexure-2). In that view of the matter, the petitioner would not be entitled for salary from 20.4.2006 to 31.8.2006, which however is treated for reckoning his service as continuous till his normal date of retirement for the purpose of post retirement benefit. Respondents are directed to pay the post retirement benefit to the petitioner, if not already paid with arrears of salary within 12 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 9. The writ petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms.