Judgment :- 1. Heard the counsel for the parties. 2. This petition takes exception to the fresh tender process commenced by the respondent Corporation in respect of CLOSED HDPE REFUSE BINS OF 120 lit. & 240 lit .CAPACITY for a period of one year, vide tender notice dated 7th November, 2012 and also the decision of the Corporation to terminate the first tender process vide tender notice dated 1st August, 2012. 3. The petitioner had submitted his bid pursuant to the first tender notice, which was considered along with the offer of other bidders. It appears that the tender Committee considered the offer made by the petitioner as responsive offer and processed his bid further. However, when the proposal was placed before the Additional Municipal Commissioner (City), considering the complaint received from the rival bidder and the communication received from the expert whose certificate and test report was relied by the petitioner, the Additional Commissioner vide order dated 30th October, 2012 decided to cancel the first tender process. On the basis of the said decision, the petitioner was informed by the Executive Engineer vide letter dated 6th November, 2012 that the tender process was cancelled. On the next day, a fresh tender process was commenced on the same terms and conditions, vide tender notice dated 7th November, 2012. The petitioner has already submitted his bid for the second tender process. However, the petitioner apprehends that relying on the opinion already recorded by the Additional Municipal Commissioner, the bid submitted by the petitioner will be treated as ineligible and rejected. It is on this apprehension the petitioner has approached this court by way of present Writ Petition, not only challenging the issuance of second e-tender notice, but also the decision of the officials of the Corporation in terminating the earlier tender process in which the petitioner had offered his bid. In the first place, the petitioner, having submitted his offer to the fresh tender notice, cannot be allowed to assail the decision of the Corporation to terminate the first tender process. The subtle attempt of the Petitioner is to seek declaration from this Court that the so called EN Certificate tendered by the Petitioner is a valid EN Certificate. That cannot be countenanced. 4. The subtle attempt of the Petitioner is to seek declaration from this Court that the so called EN Certificate tendered by the Petitioner is a valid EN Certificate. That cannot be countenanced. 4. Be that as it may, according to the petitioner, the petitioner had offered lowest bid and if it were to be accepted, it would benefit the public exchequer by almost more than Rs.1 crore, being less than the next lowest offer. 5. Counsel for the petitioner has assailed the entire process essentially on the ground that the decision was taken by the Additional Municipal Commissioner without hearing or without giving an opportunity to cure the deficiency in the offer submitted by it, if any. Moreover, the order passed by the Additional Municipal Commissioner is not even adverted to in the communication received by the Petitioner from the Executive Engineer about the cancellation of the tender process. As a result, the decision taken by the Additional Municipal Commissioner and the follow up action taken by the officials of the Corporation including intimation given to the petitioner of cancellation of tender process is vitiated, being violative of the principles of natural justice. Counsel for the petitioner made feeble attempt to persuade the court that the action is malafide and colourable exercise of power, without any foundation to substantiate the same. These are the broad grounds urged before us. 6. Having considered the rival submissions, we are in agreement with the submission made by the counsel for the Corporation that the petitioner has merely relied on clause g) in the technical specifications given in the tender notice. Clause g) reads thus: “g) The Dimensions of the bins shall be as per EN 8401 Standards. The copy of test report of EN 8401 Standard shall be submitted to prove that the dimensions are in line with standard. The dimensional tolerances shall be as per the EN 840 Standard.” 7. The petitioner ought to have also kept in mind the other crucial clauses found in the technical specifications in the tender process which are relevant for considering the eligibility criteria of the bidder. Amongst others, clause iv), which reads thus: “iv) The dealer shall submit latest valid EN Certification copy along with the Tender document." 8. The petitioner ought to have also kept in mind the other crucial clauses found in the technical specifications in the tender process which are relevant for considering the eligibility criteria of the bidder. Amongst others, clause iv), which reads thus: “iv) The dealer shall submit latest valid EN Certification copy along with the Tender document." 8. On conjoint reading of both the above clauses, we have no hesitation in accepting the argument of the respondent Corporation that the bidder was expected to submit a latest “valid” EN-certification copy. The term EN certification copy has not been defined in the tender document but it is common ground that EN Certification means Certification by Expert of the product matching European Norms Standards. 9. The petitioner has relied on the certificate issued by Tuv-Sud-Psb Singapore. The moot question is: whether the said agency was competent to issue a “valid” EN Certificate. It is noticed from the communication at Exh.I at page 184 of the paper book, received by the Corporation from the said Expert agency that the certificate issued by them was not CE mark or EN certificate which need to be approved by the European Nations. The relevant extract of the said communication reads thus: “The cert we issue to time technoplast is our type test confirmity cert to show that their product went through the stated EN test with us and conform with the standard requirement and the detail of results are as per report mentioned in cert. The cert is not CE MARK or EN cert which need to be approved by EN directive in Europe.” (emphasis supplied) 10. It would be useful to refer to the communication of the said agency, which is pressed into service by the petitioner, at Exh.N at pages 312-313 of the paper book. In para 7 of the said communication, the agency has clearly reiterated the above position in the following words : “We further clarify that if you want to sell the said bins manufactured in your Silvassa plant in the European Economic Area, then you are advised to check and comply with the necessary requirement.” 11. We are in agreement with the submission of the respondent that the certificate relied by the petitioner cannot be considered as a “valid” EN certificate. We are in agreement with the submission of the respondent that the certificate relied by the petitioner cannot be considered as a “valid” EN certificate. In absence thereof, the Additional Municipal Commissioner, who was the superior Authority to be consulted in the tender process, justly, took a view that the petitioner does not satisfy the eligibility criteria specified in the tender notice having failed to submit a valid EN certificate. Notably, the respondent Corporation gave opportunity to the petitioner to submit a valid EN Certificate, but the petitioner chose to rely on the certificate issued by the same Singapore Laboratory. The Petitioner did not take any steps for obtaining a valid EN certificate from laboratory authorised to issue such Certificate. Even during the pendency of this petition, the Corporation through counsel submitted that if the petitioner is able to produce such certificate, even then the offer now given by the Petitioner pursuant to the fresh tender notice will be considered along with other offers received. It is for the petitioner to avail of that option. The Corporation is willing to wait for a reasonable period upto six weeks from today for that purpose. If the petitioner were to submit a valid EN certificate in support of his offer given pursuant to the second tender notice, the Petitioner's offer can be considered by the Corporation along with other offers. 12. We however, find no merits in the grievance made by the petitioner about any error committed by the consultee Authority in terminating the first tender process. Further, the argument of the petitioner that the communication received by the petitioner dated 6th November, 2012 does not refer to the order passed by the Additional Municipal Commissioner dated 30th October, 2012 also does not commend to us. The communication is not the basis of terminating the first tender process, but only intimation given to the petitioner about the same. The argument of the petitioner having been denied fair opportunity also does not commend to us as it is seen that the Corporation called upon the petitioner to furnish a valid EN certificate. Instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioner once again chose to rely on the certificate issued by the same agency who was not competent to issue a valid EN certificate. Instead of availing of that opportunity, the petitioner once again chose to rely on the certificate issued by the same agency who was not competent to issue a valid EN certificate. Thus understood, it is neither a case of violation of principles of natural justice nor any manifest error committed by the Corporation in terminating the first tender notice after insisting for submission of a valid EN Certificate of the product by the petitioner for taking his offer bid forward. The Corporation, therefore, cannot be blamed for having issued a fresh E tender notice. The respondents have rightly relied on the exposition of the Apex Court in the case of M/s.Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. vs. The State of Karnataka & Ors. being Civil Appeal No.5898 of 2012 decided on 17th August, 2012. In para 19 and 20 of the said decision, the court expounded thus: “19) From the above decisions, the following principles emerge: (a) the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into consideration the national priorities; (b) fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the purview of the executive and courts hardly have any role to play in this process except for striking down such action of the executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders, in those circumstances, the interference by Courts is very limited; (c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a misuse of its statutory powers, interference by Courts is not warranted; (d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity and the resources to successfully execute the work; and (e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly and in public interest in awarding contract, here again, interference by Court is very restrictive since no person can claim fundamental right to carry on business with the Government. 20) Therefore, a Court before interfering in tender or contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”; and (ii) Whether the public interest is affected. If the answers to the above questions are in negative, then there should be no interference under Article 226.” 13. In our opinion, therefore, no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction is warranted in the fact situation of this case. 14. Writ Petition is dismissed.