HCL Infosystems Limited v. Bihar State Electricity Board
2013-02-18
RAMESH KUMAR DATTA
body2013
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the respondent Bihar State Electricity Board. 2. The petitioner has filed the writ application for quashing the office order dated 29.8.2012 issued by the Secretary, Bihar State Electricity Board ordering that the Board has debarred the petitioner HCL Infosystems Limited from all business dealings with B.S.E.B. including participation in future B.S.E.B.’s tender for two years from the date of issue of the letter. 3. The petitioner HCL Infosystems Limited is a manufacturer of Desk Computer, printers, accessories, etc. and is a registered supplier of the same with DGS & D . It had by letter dated 20.9.2011 informed the Electrical Superintending Engineer (Purchase) of the Bihar State Electricity Board that it had authorized M/s. Starlite Infotech Ltd. to quote and conclude the contract with the Board against the requirement of 47 numbers of Desktop Computers with Printer, UPS, DVD RW, Antivirus, etc. On 21.10.2011 Contract No.37 dated 21.10.2011 was made between the respondent Board as one party and M/s. Starlite Infotech Ltd. and HCL Infosystem Ltd. as the other party (referred to as the “supplier”) in which the supplier agreed to deliver 47 Desktop Computers with Printer, UPS, DVD RW, Antivirus, etc. on DGS & D contract rate as per L.O.I. No.934 dated 21.10.2011, for which Rs.19,11,997/- was to be paid inclusive of all taxes, duty, freight and insurance. The delivery was to be completed within two months from the date of issuance of purchase order and the delivery was to be guaranteed under penalty clause as per the usual term of penalty @ 0.25% per week or part thereof subject to maximum ceiling of 5%. The purchase order was issued on 27.10.2011 to M/s. Starlite Infotech Ltd. in terms of the said contract. When the supply was not made after the lapse of two months, intimations were given to M/s. Starlite Infotech Ltd. It by its letter dated 30.3.2012 said that M/s. HCL Infosystems (petitioner) is not ready to supply the material due to global hike in price. The matter was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 24.4.2012 by the Board. Other reminders were also issued but since no supply was made in terms of the contract the purchase order dated 27.10.2011 was cancelled by memo dated 27.7.2012 of the Electrical Superintending Engineer (Purchase), copy of which was forwarded to the petitioner’s Patna office.
The matter was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 24.4.2012 by the Board. Other reminders were also issued but since no supply was made in terms of the contract the purchase order dated 27.10.2011 was cancelled by memo dated 27.7.2012 of the Electrical Superintending Engineer (Purchase), copy of which was forwarded to the petitioner’s Patna office. Thereafter, by the impugned order dated 29.8.2012, the Secretary of the Board communicated that the petitioner’s concern has been debarred from all business dealings with the Board, including participation in future B.S.E.B.’s tender for two years from the date of issue of the letter. 4. It is stated in the counter affidavit of the Board that the order was only communicated by the Secretary but passed by the Chairman of the Board, who had been authorized earlier by the Board to pass such orders of blacklisting. 5. Aggrieved by the blacklisting order, the petitioner has come to this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the debarring/blacklisting order has been passed by the respondent Board without issuing any notice and without providing any opportunity of being heard to the petitioner. It is, thus, submitted that there has been violation of the principles of natural justice on which ground alone, the order is fit to be set aside. 7. In support of the aforesaid stand, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal and another: AIR 1975 S.C. 266 = (1975) 1 S.C.C. 70 , in paragraph Nos. 15 to 20 of which it has been held as follows:- “15. The blacklisting order does not pertain to any particular contract. The blacklisting order involves civil consequences. It casts a slur. It created a barrier between the persons blacklisted and the Government in the matter of transactions. The blacklists are "instruments of coercion". 16. In passing an order of blacklisting the Government department acts under what is described as a standardised Code. This is a Code for internal instruction. The Government departments make regular purchases. They maintain list of approved suppliers after taking into account the financial standard of the firm, their capacity and their past performance. The removal from the list is made for various reasons.
This is a Code for internal instruction. The Government departments make regular purchases. They maintain list of approved suppliers after taking into account the financial standard of the firm, their capacity and their past performance. The removal from the list is made for various reasons. The grounds on which blacklisting may be ordered are if the proprietor of the firm is convicted by court of law or security considerations so warrant or if there is strong justification for believing that the proprietor or employee of the firm has been guilty of malpractices such as bribery, corruption, fraud, or if the firm continuously refuses to return Government dues or if the firm employs a Government servant, dismissed or removed on account of corruption in a position where he could corrupt Government servant. The petitioner was blacklisted on the ground of justification for believing that the firm has been guilty of malpractices such as bribery, corruption, fraud. The petitioners were blacklisted on the ground that there were proceedings pending against the petitioners for alleged violation of provisions under the Foreign Exchange Regulations Act. 17. The Government is a government of laws and not of men. It is true that neither the petitioner nor the respondent has any right to enter into a contract but they are entitled to equal treatment with others who offer tender or quotations for the purchase of the goods. This privilege arises because it is the Government which is trading with the public and the democratic form of Government demands equality and absence of arbitrariness and discrimination in such transactions. Hohfeld treats privileges as a form of liberty as opposed to a duty. The activities of the Government have a public element and, therefore, there should be fairness and equality. The State need not enter into any contract with any one but if it does so, it must do so fairly without discrimination and without unfair procedure. Reputation is a part of person's character and personality. Blacklisting tarnishes one's reputation. 18. Exclusion of a member of the public from dealing with a State in sales transactions has the effect of preventing him from purchasing and doing a lawful trade in the goods in discriminating against him in favour of other people. The State can impose reasonable conditions regarding rejection and acceptance of bids or qualifications of bidders.
18. Exclusion of a member of the public from dealing with a State in sales transactions has the effect of preventing him from purchasing and doing a lawful trade in the goods in discriminating against him in favour of other people. The State can impose reasonable conditions regarding rejection and acceptance of bids or qualifications of bidders. Just as exclusion of the lowest tender will be arbitrary, similarly exclusion of person who offers the highest price from participating at a public auction would also have the same aspect of arbitrariness. 19. Where the State is dealing with individuals in transactions of sales and purchase of goods, the two important factors are that an individual is entitled to trade with the Government and an individual is entitled to a fair and equal treatment with others. A duty to act fairly can be interpreted as meaning a duty to observe certain aspects of rules of natural justice. A body may be under a duty to give fair consideration to the facts and to consider the representations but not to disclose to those persons details of information in its possession. Sometimes duty to act fairly can also be sustained without providing opportunity for an oral hearing. It will depend upon the nature of the interest to be affected, the circumstances in which a power is exercised and the nature of sections involved therein. 20. Blacklisting has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for purposes of gains. The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” 8.
The fact that a disability is created by the order of blacklisting indicates that the relevant authority is to have an objective satisfaction. Fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist.” 8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that by letter dated 8.10.2012, the petitioner had referred to the visit of the Senior Officials of the company to the office of the Board on 28.9.2012 and had taken full note of the regrettable lack of coordination and communication by M/s. Starlite Infotech Ltd. and reiterated its full commitment to the execution by fulfilling complete supply under it by asking for a new time schedule of delivery which the petitioner would adhere to over the execution of the said purchase order; it was, accordingly, requested to revoke the debarment order imposed on the petitioner company but nothing came out of it. It is, thus, urged by learned counsel that if the petitioner company has been issued the show cause notice regarding blacklisting then the matters may not have reached such a stage and there would have been no question of any blacklisting. 9. On the merits also, it is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the Board is a creation of the State Government under the statute, namely, the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (since repealed). Thus its power in the matter of blacklisting can only flow from any provision of the same by the said statute but there is no such statutory power conferred upon the Board. It is, thus, submitted that the Board cannot exercise power of blacklisting which is available only to the Central Government or State Governments by virtue of Article 298 of the Constitution of India and other statutory bodies if the statute confers such power upon them. 10. In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Patel Engineering Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr.: AIR 2012 S.C. 2342 in paragraph No.17 of which it has been held as follows:- “17.
10. In support of the aforesaid proposition, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Patel Engineering Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr.: AIR 2012 S.C. 2342 in paragraph No.17 of which it has been held as follows:- “17. The authority of the 2nd respondent to enter into contracts, consequently, the concomitant power not to enter into a contract with a particular person, does not flow from Article 298, as Article 298 deals with only the authority of the Union of India and the States. The authority of the 2nd respondent to enter into a contract with all the incidental and concomitant powers flow from Section 3 (1) and (2) of the National Highways Authority Act. The nature of the said power is similar to the nature of the power flowing from Article 298 of the Constitution, though it is not identical. The 2nd respondent, being a statutory Corporation, is equally subject to all constitutional limitations, which bind the State in its dealings with the subjects. At the same time, the very authority to enter into contracts conferred under Section 3 of the NHA Act, by necessary implication, confers the authority not to enter into a contract in appropriate cases (blacklist). The “bid document” can neither confer powers, which are not conferred by law on the 2nd respondent, nor can it substract the powers, which are conferred by law either by express provision or by necessary implication. The bid document is not a statutory instrument. Therefore, the rules of interpretation, which are applicable to the interpretation of statutes and statutory instruments, are not applicable to the bid document. Therefore, in our opinion, the failure to mention blacklisting to be one of the probable actions that could be taken against the delinquent bidder does not, by itself, disable the 2nd respondent from blacklisting a delinquent bidder, if it is otherwise justified. Such power is inherent in every person legally capable of entering into contracts.” 11.
Therefore, in our opinion, the failure to mention blacklisting to be one of the probable actions that could be taken against the delinquent bidder does not, by itself, disable the 2nd respondent from blacklisting a delinquent bidder, if it is otherwise justified. Such power is inherent in every person legally capable of entering into contracts.” 11. It is urged by learned counsel that the entire contract in the present matter was for an amount of a little over Rs.19 lacs and on failure to adhere to the contract for such a small amount in which the items involved may be easily available from alternative sources, the loss to the Board would, if at all, not exceed for Rs.2-3 lacs and for the same it is grossly disproportionate to blacklist for a period of two years a company like the petitioner which is a national level manufacturer and supplier of computers and its peripherals. 12. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that a blacklisting order apart from affecting the reputation of the firm is today given effect by all the different State Governments as also the Central Government and other public undertakings and bodies and the effect of the blacklisting order may in many cases be to paralyse the very functioning and survival of a national level Corporation and, therefore, should be awarded in a rare case after considering all the aspects of the matter and generally not for a mere breach of contract but for something in the nature of corrupt practices, bribing, fraud, etc. In the present matter also, learned counsel refers to the impugned order which has been forwarded to as many as 25 Electricity Boards and Power Corporations throughout the country. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent Board, on the other hand, submits that in the present matter the show cause was not required to be issued as there was correspondence with the petitioner by the Board and its dealer in that regard, particularly in view of the fact that Starlite Infotech Ltd. had clearly stated by its letter dated 30.3.2012 that the petitioner is not ready to supply the computers and its peripherals, etc. due to global hike in price. 14.
due to global hike in price. 14. It is also submitted that when the petitioner and its dealer had failed to make the supplies which was beyond the period of two months under the contract and purchase order and had made correspondences in the manner by its letter dated 30.3.2012, the Board had given two opportunities by letters dated 24.4.2012 and 29.5.2012 to supply the materials within seven days, failing which appropriate action would be taken by them but the petitioner company did not supply the same. It is, thus, submitted that since the petitioner had already stated that it will not supply the materials, therefore, the plea of violation of natural justice on account of not issuing show cause is a very tactical plea as the petitioner has nothing further to say in the matter. It is urged that when the future course is quite predictable no purpose would be served in issuing any show cause. The response of the petitioner was already known. 15. In this regard, it is further submitted by learned counsel for the Board that the cancellation of the purchase order by letter dated 27.7.2012 is not under challenge in the writ petition and thus the petitioner admits the fact of breach of agreement on its part which is the basis of passing of the blacklisting order. 16. With respect to the power of the Board to pass such an order, learned counsel relies upon the provisions of Section 5 and 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act,1948 which empowers the State Government to constitute by a Notification in the Official Gazette a State Electricity Board and also holds that the Board shall be a body Corporate by the name notified under sub-section (1) of Section 5, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, and shall by the said name sue and be sued. It is, thus, urged by learned counsel that by the aforesaid provision a right to trade is recognized in the Board and the right of blacklisting is thus inherent power of the Board. 17.
It is, thus, urged by learned counsel that by the aforesaid provision a right to trade is recognized in the Board and the right of blacklisting is thus inherent power of the Board. 17. It is also urged by learned counsel in this regard that by the Board’s Order No.1/1958-59 dated 10.4.1958 in its first meeting dated 10.4.1958, it was decided that the P.W.D. Code, P.W.A. Code, Financial Rules and other procedural rules of the State Government shall be made applicable to the Board until regulations under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 are framed by the Board. Thus according to learned counsel the adoption of the same gives power to the Board to act in terms of the PWD Code under which the Bihar Registration of Contractor Rules, 2007 is to be found. It is also submitted by learned counsel that the Board has power to make regulation under Section 79 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, and thus the adoption of the Rules of the State Govt. amounts to framing of regulations under Section 79 of the Act. 18. It is also the contention of learned counsel that the Board has been exercising the right of blacklisting since its inception and the power to pass such order has never been challenged at any time earlier. It is submitted that the Board being admittedly a public body and “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution it has no right to exclude any one from trade and contract with it by virtue of Article 14 of the Constitution and the right to equality conferred under it, unless the person concerned is blacklisted and the only limitation on such power of blacklisting is to act reasonably. 19. It is contended that unless the Board takes such a decision it would not be precluded from dealing with such parties in the future. 20. Learned counsel also submits that the grant of power to the Board to trade will not be valid unless the same is complete; therefore unless the right to blacklisting is recognized, the Board cannot function effectively. 21.
20. Learned counsel also submits that the grant of power to the Board to trade will not be valid unless the same is complete; therefore unless the right to blacklisting is recognized, the Board cannot function effectively. 21. Learned counsel also submits that the order of blacklisting for a period of two years is not disproportionate as urged by learned counsel for the petitioners rather the gravity of the misconduct of entering into a contract that too at DGS & D rates and then going back on the supply on various uncalled for grounds makes the conduct of the petitioner quite questionable and unethical and unless a due punishment like blacklisting is awarded for the same, such unethical practice will not come to an end. 22. It is also urged by learned counsel that under the terms of agreement, there is only provision for damages for 0.25 % per week or part thereof subject to maximum ceiling of 5 %, whereas damage to the Board by the action of the petitioner is not quantifiable and thus the punishment of blacklisting was essential. 23. Having considered the rival submissions of learned counsels for the parties, I am of the view that the impugned order dated 29.8.2012 passed by the Board suffers from serious legal infirmities on all the three counts as have been put forward by learned counsel for the petitioner. 24. It has been held by the Apex Court in the leading case of M/s. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. (supra) that blacklisting involves civil consequence and has the effect of preventing a person from the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for the purpose of gains and fundamentals of fair play require that the person concerned should be given an opportunity to represent his case before he is put on the blacklist and the authority concerned before it passes an order of blacklisting must arrive at an objective satisfaction on the basis of the materials brought on the record. If no show cause is issued and no reasonable opportunity is provided in case a blacklisting order is proposed to be passed then the effect would be that the entire order would be based upon the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority contrary to the law laid down in the case of Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. (supra).
If no show cause is issued and no reasonable opportunity is provided in case a blacklisting order is proposed to be passed then the effect would be that the entire order would be based upon the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority contrary to the law laid down in the case of Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. (supra). The rule of audi alteram partem immediately comes into play whenever an order of a public authority visits a person with civil consequence and he has a right to explain that his conduct was not such as to impose an extreme penalty like blacklisting upon him. 25. The submission of learned counsel for the Board that the position of the petitioner was well known does not appear to be correct even on the facts of the case. The letter dated 30.3.2012 was not written directly by the petitioner but by its dealer stating that the petitioner was not willing to supply the materials in view of increase in rates internationally. However, immediately after the blacklisting order when the petitioner’s senior officials visited the office of the respondent Board they made a commitment to supply the materials in the time schedule as may be provided by the Board at the same rate as in the contract and thus it could not be said that the petitioner was bent upon violating the agreement and acting in an unethical manner. May be the petitioner and its dealer did not act in the matter as is expected of a party in a free and fair contract entered into between the parties as per terms and conditions of the contract but for a mere contractual violation it cannot be said that the only penalty can be blacklisting and thus an opportunity to show cause would have been essential even on the facts of the present case. Thus, the impugned order dated 29.8.2012 is bad for violation of the principles of natural justice. 26. With regard to the power of the Board to issue a blacklisting order, I find that the statutory authority conferred under Section 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act is not exactly in the same terms as that under the National Highways Authority Act. The provisions of the two Acts may be studied together. In this regard Section 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act are quoted below:- “12.
The provisions of the two Acts may be studied together. In this regard Section 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Act are quoted below:- “12. Incorporation of Board- The Board shall be a body corporate by the name notified under sub-section (1) of Section 5, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, and shall by the said name sue and be sued.” 27. Section 4 (3) (1) (2) of the National Highways Authority Act is also quoted below:- 4. (3) Constitution of the Authority.--(1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint in this behalf, there shall be constituted for the purposes of this Act an Authority to be called the National Highways Authority of India. (2) The Authority shall be a body corporate by the name aforesaid having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable and immovable, and to contract and shall by the said name sue and be sued.” 28. From a mere reading of the provisions of the Electricity (Supply) Act and National Highways Authority Act, it is evident that while they appear to be generally in the same terms, under the National Highways Authorities Act there is a specific reference to a power in the National Highway Authority to contract whereas there is no reference in specific terms in the Electricity (Supply) Act while conferring similar powers on the Board. It is true that the power to enter into a contract is inherent in every person, legal or natural, who is entitled to contract under the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 but that is a general power to enter into contract and not an executive power like that conferred upon the Union of India and the State Governments by Article 298 of the Constitution nor a statutory power conferred on the National Highways Authority by the statute constituting it, namely, under Section 3 (2) of the Act.
In the absence of statutory power of the nature as conferred upon the National Highways Authority and being devoid of any Constitutional power like the Central and the State Governments, the Board can only enter into contract like any other person but being “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution it would be subject to the Constitutional limitations which bind the State in dealing with its subject. After the coming into force of the Electricity Act, 2003 with effect from 10.6.2003, whereby the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 has been repealed, it cannot even be said that the Electricity Board has any statutory status or powers. Even before the implementation of the transfer scheme under Part XIII of the new Act the Electricity Board would have been continuing as a mere distribution licencee and the State Transmission Utility which was also owning generation assets. 29. While it is open to a private party to enter into or not to enter into contract with any person as it may choose but in my view, it would not be open to any State authority or body to act in a similar fashion. Under the clauses equality before the law and the equal protection of the law under Article 14 of the Constitution a fundamental right has been conferred upon all persons which includes the privilege and advantage of entering into lawful relationship with the Government for the purpose of gains. In the absence of Constitutional or statutory power if such an authority is “State” under Article 12 it would not be open to it to ordinarily blacklist any person dealing with it, rather it is required to ensure that its rights are protected by incorporating provisions in the contract for damages, etc. for breach of contract. Action for blacklisting may, however, be taken in exceptional cases for the self protection of the public organization in question if it involves commission of corrupt practice or unfair practice or in cases of criminality of a grave nature committed by the concerned person. It is evident that while a private person may or may not deal with any person while entering into contract, freedom to the same extent is not available to a body which is “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. 30.
It is evident that while a private person may or may not deal with any person while entering into contract, freedom to the same extent is not available to a body which is “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. 30. This Court in this regard takes notice of the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of blacklisting in view of the prevalent practice is of such a gross nature that it has the sweeping effect of practically excluding the petitioner from doing business with any other public body. As a matter of fact, the present blacklisting order dated 29.8.2012 has been communicated practically to all the other Electricity Boards and Power Corporations in the country leading to the situation that the petitioner may not be able to do business with any of them. Such power, if it does not flow either from the Constitution or Statute, cannot be permitted to any organization even though it is a public organization. If at all the Board is required to protect itself, its blacklisting order can only be to the extent of preventing business with itself but such blacklisting order cannot be allowed to visit the party with the consequence of being unable to do business with any other government or public organization and destroy a thriving operation for one fault committed with respect to one such organization. In the prevailing circumstances when all other Public Undertakings and State and Central Governments start giving effect to such orders such power of blacklisting cannot be permitted to such organizations which do not have Constitutional or statutory power in the matter of contract. The blacklisting order must be limited to that very organization and it would not be open to any other Public Undertaking or the State Governments or the Central Government to act upon the basis of such blacklisting order passed by such organization. 31. Lastly, I also find that the order of blacklisting for two years is grossly disproportionate vis-à-vis the conduct of the petitioner company. It is true that the petitioner company, specially since it is registered with DGS & D, should not have refused to supply the materials under the contract at the DGS & D rates on which it had entered into. However, what has to be considered is the valuation of the deal and its consequence upon the business of the respondents.
It is true that the petitioner company, specially since it is registered with DGS & D, should not have refused to supply the materials under the contract at the DGS & D rates on which it had entered into. However, what has to be considered is the valuation of the deal and its consequence upon the business of the respondents. The contract was only for an amount of Rs. 19 lacs and with respect to materials which are easily available in the market from other suppliers of the similar quality; the loss to the Board as urged by learned counsel for the petitioner would not have exceeded Rupees two-three lacs, if at all. It is submitted by learned counsel for the Board that the Board has taken supply of the relevant materials from another party but no details have been brought on the record as to what extent loss has been incurred on account of alternative supply of materials by the other party. A mere breach of contract may not have very serious consequence on the public organization and consequently the public interest. In the case of Patel Engineering (supra) the financial loss on account of the action of the company before the Supreme Court was stated to be to the tune of Rs.3077/- crores and in the said circumstances, the blacklisting order for a period of one year was held to be not disproportionate and justified. Compared with that case at best the Board should have taken recourse to the damage clauses already therein, if applicable, or should have been careful while entering into the agreement in a manner so that any damages arising out of the contract would have been quantified accordingly. 31. The extreme action of blacklisting at the drop of a hat, particularly when it is followed by the complete inability of the concerned party to do business with any other Public Organization, the Central or State Governments cannot be considered a fair action on the part of any authority which is State under Article 12 of the Constitution. In this regard, this Court may take judicial notice of the various terms and conditions stipulated in the Standard Bid Document of the State Government as also the Central Government which provides that in case of debarment and blacklisting by any other Government or public organization the tenderer becomes disqualified to participate in the tender process.
In this regard, this Court may take judicial notice of the various terms and conditions stipulated in the Standard Bid Document of the State Government as also the Central Government which provides that in case of debarment and blacklisting by any other Government or public organization the tenderer becomes disqualified to participate in the tender process. Thus, the action of blacklisting has to be taken only as a last resort even when such power exists on account of the pervasive impact on the business of the concerned Corporation or firm. The fundamental right of a person to carry on any business, occupation or trade conferred under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution cannot be lightly interfered with and it is now not merely a case of blacklisting by one organization confined to itself in view of the practice being followed by different State Governments and Public Organizations nationally. However, as held above in the absence of the constitutional power under Article 298 or similar statutory power, any action of a public body like the Electricity Board in the matter of blacklisting, even if exercised as being permissible in a rare case must remain confined to itself and cannot be used by other public authorities and bodies to disqualify a party. 32. Thus, I have no hesitation in saying that the blacklisting order for two years in the present matter is grossly disproportionate. 33. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid discussions, the writ application is allowed and the impugned order dated 29.8.2012 passed by the Secretary, Bihar State Electricity Board is quashed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.