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Rajasthan High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 2213 (RAJ)

State of Rajasthan v. Chandi

2013-12-06

BELA M.TRIVEDI

body2013
Hon'ble TRIVEDI, J.—The present appeal filed under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') is directed against the judgment and order dated 2.6.2000 passed by the District Judge, Kota (hereinafter referred to as 'the court below') in Civil Misc. (Arbitration) Case No. 43/92, whereby the court below has rejected the objections filed by the appellant-non claimant under Section 30 and 33 of the said Act against the award dated 31.3.92, and has made the said award rule of the court. 2. The short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the respondent-claimant was awarded the contract for the constructions of Bilas Irrigation Project Chain No. 52 to 74 vide the agreement No. 6/85-86, as per the office order dated 31.1.86, for Rs. 84,64,779/-. The said work was required to be completed within 24 months excluding the rainy season, which was of four months every year and accordingly the date of completion of the work was fixed as 14th February, 1989, after granting 15 days time for the mobilisation to start the work. It appears that the respondent-claimant abandoned the work as per his letter dated 29.8.88 and about two years thereafter raised various disputes with the appellant department. The respondent-claimant approached the District & Sessions Court, Kota for the appointment of the sole arbitrator under Section 20 of the said Act to settle the disputes between the parties, by filing the Civil Misc. Case No. 57/90. The said court, therefore, appointed the sole arbitrator as per the order dated 12.4.1991, to resolve the disputes between the parties in respect of the contractual work in question. The respondent-claimant filed the claim petition before the sole arbitrator making various claims under 19 heads and 32 items worth Rs. 67,34,609/-. It appears that the respondent-claimant thereafter made another application to the District Court on 31.5.91 for referring the additional claims to the Arbitrator, and the court allowed the same as per the order dated 31.5.91. The respondent-claimant further made an application to the court on 23.10.91 for referring the claims for additional items and the court again ordered for the supplementary reference of those claims to the same arbitrator as per the order dated 30.1.92. The appellants had also raised certain counter claims before the Arbitrator. 3. The respondent-claimant further made an application to the court on 23.10.91 for referring the claims for additional items and the court again ordered for the supplementary reference of those claims to the same arbitrator as per the order dated 30.1.92. The appellants had also raised certain counter claims before the Arbitrator. 3. The arbitrator after appreciating the evidence on record allowed the claim No. 1,2,3,6,7,8,9(a)(i), 9(b), 9(f), 10(i), 11, 18 and 19, and disallowed the remaining claims of the respondent-claimant, and also rejected the counter claims of the appellants vide the award dated 31.2.92. The arbitrator awarded Rs. 1,04,01,661/- and interest amount of Rs. 3,91,36,249/- and in aggregate Rs. 4,95,37,910/- to the respondent-claimant. Being aggrieved by the said award the appellant filed the objections before the court below under Section 30 and 33 of the said Act, which have been dismissed by the court below, vide the impugned order as stated hereinabove. 4. The learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. Dinesh Yadav for the appellant taking the court to the award made by the arbitrator, vehemently submitted that the arbitrator had travelled beyond the scope of arbitration and misconducted himself by allowing the claims of the respondent-claimant dehors the agreement in question. According to Mr. Yadav the arbitrator had misconducted himself by awarding the amount for the claim No.1 as per the Basic Scheduled Rates (hereinafter referred to as 'the BSR'), though the respondent-claimant was entitled for the payments as per the rates mentioned in the “G” Schedule, in view of the condition NO.10 of the agreement entered into between the parties. As regards the claim No.2, Mr. Yadav submitted that the shrinkage allowance was admissible to the respondent @ Rs. 55/- per cum as per the “G” Schedule, however the arbitrator had awarded the said allowance @ Rs. 70/- per cum as per the BSR, dehors the terms and conditions of the agreement. As regards the claim No.3 for extra lead of earth work beyond two kilometers, Mr. Yadav submitted that such a claim was not admissible as per the agreement. As regards the claim No.6, he submitted that as per condition No.13 of General Specification and Conditions of Contract, the royalty for any material was to be paid by the respondent only and the arbitrator could not have awarded the said claim for the cost of sand on account of payment of royalty. According to Mr. As regards the claim No.6, he submitted that as per condition No.13 of General Specification and Conditions of Contract, the royalty for any material was to be paid by the respondent only and the arbitrator could not have awarded the said claim for the cost of sand on account of payment of royalty. According to Mr. Yadav the arbitrator had violated the formula envisaged in clause No. 45 of the agreement by granting escalation under the claim No.7. He also submitted that the appellant was compelled by the arbitrator to prepare the revised statement for the amount of escalation, though such a claim was not permissible under the agreement. 5. As regards the claim No. 8, Mr. Yadav submitted that there was no entry in the measurement book as regards the excavation of hard Kankar compacted Morrum and even otherwise the arbitrator could not have awarded the amount under the said head as per the BSR, when the respondent was entitled for the amount only as per the “G” Schedule. Similarly there was no record of unpaid aggregate in the measurement book, as claimed in claim NO. 9(b) and also for the pitching stone in the measurement book as claimed in claim No. 9(f), however the arbitrator has allowed the said claims without any justification. 6. Mr. Yadav further submitted that the arbitrator has wrongly awarded the amount under the head of compensation for the interruptions as claimed in claim No. 10, though there was no interruptions or hindrances caused by the appellant in the work in question, and that it was the respondent who had caused the delay by not signing the bills in time. Mr. Yadav further submitted that since the respondent had abandoned the work, the Department had to get the work of pitching done for the safety of dam at the cost and risk of the contractor, which expenses incurred by the appellant were required to be recovered from the respondent. According to him, the arbitrator without any justification had quashed the imposition of penalty, and had arbitrarily awarded the refund of amount recovered by the appellant and further awarded the compensation. He also submitted that though the respondent-claimant was not entitled for the refund of the security amount, he having abandoned the work, the arbitrator had arbitrarily awarded the said amount to the respondent, misinterpreting the evidence on the record. According to Mr. He also submitted that though the respondent-claimant was not entitled for the refund of the security amount, he having abandoned the work, the arbitrator had arbitrarily awarded the said amount to the respondent, misinterpreting the evidence on the record. According to Mr. Yadav, the arbitrator had also awarded exorbitant rate of interest @ 17.5% per annum on the claims allowed by him without any justification. Mr. Yadav has relied upon various decisions of the Apex Court in support of his submissions that the deliberate departure from the terms of contract on the part of the arbitrator amounts not only to manifest disregard of the authority or misconduct on the part of the arbitrator, but it tantamounts to malafide action on the part of the arbitrator. 7. The learned counsel Mr. R.P. Garg for the respondent-claimant, however referring to the various claims dealt with by the arbitrator in the award in question, in the light of various terms of the agreement, submitted that the arbitrator after rightly appreciating the evidence on the record, had passed the reasoned award, and the court below has rightly not interfered with the same, and that this court also should not interfere with the said award. Mr. Garg submitted that as per the general principles of interpretation, the instrument should be interpreted gathering the intentions of the parties and that the construction thereof should be interpreted in a liberal and reasonable manner. According to him, the respondent-claimant was entitled for the payment as per the BSR subject to the quoted percentage for all items as mentioned in the “G” Schedule and that even otherwise both the parties had agreed for the payment on various items at the rates mentioned in the BSR 1983 Irrigation Circle, Kota. Taking the court to the letter dated 28.11.91 of Superintending Engineer, he submitted that the “G” Schedule of the said work was prepared on the basis of the 1983 BSR, Irrigation Circle, Kota, and that the arbitrator therefore had rightly relied upon the BSR for allowing the claims of the respondent. Referring to the various clauses of the agreement and more particularly clause 12 thereof, Mr. Garg submitted that both the parties had intended to make payment as per the BSR 1983, which was the integral part of the agreement. Referring to the various clauses of the agreement and more particularly clause 12 thereof, Mr. Garg submitted that both the parties had intended to make payment as per the BSR 1983, which was the integral part of the agreement. He also submitted that the appellant in their counter claim had also referred to the BSR 1983 and, therefore, the appellant could not be permitted to approbate or reprobate at the same time. 8. Mr. Garg, supporting the award made by the arbitrator submitted that the arbitrator having analysed each and every claim of the respondent and having given reasons for allowing such claims, the court should not re-appreciate the evidence and set aside the findings arrived at by the arbitrator, merely because another view is possible. Mr. Garg has also relied upon the various authorities of the Apex Court to buttress his submissions that the court has no jurisdiction to correct even the error of law, much less of facts committed by the arbitrator in reaching to his conclusions. 9. Before adverting to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsels for the parties, it would be beneficial to reproduce the legal position stated by the Apex Court from time to time on the powers of court under Section 30 of the said Act to interfere with or set aside the award made by the Arbitrator. In case of Union of India vs. Bungo Steel Furniture Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 1032 , the Apex Court had observed interalia that the court had no jurisdiction to investigate into the merits of the case and to examine the documentary and oral evidence on the record for the purpose of finding out whether or not the Arbitrator had committed an error of law. It was also observed that the award of Arbitrator can be set aside on account of error of law on the face of the award only when in the award or in a document incorporated with it, some erroneous legal proposition, which was the basis of the award was found. The said proposition of law was reiterated by the Apex Court in case of N. Chellappan vs. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board & Anr. AIR 1975 SC 230 . 10. In case of M/s. Sudarsan Trading Co. vs. Govt. of Kerala & Anr. The said proposition of law was reiterated by the Apex Court in case of N. Chellappan vs. Secretary, Kerala State Electricity Board & Anr. AIR 1975 SC 230 . 10. In case of M/s. Sudarsan Trading Co. vs. Govt. of Kerala & Anr. AIR 1989 SC 890 , the Apex Court reiterating the legal position had observed interalia that an arbitrator acting beyond his jurisdiction is a different ground from the error apparent on the face of award. It has also been further observed that the court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own evaluation of the conclusion of law or fact to come to the conclusion that the Arbitrator had acted contrary to the bargain between the parties. Following the said decision, in case of Food Corporation of India vs. Joginderpal Mohinderpal AIR 1989 SC 1263 , the Apex Court had observed interalia that when the Arbitrator had chosen to give the reasons, unless it was demonstrated to the court that such reasons are erroneous as much as propositions of law, or a view which the Arbitrator had taken was a view which could not possibly be sustained on any view of the matter, then the challenge to the award of the Arbitrator could not be sustained. It has also been held in case of Puri Construction Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India AIR 1989 SC 777 that the court cannot sit in appeal over the view of the Arbitrator by examining and re-assessing the materials or evidence on the record. 11. However, in case of Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. & Anr. vs. Balasore Technical School (2000) 9 SCC 552 , following the earlier decisions it has been held by the Apex Court that when an award is made contrary to the terms of the contract, not by misinterpretation but it is plainly contrary to the terms of the contract, it would certainly lead to inference that there is an error apparent on the face of the award which results in jurisdictional error in the award. In such a case the court can certainly interfere with the award made by the Arbitrator. 12. In case of Associated Engineering Company vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1991) 4 SCC 93 , the Apex Court held in para 24 and 25 as under:- “24. The arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. In such a case the court can certainly interfere with the award made by the Arbitrator. 12. In case of Associated Engineering Company vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1991) 4 SCC 93 , the Apex Court held in para 24 and 25 as under:- “24. The arbitrator cannot act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independently of the contract. His sole function is to arbitrate in terms of the contract. He has no power apart from what the parties have given him under the contract. If he has travelled outside the bounds of the contract, he has acted without jurisdiction. But if he has remained inside the parameters of the contract and has construed the provisions of the contract; his award cannot be interfered with unless he has given reasons for the award disclosing an error apparent on the face of it.” 13. In the latest decision of the Apex Court in case of P. Radhakrisha Murthy vs. National Buildings Construction Corporation Ltd. 2013(3) SCC 747 , the Apex Court has held as under :- “15. The High Court has rightly held that the Arbitrator is not a conciliator and his duty is to decide the disputes submitted to him according to the legal rights of the parties and not according to what he may consider to be fair and reasonable. The High Court has further rightly made observation in the impugned judgment that an Arbitrator cannot ignore law or misapply it, nor can he act arbitrarily, irrationally, capriciously or independent of the contract while passing the award. Courts of law have a duty and obligation to maintain purity of standards and preserve full faith and credit as well as to inspire confidence in the minds of litigants while adjudicating the claims of the parties by resorting to alternate dispute redressal method of arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration Act. “ 14. In view of the aforesaid legal position let us examine the facts of the present case in order to see as to whether the Arbitrator in the instant case had committed any misconduct as contemplated under Section 30 of the said Act, rendering the award in question liable to be set aside. 15. The bone of contention raised by the learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. 15. The bone of contention raised by the learned Addl. Advocate General Mr. Yadav is that the Arbitrator had travelled beyond the scope of the contract entered into between the parties and awarded the amount as per the BSR, though the respondent-claimant was entitled for the payments as per the 'G' Schedule only and that the help of BSR was to be taken only in case of typographical or clerical error as contemplated in clause 47 of the conditions of the contract. However, as per the submissions made by the learned counsel Mr. R.P. Garg for the respondent-claimant, the BSR 1983 was to be construed as a part of the contract and the appellant had also referred to the BSR at various places in the agreement as well as in the counter-claims raised before the Arbitrator. 16. In order to appreciate the said submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, it would be necessary to refer to various clauses of the agreement entered into between the parties. As per Rule (1) of the General Rules & Directions, contained in the agreement form for civil construction works, all works proposed for the execution by the contract was to be notified in a form of invitation to tender signed by the Chief Engineer or other duly authorised Engineer. Accordingly, in the tender form, submitted by the respondent-claimant, in response to the said NIT, it was interalia agreed that the respondent would execute the work in question within the time specified in Schedule 'F' and as per the rates entered in Schedule 'G' and that the work will be carried out in accordance with the details, specifications, designs and drawings and instruments referred to in the attached schedule sheets. In the note contained at the bottom of the said tender form, it was mentioned that all extra items or work not included in Schedule 'G' will be paid at the schedules rates (BSR). Further the clause (10) of the general specifications and conditions of contract reads as under :- “10. The payment for the work done shall be made in the manner set out in the general conditions and specifications hereto annexed and at the rates stated in Schedule “G”. As regards work done in quantities, it shall be determined by the actual measurements of the work approved by the Engineer-in-charge or his authorised representative. The payment for the work done shall be made in the manner set out in the general conditions and specifications hereto annexed and at the rates stated in Schedule “G”. As regards work done in quantities, it shall be determined by the actual measurements of the work approved by the Engineer-in-charge or his authorised representative. A supplementary Schedule “H” (hereto annexed) must also be filled in by the contractors at the time of tendering for use as may be found applicable in regulating payment in the event of alterations in the description of the works specified and also for use in extra work and in deduction and day work when ordered and for the supply of materials if ordered as extras. The prices given for the materials enumerated in the supplementary must include the charges for the delivery at the site of the work. This supplementary schedule must not be taken as altering or interfering with the contract rates given in the Schedule “G” annexed hereto and the prices in supplementary schedule must agree with the prices set forth in Schedule “G” aforesaid.” 17. Clause 47 of the Conditions of Contract Rules reads as under :- “Clause 47:- In case of percentage rate tenders, if there is any typographical or clerical error in the rates shown by the Department in the “G” schedule the rates as given in the Basic Schedule of Rates of the Deptt. for the area shall be taken as correct.” 18. It is pertinent to note that the agreement in question comprising of various parts and the tender form alongwith the schedules were duly signed by both the parties. It is not disputed that the respondent-claimant had agreed to execute the work in question within the specified time mentioned in the memorandum. It further appears that though earlier the respondent had agreed to carry out the work as per the rate at 10.25% below the rates of Schedule 'G', subsequently as per the negotiations made between the parties, the tender of the respondent at the rate 7.7.% below the schedule 'G' amounting to Rs. 84,64,779/- was accepted, as per its order dated 31.1.86, and the respondent had agreed to complete the work under contract within 24 months excluding rainy season i.e. upto 14.2.1989. 84,64,779/- was accepted, as per its order dated 31.1.86, and the respondent had agreed to complete the work under contract within 24 months excluding rainy season i.e. upto 14.2.1989. However, it appears that after accepting the payments of about 49 running bills, the respondent-claimant had informed the appellant vide the letter dated 29.8.88 that he did not intend to continue to execute the work any further. At this juncture, the said letter dated 29.8.88 deserves to be reproduced, which reads as under:- lsok esa] Jheku~ vfrfjä eq[; vfHk;Urk] vkj-ih-,l- ,UM ts-,l- ldZy dksVk] dksVk fo"k;% foykl flapkbZ ifj;kstuk ds dk;Z psu 52 ls 74 ckcr~A egksn;] mijksä fo"k; esa fuosnu gS fd ;g dk;Z gesa 84]64]779@& :i;s dk vkoafVr gqvk Fkk] ftlds ,ot esa ge 20 izfr'kr ls T;knk dk;Z le; ls igys iwjk dj pwds gSA rFkk DykWt 12, ds rgr ge vkxs dk;Z djus ds fy, ck/; ugha gSA vr% Jheku~ th ls fuosnu gS fd gekjk dk;Z QkbZuy fd;k tkosA D;ksafd ge vkxs dk;Z ugha djuk pkgrs gSA izkFkhZ] okLrs% eSllZ pUnh ,UM dEiuh** 19. From the bare reading of the said letter, it transpires that the respondent had intimated the appellant that he was not bound to continue with the execution of the work in question. In the said letter, he had not raised any such disputes as were raised subsequently in the application under Section 20 of the said Act filed about two years after the said letter. Since the respondent had abandoned the work leaving it incomplete, the appellant had to get the remaining work done through the other contractor, for which the penalty was also levied on the respondent. As stated hereinabove, the disputes having been referred to the Arbitrator, the respondent had made various claims under various heads and the appellant had also raised certain counter claims. 20. So far as the Claim No.1 made by the respondent-contractor was concerned, the respondent had claimed Rs. 33,79,367.70/- under the head “correct rates for leads of paid quantities as per BSR instead of 'G' Schedule” and Rs. 6,33,631.44/- towards escalation amount with interest @ 24% per annum on the said amount claimed. The Arbitrator under this Claim No.1 awarded Rs. 34,42,901.04/- for the leads of earthwork and other construction material and Rs. 33,79,367.70/- under the head “correct rates for leads of paid quantities as per BSR instead of 'G' Schedule” and Rs. 6,33,631.44/- towards escalation amount with interest @ 24% per annum on the said amount claimed. The Arbitrator under this Claim No.1 awarded Rs. 34,42,901.04/- for the leads of earthwork and other construction material and Rs. 6,04,910/- towards the escalation amount, and also the interest @ 17.5% per annum on the said award amount for the period from 1.10.88 till realisation. The said claim was allowed by the Arbitrator under the guise that there were typographical or clerical errors in the rates shown by the Department in the 'G' Schedule and therefore the respondent was required to be paid as per the BSR, as contemplated in clause 47 of the agreement. 21.Now as clearly transpiring from the evidence on the record, various documents like the tender form, the general rules and directions, the conditions of contract contained in the agreement, the schedules including the Schedule 'G', the general specifications and conditions of contract etc. were made part of the contract and all these documents were duly signed by the parties. The said documents were treated as part of the agreement entered into between the parties, whereas the BSR 1983 was a separate document containing schedule rates in general. The said document of BSR was neither signed by the parties nor treated as part of the agreement. Of course, it is not disputed by the appellant that the 'G' Schedule was prepared by the department on the basis of BSR and the analysis of rates. However as per Clause 47 of the agreement, the BSR was to be referred only in case of typographical or clerical error found in the 'G' Schedule. When the Schedule 'G' specifying the items and rates were provided to the contractor alongwith the tender, and when the negotiated tender of the claimant was accepted by the appellant at 7.7% below the 'G' Schedule amounting to Rs. 84,64,779/- there was no question of making payments to the respondent as per the BSR as sought to be done by the arbitrator. The rates mentioned in the BSR were never intended or treated as part of the agreement between the parties, nor the appellant had agreed to make payments as per the BSR. 22. 84,64,779/- there was no question of making payments to the respondent as per the BSR as sought to be done by the arbitrator. The rates mentioned in the BSR were never intended or treated as part of the agreement between the parties, nor the appellant had agreed to make payments as per the BSR. 22. Merely because a reference of BSR was made in the said clause 47 of the agreement, it could not be said that the BSR was made part of the agreement, as sought to be submitted by the learned counsel Mr. R.P. Garg for the respondent. The appellant in their reply to the claims made by the respondent and in their counter claims before the Arbitrator had referred to the rates mentioned in the BSR only for the purpose of substantiating their contention that it was only the 'G' Schedule which was agreed to be followed by the parties and not the rates of BSR. The court, therefore, does not find any substance in the submission made by Mr. Garg that the appellant had tried to approbate and reprobate or had tried to rely upon the document i.e. BSR at one time and rejected the same at the other time. There cannot be any disagreement with the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in case of R.N. Gosain vs. Yashpal Dhir, (1992) 4 SCC 683 relied upon by Mr. Garg in support of his submission that the law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate, and that the doctrine of election postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument. However, the said decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The appellant has relied upon the terms of the agreement alone to buttress its case that the respondent was entitled to the payments as per the agreed rates of Schedule 'G' alone and not as per BSR. It was the Arbitrator, who instead of deciding the disputes referred to him sought to play a role of conciliator and awarded the amount which he considered was fair and reasonable, which was totally contrary to the legal position settled by the Apex Court from time to time and in the latest case of P. Radhakrishna Murthy vs. NBCC (supra). 23. 23. As per the settled legal position, the Arbitrator being the creature of the agreement entered into between the parties, is bound to decide the claims of the parties as per the terms of the agreement alone, applying correct legal position. He cannot travel beyond the specific terms of the agreement and award the amount arbitrarily, misreading and misinterpreting the agreement, as sought to be done in the instant case. As transpiring from the award itself, the Arbitrator had sought to analyse and compare the rates of the Schedule 'G' with the rates of BSR, and concluded that there was a clerical mistake in the rates mentioned in the Schedule 'G', which was not the dispute referred to him by the court making reference under Section 20 of the said Act in any of the orders passed by it. It is very pertinent to note that the respondent-contractor had accepted all the bills without any protest as per the negotiated rates of the Schedule 'G' till he abandoned the work in September-October, 1988, and he never raised any dispute with the Department about any clerical or typographical mistake in the said rates mentioned in the 'G' Schedule. There was not even a whisper in his application filed under Section 20 of the said Act for referring such dispute to the Arbitrator on the ground that there were typographical or clerical mistakes in the rates of 'G' Schedule, nor the court making reference or supplementary reference of the disputes had referred such dispute to the Arbitrator requiring him to decide as to whether there was any typographical or clerical error in the 'G' Schedule or not, as contemplated in clause 47 of the agreement. The Arbitrator, therefore, could not have analysed and compared the rates of 'G' Schedule and of BSR and then come to the conclusion that there were typographical/clerical errors in the rates of 'G' Schedule and, therefore, the respondent was entitled to the payment as per BSR. The respondent had neither raised such dispute in any of his correspondences, nor had raised any protest against the payments of the bills made as per the agreed rates of 'G' Schedule, nor had requested to refer such dispute to the Arbitrator in the application under Section 20 of the said Act, nor such dispute was referred to the Arbitrator by the court. From the sets of terms and conditions mentioned in the agreement, read with the tender form and other general rules and terms, signed by the parties, the only irresistible conclusion which could be arrived at is that the respondent was entitled to the payments only as per the rates mentioned in the Schedule 'G' which was signed by the parties, and that the Arbitrator, instead of deciding the legal rights of the parties arising out of the contract in question, had awarded the claims independent of the contract. The court therefore is of the opinion that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself by travelling beyond the specific terms of the contract, as also the terms of reference, and in awarding the amount under the Claim No.1 as per the BSR under the guise that there were typographical or clerical errors in the rates of 'G' Schedule, though no such dispute was referred to him for adjudication. 24. The respondent-contractor had made claim NO.2 for the shrinkage allowance, i.e. payment for leads and lifts for the additional earthwork involved on account of the compaction of the embankment to a higher density than that of borrow area. The Arbitrator again travelling beyond the specific terms of the contract had allowed Rs. 14,06,000/- for the shrinkage allowance, Rs. 2,47,034/- towards escalation amount and the interest amount thereon @ 17.5% per annum. It is required to be noted that the item of earthwork was already covered under Item No.2 in the Schedule 'G' and further explained in the specifications and in the special conditions. As stated hereinabove, the terms of agreement having already been accepted by the respondent-contractor as per the rates given in 'G' Schedule, the Arbitrator could not have awarded any additional amount under the said head. The submission of the learned counsel Mr. R.P. Garg for the respondent-contractor that though there was a provision of extra carriage in case of earthwork on account of the reduction in volume due to the compaction in the other irrigation circles in Rajasthan like Ajmer, Udaipur, the same was not included in the irrigation circle Kota and, therefore, the Arbitrator was justified in allowing the said amount under the head of shrinkage allowance as per the BSR, cannot be accepted. It appears that while allowing the said claim of the respondent-contractor, the Arbitrator had taken into consideration the internal correspondence of the Department, which had taken place after the reference period. The Arbitrator could not have referred to any such documents when the rates were specifically mentioned in the 'G' Schedule for the particular items and which were also accepted by the respondent-contractor without any protest. 25. Similarly, the Arbitrator in the impugned award has awarded Rs. 2,21,773/- towards extra lead of earthwork beyond 2 Kms. and escalation amount of Rs.38,966/-, with interest @ 17.5% per annum under the claim NO.3, though the rates of the said work were already covered under the Item No.3 of the 'G' Schedule. The Arbitrator has also awarded Rs. 1,36,078/- and escalation amount of Rs.23,900/- under the Claim No.6 for the cost of sand on the ground that the Department had failed to provide the quarry site prescribed at Parbati River with the lead of 35 Kms. as mentioned in the 'G' Schedule. According to the learned counsel Mr. Garg for the respondent-claimant, the said claim was made as the entire reach site was leased out to one contractor M/s. Kalla by the Mining Department and the respondent had to purchase the sand from Shri Kalla @ Rs.100/- per cum., which amount was required to be reimbursed by the appellant. However, according to the learned counsel Mr. Yadav for the appellant, the said part of the work was already over by August, 1986 and the respondent-claimant had not made any claim of this amount in any of his running bills. Now, it appears that the respondent-contractor had not produced any document to show that he had made any such payments for the sand @ Rs.100/- per cum. Even in his pleadings, the respondent-claimant had made claim for the cost of sand @ Rs.50/- per cum., out of which Rs.40/- per cum., towards cost of sand and Rs.10/- per cum. for the road repairs. It is pertinent to note that the Arbitrator has allowed the said claim by holding that the respondent-contractor was entitled to the extra payment of Rs.28/- per cum. though the said item was already covered under Item No.9 in the 'G' Schedule and though the respondent-contractor had failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove that such extra payments were made by him. though the said item was already covered under Item No.9 in the 'G' Schedule and though the respondent-contractor had failed to produce any documentary evidence to prove that such extra payments were made by him. The court therefore is of the opinion that the Arbitrator has certainly misconducted himself by awarding the said claims, travelling beyond the terms of agreement and without any evidence on the record. 26. The Arbitrator has further awarded Rs.56,997/- under the head of Escalation for the Claim No.7, and that too with interest @ 17.5% per annum. In this regard the Arbitrator has relied upon Clause No.45 which pertained to “the price adjustment” i.e. increase or decrease in the cost of labour or material, as per the formula set out therein. It is also pertinent to note that the said clause of price adjustment was applicable only for the work that was carried out by the contractor within the stipulated time or extensions thereof, as were not attributable to the contractor. As a matter of fact such a clause could not be said to be an escalation clause. As per the settled legal position, in absence of the escalation clause, the Arbitrator cannot assume any jurisdiction to award any amount towards escalation. Beneficial reference of the decision of the Apex Court in case of State of Orissa vs. Sudhakar Das (dead) by Lrs. (2000) 3 SCC, 27, in the case of Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. vs. Eastern Engineering Enterprises & Anr. (1999) 9 SCC 283 and in case of Food Corporation of India vs. A.M. Ahmed & Co. & Anr. (2006) 13 SCC 779 be made in this regard. Dealing with similar condition as contained in clause 45 of the agreement in the instant case, the Apex Court in case of Associated Engineering Co. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (supra), held as under :- “An arbitrator who acts in manifest disregard of the contract acts without jurisdiction. His authority is derived from the contract and is governed by the Arbitration Act which embodies principles derived from a specialised branch of the law of agency (see Mustill & Boyd’s Commercial Arbitration, Second Edition, p. 641). He commits misconduct if by his award he decides matters excluded by the agreement (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume II, Fourth Edition, Para 622). He commits misconduct if by his award he decides matters excluded by the agreement (see Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume II, Fourth Edition, Para 622). A deliberate departure from contract amounts to not only manifest disregard of his authority or a misconduct on his part, but it may tantamount to a mala fide action. A conscious disregard of the law or the provisions of the contract from which he has derived his authority vitiates the award.” 27. Now, even if the said Clause No. 45 of price adjustment is presumed to be an escalation clause, then also the Arbitrator could not have awarded any amount under the said head, when the respondent-contractor had not carried out the work within the stipulated time and when he had abandoned the work in October, 1988 as per his letter dated 29.8.88, and when the incomplete work was required to be got completed by the appellant by inviting fresh tenders, and for which the penalty was also imposed on the respondent-contractor. Merely because the respondent-claimant had pleaded about the increase in price of material and labour, the Arbitrator could not have allowed the said claim without any evidence on record. Further, it is also required to be noted that the arbitrator had allowed the said claim of escalation, ignoring the specific formula mentioned in the said clause. It is needless to say that the respondent-contractor was obliged to prove the claim for escalation by leading evidence and the Arbitrator could not have awarded the said claim ignoring the specific formula mentioned in Clause 45 of the agreement. The Arbitrator appears to have awarded the amount under the claim of escalation @ 17.5% on the basis of the payments made by the appellant under the said Clause 45, though the appellant had made counter claim for the refund of the said amount, the respondent having not completed the work within the stipulated time limit and having abandoned the work. Such an award of claim made by the arbitrator, would certainly tentamount to an error apparent on the face of the award, and the misconduct of the proceedings by the Arbitrator. The arbitrator had similarly awarded other claims of the respondent dehors the contract, rendering the award liable to be set aside. 28. Such an award of claim made by the arbitrator, would certainly tentamount to an error apparent on the face of the award, and the misconduct of the proceedings by the Arbitrator. The arbitrator had similarly awarded other claims of the respondent dehors the contract, rendering the award liable to be set aside. 28. The Arbitrator had also arbitrarily awarded the interest amount @ 17.5%, in utter disregard of the rate of interest prevailing at the relevant time. As rightly submitted by the learned Add. Advocate General Mr. Yadav, relying upon the various decisions of the Apex Court, more particularly on the decisions in the case of MSK Projects Indian (JV) Ltd. vs. State of Raj. & Anr. (2011) 10 SCC, 573 and in case of ONGC Ltd. vs. Garware Shipping Corporation Ltd. (2007) 13 SCC, 434, the Arbitrator cannot award an exorbitant rate of interest. In the case of J.C. Budhraja vs. Chairman, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. & Anr. 2008(2) SCC 444 = 2008(4) RLW 2909 (SC), the Apex Court had awarded interest @ 6% per annum for the period during 1986 and thereafter. In case of State of Rajasthan vs. Ferro Concrete Construction Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 12 SCC 1 , also the Apex Court had observed that rate of interest @ 18% per annum in the award governed by an old Act was an error apparent on the face of record and the interest @ 9% per annum would be the appropriate rate of interest for the pendente lite interest and future interest. In view of the said observations made by the Apex Court, it clearly transpires that the award of interest @ 17.5% per annum by the Arbitrator in the instant case is clearly arbitrary and error apparent on the face of record. 29. In view of the foregoing discussions, the court is of the opinion that the Arbitrator while allowing the claims of the respondent-contractor had travelled beyond the terms of reference, and also beyond the specific terms of the contract, and had also awarded the claims without any evidence on the record, making deliberate departure from the express terms of contract, which tentamounted to malafide action and misconduct on his part and, therefore, award made by him is liable to be set aside. It is unfortunate that the court below, without considering any of the issues involved, had passed the impugned order dated 2.6.2000 in a very cursory and perfunctory manner. Therefore the said order is also liable to be set aside. 30. In that view of the matter, the impugned order dated 2.6.2000 passed by the court below and the award dated 31.3.92 made by the Arbitrary are hereby set aside. The appellant shall be at liberty to recover the amount if already paid from the respondent with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of payment till refund. The appeal stands allowed accordingly.