JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner, Om Prakash, has preferred this writ petition for assailing the impugned order dated 1st of January, 2000 (Annex.P/1), whereby he was removed from services as a consequence of his conviction for the offence under Sections 7 read with Section 13(1)(d)(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (for shot, 'the PC Act'). That apart, the petitioner has also assailed the order of the appellate authority dated 13th July, 2000 (Annex.P/3), whereby the appellate authority has dismissed his appeal. 2. Scorning the facts in detail, brief facts of the case giving rise to this appeal, are that the petitioner was working as Revenue (Patwari) in the office of District Collector, Hanumangarh pursuant to his appointment dated 15th June, 1984. In the year 1994, a case under Sections 7 and 13(2) of PC Act was registered against him and after investigation a charge-sheet was submitted before the Special Judge, Anti Corruption Cases, Bikaner. On completion of trial, learned Special Judge, vide its judgment dated 30th July, 1998, convicted the petitioner for the offences aforesaid and was sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2,000/- under Section 7 of PC Act and for offence under Section 13(2) of the PC Act, he was sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2,000/-. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Despite the conviction of the petitioner, he continued to serve the respondents for more than a year and thereafter vide order dated 1st of January, 2000, he was removed from services by the disciplinary authority, while resorting to Rule 19(1) of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short, 'the Rules of 1958). 3. Feeling disgruntled from the order of removal, the petitioner preferred an appeal before the appellate authority and the appellate authority, by its order dated 13th July, 2000, fully concurred with the findings and conclusions of the disciplinary authority and dismissed his appeal. The appellate authority has concluded that the conduct of the petitioner, which has led to his conviction has warranted the said punishment, which cannot be interfered with. 4. Feeling aggrieved from the order of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition, which is pending since 2000. The appellate authority has concluded that the conduct of the petitioner, which has led to his conviction has warranted the said punishment, which cannot be interfered with. 4. Feeling aggrieved from the order of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition, which is pending since 2000. On behalf of the petitioner, an additional affidavit is submitted on 18th July, 2013, wherein it is mentioned with clarity and precession that the conviction recorded by the learned trial Court has been set at naught by this Court on an appeal preferred by the petitioner. The appeal bearing S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 488/1998 preferred by the petitioner against his conviction was allowed by this Court by its judgment dated 30th May, 2013. A certified copy of the same has been placed on record with the additional affidavit. The learned Single Jude of this Court while allowing the appeal of the petitioner has found that the money, which was paid to the petitioner, was not in the form of an illegal gratification and in fact it was an amount paid towards Lagaan amount, and therefore, the petitioner is not guilty for the offences under Section 7 and 13(2) of the PC Act. The Court has ultimately acquitted the petitioner honorably. Concluding part of the judgment rendered in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 488/1998 is reproduced as under:- In this case, the accused has proved beyond any manner of doubt that the money which was paid to him by the complainant was towards the due lagaan amount which the accused was authorised to recover. In this view of the matter, in the opinion of this Court, the subordinate court committed gross error as well as illegality in convicting the appellant under Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Appellant is entitled to an honorable acquittal. Resultantly, this appeal deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The conviction of the appellant as recorded vide judgment dated 30.7.1998 passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act Cases), Bikaner is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. The appellant is on bail. He need not surrender and his bail bonds are discharged. 5. The conviction of the appellant as recorded vide judgment dated 30.7.1998 passed by the learned Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act Cases), Bikaner is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. The appellant is on bail. He need not surrender and his bail bonds are discharged. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner, while laying emphasis on the judgment of this Court, which was rendered on his appeal has argued that after his acquittal now the cause for removal does not survive and the stigma of conviction stands obliterated. With this submission, learned counsel has urged that the petitioner is liable to be reinstated in the services. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this court in case of S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1851/2003 decided on 11th February, 2011 (State of Lohara Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.). 6. Per contra, Mr. I.S. Pareek, learned Additional Government Counsel, has argued that the acquittal of the petitioner by the appellate Court cannot absolve the petitioner from the offence, which he has committed and the stigma of conviction can, at the most, be treated to have been obliterated from the date of judgment of the appellate Court. With this submission, learned counsel for the respondents has argued that the claim of the petitioner for back wages cannot be sustained. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment rendered by the appellate Court which was rendered in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 488/1998. 8. From a bare perusal of the judgment, it is amply clear that the petitioner has been acquitted honorably by this Court. One more fact, which is throwing light on the issue involved in the matter, is that the prosecution against the petitioner was launched at the behest of the employer inasmuch as precisely the offence has direct proximity with the service and the charge attributed is within the four corners of Prevention of Corruption Act. The sole ground for his removal from service is the conviction by a competent court. Admittedly, for the alleged offence of the petitioner, no disciplinary inquiry was initiated him inasmuch as neither any charge-sheet was given to him, nor any disciplinary action was taken against him. 9. The sole ground for his removal from service is the conviction by a competent court. Admittedly, for the alleged offence of the petitioner, no disciplinary inquiry was initiated him inasmuch as neither any charge-sheet was given to him, nor any disciplinary action was taken against him. 9. On examining the matter, in its entirety, in my considered opinion, order of removal, which was founded on the conviction of the petitioner by a competent criminal court, cannot be sustained for the simple reason that he has been acquitted by the appellate Court honorably and the writ petition deserves acceptance. 10. Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat, Electricity Board, Himmatnagar (Gujarat) & Anr., [ (1996) 11 SCC 603 ] considered the issue relating to grant of back wages to an incumbent who has been ordered to be reinstated in service after his acquittal by the Appellate Court. The Court made following observations in para 3 of the verdict:- 3. The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference. 11. While considering grant of back wages, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its subsequent judgment, in case of Union of India & Ors. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not committed any error of law warranting interference. 11. While considering grant of back wages, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in its subsequent judgment, in case of Union of India & Ors. v. Jaipal Singh, [ (2004) 1 SCC 121 ] , has dealt with elaborately the issue relating to grant of back wages. The Hon'ble Apex Court made following observations in para 4 & 5 of the verdict. 4. On a careful consideration of the matter and the materials on record, including the judgment and orders brought to our notice, we are of the view that it is well accepted that an order rejecting a special leave petition at the threshold without detailed reasons therefor does not constitute any declaration of law by this Court or constitute a binding precedent. Per contra, the decision relied upon by the appellant is one on merits and for reasons specifically recorded therefor it operates as a binding precedent as well. On going through the same, we are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Ranchhodji. If prosecution, which ultimately resulted in acquittal of the person concerned was at the behest of or by the department itself, perhaps different considerations may arise. On the other hand, if as a citizen the employee or a public servant got involved in a criminal case and if after initial conviction by the trial court, he gets acquittal on appeal subsequently, the department cannot in any manner be found fault with for having kept him out of service, since the law obliges a person convicted of an offence to be so kept out and not to be retained in service. Consequently, the reasons given in the decision relied upon, for the appellants are not only convincing but are in consonance with reasonableness as well. Though exception taken to that part of the order directing reinstatement cannot be sustained and the respondent has to be reinstated in service, for the reason that the earlier discharge was on account of those criminal proceedings and conviction only, the appellants are well within their rights to deny back wages to the respondent for the period he was not in service. The appellants cannot be made liable to pay for the period for which they could not avail of the services of the respondent. The High Court, in our view, committed a grave error, in allowing back wages also, without adverting to all such relevant aspects and considerations. Consequently, the order of the High Court insofar as it directed payment of back wages is liable to be and is hereby set aside. 5. The respondent will be entitled to back wages from the date of acquittal and except for the purpose of denying the respondent actual payment of back wages, that period also will be counted as period of service, without any break. The reinstatement, if not already done, in terms of the order of the High Court will be done within thirty days from today. 12. In yet another judgment in case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ (2006) 5 SCC 446 ] , wherein although the issue involved was slightly different but while dilating on the issue of back wages even in case of honorable acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has declined to grant back wages to the incumbent-employee. The Hon'ble Apex Court has made following observations in para 32 of the verdict:- 32. In the instant case, the appellant joined the respondent in the year 1953. He was suspended from service on 8-2- 1979 and got subsistence allowance of Rs. 700 p.m. i.e. 50% of the salary. On 15-10-1982 dismissal order was passed. The appellant had put in 26 years of service with the respondent i.e. from 1953-1979. The appellant would now superannuate in February 1986. On the basis of the same charges and the evidence, the department passed an order of dismissal on 21-10-1982 whereas the criminal court acquitted him on 30-1-2002. However, as the criminal court acquitted the appellant on 30-1-2002 and until such acquittal, there was no reason or ground to hold the dismissal to be erroneous, any relief monetarily can be only w.e.f. 30-1-2002. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension. 13. But by then, the appellant had retired, therefore, we deem it proper to set aside the order of dismissal without back wages. The appellant would be entitled to pension. 13. In this view of the matter, impugned orders passed by the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority are not sustainable and are accordingly annulled and the respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner forthwith in the services with the benefit of continuity of services. The question regarding grant of back wages to the petitioner is left at the discretion of the disciplinary authority and it is expected from the disciplinary authority to decide the question regarding grant of back wages or other monetary benefits to the petitioner strictly in accordance with law. The requisite exercise in this behalf is to be undertaken by the respondents as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of two months from the date of presentation of copy of this order.Writ Petition Allowed. *******