Judgment 1. The petitioner has filed this writ petition to quash the order of the second respondent dated 21.10.2008 imposing punishment of stoppage of increment for one year with cumulative effect. 2. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police in the year 1979 based on selection made by TNPSC. On 07.08.1986, while the petitioner was working at Avadi, he cleared the encroachment made by one police constable in the temple land. Aggrieved by the removal of encroachment, the said police constable gave a complaint on 08.08.1986 to the vigilance as if the petitioner has demanded a sum of Rs.300/-. A charge memo was issued on 19.08.1987 for the said incident. On 02.07.1998, final order was passed by the disciplinary authority viz., the Deputy Inspector General of Police stating that there was motive on the part of the complainant and there was no demand or bribe on the part of the petitioner. However, a punishment of stoppage of increment for two years in two stages with cumulative effected was imposed. Aggrieved about the said punishment imposed, the petitioner has filed an appeal before the Inspector General of Police which was rejected by a non-speaking order dated 24.02.1999. As against the said order, the petitioner filed review petition before the Director General of Police under Rule 15(1)(A) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955. The said review petition was allowed by the Director General of Police on 23.07.2001 by setting aside the order of punishment and the petitioner was warned. In the year 2002, the petitioner was promoted as Inspector of Police i.e., after the finality of the disciplinary proceedings. While the petitioner was serving as Inspector of Police, the second respondent initiated suo motu review under Rule 15-A of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955 and was issued a show cause notice on 26.06.2006 i.e., after a lapse of five years. The petitioner submitted objection for initiating suo motu proceedings after a lapse of seven years. The second respondent without considering the said objection passed the impugned order dated 21.10.2008 imposing punishment of stoppage of increment for one year with cumulative effect. The petitioner submitted objection for initiating suo motu proceedings after a lapse of seven years. The second respondent without considering the said objection passed the impugned order dated 21.10.2008 imposing punishment of stoppage of increment for one year with cumulative effect. The grievance of the petitioner is that final order having been passed by the Director General of Police as early as on 23.07.2001 modifying the punishment of withholding of one increment with that of warning, initiation of suo motu proceedings by second respondent after a lapse of seven years, is illegal. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner cited a judgment of mine in N. Bose vs. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by its Secretary to Government, Education Department, Fort St. George, Chennai – 600 009 and another reported in 2009 (1) CTC 529 wherein exercise of suo motu power with unreasonable delay of 7 years was set aside by following the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh [ 2004 (10) SCC 585 ]. Learned counsel also submitted that the said judgment was followed in a subsequent decision of this Court in K. Jayakumar vs. The Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Kilpauk, Chennai and others [ 2010 (1) CWC 748 ] wherein also the learned Judge has relied on the judgment of this Court in A. Thangavelu v. The Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation [ 1998 (1) CTC 283 ] apart from the above referred judgment of mine and allowed the writ petition. Both the said cases arose out of Rule 36 of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1955, which is in parimateria with Rule 15-A of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1955. 4. When the matter was heard on 07.01.2013, the learned counsel for the respondents was directed to go through the said orders and find out whether writ appeals were filed against the said orders. Today, learned counsel for the respondents, after going through the judgments, submitted that no appeal is filed against the said orders. 5. In the said judgment, a reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh [ 2004 (10) SCC 585 ], wherein in paragraph No.6, the Supreme Court considered a similar issue of suo motu revision exercised by the Government after 15 years. 5. In the said judgment, a reference was made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of H.P. v. Rajkumar Brijender Singh [ 2004 (10) SCC 585 ], wherein in paragraph No.6, the Supreme Court considered a similar issue of suo motu revision exercised by the Government after 15 years. Paragraph No.6 of the judgment reads as follows: "6. We are now left with the second question which was raised by the respondents before the High Court, namely, the delayed exercise of the power under sub-section (3) of Section 20. As indicated above, the Financial Commissioner exercised the power after 15 years of the order of the Collector. It is true that sub-section (3) provided that such a power may be exercised at any time but this expression does not mean there would be no time-limit or it is infinity. All that is meant is that such powers should be exercised within a reasonable time. No fixed period of limitation may be laid but unreasonable delay in exercise of the power would tend to undo the things which have attained finality. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case as to what is the reasonable time within which the power of suo motu action could be exercised. For example, in this case, as the appeal had been withdrawn but the Financial Commissioner had taken up the matter in exercise of his suo motu power, it could well be open for the State to submit that the facts and circumstances were such that it would be within reasonable time but as we have already noted that the order of the Collector which has been interfered with was passed in January 1976 and the appeal preferred by the State was also withdrawn sometime in March 1976. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out such other special facts and circumstances by reason of which it could be said that exercise of suo motu power after 15 years of the order interfered with was within a reasonable time. That being the position in our view, the order of Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with. That being the position in our view, the order of Financial Commissioner stands vitiated having been passed after a long lapse of 15 years of the order which has been interfered with. Therefore, while holding that the Financial Commissioner would have power to proceed suo motu in a suitable case even though an appeal preferred before the lower appellate authority is withdrawn, may be, by the State. Thus the view taken by the High Court is not sustainable. But the order of the Financial Commissioner suffers from the vice of the exercise of the power after unreasonable lapse of time and such delayed action on his part nullifies the order passed by him in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section 20". 6. Apart from the above judgment, a reference was also made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy [ 2003 (7) SCC 667 ], wherein in paragraph Nos.12 and 13, it has been observed as follows: "12. The learned Single Judge has referred to and relied on various decisions including the decisions of this Court as to how the use of the words "at any time" in sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act should be understood. In the impugned order the Division Bench of the High Court approves and affirms the decision of the learned Single Judge. Where a statute provides any suo motu power of revision without prescribing any period of limitation, the power must be exercised within a reasonable time and what is "reasonable time" has to be determined on the facts of each case. 13. In the light of what is stated above, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was right in affirming the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the suo motu power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act is to be exercised within a reasonable time." 7. In this case the disciplinary proceeding was initiated in the year 1987 and the finality was reached in the said disciplinary proceeding on 23.07.2001. Petitioner was promoted as Inspector of police in the year 2002 and suo motu proceeding was initiated by the second respondent on 26.06.2006 and final order was passed on 22.10.2008. In this case the disciplinary proceeding was initiated in the year 1987 and the finality was reached in the said disciplinary proceeding on 23.07.2001. Petitioner was promoted as Inspector of police in the year 2002 and suo motu proceeding was initiated by the second respondent on 26.06.2006 and final order was passed on 22.10.2008. Thus, the delay of about 5 years in initiation of suo motu proceeding and the said time gap, is not reasonable on the facts and circumstances of this case. 8. In the light of the decisions referred to above, I am of the view that the initiation of suo motu proceedings by the second respondent after a lapse of five years and the consequential imposing punishment of stoppage of increment for one year with cumulative effect, is unsustainable. 9. Accordingly, this Writ Petition is allowed and the impunged order is set aside. No costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.