JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—The petitioner has preferred this writ petition seeking issuance of writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 7th May, 1997, 31st August, 2003 and 28th March, 2005 passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, Varanasi, and Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Zone, Varanasi i.e. disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority respectively whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service and his appeal and revision have been rejected. 2. The relevant facts, which are necessary to decide the issue in question, are that in the year 1979 the petitioner was appointed as a Constable in Civil Police. After completing his training, the petitioner was posted at District Varanasi. It is stated that petitioner has unblemished service record. He was transferred to various places and he complied with the transfer orders. The petitioner earned several appreciation letters and he was also awarded cash for his exemplary and excellent service. These facts have also been entered in the service record of the petitioner. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that to harass him a frivolous complaint in the name of his wife Smt. Genda Devi was made to the Senior Superintendent of Police. That apart, with the same object, one Smt. Seema Yadav, wife of Sri Ram Lagan Yadav, had also made a false complaint alleging therein that petitioner has married with her (Smt. Seema Yadav) in the year 1993 inspite of the fact that his first wife Smt. Genda Devi is alive. It is stated that the petitioner is already married with Smt. Genda Devi and he has three sons and three daughters, who are living at his ancestral house at Chauri Chaura, District Gorakhpur, and he has never married with Smt. Seema Yadav nor he has any relationship with her. 4. On the basis of those false complaints, a preliminary enquiry was conducted and thereafter the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceeding under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (for short called as the “Rules, 1991”). 4. On the basis of those false complaints, a preliminary enquiry was conducted and thereafter the petitioner was subjected to disciplinary proceeding under the provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (for short called as the “Rules, 1991”). However, said proceeding was purportedly conducted under Rule 14(1) of the Rules, 1991 but no charge-sheet was served on the petitioner and on the basis of an ex parte enquiry, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner and thereafter vide order dated 07th May, 1997 the petitioner has been dismissed from service. A copy of the order of dismissal dated 07th May, 1997 has been brought on record as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. 5. In the dismissal order it is mentioned that on 28th December, 1996 a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner under Rule 14 (1)(Ka) (sic) of the Rules, 1991 after completing departmental proceedings. Said show-cause notice was stated to be accompanied by the “finding” and was sent through special messenger. But the petitioner was not available at his home, therefore, a copy of the show-cause notice as well as the “finding” was pasted at the front of his house. Since the petitioner did not submit reply to the show-cause notice, the disciplinary authority found that all the charges levelled against him were proved and there was no procedural defect in the departmental proceeding. Against this background, the disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal dated 07th May, 1997. 6. Petitioner has averred that he was not given copy of order of dismissal but he was orally informed on 07th January, 2002 that he has been dismissed from service, and thereupon on 08th January, 2002 the petitioner moved an application under the registered cover to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Varanasi to the effect that a copy of the dismissal order may be provided to him. After several reminders, ultimately on 27th May, 2002 a copy of the dismissal order was served on the petitioner. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the petitioner filed an appeal before the respondent No. 3/Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, Varanasi. A copy of the ground of appeal has been brought on record as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. 8. 7. Feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the petitioner filed an appeal before the respondent No. 3/Deputy Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Range, Varanasi. A copy of the ground of appeal has been brought on record as Annexure-4 to the writ petition. 8. The appeal of the petitioner has been rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 31st August, 2003 by recording finding that from the records of the preliminary enquiry ( izkjfEHkd tkap vk[;k ) it is established that the petitioner has married with another lady in the year 1993 during the lifetime of his first wife and he has six children from his first wife. The appellate authority has also recorded in its order that on the basis of preliminary enquiry when disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and charge-sheet was sent to him, he was not found at his house and, therefore, charge-sheet and other documents were served on his heirs. Since the petitioner failed to submit reply to the charge-sheet nor did he attend the disciplinary proceeding, the charges levelled against him were found to be proved, therefore, he was found guilty. 9. Aggrieved by the order of appellate authority dated 31st August, 2003, petitioner preferred a revision before the respondent No. 2/Inspector General of Police, Varanasi Zone, Varanasi. A copy of the grounds of revision is on the record as Annexure-6 to the writ petition. The revision of the petitioner has been rejected by the respondent No. 2 vide order dated 28th March, 2005. The revisional authority has recorded the finding that the petitioner did not participate in the proceedings and his both the wives had given their statement during the disciplinary proceeding. Against this background, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition. 10. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent No. 4. Stand taken in the counter-affidavit is that petitioner’s wife Smt. Genda Devi had moved an application against the petitioner that he has illegally married with Smt. Seema Yadav. On the basis of said complaint, a preliminary enquiry was conducted, wherein some photographs were filed which indicate that the petitioner had married with Smt. Genda Devi. It is also stated that the petitioner has admitted some letters written by him to Smt. Seema Devi. This conduct of the petitioner is in violation of Rule-29 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. It is also stated that the petitioner has admitted some letters written by him to Smt. Seema Devi. This conduct of the petitioner is in violation of Rule-29 of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. It is further stated that during the preliminary enquiry statement of the petitioner was recorded and in the preliminary enquiry he was found guilty. Therefore, the competent authority issued the order to conduct the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner in terms of Rule 14(1)(Ka) (sic) of the Rules, 1991. 11. It has also been stated that when the charge-sheet was sent to the petitioner through special messenger, he was not available at his home, therefore, the charges were read out to his father Sri Ramraj, who had received the charge-sheet. Furthermore, show-cause notice was also sent to the petitioner but since he was not available at his home, it was pasted at a conspicuous place. However, despite that the petitioner deliberately did not participate in the disciplinary proceeding and as such, the order of dismissal was passed by the Senior Superintendent of Police. 12. In rebuttal a rejoinder-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that Smt. Seema Yadav is married wife of Sri Ram Lagan Yadav and she is an Aanganbari Karyakatri. The petitioner has denied the fact that he has ever admitted his relationship with Smt. Seema Yadav. He has denied his letters as manufactured documents. The petitioner has also denied the fact that copy of the charge-sheet was ever served on his father. He has categorically stated that neither charge-sheet was served upon him nor he has received any copy of the show-cause notice. The petitioner has also categorically denied that Smt. Seema Yadav has given any statement. Moreover, copy of the statement of Smt. Seema Yadav or any other witness was never given to the petitioner. 13. I have heard Sri Daya Shanker Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Sri J.K. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel. 14. Sri Daya Shanker Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that no departmental proceeding was conducted against the petitioner as the copy of the charge-sheet was never served on the petitioner. 13. I have heard Sri Daya Shanker Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and Sri J.K. Tiwari, learned Standing Counsel. 14. Sri Daya Shanker Mishra, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that no departmental proceeding was conducted against the petitioner as the copy of the charge-sheet was never served on the petitioner. The departmental proceeding was conducted against the petitioner ex parte; no copy of statements of the witnesses or any other documents were supplied to the petitioner; copy of the enquiry report and show-cause notice were admittedly not served on the petitioner; evidence adduced in the preliminary enquiry cannot be used in the departmental proceeding without supplying copy of those documents to the delinquent; and, no date, time or place was fixed by the Inquiry Officer. 15. Sri Mishra further urges that the only charge levelled against the petitioner that he has contracted second marriage, has not been proved by any evidence on record. The disciplinary authority has not referred any evidence in its order and only conclusion has been recorded that the charges against the petitioner are established without reference to any document or the enquiry report. The petitioner in his ground of appeal has raised several grounds which have not been adverted to by the appellate authority. The revisional authority fell in the same error, as without reference to any evidence on the record it has also found the petitioner guilty of the charges. 16. Lastly, Sri Misra submits that the punishment of dismissal from service awarded to the petitioner is totally disproportionate to the alleged misconduct levelled against him. His excellent service record has totally been ignored. 17. Learned Standing Counsel, who was earlier directed to produce the record, has produced the original record before the Court. He submits that the petitioner deliberately did not participate in the disciplinary proceeding and as such, he cannot make a complaint of violation of natural justice. He urges that copy of the charge-sheet was served on the father of the petitioner through special messenger and copy of the show-cause notice alongwith enquiry report was pasted at a conspicuous place of his house and, as such, the petitioner was fully aware of the departmental proceeding. 18. I have considered the rival submissions of the respective parties and perused the record. 19. The disciplinary proceedings of the police officers of the subordinate ranks are governed by the Rules, 1991. 18. I have considered the rival submissions of the respective parties and perused the record. 19. The disciplinary proceedings of the police officers of the subordinate ranks are governed by the Rules, 1991. The Rules, 1991 has been framed in exercise of the powers under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 46 read with Sections 2 and 7 of the Police Act, 1861 (Act No. 5 of 1861) by the Governor. Rule 4 of the Rules, 1991 deals with minor and major penalties and it enumerates various kinds of punishments. Rule 8 provides that no police officer shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after proper enquiry and disciplinary proceedings. Rule 14 lays down the procedure for conducting the departmental proceeding. In fact, detailed procedure has been provided in Appendix I. Rule 14 of the Rules, 1991 reads as under: “14. Procedure for conducting departmental proceedings.—(1) Subject to the provisions contained in these Rules, the departmental proceedings in the cases referred to in sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 against the police officers may be conducted in accordance with the procedure laid down in Appendix I. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1) punishments in cases referred to in sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 may be imposed after informing the police officer in writing of the action proposed to be taken against him and of the imputations of act or omission on which it is proposed to be taken and giving him reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may wish to make against the proposal. (3) *** ***” A careful reading of Appendix I would make it abundantly clear that it is analogous to Rule 7 of the U.P. Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, whereunder detailed procedure has been laid down for conducting the departmental proceeding against the Government servants. 20. Relevant would it be to notice Appendix I. Again there are certain Instructions mentioned in the said Appendix. Relevant part of the Instructions reads as under: “(i) The charge-sheet should be given to the person concerned and his signature should be taken on a copy of the charge-sheet. If that is not possible, it should be served by registered post. (ii) Each charge should be drawn up precisely and clearly, care being taken to avoid vagueness.” 21. In the case in hand, indisputably the aforementioned instructions have not been followed. If that is not possible, it should be served by registered post. (ii) Each charge should be drawn up precisely and clearly, care being taken to avoid vagueness.” 21. In the case in hand, indisputably the aforementioned instructions have not been followed. Concededly, the charge-sheet was not served on the petitioner nor it was sent under the registered cover. It is stated that charge-sheet was read over to the father of the petitioner and it was given to him. In view of the said fact, there is clear violation of the statutory provisions and natural justice. The procedure adopted to serve the charge-sheet upon father/relative/family member is not a fair procedure in terms of the Instructions provided in the Appendix, inasmuch as only two modes are provided in it i.e. personal service upon the delinquent employee or under the registered cover. 22. It is pertinent to mention that after the enquiry was completed, show-cause notice and enquiry report were also not served upon the petitioner. Both the documents were stated to be pasted at the conspicuous part of his house. Again, it was not one of the procedures prescribed in the Instructions of the Appendix. 23. In respect of service of notice the law is well-settled. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 articulates that if a notice is sent under the registered cover at the correct address of the addressee, it shall be presumed that notice has been duly served. Reference may be made to the judgements of the Supreme Court in the cases of V. Raja Kumari v. P. Subbarama Naidu and another, (2004) 8 SCC 774 . The relevant observation of the Supreme Court, as in paragraph-9 of the judgement, reads as under: “9. In Black’s Law Dictionary “giving of notice” is distinguished from receiving of the notice (vide p. 621): “A person notifies or gives notice to another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in the ordinary course, whether or not such other actually comes to know of it.” A person “receives” a notice when it is duly delivered to him or at the place of his business.” 24. The Supreme Court in the case of Harcharan Singh v. Shivrani, (1981) 2 SCC 535 , had the occasion to interpret Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which deals with meaning of service by post. The Supreme Court in the case of Harcharan Singh v. Shivrani, (1981) 2 SCC 535 , had the occasion to interpret Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which deals with meaning of service by post. The relevant part of the judgement is extracted hereunder: “7. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic.—“Meaning of service by post” and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus raises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, prepaying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgment due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by prepaying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise.” 25. Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise.” 25. From the aforesaid judgements it emanates that proper service can be presumed only when a registered letter is sent to the addressee at the correct address and in case letter is returned with the endorsement that the addressee was not found or the addressee denied the receipt of notice, then the onus is shifted on the employer to prove that the notice was sent to the addressee or when the notice has been served personally upon the delinquent. 26. The next question, which calls for determination, is what would be effect if Enquiry Officer does not fix any date, time and place of enquiry. This question needs not to be answered by this Court as the Supreme Court and this Court in a long line of decisions have held that if Enquiry Officer fails to intimate the delinquent the date, time and place of enquiry, then it would be violation of principles of natural justice. It has also been held that even if the delinquent refuses to participate in the enquiry, the employer cannot straightaway dismiss him but he must hold an ex parte enquiry, where the evidence must be led. Reference may be made to the judgements in the cases of The Imperial Tobacco Company of India Ltd. v. Its Workmen, AIR 1962 SC 1348 ; Meenglas Tea Estate v. The Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719 ; Uma Shanker Yadav v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies and others, 1992 (65) FLR 674; Subhash Chandra Sharma v. Managing Director and another, (2000) 1 UPLBEC 541 ; Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 2010 (10) SCC 539 ; State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, 2010 (2) SCC 772 ; Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and others, 2009 (2) SCC 570 . 27. From the order of disciplinary authority and the pleadings of the counter-affidavit, it is evident that the preliminary enquiry was conducted in the matter and various materials as well as the findings of the preliminary enquiry have been relied upon by the disciplinary authority. 27. From the order of disciplinary authority and the pleadings of the counter-affidavit, it is evident that the preliminary enquiry was conducted in the matter and various materials as well as the findings of the preliminary enquiry have been relied upon by the disciplinary authority. It is well-settled law that findings and materials of the preliminary enquiry cannot be relied upon in the disciplinary proceeding if the delinquent was not associated with preliminary enquiry. Admittedly, in the present case, petitioner was not given any such opportunity. It is a trite law that object of the preliminary enquiry is to satisfy the employer itself that a disciplinary proceeding can be conducted against an employee. Its purpose is to collect the facts. Once the employer is satisfied on the basis of the materials and report of the preliminary enquiry that disciplinary proceeding may be initiated in terms of the relevant service Rule, the delinquent is placed under suspension, and a copy of the charge-sheet and other documentary evidences relied upon in support of the charges are served upon him. 28. It is noteworthy that if in the disciplinary proceeding the department wants to rely on some materials of preliminary enquiry, it is necessary to supply a copy of said materials to the employee. Reference may be made to the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Employees of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. (Private) Ltd. v. The Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 236 . In a recent judgement in the case of Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of Gujarat and another, (2013) 4 SCC 301 , the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the scope of preliminary enquiry at length. The observations of the Supreme Court in Nirmala J. Jhala (supra), which are relevant to the present controversy, read as under: “45. In view of the above, it is evident that the evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry cannot be used in regular inquiry as the delinquent is not associated with it, and opportunity to cross-examine the persons examined in such inquiry is not given. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.” “47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry.” “51. Using such evidence would be violative of the principles of natural justice.” “47. The preliminary enquiry may be useful only to take a prima facie view, as to whether there can be some substance in the allegation made against an employee which may warrant a regular enquiry.” “51. There is nothing on record to show that either the preliminary enquiry report or the statements recorded therein, particularly, by the complainant-accused or Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, had been exhibited in regular inquiry. In the absence of information in the charge-sheet that such report/statements would be relied upon against the appellant, it was not permissible for the enquiry officer or the High Court to rely upon the same. Natural justice is an inbuilt and inseparable ingredient of fairness and reasonableness. Strict adherence to the principle is required, whenever civil consequences follow up, as a result of the order passed. Natural justice is universal justice. In certain factual circumstances even non-observance of the rule will itself result in prejudice. Thus, this principle is of supreme importance. [Vide S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 ; D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) 3 SCC 259 ; and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P., (2010) 10 SCC 539 )” “52.2 The enquiry officer, the High Court on administrative side as well as on judicial side, committed a grave error in placing reliance on the statement of the complainant as well as of Shri C.B. Gajjar, Advocate, recorded in a preliminary enquiry. The preliminary enquiry and its report loses significance/importance, once the regular enquiry is initiated by issuing charge-sheet to the delinquent. Thus, it was all in violation of the principles of natural justice.” “52.4 The onus lies on the department to prove the charge and it failed to examine any of the employees of the Court i.e. stenographer, Bench Secretary or peon attached to the office of the appellant for proving the entry of Shri Gajjar, Advocate in her chamber on 17.8.1993.” 29. In the present case, no such procedure has been adopted by the respondents as the disciplinary authority has relied upon the preliminary enquiry but there is nothing on the record to indicate that said materials of the preliminary enquiry were supplied to the petitioner. Alongwith the counter-affidavit the respondents have not filed the alleged statement of petitioner’s wife Smt. Genda Devi or Smt. Seema Devi. Alongwith the counter-affidavit the respondents have not filed the alleged statement of petitioner’s wife Smt. Genda Devi or Smt. Seema Devi. Learned Standing Counsel also could not point out any material from the records produced by him, from which it can be established that the petitioner has contracted second marriage with Smt. Seema Devi. There is no evidence on the record to the said effect. Merely some letters purportedly written by the petitioner to Smt. Seema Devi cannot establish the relationship of husband and wife. Petitioner has denied that those letters were written by him and the department has not established that those letters were written by the petitioner. Even if those letters are assumed to be correct and written by the petitioner, a perusal thereof do not establish that there was a relationship of husband and wife between them. 30. After careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the disciplinary proceeding conducted against the petitioner is vitiated on the ground of violation of principles of natural justice and as such, the orders passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority dated 07th May, 1997, 31st August, 2003 and 28th March, 2005 respectively (annexures-1, 5 and 7 respectively to the writ petition), impugned in this writ petition, cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. The matter is remitted back to the disciplinary authority to conduct a fresh enquiry in the matter after serving a copy of the charge-sheet upon the petitioner. The enquiry may be conducted and completed in accordance with the law as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order. Petitioner is directed to cooperate in the enquiry and he will not take unnecessary adjournments. 31. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 32. No order as to costs.