Judgment :- K.M. Joseph, J. 1. As common questions arise for consideration in all these cases, they were heard together and disposed of by a common Judgment. All these revision petitions are filed by the State of Kerala, invoking the provisions of Section 41 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The brief facts of the cases are as follows: 2. STR No.57/11 is filed in respect of the assessment year 2000-01. STR No.55/11 is filed in respect of the assessment year 2001-02. STR No.63/11 is filed in respect of the assessment year 2000-01. As far as TRC Nos.72, 75 and 76 are concerned, they are filed in respect of the assessment years 1998-99, 1999-2000 and 2000-01 respectively. Respondents in all these revisions are assessees under the Act. They are small sale industrial units, registered with the Industries Department. The real question which arises for consideration in all these revisions is whether the respondent assessees are entitled to the benefit of concessional rate of tax as vouchsafed under GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988. The said order is extracted below for the sake of convenience. “The question of encouraging the rubber based industries in Kerala had been engaging the attention of Government for some time past and as rubber is an important raw material for industries, the State Government had been thinking to give further encouragement for setting up more rubber industries in the State. With this end in view, a meeting was held inviting all those concerned to discuss the ways and means of inducing more industries using rubber as raw-material inside the State. The consensus arrived at the meeting was that there was need for giving some concessions and relief to the new entrepreneurs for starting rubber industries. Government considered the various suggestions made by the rubber manufacturers and technical experts and have decided to extend the following concessions to promote rubber industries. 1) Rubber to be used for new industries in Kerala will be exempted from levy of purchase tax. 2) An additional capital subsidy of 5% will be given to new rubber industries to be set up in Kerala and this subsidy will be in addition to the Central/State subsidy now available to the industries. 3) Sales tax on finished rubber goods produced from factories in Kerala will be reduced to 3%. (emphasis supplied) 3. 2) An additional capital subsidy of 5% will be given to new rubber industries to be set up in Kerala and this subsidy will be in addition to the Central/State subsidy now available to the industries. 3) Sales tax on finished rubber goods produced from factories in Kerala will be reduced to 3%. (emphasis supplied) 3. In this revisions, we are concerned, only with the issue arising from the operation of the third clause in the aforesaid Government Order, namely, the direction that tax need be paid only at concessional rate, i.e., @ 3% on sale of finished rubber products produced by the factories in Kerala. The following are the questions of law raised in these revisions: “A) Has not the Tribunal gone wrong in directing the assessing authority to allow the claim of concessional rate of tax to the assessee as provided in the notification GO (MSNo.124/88/ID dated 31.8.1988? B) Has not the Tribunal grievously erred in interpreting the amendment brought into the KGST Act, by way of introducing sub-section (xv A) to Section 2, relying on the decision reported in 8 KTR 361, especially since the subject matter of the said decision was an assessment year anterior to the amendment brought about on 1.4.1998? C) Ought not the Tribunal have held that in any event, all exemption notifications were withdrawn by the Government by SRO 1091/99 and concession can be claimed only under the said notification in the relevant assessment year? D) Ought not the Tribunal have held that the assessee not being a new industrial unit, is not entitled to the exemption granted by GO(MS)nO.124.88/ID dated 31.8.1988?” 4. Originally, the assessments were completed by the Assessing Officer, rejecting the contentions of the respondents. The first appeals filed by them were unsuccessful. The Appellate Tribunal, however, allowed their appeals and found that they were entitled to the benefit of concessional rate of tax in tune with GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988. The State carried the matter in revision before this Court. This Court, in the revisions, took the view that GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 is essentially meant for new industries. The Division Bench further held that in the aftermath of subsequent notifications, the assessees would not be entitled to claim the benefit of concessional rate of tax provided under GO(MS) 124/88/Id dated 31.08.1988. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal. This Court, in the revisions, took the view that GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 is essentially meant for new industries. The Division Bench further held that in the aftermath of subsequent notifications, the assessees would not be entitled to claim the benefit of concessional rate of tax provided under GO(MS) 124/88/Id dated 31.08.1988. The matter was remanded to the Tribunal. Against the said Judgment, the assessees carried the matter before the Apex Court and the Apex court remanded the matter back to the Tribunal. The relevant portion of the said order is extracted below: “In the present cases, the High Court found that the Tribunal has allowed the appeals of the assessees without reference to the amendment in the Act and relevant notifications. Accordingly, the matters stood remanded by the High Court to the Tribunal. At this stage, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. However, we make it clear that the Tribunal shall decide the cases de novo uninfluenced by any observation made by the High Court in the impugned orders.” Later on, the petitioner filed interlocutory applications, seeking modification of the above quoted order and the Apex Court passed the following order on 27.09.2010: “By these interlocutory applications, the petitioner has sought modification of our order dated 29th March 2010, which reads as under: ‘In the present cases, the High Court found that the Tribunal has allowed the appeals of the assessees without reference to the amendment in the Act and relevant notifications. Accordingly, the matters stood remanded by the High Court to the Tribunal. At this stage, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. However, we make it clear that the Tribunal shall decide the cases de novo uninfluenced by any observation made by the High Court in the impugned orders. Accordingly, the special leave petitions are disposed of.’ As can be seen from the above order, since interpretation of the amendment to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and relevant notifications were involved, we thought it fit to remit the cases to the Tribunal for de novo consideration. That order is retained by us. We see no reason to modify our order. We make it clear that in the first instance, the Tribunal will consider the matter in the light of the amendment to the Act and the relevant notifications. That order is retained by us. We see no reason to modify our order. We make it clear that in the first instance, the Tribunal will consider the matter in the light of the amendment to the Act and the relevant notifications. However, if the Tribunal is of the view that the matter needs to be considered by the Assessing Officer in the light of the factual background, it may remit the cases to the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, the interlocutory applications stand disposed.’ 5. Pursuant to the order of remand, the matter was redone by the Tribunal in all these cases. The Tribunal found that the respondent Assessees are entitled to the benefit of concessional rate of tax as provided under GO (MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988. It is feeling aggrieved by the same that the State has come up with the present revision petitions. 6. We heard the learned Government Pleader Sri. Bobby John Pulickaparambil, Sri. C.K. Thanupillai, learned Counsel appearing for the respondents in STR Nos.55, 57 and 63 of 2011 and also Sri. S. Anilkumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in STR Nos.72, 75 and 76 of 2012. 7. The learned Government Pleader would submit that GO(MS) 124/88/ID is actually meant for new industries. He would further submit that at any rate, having regard to the subsequent notifications, the said Government Order would not survive, as SRO No.1091/99 has the effect of superseding all the existing notifications, except those, which are expressly mentioned. Therefore, GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 has ceased to exist. The further contention raised by the learned Government Pleader is that having regard to the insertion of definition of the word “Notification” in the Act with effect from 01.04.1998, unless and until there is a notification issued as provided in the definition of the word “Notification”, the respondents assessees could not possibly claim the benefit of the concessional rate of tax under GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988. It is contended that the intention is very clear to the effect that it should supersede all notifications except those which are expressly saved. 8. Per contra, the learned Counsel Sri. C.K. Thanupillai, appearing in three of the revisions, would address the following submissions before us: 9. He would submit that the Apex Court has remanded the matter back to the Tribunal with certain observations. 8. Per contra, the learned Counsel Sri. C.K. Thanupillai, appearing in three of the revisions, would address the following submissions before us: 9. He would submit that the Apex Court has remanded the matter back to the Tribunal with certain observations. He could contend that it is not open to the State to contend that GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 is meant only for new industries. He would, in fact, contend that the Division Bench in the earlier round of litigations, ought not to have found that GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 is confined only to new industries, as there was no legal occasion for the court to make such a finding having regard to the wording of Section 41 of the Act. He would next contend that GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 is not published in the Gazette. After the insertion of the word Notification in the year 1998 in the Act, unless and until a notification is published in the Gazette, it cannot be treated as a notification for the purpose of the Act. The resultant position would be that SRO No.1091/99, which purports to supersede the earlier notifications, would not take within its fold GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988, as it cannot be treated as a notification fulfilling the ingredients of the definition of the word “Notification”, after the amendment in the year 1998. Still further, he would contend that a Division Bench of this court had, in the decision in SS Tread Rubber M. Association v. State of Kerala ( 2000 (1) KLT 564 ) taken the view that as long as GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 is not specifically withdrawn, the assessees could take resort to its provisions. He would also submit in this context that in SRO No.1091/99, there is no express mention of the authority, withdrawing GO(MS) 124/88/ID. In other words, having regard to the decisions of this Court in SS Tread Rubber M. Association (supra) and Thamarappally Rubber Products v. Additional Sales Tax Officer (1994) 94 STC 178 ), unless and until GO(MS) 124/88/ID is withdrawn specifically and expressly, the said Government Order must be treated as still alive. Next, he would contend that as noticed by the Division Bench of this Court in SS Tread Rubber M. Association’s case, the Government have taken a policy decision vide GO(MS) No/17/92/ID dated 24.1.1992 to continue with the concessions, which are granted under GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988. Next, he would contend that as noticed by the Division Bench of this Court in SS Tread Rubber M. Association’s case, the Government have taken a policy decision vide GO(MS) No/17/92/ID dated 24.1.1992 to continue with the concessions, which are granted under GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988. A perusal of the said order dated 24.1.1992 would show that it was signed by the then Chief Secretary, which shows that it was a Cabinet decision. Being a Cabinet decision, the benefit, which was vouchsafed under the same, by the continuance of GO (MS) 124/88/ID could not be taken away by the Taxes Department by issuing a notification under Section 10 of the Act. In this context, the learned counsel would rely on the Judgment of the Apex Court in State of Bihar v. Suprabhat Steel (1998) 112 STC 258). He would also draw our attention to the reasoning of the Tribunal in this context. According to the Tribunal, it is not as if the grant of concessions is to be monopolized by the Taxes Department Tax concessions can be given by the Industries Department also. GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.08.1988 is issued by the Government of Kerala in the Industries Department. Subsequently, the same was continued by virtue of the Cabinet decision taken in 1992 vide GO(MS) No.17/92/ID dated 24.1.1992. In such circumstances, the learned Counsel would submit that even though the Appellate Tribunal has not expressly referred to the dictum laid down in Suprabhat Steel’s case, it is quite clear that the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Suprabhat Steel’s case is squarely applicable to the cases on hand and it is not open to the Government to take away the benefits given under GO(MS) 124/88/ID. 10. Sri. S. Anilkumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in STR Nos.72, 75 and 77 of 2012 adopted the very same contentions raised by Sri. C.K. Thanupillai. 11. The Tribunal has, in the impugned orders, reasoned as follows: The Industries Department just like the Taxes Department, is also a limb of the Government machinery. Government in the Taxes Department cannot say that an order issued by the Industries Department will not be obeyed by the Taxes Department. To promote small scale industries or for rehabilitation of sick industrial units, the Government in the Industries Department may have to announce certain tax reliefs to industrial units. Government in the Taxes Department cannot say that an order issued by the Industries Department will not be obeyed by the Taxes Department. To promote small scale industries or for rehabilitation of sick industrial units, the Government in the Industries Department may have to announce certain tax reliefs to industrial units. Reference is made to GO(MS) No./17/92/ID dated 24.1.1992 issued by the chief Secretary to Government in accordance with the policy decision included in GO(P) No.119/91 dated 22.10.1991 and ordering that the sales tax concessions provided under GO(MS) 124/88/ID will continue. It is also stated that the Law Officer has no case that the policy decision of the Government has since changed. So long so such an order changing the policy of the Government is not announced, sales tax concessions granted as per GO(MS) 124/88/ID cannot be superseded by another notification or Government Order, issued by the Secretary to Government in the Taxes Department. Referring to the Bill contained, the explanation to the word Notification sought to be inserted as Clause 2(xv A), the Tribunal found that the fact that the explanation was omitted, would show that the word Notification as inserted, would have no application as regards GO(MS) 124/88 is concerned and as long as the said Government Order is not specifically withdrawn, the same will apply to new industries as well as the existing rubber industries. It is also stated that the challenge against GO (MS) 124/88 was finally settled by the Apex Court in CC Nos.6176 to 6182 of 2000. On this ground also, it is held that the 1988 Government Order applies to rubber based industries. 12. We will first examine the contention of the respondents that in view of the insertion of explanation of the word “Notification” in 1998 and as GO(MS) 124/88/ID was not published in the Gazette, SRO No.1091/99 cannot have the effect of superseding GO No.(MS) No.124/88/ID. Following is the definition of the word “Notification”. “(xvA) Notification means a notification issued by the Government, under the provisions of this Act and published in the Gazette.” The above quoted definition was inserted by amending the Act with effect from 1.4.1998. In the Bill, the amendment was contemplated aided by an explanation. Following is the definition of the word “Notification”. “(xvA) Notification means a notification issued by the Government, under the provisions of this Act and published in the Gazette.” The above quoted definition was inserted by amending the Act with effect from 1.4.1998. In the Bill, the amendment was contemplated aided by an explanation. The proposed clause read as follows: (xvA) ‘Notification’ means a notification issued by the Government in the Taxes Department under the provisions of this Act and published in the Gazette.” The explanation to the said clause read as follows: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any court, tribunal or other authority, a notification in existence on the 1st of April, 1998 which does not satisfy the requirement of this clause shall not be treated as a notification for the purposes of this Act.” However, when the Bill came to be passed and was made Law, the explanation was omitted. Therefore, we are left with the definition of the word “Notification” as it stands. It is admitted that GO(MS) 124/88/ID is not published in the Gazette. In SRO No.1091/99, it is specifically stated that it is issued under the provisions of the Act. If we are persuaded to hold that GO(MS) 124/88/ID is not published in the Gazette and therefore, it cannot be treated as a notification, it cannot be treated as a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, which was superseded and therefore, the respondent assessees would be entitled to the benefit of reduced rate of tax. According to the learned Government Pleader, while it is true that in the Bill, there was an Explanation and in the Law as finally made, the Explanation was omitted, unless and until GO(MS) 124/88 conforms to the definition of the word Notification, it cannot hold good after the insertion of the definition of the word Notification in the Act. 13. In order to appreciate these arguments, we must find out as tow hat really was the apparent reason for proposing an Explanation. A perusal of the Explanation would show that the order starts with a non-obstante clause. 13. In order to appreciate these arguments, we must find out as tow hat really was the apparent reason for proposing an Explanation. A perusal of the Explanation would show that the order starts with a non-obstante clause. In other words, the non-obstante clause refers to the judgments rendered and the intention of the Legislature to provide that any notification existing as on the date, despite any judgments to the contrary, which do not conform to the main provision of the definition, shall not be treated as a notification issued under the provisions of the Act. GO(MS) 124/88/ID was published on 31.8.1988. It was published by the Industries Department of the State of Kerala. It was intending to encourage the industrial activities of the State, especially rubber based industries, it was issued. Among the benefits vouchsafed under the said Government Order, was the grant of concession in the matter of rate of tax in respect of products sold by rubber industries situated in the State of Kerala. The concessional rate of tax was fixed @ 3%. In the decision of this Court speaking through a learned Single Judge in Thamarappally’s case (supra), the learned single Judge, by Judgment dated 8.2.1994, took the following view: “10. From Exhibit P1, it can be seen that the Government have issued orders to the effect that the sales tax on finished rubber goods had been reduced to 3 percent as claimed and enjoyed by the petitioner in this case. There is absolutely no justification for the State to contend that this notification has not been issued under section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Ac. In the light of the decision reported above, it shall be declared that exhibit P1 notification is a notification issued under section 10 of the Act and the liability of the petitioner is only 3 percent on finished rubber goods produced from factories in Kerala.” (emphasis supplied) In essence, the learned single Judge took the view that GO(MS) 124/88 is a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act and the liability of the petitioner therein was to pay tax @ 3% on the finished rubber goods produced from factories in Kerala. The said Judgment was affirmed in Writ Appeal. The said Judgment was affirmed in Writ Appeal. Still later, on 14.09.1998, a Division Bench of this Court in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Cross Field Rubbers (1998 115 STC 577), took the following view: “2. These tax revision cases raise a common question for consideration whether under GO(MS) No.124/88/ID dated August 31, 1988, concessional rate of tax at 3 percent shall continue. The learned Government Pleader has not shown to us that the said G.O was withdrawn by the Government or modified. Unless the GO is withdrawn or modified, that would continue to remain in force. This controversy earlier also came up before this Court and then, a learned single Judge of this Court in Thamarappally Rubber products v Additional Sales Tax Officer (1994) 94 STC 178 held that it could be seen from the order that the Government had issued orders to the effect that the sales tax on finished rubber products had been reduced to 3 percent. There was no justification for the State to contend that this notification had not been issued under section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. Therefore, the liability of the petitioner was only to pay tax at 3 percent on finished rubber products from factories in Kerala. The Government Pleader further submits that the said decision of the learned single Judge was affirmed by a Division Bench on appeal. This being so, we do not see any patent illegality in the order of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal. These revision cases are, therefore, dismissed, in limine.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, this Court took the view though GO(MS) 124/88/ID was not published in the Gazette and it was not issued by the Taxes Department that it was issued under Section 10 of the Act. We are of the view that when the Explanation was proposed, the intention of the Legislature was that GO(MS) 124/88/ID, which continued to hold the field, apparently as on the date on which the Bill was introduced, should not be allowed to continue as a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. In other words, the movers of the Bill apparently intended that the benefit vouchsafed under GO(MS) 124/88/ID, which was declared by this Court as a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, should not any longer continue to be the source for claiming concessional relief. In other words, the movers of the Bill apparently intended that the benefit vouchsafed under GO(MS) 124/88/ID, which was declared by this Court as a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, should not any longer continue to be the source for claiming concessional relief. But, it is admitted that when ultimately the Finance Act was passed, the Explanation was omitted. According to the learned Government Pleader, even after the omission of the Explanation, with effect from the date on which the definition of the word Notification was inserted, namely, 1.4.1998, unless and until there is a notification issued by the Government and published in the Gazette, it cannot be treated as a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act and therefore, it cannot be treated as capable of conferring concessions legally on the respondents assessees, after the word Notification was defined. We may at once notice the submission of the learned Government Pleader when he addressed us on the alternate argument that at any rate, after the issuance of SRO No.1091/99, GO(MS) 124/88 must be treated as being superseded. It is here that the learned counsel for the party respondents would contend that GO(MS) No.124/88/ID not being published in the Gazette, cannot be treated as a Notification and only a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act can be superseded by SRO 1091/99. We are of the view that the argument of the learned Government Pleader that with the insertion of the definition of the word Notification in the Act, the benefit which was legally available under GO(MS) 124/88/ID, will cease to be available if the other conditions are satisfied, cannot be accepted. When an amendment is made to an Act, unless the words are clear or necessary implication is inevitable, a provision will have only prospective operation. In fact, the learned Government Pleader does not dispute the fact that in Section 10 of the Act, there was already a requirement that the Notification must be published in the Gazette. 14. There are two limbs to the definition of the word Notification in section 2(xvA) of the Kerala Finance Bill, 1998, of which, one is that it should be issued by the Government. 14. There are two limbs to the definition of the word Notification in section 2(xvA) of the Kerala Finance Bill, 1998, of which, one is that it should be issued by the Government. We may notice here that initially, in the proposed definition of the word Notification, the words used were “A notification means a Notification issued by the Government in the Taxes Department under the provisions of the Act and published in the Gazette.” When it was finally made into Law, the word Notification has been inserted to mean a Notification issued by the Government under the provisions of the Act and published in the Gazette. We are of the view that certainly, as far as any notification issued after the date of the Act is concerned, it can only be treated as a Notification, if it fulfills the ingredients of the definition as inserted, i.e., to say, after the date of amendment, unless there is a notification issued by the Government under the Act and it is published in the Gazette, it would not have the force of a notification. 15. Here, we are called upon to consider the question as to whether GO(MS) 124/88/ID, which is a Government Order and that too, issued by the Industries Department in the year 1988, would be affected by the insertion of the definition of the word Notification in the year 1998. In this context, as already noted by us, we must not be oblivious of the Law declared by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the decision in Thamarappally’s case (supra) dated 8.2.1994 that GO(MS) 124/88/ID is a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. Later, the said view was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court. Still later, by Judgment dated 14.09.1998, another Division Bench rejected the contention of the learned Government Pleader and held that GO(MS) 124/88/ID has been issued under Section 10 of the Act. Thus, there were judicial verdicts, clearly taking the view that it must be treated as a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. Apparently, it was a view, which held the filed, even after 1998. In this context, we must bear in mind, the significance of the original proposal to knock out the effect of the judgments of this Court by introducing an Explanation. Apparently, it was a view, which held the filed, even after 1998. In this context, we must bear in mind, the significance of the original proposal to knock out the effect of the judgments of this Court by introducing an Explanation. We have also noticed that the definition of the word Notification also insisted that it must be issued by the Taxes Department. At any rate, as already held by us, the definition of the word Notification, would have only prospective operation and therefore, GO(MS) 124/88/ID would continue to retain its effectiveness as a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. 16. The next contention raised by the learned Government Pleader is that at any rate, GO(MS) 124/88/ID cannot survive after the date of issuance of SRO No.1091/99. In this context, we must consider the arguments of the respondents assessees that in SRO 1091/99, there is no specific reference to GO(MS) 124/88/ID and therefore, GO(MS) 124/88/ID will continue to hold the field, even after the issuance of SRO No.1091/99. Section 10 of the Act being relevant is extracted below: “10. Power of Government to grant exemption and reduction in rate of tax: (1) The Government may, if they consider it necessary in the public interest, by notification in the Gazette, make an exemption or reduction in rate, either prospectively or retrospectively) in respect of any tax payable under this Act,- (i) on the sale or purchase of any specified goods or class of goods, at all points or at a specified point or points in the series of sales or purchases by successive dealers, or (ii) by any specified class of persons in regard to the whole or any part of their turnover. (2) Any exemption from tax, or reduction in the rate of tax, notified under sub-section (1)- (a) may extend to the whole State or to any specified area or areas therein, (b) may be subject to such restrictions and conditions as may be specified in the notification. (3) The Government may be notification in the Gazette, cancel or vary any notification issued under sub-section (1).” Section 10 empowers the Government to make an exemption or reduction, both prospectively and retrospectively in respect of tax payable under the Act. Sub-section (3) empowers the Government to cancel or vary any notification issued under Subsection (1) of the Act. (3) The Government may be notification in the Gazette, cancel or vary any notification issued under sub-section (1).” Section 10 empowers the Government to make an exemption or reduction, both prospectively and retrospectively in respect of tax payable under the Act. Sub-section (3) empowers the Government to cancel or vary any notification issued under Subsection (1) of the Act. SRO No.1091/99 is a notification issued on a review of the previous notifications. There is no case at all for the respondents assessees that SRO 1091/99 is not published in the Gazette as ordained in the definition clause and in Section 10 of the Act. In SRO 1091/99, the Government, inter alia, provides for concessional rate of 8% in respect of products sold by small scale industries registered with the Industries Department. The wording of SRO No.1091/99, insofar as it is material, is as follows: “In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (Act 15 of 1963) and in supersession of all the earlier notifications (except the notification issued in GO(P)No.155/93/TD dated 3rd November 1993) issued under section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, which are in force as on 31st day of December 1999, the Government of Kerala, having considered it necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby. I make a reduction in the rate of tax payable under the said Act.…………………’ (emphasis supplied) Thereafter, it has proceeded to provide for reduced rate of tax in respect of various commodities. SOR 1091/99 in uncertain terms, declares that it will hold the field in super-session of the notifications existing as on 31.12.1999 except one notification, namely GO(P) No.155/93, which is specifically referred to. Here, it is apposite to contrast the words of the aforesaid Notification with the words of SRO 1728/93. That was a notification, which was issued on the review of the notifications prevalent in 1993 and the Government issued SRO No.1728/93, providing specifically for the notifications, which were being superseded. That effect is inevitable on the following wording of the SRO: “In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963(Act 15 of 1963) and in supersession of the notifications mentioned in Schedule I, the Government of Kerala having considered it necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby, 1. That effect is inevitable on the following wording of the SRO: “In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963(Act 15 of 1963) and in supersession of the notifications mentioned in Schedule I, the Government of Kerala having considered it necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby, 1. Make a reduction in the rate of tax payable under the said Act,- (1) On the sale or purchase, as the case may be, of goods specified in column (2) of Schedule II from the rate specified in column (3) to the rate specified in column (4) thereof, against each; (2) On the sale of goods specified in column (2) of Schedule III for the period mentioned therein from the rate specified in column (3) thereof, to the rate specified in column (4) thereof, against each; ……… 17. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 10 of the Act and in supersession of the notifications mentioned in the schedule the Government proposed various deductions. When we contrast the wording of the aforesaid Notification with the wording of SRO 1091/99, it is quite clear that the intention of the Government was that once SRO No.1091/99 came into force, all earlier notifications which were in force as on 31.12.1999, except the notification which was expressly saved, were to cease to exist. The significance of this difference is sufficient to answer the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the party respondents that GO(MS) 124/88/ID was not expressly referred to and supersede. We are of the view that it is not necessary to expressly refer to GO(MS) 124/88/ID when the intention of the Government was that there must be one compendious notification, providing for reduced rate of tax as stated in SRO No.1091/99. 18. No doubt, the learned counsel for the party respondents would submit that after the insertion of the definition of the word Notification in the year 1998 when SRO No.1091/99 purported to supersede all notifications issued under Section 10 of the Act, there is no legal efficacy for the Government to supersede GO(MS) 124/88/ID by superseding the notifications issued under Section 10 of the Act. In other words, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, insofar as GO(MS) 124/88/ID was not admittedly published in the Gazette, it cannot be treated as a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act after 1.4.1998. If it is not a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, we fail to see how the assessees could claim the benefit of reduced rate after the definition of the word Notification was inserted. We would think that their arguments lie in the teeth of the Judicial declaration by this Court in two Division Bench decisions already mentioned, to the effect that GO(MS) 124/88/ID was a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. We must, in this context, note that even at the time when GO(MS) 124/88/ID was published, Section 10 of the Act required publication of the Notification in the Gazette. Even when the Law required publication of the notification in the Gazette under Section 10 of the Act, this Court took the view, at the instance of the assessees that GO(MS) 124/88/ID was a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. At any rate, at the time when GO(MS) 124/88/ID was issued, the word Notification was not defined in the Act. As already noted, the said definition of the word Notification was inserted only in 1998. We have already held that it has only prospective operation. The parties were deriving the benefit under the said Government Order and therefore, once the notification is issued by the Government, intending to supersede all the notifications existing as on 31.12.1999, certainly, GO(MS) 124/88/ID will die a natural death. If we were to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the party respondents, we must hold that GO(MS) 124/88/ is not a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. What we have to consider is that after it was issued, till the word notification was defined, whether it was a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. In this context, the matter is not res integra and judicial verdicts occupied the field, as already noticed. We do not see how the assessees can turn around and contend that it can only be deemed to be a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. In this context, the matter is not res integra and judicial verdicts occupied the field, as already noticed. We do not see how the assessees can turn around and contend that it can only be deemed to be a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act. Apparently, the assessees have been getting relief on the basis that it is a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act and the courts have also taken the said view. We would think that the mere insertion of the definition of the word Notification in the year 1998, will not have the effect of taking away the judicial declaration that GO (MS) 124/88/ID was a notification issued under the Act. The Government issued GO (MS) No.17/92/ID in the following terms; “In accordance with the policy decision included in the Government Order read first above, Government are pleased to order that the following tax concessions will be available to new industrial units, starting commercial production on or after 23.9.1991. (a) New units will be exempted from all connected State taxes for the first seven years from the date of commencement of commercial production. The exemption will, however, not be applicable to taxes due to local bodies such as property tax, profession tax etc. (b) So far as sales tax and turnover tax are concerned, the exemption will be available for seven years from the date of commencement of commercial production, subject to a ceiling of 100% of fixed capital investment. In the alternative, units in the medium and large scale sectors can opt for deferment of sales tax for ten years from the date of commencement of commercial production subject to the same ceiling. (c) Those units which opt for deferment may remit the accumulated sales tax and turnover tax over a period of five years. There will be no interest on the tax accumulation for the first ten years. However, from the eleventh year onwards, simple interest at the rate of 15% will be charged. For defaulted amounts, there will be an additional penal interest of 2% per year. (d) New units in the small scale sector will have the option to deposit the tax with the Government in the “Tax for Growth Fund” on which orders have been issued in the Government Order read second above. For defaulted amounts, there will be an additional penal interest of 2% per year. (d) New units in the small scale sector will have the option to deposit the tax with the Government in the “Tax for Growth Fund” on which orders have been issued in the Government Order read second above. (e) Existing industrial units undertaking expansion diversification or modernization on or after 23.9.91 will also have the option mentioned in (b) and (c) above, in respect of the additional capacity created, subject to a ceiling of 100% of the additional fixed capital investment made for such expansion, diversification or modernization.………… (i) Sales Tax concessions announced for rubber based industries in GO(MS) No,14/88/ID dated 31.8.1988 will continue. (emphasis supplied) (ii) The concessions in CST for aluminium extrusions, electronic goods and power tillers announced in GO (P) No.125/91/ID dated 31.071991 will also continue. (iii) Other existing concession, if any, over and above those mentioned above, will also continue. These concessions will not be available to State Public Sector Units. With regard to Central Public Sector Units, the concessions, if needed will be extended on a case to case basis after due consideration by the Industries and Taxes Departments. The notification necessary for the statutory validation of the above orders will be issued separately by the Taxes Department.” It is a policy decision. It has evinced its intention to continue the concessions declared under GO(MS) 124/88/ID. If this is the basis for the Division Bench of this Court in SS Tread Rubbers’ case, to hold that despite the issuance of GO(P) No.47/98/ID dated 27.3.1990, unless and until GO(MS) 124/88 is specifically withdrawn, the benefits under GO(MS) 124/88 will continue, runs the respondents’ arguments. Therefore, it is the contention of the party respondents that since GO(MS) 17/92/ID was a policy declaration made by the State, it must be treated as a Cabinet decision as indicated conclusively, the same being issued by the Chief Secretary of the State. The same cannot be overridden by a notification issued by the Taxes Department in the State of Kerala, it is submitted. Support is sought to be drawn from the decision of the Apex Court in Suprabhat’s case (supra). The same cannot be overridden by a notification issued by the Taxes Department in the State of Kerala, it is submitted. Support is sought to be drawn from the decision of the Apex Court in Suprabhat’s case (supra). It is further contended that in view of the Bench decision of this court in SS Tread Rubber’s case, unless GO(MS) 124/88 is specifically referred to and withdrawn, it must be treated as continuing, despite the issuance of SRO 1091/99. 19. In order to appreciate the context in which this Court decided SS Tread Rubber’s case, we must understand as to what the notification dated 27.3.1990 purported to do. SRO No.554/90 read as follows: “In exercise of the powers conferred by section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (15 of 1963), the Government of Kerala having considered it necessary in the public interest so to do, hereby make 1. an exemption in respect of tax payable on the turnover of purchase of rubber by new medium and small scale industrial units for use in the manufacture of rubber goods by such units for sale inside the State or inter-state sale. 2. a reduction in the rate of tax payable by new medium and small scale industrial units on the sale of rubber products to 3% for a period of two years from the date on which such units cease to entitle the exemption granted as per Notification I issued in GO(MS) No.74/80/TD dated the 29th September 1980, published as S.R.O. No.968/80 in the Kerala Gazette No.42 dated the 21st October 1980 or as per Notification issued in GOP (P) No.94/89/TD dated 27th April 1989 in the Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.393 dated 27th April 1989. Provide that the cumulative sales tax concession granted as per the Notification issued in SRO No.968/80 and SRO No.654/89 referred to above and the purchase tax concession granted as per this notification shall not exceed 90% of the cumulative gross fixed capital investment of the unit. Provided further that all the conditions prescribed for the sales tax concessions as per the Notifications in SRO No.968/80 and SRO No.654/89 referred to above in the SRO shall apply for the purchase tax exemption as per this notification: Provided also that the sales tax collected, if any, shall be paid over to Government. Provided further that all the conditions prescribed for the sales tax concessions as per the Notifications in SRO No.968/80 and SRO No.654/89 referred to above in the SRO shall apply for the purchase tax exemption as per this notification: Provided also that the sales tax collected, if any, shall be paid over to Government. Explanation – for the purpose of this Notification, “manufacture” shall not include any process to convert one form of rubber into another form which is taxable at the point of last purchase in the State, under any of the entries in the first to the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. This notification shall be deemed to have come into force on the 31st day of August 1988 and shall be in force till 31st March 1990.” The Explanatory Note to the said SRO reads as follows: “Government as per GO(MS) No.124/88/ID dated 31.8.1988 has announced that rubber based industries will be exempted from purchase tax and sales tax on rubber product will be reduced to 3%. This notification is tended to achieve the object.” Thus, a perusal of the above SRO would show that GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.8.1988 was not specifically withdrawn by the said SRO. Apparently, the State wanted the old small industrial units to enjoy the benefit reduction in the rate of tax of 3% for a period of 2 years from the date on which the units ceased to be entitled to the exemption granted as per the notification published as SRO 968/80 or as per the notification published as SRO 654/89, subject to certain conditions as mentioned therein. The notification was to come into effect from the date of GO(MS) 124/88/ID namely 31.8.1988 and it was to continue till 31.3.1990. The notification is dated 27.3.1990. We notice that SRO 968/80 provided for exemption from tax payable under the KGST Act, in respect of the turnover of the sale of goods produced and sold by new industrial units under the small scale industries for a period of five years from the date of commencement of the sale of such goods by the said units subject to certain conditions. Quite clearly, the Government intended to give the benefit of concessional rate on those units which were governed by SRO 968/80 also. Quite clearly, the Government intended to give the benefit of concessional rate on those units which were governed by SRO 968/80 also. Likewise, SRO 654/89 provided for exemption in respect of tax payable on the sale of goods produced and sold by the new industrial units for a period of five years from the date of commencement of the sale, subject to certain conditions. The same came into force w.e.f. 1.4.1989. What is relevant is that the notification did not specifically withdraw GO(MS) 124/88/ID. More importantly, the Government in the policy decision in GO(MS) 17/92 dated 24.1.1992, specifically directed that the concessions announced in GO(MS) 124/88/ID will continue. This is the context in which we must appreciate the dictum laid down by this court in SS Tread Rubber’s, Thamarappally’s and also Crossfield Rubbers’ cases (supra). It is apposite and pertinent to bear in mind that in none of the decisions, this court was called upon to consider the effect of SRO 1091/99. In the judgment in SS Tread Rubber’s case, there is no reference to SRO No.1091/99 and the issue fell to be considered with reference to GO(MS) 17/92/ID and SRO 554/90, which we have adverted to earlier. Therefore, if GO (MS) 124/88/ID is treated as a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, then, certainly, the Government would have the power to supersede the same. 20. Seemingly formidable arguments were addressed before us by Sri. C.K. Thanupillai, learned Counsel that having regard to GO(MS) 17/92/ID, which indicates that a solemn decision has been taken by the Cabinet, as evident from the fact that it is signed by the Chief Secretary, it may not be open to the Government acting in the Taxes Department, by issuing a notification under Section 10 of the Act, to take away the benefits granted as part of the industrial policy of the Government. In this regard, he would invite our attention to the decision of the Apex Court in Suprabhat Steels’ case. In Suprabhat Steels’ case (supra), the Apex Court has inter alia held as follows: “The notification dated 4.4.1994 was issued under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act by the State Government in the Finance Department to carry out the objectives and the policy decisions taken in the industrial policy itself. In Suprabhat Steels’ case (supra), the Apex Court has inter alia held as follows: “The notification dated 4.4.1994 was issued under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act by the State Government in the Finance Department to carry out the objectives and the policy decisions taken in the industrial policy itself. Therefore, any notification issued by the Government order in exercise of power under Section 7 of the Bihar Finance Act, if it is found to be repugnant to the industrial policy declare in a Government resolution, then, the said notification must be held to be bad to that extent. In the instant case, the notification issued by the State Government on 4.4.1994 has been examined by the High Court and has been found, rightly to be contrary to the Industrial Incentive Policy, more particularly, the policy engrafted in clause 10(i)(b). Consequently, the High Court was fully justified in striking down that part of the notification which is repugnant to clause 10.4(i)(b). It is not possible to accept the State’s contention that it would be open for the Government to issue a notification in exercise of power under Section 7, Bihar Finance Act, which may override the incentive policy itself. The expression “such conditions and restrictions as it may impose” in Section 7(3) will not authorise the State Government to negate the incentives and benefits which any industrial unit would be otherwise entitled to under the general policy resolution itself.” It is necessary, however, to appreciate the contextual background as revealed by the factual background in the said case. The State of Bihar, with an intention to promote industrial activities in the State, had issued various industrial resolutions. Regarding the industrial policy in question, which the Apex Court and High Courts were apparently concerned with, the High Court, inter alia, held as follows: “Then comes paragraph 10.4, which is the crucial paragraph so far as the dispute in these writ petition is concerned. Regarding the industrial policy in question, which the Apex Court and High Courts were apparently concerned with, the High Court, inter alia, held as follows: “Then comes paragraph 10.4, which is the crucial paragraph so far as the dispute in these writ petition is concerned. For the sake of convenience, the same is reproduced below: “10.4 sales tax exemption on the purchase of raw material- (i) This facility will be admissible to the industrial units mentioned in annexure V in the following matter: (a) Industrial units coming into production between Apri1, 1993 o March 31, 1998 whose investment on plant and machinery does not exceed Rs.15.00 crores shall be entitled for this facility for a period of seven years from April 1 1993. (b) Such old industrial units whose investment on plant and machinery do no exceed Rs.15.00 crores on April 1, 1993 shall be entitled for this facility for a period of seven years from April 1, 1993. (ii) All other industrial units shall continue to enjoy the existing facility of purchase of raw material on concessional rate of tax as announced and made applicable by the sales Tax Department as before.” 7. Paragraph 10.5 provides as follows” “10.5 A separate order/notification for sales tax exemption will be issued by the Commercial Tax Department and the condition mentioned in that order/notification shall be binding in final terms.” 8. The case of the petitioners is that the language employed in paragraph 10.4(i)(b) being clear and unequivocal, there is no scope for any misunderstanding since it is clear from a mere perusal of the said paragraph that it refers to old industrial units, meaning thereby industrial units which came into production before April 1, 1993. It dos not provide for any date of production nor does it provide any condition as to whether the unit had or had not in the past taken the benefits under any other industrial policy. The facility given to such old industries is material. The new units, namely, those which came into production on or after April 1, 1993, are entitled to all other facilities under the Industrial Incentive Policy of 1993, such as subsidy, financial assistance, facility of sales tax deferment on finished goods and facility of sales tax exemption/deferment on finished products. The facility given to such old industries is material. The new units, namely, those which came into production on or after April 1, 1993, are entitled to all other facilities under the Industrial Incentive Policy of 1993, such as subsidy, financial assistance, facility of sales tax deferment on finished goods and facility of sales tax exemption/deferment on finished products. Those facilities have not been extended to old industrial units, but only a limited facility is extended to such old units whose investment on plant and machinery did not exceed Rs.15.00 crores on April 1, 1993. The grievance of the petitioners is that despite the clear language employed in the industrial policy, the Commercial Taxes Department issued a notification on April 4, 1994, purportedly in exercise of authority under paragraph 10.5 of the policy laying down that the old industries which had made investment of less than Rs.15.00 crores upto April 1, 1993 shall be entitled to get exemption, provided they had not got any benefit under any previous industrial incentive policy. According to the petitioners, this amounts to depriving them of the facility/benefit granted to old industrial units under the Industrial Incentive Policy of 1993. Under paragraph 10.5 of the policy, the conditions with regard to grant of exemption could be specified by Commercial Taxes Department and this could relate to details of the utilisation of raw materials and other things, but a condition could not be imposed, whereby the exemption could be denied to old industrial units. Under the earlier industrial incentive policy in exercise of similar power, the department had prescribed the form for application, grant of certificates, account of raw material purchased, goods manufacturer, etc. with a view to ensure that the incentive was not misutilised or was not extended to undeserving units. By issuance of the notification dated April 4, 1994, the benefit itself has been withdrawn contrary to the Industrial Incentive Policy. The notification issued by the Commercial Taxes Department is, therefore, in conflict with the industrial incentive policy of 1993. The petitioners had made purchases of raw materials within the State of Bihar, relying upon the representation made in the industrial incentive policy.” It is in the context of the said facts that the Apex Court proceeded to take the views, which it took. 21. Here, we must immediately notice the nature of the proceedings. The petitioners had made purchases of raw materials within the State of Bihar, relying upon the representation made in the industrial incentive policy.” It is in the context of the said facts that the Apex Court proceeded to take the views, which it took. 21. Here, we must immediately notice the nature of the proceedings. Writ Petitions were filed in the Patna High Court, challenging the notification, on various grounds. The notification was challenged, inter alia, on the ground of violation of fundamental rights as also on the ground that it was violative of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, having regard to the detriment, which was caused to the petitioners by the clause, which was added to the terms of the Industrial policy in clause (b) thereof. In other words, the notification was contemplated under Clause 10.5 of the policy. The contention of the petitioners was apparently that going by the previous practice, such notifications could have been issued for the purpose of getting the details and for facilitating and implementing industrial policy, which was one for granting exemption as contemplated therein. By adding the words in the notification to the effect that if a particular party has already derived the benefit under the earlier industrial policy, they would not be entitled to the benefit, in effect, a notification was issued which took away the benefits. It was this, which was held to be impermissible in duly constituted proceedings, calling in question, the notification. In contrast, we are deciding the issue in a statutory revision. Our jurisdiction is limited. The question is as to whether the question of law has been decided or whether it has been decided erroneously. It is not open to the respondents to attack a notification issued under Section 10 in a revision under Section 41 of the Act. In fact, the respondents assessees are estopped as, even according to them, in the appeal carried before the Apex Court, the matter has been remanded back for considering the effect of the notification. Therefore, at no stage, including before the Apex Court, the assessee has a case that the notification (SRO No.1091/99) is vulnerable on grounds, which ultimately found favour with the Patna High Court and later, with the Apex Court in Suprabhat Steel’s Case. Therefore, at no stage, including before the Apex Court, the assessee has a case that the notification (SRO No.1091/99) is vulnerable on grounds, which ultimately found favour with the Patna High Court and later, with the Apex Court in Suprabhat Steel’s Case. Therefore, we are of the view that the principle, which has been enunciated in the said case, cannot be canvassed by the respondents assessees before us in these proceedings. 22. The learned Government Pleader has a case that he is not clear as to whether there was a Cabinet decision. But, we also cannot overlook the argument of the learned Government Pleader that even GO(MS) 17/92/ID clearly states that the concessions announced in GO(MS) 124/88/ID will continue. The learned Government Pleader has a definite case that when an industry is in its infancy, a helping hand extended by the Government is one thing and a demand for continuing the same perpetually, is totally a different thing. We must notice that in the case before the Apex Court, the benefits which were vouchsafed under the industrial policy resolutions, were for a period of 7 years from 1.4.1993. The parties apparently proceeded to rely on the said industrial policy, purchased raw materials in the State of Bihar under the impression that under the industrial policy, they would get exemption from tax in respect of the said raw materials. After the publication of the notification, a clause was added, which took away the benefits. It is in this context that the Apex Court proceeded to take the view that the notification is bad. The legality of the notification was put in issue in duly constituted proceedings and the Apex court was persuaded to lay down the proposition. We would think that the said proposition cannot be availed of by the respondents assessees in the proceedings before us. We are reinforced, at any rate, by the fact that no time limit was mentioned in the so called industrial policy evidence by GO(MS) No.17/92/ID dated 24.1.1992, which is not capable of being withdrawn. We have already taken the view that GO(MS) 124/88/ID was held to be a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, by the Bench decisions of this court. We have also already noticed the actual wording of SRO No.1091/99, which leaves us in no doubt that it clearly superseded all the notifications providing for reduced rate of tax. We have already taken the view that GO(MS) 124/88/ID was held to be a Notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, by the Bench decisions of this court. We have also already noticed the actual wording of SRO No.1091/99, which leaves us in no doubt that it clearly superseded all the notifications providing for reduced rate of tax. Incidentally, we may notice that by issuing SRO No.1090/91, another notification was brought out on the basis of review of the earlier notifications, providing for exemption of various goods from tax. But, we are concerned, in this case, with the reduction in the rate of tax. We would think that the Government had all the power to issue the notification under Section 10 of the Act, purporting to withdraw GO(MS) 124/88/ID. We are not called upon to decide the legality of the notification under Section 41 of the Act. 23. We must again notice another argument of the learned Counsel Sri. C.K. Thanupillai. He would point out that the Tribunal has reasoned that the Government acts in various departments and it is not as if the grant of concessions is confined to Taxes Department alone. The Industries Department also can give concessions. It is the Industries Department, that has given the concessions mentioned in GO(MS) 124/88/ID. Therefore, he would contend that it was essentially following the principle in Suprabhat Steel’s case that GO(MS) 124/88/ID has been held as continuing, despite the issuance of SRO No.1091/99. It may be true that it was issued by the Industries Department. But, one the superior court, in writ jurisdiction, in Thamarappally’s case, took the view that GO(MS) 124/88/ID is a notification issued under Section 10 and it is admittedly by the Division Bench, it was not open to the Tribunal to say that it is one issued by the Industries Department, apparently, applying the doctrine enunciated in Suprabhat Steel’s case, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents. The upshot of the above discussions is that the following conclusions are inevitable: 1. SRO No.1091/99 has the effect of superseding GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.8.1988. 2. GO(MS) 124/88/ID has to be held as a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, despite the insertion of the word ‘notification’ in the definition clause of the Act. The upshot of the above discussions is that the following conclusions are inevitable: 1. SRO No.1091/99 has the effect of superseding GO(MS) 124/88/ID dated 31.8.1988. 2. GO(MS) 124/88/ID has to be held as a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act, despite the insertion of the word ‘notification’ in the definition clause of the Act. The definition clause would have prospective operation and if the notification is issued after the date of such notification, it must fulfill the requirements in the definition. 3. GO(MS) 124/88/ID would continue to have efficacy as a notification issued under Section 10 of the Act as held by the Division Bench of this Court only till the date of SRO 1091/99. In other words, from 1.1.2000, GO(MS) 124/88/ID cannot be in force. As far as STR 72/12 and 75/12 are concerned, they are filed by an assessee, who has admittedly set up a new industry after the date of GO(MS) 124/88/ID. Even though a question of law has been raised by the State to contend that GO(MS) 124/88/ID is available only to new industries, meaning thereby obviously, industries which are started after 31.8.1988, in the circumstances of the cases, we are not called upon to consider the said issue because on facts, admittedly, the assessee in STR Nos.72/12 and 75/12 is a new industrial unit. Therefore, we need not answer the said question. As far as STR 72/12 is concerned, the assessment year is 1998-99. In such circumstances, this revision filed by the State on the basis of our discussions and conclusions, is found to be meritless and accordingly, the said revision is dismissed. 24. As far as Revisions 55/11, 57/11 and 63/11 filed by the State are concerned, they are to be allowed. The order passed by the Appellate Tribunal will stand modified and the order passed by the Appellate Authority will stand restored in regard to the question decided by us. 25. In the light of our above discussions, TRC 76/12 filed by the State is allowed. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is modified and the order of the appellate authority is restored in regard to the question decided by us. 26. As far as TRC 75/12 is concerned, it relates to the assessment year 1999-2000. As already noticed, SRO No.1091/99 came into fore on 1.1.2000. The order of the Appellate Tribunal is modified and the order of the appellate authority is restored in regard to the question decided by us. 26. As far as TRC 75/12 is concerned, it relates to the assessment year 1999-2000. As already noticed, SRO No.1091/99 came into fore on 1.1.2000. In such circumstances, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and hold that the respondents assessee would be entitled to get the benefit of the concessional rate under GO(MS) 124/88/ID till 01.01.2000 and from 01.01.2000 onwards, he would not be entitled to the concessional rate. The Assessing Officer will pass fresh orders in the light of the aforesaid findings. TRC 75 is disposed of as above.