JUDGMENT Dr. B.R. Sarangi, J. Petitioner No.1 being the husband and petitioner nos.2 & 3 being the father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively and petitioner no.4 being the sister-in-law of the complainant-opposite party no.2, have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to quash the order dated 14.3.2011 passed by the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba in G.R.Case No. 97 of 2010 taking cognizance of offence under Sections 498/A, 323, 294, 307, 506,406/34, IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act against the petitioners. 2. Brief facts of the case are that opposite party no.2 filed a complaint case bearing ICC No. 27 of 2010 before the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba against the petitioners alleging that she had married to the petitioner no.1 on 2.2.2006 in the temple of Adia Mahadev, Baramba as per the Hindu rites and customs and at the time of marriage, petitioner no.1 was given Rs.40,000/-along with one gold ring as per the demand. It was further alleged that after leading two years of happy conjugal life, the petitioners demanded a further sum of Rs.20,000/-from her father, but when the demand was not fulfilled, the petitioners started torturing the complainant-opposite party no.2 both physically and mentally and petitioner no.1 at the instance of petitioner nos.2 & 3 threatened to marry again even though a male child was born out of their wed-lock. Further, it was alleged that on 23.9.2009 at about 12.30 P.M. the petitioners tried to do away with the life of the complainant-opposite party no.2 by burning her on pouring kerosene on her body while other petitioners caught hold of her. When petitioner no.1 started setting fire on her, she shouted and the neighbours reached at the spot and rescued her. The complainant-opposite party no.2 went to her father’s house and thereafter instituted the aforesaid complaint case. 3. Learned J.M.F.C., Baramba forwarded the complaint lodged to IIC, Baramba Police Station under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C., basing upon which Baramba P.S.Case No. 97 dated 30.9.2010 corresponding to G.R.Case No. 97 of 2010 was registered under Sections 498/A, 323, 294, 307, 506, 406/34, IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act and investigation was undertaken by the police. 3. Learned J.M.F.C., Baramba forwarded the complaint lodged to IIC, Baramba Police Station under Section 156 (3), Cr.P.C., basing upon which Baramba P.S.Case No. 97 dated 30.9.2010 corresponding to G.R.Case No. 97 of 2010 was registered under Sections 498/A, 323, 294, 307, 506, 406/34, IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act and investigation was undertaken by the police. After completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted charge-sheet on 9.3.2011 against the petitioners under Sections 498-A, 323, 294, 307, 506, 406/34, IPC and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, basing upon which cognizance was taken by the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba on 14.3.2011 for the said offences and summons were issued to the petitioners for their appearance. 4. Challenging the said order of cognizance dated 14.3.2011 under Annexure-1, the petitioners have filed the present application on the ground that the said order of cognizance is an out-come of non-application of judicial mind and has been passed without considering the materials available on record. The entire F.I.R. story is false, baseless, concocted one and the informant has initiated the criminal proceeding intentionally and purposefully to harass the petitioners and to satisfy her personal vendetta as the complainant-opposite party no.2 insisted the petitioner no.1 to have a separate mess, to which he did not agree. In fact no such incident as unfolded in the complaint petition has happened on the alleged date of occurrence. It is urged that the order of cognizance is also liable to be quashed on the ground that no case under Section 498-A,IPC is made out as on a bare reading of the F.I.R. vis-à-vis the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. it appears that no specific allegation is there regarding demand of dowry and the alleged torture, if any, cannot be related to dowry demand. It is further urged that so far as the cognizance taken under Sections 323, 307 and 406, IPC is concerned, neither any evidence nor any material is available on record, so also no prima facie case is made out against the petitioners and the ingredients of the said sections are also not satisfied. 5. Considering the above mentioned facts and circumstances, this Court directed the learned counsel for the petitioners to implead the complainant-opposite party no.2 as a party and on the very same day, the complainant-opposite party no.2 entered her appearance through her counsel by filing vakalatnama. 5. Considering the above mentioned facts and circumstances, this Court directed the learned counsel for the petitioners to implead the complainant-opposite party no.2 as a party and on the very same day, the complainant-opposite party no.2 entered her appearance through her counsel by filing vakalatnama. It is stated on her behalf that the dispute between her and the petitioners has been resolved and she is now staying in the matrimonial house and she is leading a happy conjugal life with the petitioner no.1 and as such, she does not want to proceed with the criminal proceeding initiated at her instance. 6. To the above submissions made by the parties, this Court by order dated 9.10.2012 directed the complainant-opposite party no.2 to appear before the concerned I.O., who shall produce her before the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba for the purpose of recording her statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. and the learned J.M.F.C. was directed to transmit such statement to this Court for the purpose of consideration in the present case. While passing such order, this Court in Misc. Case No.1271 of 2011 also directed stay of further proceedings of the aforesaid G.R.Case till the next date. 7. Since the statement of the complainant-opposite party no.2 could not be recorded within the time stipulated by this Court, a petition being Misc. Case No. 741 of 2013 was filed by the opposite party no.2 for extension of time as she could not appear before the learned JMFC, Baramba for recording of her statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. due to her illness. On hearing the learned counsel for the parties, this Court by order dated 24.4.2013 directed the opposite party no.2 to appear before the Investigating Officer on 30.4.2013 at 10 A.M. and the Investigating Officer was directed to produce her before the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba so that her statement under Section 164, Cr.P.C. can be recorded and directed the matter to be listed after the summer vacation. 8. Pursuant to such order of this Court, the statement of the complainant-opposite party no.2 under Section 164, Cr.P.C. on 30.4.2012 was recorded by the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba and the same has been received by this Court. 8. Pursuant to such order of this Court, the statement of the complainant-opposite party no.2 under Section 164, Cr.P.C. on 30.4.2012 was recorded by the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba and the same has been received by this Court. In the said statement, complainant-opposite party no.2 has specifically stated that she is living with her husband in the matrimonial home at Sankhameri with her son and leading a happy conjugal life since one year and she has amicably settled the dispute with the accused persons and wants to live peacefully with her husband. She further stated that she has no complaint against the accused persons and she does not want to proceed further with the case. 9. On the basis of the aforementioned facts and circumstances, it is apparently clear that the matrimonial dispute has been settled amicably between the parties and now the question arises whether this Court in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can quash the criminal proceeding. In order to answer this question, it is apt to mention here that the scope and ambit of the power under Section 482, Cr.P.,C. has been examined in catena of decisions by this Court as well as the apex Court. In the present case, this Court is only concerned with the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482, Cr.P.C. in relation to matrimonial dispute. It is not in dispute that matrimonial disputes have considerably increased in recent times resulting in filing of complaints under Section 498-A, 406, IPC read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act along with other ancillary sections against the husband and other in-laws and relatives. The question is when such matters have been resolved either by the wife agreeing to rejoin in the matrimonial home or by mutual settlement with others whether prayer for compounding the pending disputes for which both sides approach the High Court and jointly pray for quashing of the criminal proceeding or F.I.R. or complaint made by the wife under the alleged sections, can be declined on the sole ground that since the offences are not compoundable under Section 320, Cr.P.C. it would not be permissible for the Court to quash the criminal proceeding or F.I.R. or complaint. 10. 10. As it transpires from the record, even though the opposite party no.2-wife lodged the complaint and on that basis investigation was carried on by the police, subsequently, she voluntarily entered appearance in the case by filing vakalatnama through her counsel and subsequently in compliance to the order passed by this Court, she has made her candid deposition voluntarily under Section 164, Cr.P.C. before the learned J.M.F.C., Baramba stating that she is living with her husband and leading a happy conjugal life and as such, requested the court not to proceed with the case any further. In the meantime out of their wed-lock she has been blessed with a son, who is now aged 7 years. In an identical circumstances, the apex Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, 2003 (II) OLR (SC) 101, (2003)4 SCC 675 held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482, Cr.P.C. can quash the criminal proceedings in matrimonial disputes where the dispute is entirely private and the parties are willing to settle their disputes amicably. It is not in dispute that the facts of the case in hand are akin to the facts in B.S.Joshi (supra). 11. Law is well settled by various decisions of the apex Court with regard to exercise of power under Section 482, Cr.PC. for quashing the proceeding, which has been laid down in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and explaining the decisions rendered in Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 , Surendra Nath Mohanty & Anr. vs. State of Orissa, (1999) 5 SCC 238 and Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749 , wherein it is held as follows: “8. … …. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.” Considering matrimonial matters, the apex Court also held: “12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.” Considering matrimonial matters, the apex Court also held: “12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.” In addition to the above mentioned facts and law, Mr.A.K.Mohapatra, learned counsel for the petitioners has brought to my notice the judgment of the apex Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 , where the apex Court examined the law laid down in B.S.Joshi (supra), Nikhil Merchant v. CBI, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma v. State (2008) 16 SCC 1 with regard to the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482, Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceeding involving non-compoundable offences in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties. If such power is made available, then when can it be exercised? While considering the same, the apex Court has framed the guidelines and limitations on exercise of quashment power of the High Court. While holding so, the apex Court has categorically stated that the power of the High Court for quashing the criminal proceeding or F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power of the criminal courts on compounding offences under Section 320, Cr.P.C. In such a case power to quash the criminal proceeding may be exercised where parties have settled their disputes and the same depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and before exercising the quashment power under Section 482, Cr.P.C., High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime and its social impact. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accordance with the guidelines engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. Therefore, the apex Court confirmed the law laid down in B.S.Josi(supra), Nikhil Merchant (supra ) and Manoj Sharma (supra) and stated that they were decided correctly. 12. Therefore, the apex Court confirmed the law laid down in B.S.Josi(supra), Nikhil Merchant (supra ) and Manoj Sharma (supra) and stated that they were decided correctly. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the judgment reported in (2013) 4 SCC 15, Jitendra Raghuvanshi and others v. Babita Raghuvanshi and another, wherein the apex Court has held that the High Court in exercise of its inherent power can quash the criminal proceeding or F.I.R. or complaint in appropriate cases in order to meet the ends of justice and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. Further, the apex Court also held that it is the duty of the Courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, if they relate to matrimonial disputes and the court is satisfied that the parties have settled the same amicably and without any pressure, for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing of F.I.R., complaint or the subsequent criminal proceedings. 13. In the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi (supra), the apex Court also held that the institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society and therefore, every effort should be made in the interest of the individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in the court of law and in order to do complete justice in the matrimonial matters, the Courts should be less hesitant in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction. 14. In view of the law laid down by the apex Court and considering the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, the matrimonial dispute having been resolved amicably, ends of justice requires that the criminal proceeding has to be quashed. Accordingly, the criminal proceeding in G.R.Case No. 97 of 2010 pending in the court of learned J.M.F.C., Baramba is quashed. The CRLMC is allowed. CRLMC allowed.