JUDGMENT 1. - The present appeal filed under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') is directed against the award dated 13/05/2002 passed by the Commissioner, Workmen Compensation Act, Jaipur District, Jaipur (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner') in W.C.C.F. No. 15/1996, whereby the respondents have awarded a sum of Rs. 86,764/- with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of accident till realisation by way of compensation for the death of Shri Budha Ram. 2. The short facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that the deceased Budha Ram happened to be the husband of the respondent No.1, and the father of respondent Nos.2, 3 and 4. The respondents/claimants had filed the claim petition before the Commissioner alleging inter-alia that late Shri Budha Ram was appointed as Chowkidar by the appellant in the year 1992, and was paid Rs. 2,000/- per month. It was further alleged that on 28/05/1994, when he was on duty at the premises of the appellant, situated at Amer road, in front of Jalmahal, he was bitten by a poisonous insect, due to which, he died on 29/05/1994 at SMS Hospital, Jaipur. According to the respondents/claimants, said Budha Ram having died during the course of his employment with the appellant, they were entitled to the compensation, as prayed for, in the claim petition. The said claim petition was resisted by the appellant by filing the reply denying the allegations made in the application, and further contending that the said Budha Ram was not the employee of the appellant. According to the appellant, the subject land was taken on lease in February, 1993, and therefore, the deceased could not have been appointed as Chowkidar in January, 1992. It was also contended that the deceased was never paid any salary by the appellant, as alleged in the claim petition. The Commissioner, after appreciating the evidence on record, had passed the impugned award, against which the present appeal has been filed. 3. It has been sought to be submitted by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. Kasliwal for the appellant that the Commissioner had committed an error in awarding the compensation under the said Act, though there was no evidence to establish the nexus between the appellant, and the deceased as that of the employer and employee. According to Mr. 3. It has been sought to be submitted by the learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. Kasliwal for the appellant that the Commissioner had committed an error in awarding the compensation under the said Act, though there was no evidence to establish the nexus between the appellant, and the deceased as that of the employer and employee. According to Mr. Kasliwal, the deceased did not fall within the definition of "workman", as contained in Section 2(n) of the said Act. The counsel has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. v. Ramu Pasi & Anr., (2006) 1 SCC 377 , and in case of Lakshminarayana Shetty v. Shantha & Anr., (2003) 9 SCC 190 , as also the decisions of other High Courts in support of his submission that the claimants have to prove that the deceased was the workman within the definition under the said Act. 4. The learned counsel Mr. J.R. Choudhary for the respondents/claimants also relied upon the said decision of the Apex Court in case of Central Mine Planning & Design Institute Ltd. (supra) for submitting that the amount of award having been partly paid to the claimants, and the said amount being small quantum, no order for recovery should be made against the respondents. He also submitted that even otherwise, the respondents had duly proved before the Commissioner that the deceased was the workman within the definition of Section 2(n) of the said Act, and he having expired during the course of his employment with the appellant, the respondents were entitled to the compensation. 5. In the instant case, the bone of contention raised by the learned senior counsel Mr. Kasliwal for the appellant is that the deceased was not the "workman" within the definition of Section 2(n) of the said Act, however, the said submission cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that from the evidence on record, it was established that the deceased had died on account of poisonous bite given by an insect within the premises of the appellant. It is also pertinent to note that as per the definition of the "workman" contained in Section 2(n), workman means any person, who is employed in any such capacity as is specified in Schedule II, and the person employed as Watchman in any factory or establishment is specified in entry No.XXXIII of Schedule II for being included within the definition of workman. From the evidence on record, it was duly established by the respondents/claimants that the establishment of the appellant was very much in existence on the date on which the deceased had suffered injury on account of poisonous bite given by the insect within the premises of the appellant. Even the witness Gajendra Sharma examined by the appellant, had also admitted in his evidence that he was working in the hotel of the appellant since 1989 meaning thereby the establishment of the appellant was there since 1989. It is true that an attempt was made by the appellant to show that the premises in question was taken on lease by the appellant from Chandani Properties on 03/02/1993, and therefore the deceased could not have been employed by the appellant in 1992, as sought to be claimed by the respondents/claimants. The Court however does not find any substance in the said contention. From the evidence on record, it was clearly established that on the date of death of the deceased, the establishment of the appellant was very much in existence, and the death of the deceased had also occurred at the premises of the appellant. Merely because the respondents did not have the appointment letter or the salary slip, which such type of establishment would normally not issue for the Chokidars, it could not be said that the deceased was not in the employment of the appellant. 6. In that view of the matter, the Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by the Commissioner. The appeal being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******