Sibghat Ullah Khan, J.— This writ petition was heard alongwith Consolidation No. 839 of 1981 Girdhari Vs. D.D.C. & Others. On 5.8.2013 following order was passed on the order sheet : "Heard Sri Pankaj Gupa, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri M.A. Khan, learned counsel for contesting respondent in the first writ petition. In the second connected writ petition, no one has appeared for petitioner. In the said case, even substitution of Tihuli respondent No. 2 (petitioner of first writ petition) has not taken place. Accordingly, second writ petition is dismissed in default. Judgment reserved." Gopal was common ancestor of petitioner and opposite parties 3 to 5. He had following three sons. I. Jagannath, II. Ayodhya, III. Kashi, Pedigree of each son is given below: Jagannath I II Kaulesar Vindeshwari II Tihuli III (petitioner) Nigghi (O.P. No. 5) Badri Salik I III Dwarika Vanarashi Bansh Raj Ayodhya Kashi II Banwari (O.P. No. 3) Nagai (O.P. No. 4) In the basic year when consolidation started in the area in question, Khata No.75 containing agricultural land in dispute was recorded in the name of original petitioner and Girdhari and Nagai opposite party no. 2 and 4 and some other persons. Objections were filed by Banwari S/O Ayodhya original opposite party no. 3 claiming co-tenancy. Original petitioner also filed objections claiming exclusive right over the khata in dispute. C.O. decided the matter on 20.7.1970 holding that each branch of the three sons of Gopal had one-third share against which order three appeals were filed one by petitioner, one by Girdhari and one by Nigdhi ( or Nigghi original opposite party no. 5). Appeals of petitioner and respondent no. 2 were dismissed and appeal of original opposite party no. 5 was allowed. S.O.C. gave 1/3rd share each to opposite party no. 3 and opposite party no. 4 and 1/6th share each to petitioner and opposite party no. 5 through order dated 4.2.1971. Thereafter, two revisions, Revision No. 563/1180/1008 Girdhari Vs. Tihuli and others and Revision No. 564/1179/1007 Tihuli Vs. Banwari and Others, were filed, one by the petitioner and other by Girdhari (Opposite party no. 2). Petitioner's revision was allowed by the D.D.C. through order dated 11.6.1971 and petitioner was declared to be the sole tenure holder and his name was directed to be recorded as such. Revision of Girdhari was dismissed. Banwari and Others, were filed, one by the petitioner and other by Girdhari (Opposite party no. 2). Petitioner's revision was allowed by the D.D.C. through order dated 11.6.1971 and petitioner was declared to be the sole tenure holder and his name was directed to be recorded as such. Revision of Girdhari was dismissed. Against the said judgment writ petition was filed in this Court being Writ petition No. 1411 of 1971 by Girdhari. The only contesting respondent in the said writ petition was Tihuli, the original petitioner of this writ petition. The said writ petition was allowed on 2.7.1979 and D.D.C. was directed to re-consider the matter. It was noticed in the said judgment that Tihuli had made some admission regarding co-tenancy rights of Girdhari petitioner of the said writ petition. It was also noticed in the said judgment that learned counsel for Tihuli contended that the admission was obtained by mis-representation. The matter was remanded to consider as to whether admission made by Tihuli was obtained by misrepresentation, fraud, etc. or not. Banwari, original opposite party No.3 in this writ petition, had also filed Writ Petition No.1309 of 1971 against the same judgment of the D.D.C. That writ petition was disposed of by the following order on the same date i.e. 1979: "This writ petition is also directed against the order which has been quashed in Writ Petition No.1411 of 1971. The order passed in Writ Petition No.1411 of 1971 will govern this case also." File of Writ Petition No.1309 of 1971 is not traceable. Photostat copy of certified copy of the above order (attested to be true copy by the Section Officer on 03.08.1979) has been placed on record of this writ petition by the learned counsel. In para-9 of this writ petition, it has been stated that against judgment of D.D.C. dated 11.06.1971, two writ petitions were filed, one by Banwari and Nagai and other by Girdhari and both the writ petitions were allowed and case was remanded to the D.D.C. Relevant portion of remand order by this court dated 02.07.1979 is quoted below: "Mr. Hargur Charan learned counsel for the opposite parties have submitted that since the allegation in the counter affidavit is that the admission was obtained by mis- representation of fact it is not binding upon him. The argument of Mr. Hargur Charan learned counsel for the opposite parties have submitted that since the allegation in the counter affidavit is that the admission was obtained by mis- representation of fact it is not binding upon him. The argument of Mr. Hargur Charan may or may not be correct but it was the duty of the Deputy Director to have applied his mind to the admission contained in annexure 1. While considering the admission contained in the said document it was open to the Deputy Director to have come to the finding that the admission was obtained by fraud or by misrepresentation of fact. In the absence of this finding the admission has to be taken into consideration. After having perused the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation annexure 4 it appears that he has not considered the case from this point of view. In my opinion the order passed by the Deputy Director of consolidation cannot be sustained as he has not taken into consideration the legal effect of the admission made by Tihuli contained in annexure 1 to the writ petition. For the reasons stated above the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the Deputy Director Consolidation dated 11.6.71 is set aside by the issue of a writ of certiorari under article 226 of the Constitution of India. A writ of mandamus is issued to the opposite pary no. 1 to register the revision application nos. 563 and 564 at their original numbers and decide them in the light of the observations made in this order." Thereafter, D.D.C., Faizabad again decided the revisions on 30.8.1980. The said order of the D.D.C. has been challenged through this writ petition. The D.D.C. decided the entire controversy de novo and held that initially the land in dispute was entered in the name of Gopal and that Tihuli the petitioner could not show that any fresh settlement by the Zamindar was done or fresh patta was granted in favour of his father Kaulesar . Regarding slight variation in the area D.D.C. held that it was meaningless. D.D.C. further held that it could not be shown that after the death of Gopal, Zamindar had evicted his legal representatives, i.e. aforesaid three sons. Regarding slight variation in the area D.D.C. held that it was meaningless. D.D.C. further held that it could not be shown that after the death of Gopal, Zamindar had evicted his legal representatives, i.e. aforesaid three sons. Regarding admission of Tihuli (for which remand was made) the D.D.C. referred to the admission dated 11.11.1959(Ikbaldaba/Conceding/admitting the case) and held that by reading the entire admission (Ikbaldaba) it was not clear that who were parties in the case whose title/share Tihuli had admitted, hence, it could not be said that he admitted the case of Girdhari or Bhulan. D.D.C.further observed that copy of the plaint and written statement had not been filed and copy of order of Tehsildar dated 5.12.1959 had also not been filed. Only Khatauni 1366-68 Fasli had been filed recording the entry of the names of Badri, Bindeshwari, Bhulan and Girdhari as per order dated 5.12.1959 passed by the Tehsildar. Learned D.D.C. further held that even if it was assumed that Tihuli made some admission, it was not admissible as no question was asked from him as required by Section 145 of Evidence Act and it was also held that admission was not conclusive and Tehsildar had no right to direct entry of name of some one else as Bhumidhar or sirdar in mutation proceedings on the basis of admission. It was also held that Girdhari could not show that he was in possession of which plot and on what basis. Regarding admissibility of earlier admission unless the party who had made the admission is confronted with the same in case he appears as witness the learned D.D.C. referred to two Supreme Court authorities, both by three judge benches. The first authority is reported in Bishwanath Prasad and Ors. v. Dwarka Prasad and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 117 and the second in Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil (Dead) by Lrs. and Anr, AIR 1977 SC 1712 . Unfortunately, the later authority did not consider the earlier authority. There appears to be slight conflict between the two authorities. Both the authorities have placed reliance upon AIR 1966 SC 405 , Bharat Singh Vs. Bhagirathi but have interpreted the said judgment differently. and Anr, AIR 1977 SC 1712 . Unfortunately, the later authority did not consider the earlier authority. There appears to be slight conflict between the two authorities. Both the authorities have placed reliance upon AIR 1966 SC 405 , Bharat Singh Vs. Bhagirathi but have interpreted the said judgment differently. In the first authority of Biswanath Prasad, it has been held that admission is substantive piece of evidence, if it fulfills the requirements of Section 21 of the Evidence Act and Section 145 is only relevant for discrediting the credibility of a witness. The following portion of the Bharat Singh's authority was quoted in the authority of Biswanath Prasad: "Admissions are substantive evidence by themselves, in view of Sections 17 and 21 of the Indian Evidence Act, though they are not conclusive proof of the matters admitted. We are of opinion that the admissions duly proved are admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions. The purpose of contradicting the witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act is very much different from the purpose of proving the admission. Admission is substantive evidence of the fact admitted while a previous statement used to contradict a witness does not become substantive and merely serves the purpose of throwing doubt on the veracity of the witness. What weight is to be attached to an admission made by a party is a matter different from its use as admissible evidence." However in the later authority (1977) it was held that: "It is sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity, if the documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute." This part had been quoted from Bal Gangdhar Tilak Vs. Sriniwas Pandit, AIR 1915 PC 7. For deciding this case it is not necessary to make an effort to reconcile the above authorities of the Supreme Court and to find out the true dictum laid down by the Supreme Court for three reasons. Sriniwas Pandit, AIR 1915 PC 7. For deciding this case it is not necessary to make an effort to reconcile the above authorities of the Supreme Court and to find out the true dictum laid down by the Supreme Court for three reasons. Firstly, the High Court in its earlier judgment dated 02.07.1979 had specifically directed the D.D.C. to consider as to whether the admission had been obtained by misrepresentation or fraud. Accordingly, it was the duty of the D.D.C. to decide the said question. If the High Court had been of the opinion that the admission was not admissible, there was no need to remand the matter to decide as to whether the admission was obtained by misrepresentation etc. Secondly, it is not the admission alone, which is being relied upon by the respondents. It is the order passed by the Tehsildar and the consequent entry made/corrected in the revenue record which in turn was based upon the admission of the petitioner, which is being relied upon by the contesting respondents. Thirdly, this is a writ petition and not an appeal. In an appeal, there are only grounds of challenge to the impugned judgment, however writ petition contains facts, evidence as well as grounds of challenge to the impugned judgment vide Bharat Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1988 SC 2181 and Ritesh Tewari and Anr. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 2010 SC 3823 . In the said authorities, it has been held that unlike pleadings in a suit, writ petition should also contain evidence on which petitioner wants to place reliance. In the entire writ petition, it has not been stated that the admission made by the petitioner was obtained by any misrepresentation or fraud. After passing of the earlier order of this court directing the D.D.C. to decide as to whether admission of the petitioner was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud petitioner was very much aware that his earlier statement was to be taken into consideration. Accordingly, the requirement of confrontation under Section 145 of Evidence Act was fulfilled. In this writ petition, he could very well show that how the admission was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, however he did not state any such thing in the writ petition. Tihuli himself filed this writ petition, who died subsequently and was substituted by his legal representatives. Accordingly, the requirement of confrontation under Section 145 of Evidence Act was fulfilled. In this writ petition, he could very well show that how the admission was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, however he did not state any such thing in the writ petition. Tihuli himself filed this writ petition, who died subsequently and was substituted by his legal representatives. The only thing, which has been stated in para-21 of the writ petition is that the opposite party No.1 (D.D.C.) was only to consider the effect of the statement as alleged by objectors alleged to have been made before the Tehsildar, which was considered and it was found by the opposite party No.1 that the statement has no value. As there was absolutely no explanation and petitioner completely failed to show that the amdission was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud, hence the D.D.C. was required to decide the case on the basis of admission. The D.D.C. had no authority or jurisdiction to decide anything else in view of the remand order passed by this court on 02.07.1979. The admission and the order passed in accordance therewith in the year 1959 was not challenged for about 10 years when consolidation started. By virtue of Section 96(3), C.P.C. and on the principle thereof, no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. The decree passed on the admission under Order XII Rule 6, C.P.C. or on the principles thereof, it is a consent decree/order. Accordingly, petitioner could not challenge the order of Tehsildar dated 05.12.1959 and the consequent entry on merit. It could be challenged only on the ground of misrepresentation or fraud. As far as finding of the revisional court in the impugned order to the effect that in mutation proceedings, co-tenancy could not be granted is concerned, firstly this question was not open to be decided after the remand order of this court dated 02.07.1979 and secondly, in mutation proceedings, if co-tenancy is not disputed, order regarding entry of name can very well be passed. In case co-tenancy had been disputed by the original petitioner then of course no order could be passed by Tehsildar in the mutation proceedings on merit and the only remedy available to the contesting respondents was to file declaratory suit under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. In case co-tenancy had been disputed by the original petitioner then of course no order could be passed by Tehsildar in the mutation proceedings on merit and the only remedy available to the contesting respondents was to file declaratory suit under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. Copy of application given by the petitioner before Tehsildar admitting the case of the applicants, i.e. Badri and others and the copy of khatauni 1366 and 1368 Fasli containing the order of Tehsildar dated 05.12.1959 (based upon the admission of the petitioner) are Annexures-1 & 2 to the earlier Writ Petition No.1411 of 1971. However the revisional court even though ignored the admission but still held that the property was joint and belonged to Gopal and all his descendants had share therein. In the admission of petitioner in 1959 also shares of other descendants of Gopal had been admitted. However, the difference was that in the admission share of Bhulai and Girdhari had also been admitted. It is not clear as to whether Girdhari and Bhullan were descendants of Gopal or not. Learned counsel for petitioner as well as respondents No.3 to 5 assert that Girdhari was not family member. However, Girdhari in his earlier Writ Petition No.1411 of 1971 asserted that he was the family member. In any case, writ petition filed by the Girdhari against the same judgment, which is impugned in this writ petition has been dismissed on 05.08.2013. D.D.C. approved the order of S.O.C., which had divided the property among descendants of Gopal had not given any share to Girdhari. Through the impugned order, D.D.C. dismissed the revisions and completely approved the order of the S.O.C. Accordingly, order of D.D.C. is approved even though on different considerations and points. Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. _____________