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2013 DIGILAW 2278 (MAD)

Uma Maheswari v. Deepika

2013-07-02

M.JAICHANDREN, M.M.SUNDRESH

body2013
JUDGMENT M. Jaichandren, J. & M.M. Sundresh J. 1. M.P.No.1 of 2013, in H.C.P.No.2603 of 2012, had been filed by one Uma Maheshwari, wife of Saravanan, praying that this Court may be pleased to accept her affidavit filed in support of the said petition and to take into consideration the facts and circumstances, as narrated therein, and the documents filed by the petitioner. 2. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner had submitted that a number of complaints have been filed against the detenue, who has been acting on behalf of the Aphro Trust. The detenue and the others, who have been acting on behalf of the Aphro Trust, had cheated a large number of persons stating that they would be given loans to start their own business and for other purposes. A number of self-help groups had been formed and a large number of members had been enrolled in the self-help groups, for obtaining the loans. More than 6,000 such self-help groups had been formed in the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Puducherry. The detenue, acting on behalf of the Aphro Trust, had swindled huge amounts of money amounting to several crores of rupees, causing deleterious effects on the society. The fraud committed by the detenue and the others, said to be representing the Aphro Trust, is of a huge magnitude, having adverse consequences on the lives of several thousands of persons. The petitioner is one of the aggrieved persons, who has a serious interest in the outcome of the investigation being conducted against the detenue and the others, who had cheated the public, with impunity. The petitioner has the duty to inform the authorities concerned, including this Court, about the seriousness of the issue and the far reaching consequences of the fraud committed by the detenue and her henchmen, as per clause 2 of Section 39 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 3. It had also been submitted that the facts placed before this Court, by the petitioner, would be of assistance to the public prosecutor in pursuing the matter. The victims of the fraud committed by the detenue and the others, said to be representing the Aphro Trust, have the same fundamental rights as that of the detenue. 4. 3. It had also been submitted that the facts placed before this Court, by the petitioner, would be of assistance to the public prosecutor in pursuing the matter. The victims of the fraud committed by the detenue and the others, said to be representing the Aphro Trust, have the same fundamental rights as that of the detenue. 4. It has been further stated that, even after the preventive detention order has been passed, the detenue and her henchmen had continued to cheat the people by issuing various notices by way of various publications in the newspaper. They have been making fresh promises stating that the activities of the trust would be revived, after the detenue is released from custody. 5. The learned counsel had referred to Section 24(8) and 301(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code to state that certain judicial directions can be issued by this Court, in public interest, if public order had been infringed. 6. More than 42 thousand complaints had already been made against the Aphro Trust and against those who had been managing the said Trust. Many more complaints are being filed, by the aggrieved persons, every day. Thus, it is clear that there is a serious disturbance of public order. 7. The learned counsel had also requested this Court to issue a direction to the authorities concerned to transfer all the cases relating to the fraud committed by the detenue, on behalf of the Aphro Trust, to the Economic Offences Wing of the State Government, for further investigation and for appropriate action, as per law. 8. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent in the present petition had submitted that there is no need for the petitioner to implead herself in the Habeas Corpus Petition filed before this Court challenging the order of detention passed by the third respondent. It is for the second and the third respondents to sustain the impugned order of detention passed against the detenue. No third party could have a say in such matters. It is for this Court to assess the reasons stated by the second and the third respondents for the passing of the impugned detention order. 9. The learned counsel for the first respondent in the present petition had submitted that the grounds mentioned by the detaining authority, in the impugned detention order, should be substantiated by him, both on facts and in law. 9. The learned counsel for the first respondent in the present petition had submitted that the grounds mentioned by the detaining authority, in the impugned detention order, should be substantiated by him, both on facts and in law. However, it would not be open to the petitioner in the present petition to implead herself in the Habeas Corpus Petition, to bring on record new facts and circumstances and documents said to be relevant for sustaining the order of detention passed by the third respondent. 10. It had also been submitted that the present proceedings had arisen before this Court in the exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and it cannot be compared with the ordinary criminal proceedings initiated under the normal criminal law of the land. It is for this Court to assess the validity of the impugned detention order in the given facts and circumstances of the case. However, it would not be open to third parties to bring in fresh evidence, either oral or documentary, to sustain the impugned detention order. The Habeas Corpus Petition filed before this Court, by the first respondent, challenging the order of detention passed by the third respondent, ought to be decided by this Court considering the available facts and circumstances and the relevant documents available on record. However, it would not be open to third parties to bring in new facts and circumstances to sustain the impugned order of detention passed by the third respondent. If the petitioner is allowed to be impleaded, the scope of the Habeas Corpus Petition could be altered considerably. It would also encourage third parties to intervene and to cause serious prejudice to the fair process of this Court in rendering the justice. 11. It had also been stated that even though it would be open to this Court to direct the second and the third respondents to place all the facts and circumstances based on which the impugned order of detention had been passed, it would not be appropriate for third parties to have a say in such matters, especially, when it relates to preventive detention. 12. 12. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioner, as well as the first respondent, and on a perusal of the records available, we are of the considered view that the petitioner has not made out a case for this Court to implead the petitioner in the Habeas Corpus Petition. We do not find any special reasons to implead the petitioner in the said Habeas Corpus Petition. 13. Further, the petitioner has not been in a position to show that it is one of the cases in which the petitioner ought to be impleaded in the Habeas Corpus Petition. It is a well established position in law that in matters relating to preventive detention, it is for the detaining authority and the Government concerned to justify the passing of the detention order. No third parties could have a say in the matter. In the present case, the learned public prosecutor appearing for the second and the third respondents had also made it clear that the prosecution is fully equipped to sustain the impugned detention order passed by the third respondent. He had also made it clear that there is no need for third parties to come into the picture, at this stage, to defend the order of detention passed by the third respondent, before this Court. As such, we do not find any cause or reason to accept the plea of the petitioner to implead her in the Habeas Corpus Petition. 14. In such view of the matter, we find it appropriate to pass an order dismissing the present petition, as it is not maintainable. Accordingly, the petition in M.P.No.1 of 2013 filed by the petitioner stands dismissed.