JUDGMENT : This is second visit of the petitioners to this Court. Petitioner No. 1 is a registered society under the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Society Rcgistrikaran Adhiniyam,- 1973 (in short the Adhiniyam). The registration certificate of petitioner No. 1 is filed as Annexure P/2. It is stated that earlier election of the society took place on 31-7-2011 and the next elections are due on completion of three years from the said date as per the bye-laws. The petitioner No. 1 was served with a show-cause notice by respondent No. 2 dated 30-6-2012 (Annexure P/13). The petitioner No. 1 submitted its reply to the same but the said authority issued communication Annexure P/25 and stated that petitioner No. 1 did not file its reply. At this stage, petitioner No. 1 filed W. P. No. 6995/12 before this Court. This Court disposed of the said petition on 27-9-2012. On perusal of the material, it was found by this Court that petitioner No. 1's reply was very much received by the Assistant Registrar, and therefore, his finding that reply has not been received runs contrary to the record. On the basis of aforesaid, it was found that there is violation of principles of natural justice and the making process was not proper. Consequently the order, Annexure P/1 therein, was set aside and direction was issued to the parties to appear before the said authority on an appointed date and the Assistant Registrar was directed to proceed further in accordance with law. 2. Shri Harish Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that after the order of this Court dated 27-9-2012 although certain dates of hearing were fixed by the Assistant Registrar, but he ultimately passed the order Annexure P/1 dated 24-1-2013 wherein there is no consideration of the reply submitted by petitioner No. 1. This communication (Annexure P/1) is called in question on following counts :- (i) The petitioner No. 1's reply has not been considered and dealt with and in absence thereof, the impugned order is vitiated, (ii) in the enquiry report, certain allegations were found proved against the petitioner/society. In the impugned communication, Annexure P/1, Assistant Registrar has opined in addition to the said finding of the enquiry officer and travelled beyond the finding of the enquiry officer for which no opportunity of hearing was provided to petitioner No. 1. In the impugned communication, Annexure P/1, Assistant Registrar has opined in addition to the said finding of the enquiry officer and travelled beyond the finding of the enquiry officer for which no opportunity of hearing was provided to petitioner No. 1. (iii) As per heading of section 32 of the Adhiniyam, enquiry can be conducted only when the ingredients of section 32(2) are satisfied i.e. the application is preferred by more than 1/3rd members or by majority of members of the governing body and such application is supported by an affidavit. It is stated that the heading of section 32 of the Adhiniyam makes it clear that it deals with 'enquiry and settlement'. (iv) The principles of natural justice and fair play in action are grossly violated in issuing Annexure P/1. There is no consideration of the defence of petitioner No. 1 and direction so issued by Annexure P/1 causes prejudice to the petitioner/society because there is a direction to conduct election much before completion of normal tenure of the society. (v) As per the bye-laws (clause 3(ii)), there is no requirement for homeopathy practitioner to get his name registered, and therefore, the Assistant Registrar has erred in law in relying on M. P. Gazette (extraordinary) dated 14th May, 2009 which deals with requirement of renewal of membership. In other words, Shri Dixit submits that bye-laws which were made in the year 1953 makes it crystal clear that any medical practitioner can become member and there is no need to get his name registered, and therefore, the said Gazette notification is wrongly applied by respondent No. 2. 3. Shri Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his contentions, relied on 2003(2) MPLJ 377 , Shramadham Uchchatar Madhyamik Vidvalaya Sanchalan Samiti and others vs. State of M. P. and others and AIR 2004 SC 1280 , Mangilal vs. State of M. P. 4. Shri Praveen Newaskar, learned Deputy Govt. Advocate for respondents No. 1 to 3, supported the communication Annexure P/1 and submits that communication is appealable under section 40 of the Adhiniyam. He submits that two appeals are available to the petitioners under section 40 of the Adhiniyam, and therefore, this petition is not entertainable. He submits that merits and demerits of the matter cannot be gone into at this stage by this Court, more so when there exists an alternative, efficacious remedy to the petitioners. 5. He submits that two appeals are available to the petitioners under section 40 of the Adhiniyam, and therefore, this petition is not entertainable. He submits that merits and demerits of the matter cannot be gone into at this stage by this Court, more so when there exists an alternative, efficacious remedy to the petitioners. 5. Shri D. P. Singh and Shri Deepak Khot, learned counsel for the private respondents, submit that as per amended rule published in 2009 Gazette notification of the State Government, one has to be a registered practitioner. Relying on the parent Adhiniyam and Rules, it is stated that 'medical practitioner' means a practitioner who is duly registered under the statute and in absence thereof he cannot be treated as a medical practitioner under the bye-laws. They submit that authority to practice homeopathy as a practitioner is available only when one is duly registered under the provisions of M. P. Homeopathy Council Adhiniyam, 1976 (in short 1976 Adhiniyam). They submit that enquiry officer has given finding about the members on the basis of documents and record of the society. The finding of enquiry is not binding on respondent No. 2 and it was open for respondent No. 2 to apply the Gazette notification which makes it clear as to who can be the member and in which capacity. Thus, it is stated that there is no deviation from the enquiry officer's report and in fact respondent No. 2 has applied the legal provision and his communication is only an outcome of consideration and application of Gazette notification. It is further stated that petitioner/society was given ample opportunities, the records were permitted to be produced by it and reasonable opportunity in accordance with section 32 of the Adhiniyam was afforded to the petitioner/society. It is further stated that the powers exercised by respondent No. 2 are 'suo motu' powers which are flowing from section 32(1) of the Adhiniyam. By placing reliance on Annexure P/8, it is stated that the said document makes it crystal clear that the said authority has exercised suo motu powers. It is the common stand of learned counsel for the respondents that the powers to take action suo motu can be based on an application preferred by any complainant. By placing reliance on Annexure P/8, it is stated that the said document makes it crystal clear that the said authority has exercised suo motu powers. It is the common stand of learned counsel for the respondents that the powers to take action suo motu can be based on an application preferred by any complainant. In other words, it is stated that if an application is preferred by any person, on the basis of said application, it is open for respondent No. 2 to take action by exercising suo motu powers under section 32(1) of the Adhiniyam. It is also the common stand of the respondents that petition is not entertainable because of a specific remedy available under section 40 of the Adhiniyam. 6. Lastly it is stated that petitioners have not shown any prejudice which warrants interference either in the decision making process or on communication Annexure P/1. For that, reliance is placed on 2006(4) MPIJ 403 (paras 35 and 36) Maharaja Jiwajirao Education Society and another vs. State of M. P. and others. By placing reliance on 2001(2) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 659 = (2007) 8 SCC 509, Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha and another vs. State of Maharashtra and others, it is argued that election process is on and when it is in full swing, there is no justification in making any interference at this stage. In addition, it is stated that certain members of petitioner No. 1/society have already participated in the election. 7. In rejoinder submission, Shri Harish Dixit, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that petitioner Nos. 2 and 3's registration was renewed by Annexure P/27 dated 16-1-2012 and Annexure P/28 dated 9-10-2012 respectively. He submits that despite this renewal in accordance with 2009 Rules, their names do not find place/not counted by the impugned order which will deprive them from their right to vote and participate in the election. Me submits that petitioners No. 2 and 3 are also prejudiced by this action. He submits that despite this renewal in accordance with 2009 Rules, their names do not find place/not counted by the impugned order which will deprive them from their right to vote and participate in the election. Me submits that petitioners No. 2 and 3 are also prejudiced by this action. In addition, he submits that the members of the society are from different States, including M. P., U.P. Rajasthan, and 2009 Gazette notification of the State of M. P. has no application on State of Rajasthan and U. P. Since this new point was considered for the first time in Annexure P/1, no opportunity was available to the petitioners to put forth their case and for this reasons also, petitioners arc prejudiced. He submits that there is no application of mind in the order of Assistant Registrar on this aspect i.e. applicability of Gazette notification of the State of M. P. on the members who are practising outside the territory of State of M. P. 8. No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the parties before this Court. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 10. The bone of contention of the petitioners is that pursuant to show cause notice, they submitted their reply and respondent No. 2 by impugned order opined that the election of governing body of the petitioners' society was invalid. This finding is adverse and entails civil consequences. The pivotal question is therefore, whether principles of natural justice and fair play in action have any application in the facts and circumstances of this case. The case of the petitioners is that by impugned order, an adverse decision has been taken and petitioners' elections were held to be illegal and new elections are directed. Thus, it was obligatory on the part of the respondent No. 2 to deal with the reply filed by the petitioners. In absence thereof, the principles of natural justice and fair play in action are grossly violated. I deem it proper to deal with this facet first. The stand of the other side is that section 32 nowhere prescribes that the opportunity should be granted to the petitioner before passing of Annexure P-1. In absence thereof, the principles of natural justice and fair play in action are grossly violated. I deem it proper to deal with this facet first. The stand of the other side is that section 32 nowhere prescribes that the opportunity should be granted to the petitioner before passing of Annexure P-1. It is the common stand of the respondent that under sub-section (4) of section 32, the Registrar is only obliged to provide result of the enquiry to the society and, therefore, principles of natural justice have no application in the present matter. It is apt to quote section 32, which reads as under :- "32. Enquiry and settlement of disputes. - (1) The Registrar may, on his own motion or on an application made under sub-section (2) either by himself or by a person authorised by him, by order in writing, hold an enquiry into the constitution, working and financial conditions of a society. (2) An enquiry of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) shall be held on the application together with an affidavit in support of its contents of- (a) a majority of the members of the governing body of the society; or (b) not less than one-third of the total number of members of the society. (2) An enquiry of the nature referred to in sub-section (1) shall be held on the application together with an affidavit in support of its contents of- (a) a majority of the members of the governing body of the society; or (b) not less than one-third of the total number of members of the society. (3) The Registrar or the person authorised by him under sub-section (1) shall for the purpose of an enquiry under this section have the following powers, namely :- (a) he shall at all times have free access to the books, accounts, documents, securities, cash and other properties belonging to, or in the custody of, the society and may summon any person in possession, or responsible for the custody of any such books, accounts, documents, securities, cash or other properties to produce the same, if they relate to the head office of the society at any place at the headquarter thereof and if they relate to any branch of the society, at any place in the town wherein such branch thereof is located or in his own office; (b) he may summon any person who he has reason to believe has knowledge of any of the affairs of the society to appear before him at any place at the headquarters of the society or any branch thereof or in his own office and may examine such person on oath; and (c) (i) he may notwithstanding any regulation or bye-laws specifying the period of notice for a general meeting of the society, require the officers of the society to call .a general meeting of the society at such time at the head office of the society or at any other place at the headquarter of the society and to determine such matters as may be directed by him and where the officers of the society refuse or fail to call such a meeting, he shall have power to call it himself; (ii) any meeting called under sub-clause (i) shall have all the powers of a general meeting called under the regulations or bye-laws of the society and its proceedings shall be regulated by such bye-laws. (4) When an enquiry is made under this section the Registrar shall communicate the result of the enquiry to the society and may issue appropriate directions to the society, which shall be binding on all parties concerned." (Emphasis Supplied) 11. (4) When an enquiry is made under this section the Registrar shall communicate the result of the enquiry to the society and may issue appropriate directions to the society, which shall be binding on all parties concerned." (Emphasis Supplied) 11. The aforesaid provision deals with the power of the Registrar to conduct enquiry regarding the constitution, working and financial condition of a society. For the purpose of this enquiry, he is equipped with certain powers enumerated in sub-section (3). He has free access to the books, accounts, documents, properties and other relevant material of the society, he may summon any person in whose possession or custody, the aforesaid documents are there. He may summon any person who he has reason to believe as knowledge of the affairs of the society to appear before him. He can examine such person on oath. Thus, various powers for the purpose of enquiry are given to the Registrar under the aforesaid provision. Sub-section (4) is amended on 4-9-1998. The first portion of sub-section (4) makes it obligatory on the part of the Registrar to communicate the result of the enquiry to the society. The word "shall" is employed in the first portion of sub-section (4), whereas the second portion envisages the power of the Registrar to issue appropriate directions to the society. For the purpose of exercising this power, the legislature has chosen to employ the word "may". A careful reading of sub-section (4) shows that it is obligatory on the part of the Registrar to communicate the result of the enquiry to the society. However, it is not always necessary or mandatory for the Registrar to pass any appropriate direction to the society. An element of discretion is there with the Registrar to pass appropriate directions to the society. For example, if result of the enquiry is in favour of the society and no action is required to be taken on it nor any appropriate directions are required, the Registrar may not issue any such directions. However if on the basis of enquiry report, any adverse order, directions to comply with the provisions of the Act, cure the defects etc. are to be done, the Registrar is equipped with the power to issue appropriate directions. For this purpose, the legislature has used the words "may issue appropriate directions to the society". However if on the basis of enquiry report, any adverse order, directions to comply with the provisions of the Act, cure the defects etc. are to be done, the Registrar is equipped with the power to issue appropriate directions. For this purpose, the legislature has used the words "may issue appropriate directions to the society". Thus, first portion of Sub- section (4) is mandatory, wherein Registrar is bound to communicate the result of the enquiry whereas the second portion is an enabling provision, wherein the Registrar, if required and as the case may be, may issue appropriate directions to the society. 12. In the present case, the respondent No. 2 issued a show cause notice on 20-6-2012 and copy of the enquiry conducted by Shri M. L. Kudape was supplied to the petitioner. In last line of this notice (Annexure P-13), the petitioner was directed to submit his reply @ Hindi @. In turn, petitioner submitted his reply. The respondent No. 2 passed the order dated 14-9-2012 and gave a finding that petitioner did not submit his reply pursuant to said show cause notice and enquiry report. The petitioner filed W.P. No. 6995/2012 and stated that the said reply was very much filed and is in the records of the respondents. This Court noticed the other side, summoned the record and gathered that the reply was very much received by the Assistant Registrar. Thus, it was opined by this Court that decision making process is polluted and principles of natural justice are violated. Accordingly, the matter was remitted back to the respondent No. 2 to proceed after the stage petitioner had submitted the reply (Annexure P-19 with W.P. No. 6995/2012). In turn, the respondent No. 2 has passed the impugned order (Annexure P-1). A microscopic reading of Annexure P-1 shows that the respondent No. 2 although has referred about the filing of reply of the petitioner but did not deal with the said reply. In other words, the contention and the stand of the petitioner in the said reply was not discussed, analyzed, considered and dealt with. A mere finding is given that said reply is filed. 13. In the opinion of this Court, the respondent No. 2 has taken both the actions as provided in section 32(4). Firstly he communicated the result of the enquiry to the society and then issued appropriate directions to the society. 14. A mere finding is given that said reply is filed. 13. In the opinion of this Court, the respondent No. 2 has taken both the actions as provided in section 32(4). Firstly he communicated the result of the enquiry to the society and then issued appropriate directions to the society. 14. The ultimate direction, which is given to the society, contains a finding that the election of existing governing body is found to be illegal/invalid. Findings are also given on various aspects including membership, audit report, income and expenditure etc. This is also not in dispute between the parties that before preparation of enquiry report the relevant documents/material were summoned from the petitioner No. 1. The main contention of respondents is that under section 32(4), the communication made is not an order and since respondent No. 2 is only obliged to forward the enquiry report to the society, principles of natural justice has no application. 15. In the opinion of this Court, in the factual matrix of this matter, it is clear that firstly the respondent No. 2 communicated the result of the enquiry and then based on such result passed an adverse order against the petitioners' society. The question is whether in this situation, the principles of natural justice and fair play in action have any role to play. 16. The nature of powers given to the Registrar under section 32 shows that he can summon relevant documents, record evidence on oath and therefore this nature of power is not purely administrative in nature. More so when he is given further power to act on the enquiry report by issuing appropriate directions to the society. This kind of action, which can effect the rights of the society or a person adversely, is a quasi judicial power. The dictionary meaning of the word "quasi" is "not exactly". In "principles of administrative law" (by M. P. Jain and S. N. Jain) (revised by Justice G. P. Singh and Alok Aradhe Advocate - as his Lordship then was) (Page 37, 5th Addition), it is opined that a quasi judicial act is just in between a judicial and administrative function. 17. In Ridge vs. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40, it was held that the duty to act judicially may arise from the very nature of the function perfonncd by the authority. 17. In Ridge vs. Baldwin, 1964 AC 40, it was held that the duty to act judicially may arise from the very nature of the function perfonncd by the authority. The ratio of Ridge (supra) was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme-Court in the celebrated case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 . A Division Bench of this Court in Sukhlal Sen vs. Collector, District Satna and others, 1969 MPLJ 516 , opined that the nature of duty to determine whether licensee has committed any breach of terms or conditions of his licence and whether for that reason the licence should be cancelled, imposes upon the authority the duty to act judicially and to comply with the principles of natural justice. In Sukhlal (supra) Justice G. P. Singh speaking for the Bench held as under :- "5.......Ridge vs. Baldwin establishes that judicial character of a duty may be inferred from the nature of the duty itself and there need not be any express language used by the Legislature requiring the body on which the duty is imposed to act judicially; duty to act judicially will be implicit in the duty to determine what the rights of an individual should be." "8.......Cancellation of a licence is a serious matter as it deprives, the licencee of his right to carry on business. In our opinion, the nature of the duty to determine whether the licensee has committed any breach of terms or conditions of his licence and whether for that reason the licence should be cancelled, imposes upon the authority the duty to act judicially. It necessarily follows that the authority must follow the requirements of natural justice and must give an opportunity to the licensee to meet the allegations of breaches of terms and conditions of the licence reported against him before cancelling the licence. As in the instant case, this opportunity was not given to the petitioner, it has to be held that the cancellation of his licence was invalid or void." 18. It is also apt to mention that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi judicial power was held to be thin and was treated to be gradually obliterated by various judgments of the Supreme Court. In A. K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , the Apex Court opined as under:- "13. It is also apt to mention that the dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi judicial power was held to be thin and was treated to be gradually obliterated by various judgments of the Supreme Court. In A. K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , the Apex Court opined as under:- "13. The dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is being gradually obliterated. For determining whether a power is an administrative power or a quasi-judicial power one has to look to the nature of the power conferred, the person or persons on whom it is conferred, the framework of the law conferring that power, the consequences ensuing from the exercise of that power and the manner in which that power is expected to be exercised. Under our Constitution the rule of law pervades over the entire field of administration. Every organ of the State under our Constitution is regulated and controlled by the rule of law. In a welfare State like ours it is inevitable that the jurisdiction of the administrative bodies is increasing at a rapid rate. The concept of rule of law would lose its vitality if the instrumentalities of the State are not charged with the duty of discharging their functions in a fair and just manner. The requirement of acting judicially in essence is nothing but a requirement to act justly and fairly and not arbitrarily or capriciously. The procedures which are considered inherent in the exercise of a judicial power are merely those which facilitate if not ensure a just and fair decision. In recent years the concept of quasi-judicial power has been undergoing a radical change. What was considered as an administrative power some years back is now being considered as a quasi-judicial power" (Emphasis Supplied) In the same judgment, the Court observed - "the horizon of natural justice is constantly expanding" and "if the purpose of rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice, one fail to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries". In Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405 , the Apex Court opined as under in paras 53 and 55 :- "......To-day, in our jurisprudence, the advances made by natural justice far exceed old frontiers and if judicial creativity belights penumbral areas it is only for improving the quality of government by injecting fair play into its wheels......Law lives not in a world of abstractions but in a cosmos of concreteness and to give up something good must be limited to extreme cases. If to condemn unheard is wrong, it is wrong except where it is overborne by dire social necessity......" In Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 , the Apex Court opined as under :- "44........this rule of fair play "must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands". The Court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications." 19. In the opinion of this Court, the impact of impugned order entails civil consequences on the petitioners. The Apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), opined as under :- "66......... 'Civil consequences' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-primary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence......." 20. The Constitution Bench in Maneka Gandhi (supra) has emphasized that natural justice is a great "humanising principle" which intended to invest law with fairness and to secure justice. The soul of natural justice is "fair play in action". On the basis of this, it can be said that there is no distinction between a quasi judicial and an administrative function for the purpose of applicability of the principles of natural justice. The aim of both administrative enquiry and quasi judicial enquiry is to arrive at a just decision and if a rule of natural justice is calculated to secure the justice, or, to put it negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice, it is difficult to see why it should be applicable to quasi judicial enquiry and not to administrative enquiry. It must logically apply to both. It must logically apply to both. Bhagwati, J. in Maneka Gandhi (supra) opined as under :- "12.......The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding, which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable." In Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), the Apex Court opined as under :- "44. The dichotomy between administrative and quasi-judicial functions vis-a-vis the doctrine of natural justice is presumably obsolescent." In S. L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 , the Apex Court opined as under :- "7. The old distinction between a judicial act and an administrative act has withered away and we have been liberated from the psittacine incantation of "administrative action......" 21. On the basis of the development of law and its interpretation aforesaid shows that the principles of natural justice are implicit in quasi judicial as well as administrative action. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court by following Swadeshi Cotton Mills (supra) in Mangilal (supra), the Apex Court opined as under in Para 10 :- "10. Even if a statute is silent and there are no positive words in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, there could be nothing wrong in spelling out the need to hear the parties whose rights and interest are likely to be affected by the orders that may be passed, and making it a requirement to follow a fair procedure before taking a decision, unless the statute provides otherwise. The principles of natural justice must be read into unoccupied interstices of the statute, unless there is a clear mandate to the contrary. No form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence or stand. Even in the absence of a provision in procedural laws, power inheres in every tribunal/Court of a judicial or quasi-judicial character, to adopt modalities necessary to achieve requirements of natural justice and fair play to ensure better and proper discharge of their duties. Procedure is mainly grounded on the principles of natural justice irrespective of the extent of its application by express provision in that regard in a given situation. It has always been a cherished principle. Procedure is mainly grounded on the principles of natural justice irrespective of the extent of its application by express provision in that regard in a given situation. It has always been a cherished principle. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice where substantial rights of parties are considerably affected. The application of natural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded by express words of statute or necessary intendment. (See Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India.) Its aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They are a means to an end and not an end in themselves. The principles of natural justice have many facets. Two of them are: notice of the case to be met, and opportunity to explain." (Emphasis Supplied) 22. The legal position stated above makes it clear that whether impugned order is outcome of a quasi judicial act or an administrative act in both the situations, principles of natural justice and fair play in action were the requirement of law. In other words, the impugned order could have been passed only after following the principles of natural justice and fair play in action. Fairness is an integral part of good administration. In the present case, in the first round, the petitioners succeeded because despite filing reply by him, the respondent No. 2 opined that reply has not been filed. When it was found to be incorrect on perusal of record, this Court directed the respondent No. 2 proceed further from that stage. Now in the impugned order, the respondent No. 2 mentioned about factum of filing of reply but did not deal with the contentions and averments of the reply in his order/communication. He has given a finding, which is detriment to the petitioner and an elected body is ousted before completion of normal tenure. In my considered opinion, it has serious consequences on the petitioners and this order certainly falls within the ambit of "civil consequences". The requirement of principles of natural justice and fair play was to examine, deal with, consider and discuss the reply filed by the petitioner. In my considered opinion, it has serious consequences on the petitioners and this order certainly falls within the ambit of "civil consequences". The requirement of principles of natural justice and fair play was to examine, deal with, consider and discuss the reply filed by the petitioner. In absence thereof, the impugned order runs contrary to principles of natural justice and fair play in action. 23. This is settled in law that principles of natural justice does not supplant the law but supplements the law. Its application may be excluded either expressly or by necessary implication Dr. Umrao Singh Chaudhary vs. State of M. P. and another, (1994) 4 SCC 328 . In Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), it is held by the Supreme Court that it is not permissible to interpret any statutory instalment so as to exclude natural justice. Unless the language of the instrument leaves no option to the Court. It is further observed that natural justice is so integral to the good government that the onus is on him who urges exclusion to make out why. 24. In the light of this legal position, in my opinion, the principles of natural justice are implicit and are required to be read into section 32(4) of the Adhiniyam. In cases, whether after supplying the result of the enquiry, the Registrar receives the response of the society and if he intends to pass any order which affects the right of the society in any manner or which may entail civil consequences, the Registrar is bound to follow the principles of natural justice and fair play in action. Accordingly, he is under an obligation to deal with the stand of the party going to be affected in his order. In absence of thereof, the order would be an order without assigning any reason on the defence of the petitioners. The necessity to assign reason is emphasized by the Supreme Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, 2011(1) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 691 = (2010) 9 SCC 496, in following words :- "(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants 'faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (I) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equaled with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process ". 25. In the light of aforesaid, in my opinion, the impugned order suffers from serious infirmity because the reply of the petitioners has not been considered. The principles of natural justice and fair play in action are grossly violated. No doubt, this Court can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in certain cases of availability of alternative remedy. I lowever, the said rule requiring the exhaustion of alternative remedy before the writ Court is not a rule of law but is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion. In other words, it is not a compulsion but a discretion. The High Court can certainly issue an appropriate writ in case of denial of natural justice. This view is taken by the Supreme Court way back in AIR 1958 SC 86 , State of U. P. vs. Mohd. Nooh. The same was followed by the Division Bench in Sukhlal Sen (supra). The Apex Court also took the same view in catena of judgments including in Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 . 26. In view of aforesaid, I am not inclined to relegate the petitioner to avail the alternative remedy. The objection regarding entertain-ability of this petition because election process is on, is also of no substance. Admittedly, petitioners society's normal tenure is not over and without considering the -stand of the petitioners, its election was held to be invalid. It not only entails civil consequences, it is a drastic order qua petitioners. Elections, in the present case, have not taken place whereas in the judgment of Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (supra) of the Supreme Court cited by Shri D. P. Singh, the election had already taken place. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the said judgment has-no application. Elections, in the present case, have not taken place whereas in the judgment of Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (supra) of the Supreme Court cited by Shri D. P. Singh, the election had already taken place. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the said judgment has-no application. At the cost of repetition, principles of natural justice and fair play in action coupled with the duty to act judicially is not observed by respondent No. 2. Consequently, the said order cannot be upheld. 27. In view of the analysis aforesaid, other points raised by the parties are not required to be dealt with. Consequently, petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 24-1-2013 (Annexure P-1) is set aside. However, liberty is reserved to the respondent No. 2 to pass order in accordance with law. It be noted that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs. Petition allowed.