Sibghat Ullah Khan, J.:— Heard Sri S.K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri R.K. Srivastava, learned counsel for contesting respondents in both the writ petitions. Initially one Raghubir Sahai was tenant of part of the accommodation in dispute, which had been allotted to him by R.C. & E.O. under Section 16 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. Smt. Satyawati Devi was the landlady. Release application under Section 21 of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was filed by Smt. Satyawati Devi against Raghubir Sahai on 15.06.1988, which was allowed on 03.10.1988. Thereafter, on 25.11.1988 execution application under Section 23 of the Act was filed by Smt. Satyawati Devi against Raghubir Sahai before the Prescribed Authority. Smt. Satyawati Devi died on 21.10.1989. Original respondent No.2, Virendra Prasad Shah filed substitution application on 10.11.1989 stating therein that he was son in law of Smt. Satayawati Devi and she had executed a registered Will in his favour on 20.07.1989. It was the case of Smt. Satyawati Devi/Virendra Prasad Shah that in December, 1988, petitioner had illegally been handed over possession by Raghubir Sahai who had shifted in his own newly acquired/constructed house. Petitioner also filed suit being Regular Suit No.510 of 1988 in the court of Munsif Sadar Faizabad for permanent injunction. The suit is stated to be still pending. The Prescribed Authority/Munsif Sadar, Faizabad through order dated 30(or 31).01.1995 allowed the substitution application of original respondent No.2. The said order was passed in Misc. Case No.172 of 1988, Stayawati Devi Vs. Raghubir Sahai. The first writ petition is directed against the said order. Petitioner had filed objections to the execution application contending that he had been inducted as tenant by Smt. Satyawati Devi after it was vacated by Raghubir Sahai and in that regard Smt. Satayawati Devi had also executed an unregistered agreement on 28.02.1988, copy of which is Annexure-1 to the first writ petition. In view of Chhakki Lal Vs. III Additional District Judge, Mainpuri, AIR 1977 All 8 , if a person, who is sought to be evicted in execution under Section 23 of the Act asserts that it is not the opposite party in the release application but he who is tenant then he can maintain such claim. Petitioner's application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority/Munsif on 31.03.1995 passed in Misc. Case No.36 of 1995, Awadh Narain Nishad Vs. Virendra Prasad Shah and others. Petitioner's application was rejected by the Prescribed Authority/Munsif on 31.03.1995 passed in Misc. Case No.36 of 1995, Awadh Narain Nishad Vs. Virendra Prasad Shah and others. The said order has been challenged through the second writ petition. In the alleged agreement, Annexure-1 to the first writ petition, it is stated that Dr. Raghubir Sahai Dixit, the tenant has constructed his house and agreement has taken place between the landlady and the petitioner for the tenancy and details have been settled. It is mentioned that first floor was being taken on rent by the petitioner at the rate of Rs.300/- per month. It is nowhere stated in the agreement that previous tenant Raghubir Sahai had vacated or the possession had been delivered by him to the petitioner. In para-4 of the second writ petition, it has been stated that Dr. Raghubir Sahai vacated the portion in his tenancy occupation which consisted of two rooms, bathroom and kitchen and the landlady gave the said portion of the first floor to the petitioner along with remaining portion of first floor which consisted of two rooms, two store rooms, courtyard and veranda. However, in the agreement this detail was not mentioned. As far as first writ petition is concerned, petitioner had no right to oppose substitution as any other person claiming to be legal representatives of Smt. Satayawati Devi did not come forward and Smt. Satyawati Devi had executed the registered Will in favour of the original respondent No.2, Virendra Prasad Shah, her son in law. As far as second writ petition is concerned, Smt. Satyawati Devi outrightly denied execution of any agreement. The Prescribed Authority held that her signatures on the agreement were not proved. Other attending circumstances were also taken into consideration. The Prescribed Authority held that if Raghubir Sahai had vacated the premises, release application and thereafter execution application would not have been filed by Smt. Satyawati Devi against him and as Smt. Satyawati Devi was claiming the house for his own need, hence there was no sense of letting that out to the petitioner. In the agreement, it is not mentioned that Raghubir Sahai had vacated the premises. I do not find least error in the said order also. Moreover, findings are basically findings of fact. In the agreement, it is not mentioned that Raghubir Sahai had vacated the premises. I do not find least error in the said order also. Moreover, findings are basically findings of fact. The argument of learned counsel for petitioner that as Smt. Satyawati Devi has died for whose need release was filed and allowed, hence release order cannot be executed is utterly misconceived. Such a plea could be raised by the original tenant and not by rank unauthorised occupant like the petitioner, who was inducted by the tenant surreptitiously and illegally. Learned counsel for petitioner has argued that without release under Section 16 of the Act, landlord cannot occupy the house. This argument is also not tenable. After vacation of the tenant, house cannot be left unoccupied. It has to be occupied by the landlord. There is no provision under Rent Control Act, which prohibits the landlord from occupying the house immediately after vacation by the tenant. The following authorities cited by learned counsel for petitioner are not relevant: (i) Seshambal Vs. M/s Chelur Corporation, 2010 (28) LCD 412 SC (ii) Smt. Dhanwanti Devi Vs. Sri Rama Shaker Prasad, 1982 (1) ARC 747 (iii) Mohan Singh Bedi Vs. Phool Chand, 1982 ARC 442 Accordingly, there is absolutely no merit in the writ petitions. Both the writ petitions are dismissed. Property in dispute is double storey residential accommodation containing about six rooms, two kitchens, bath rooms etc. Accordingly, it is directed that petitioner shall pay damages for use and occupation to the contesting respondents at the rate of Rs.2000/- per month w.e.f. January, 1989 till eviction. It is further directed that petitioner shall forthwith be evicted from the accommodation in dispute. For recovery of the damages, this judgment shall be treated to be certificate of recovery in Form-G under Rule 24(2) of the Rules framed under U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. _____________