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2013 DIGILAW 2293 (RAJ)

Govind Saini v. Prabhu Dayal

2013-12-16

ALOK SHARMA

body2013
Hon'ble SHARMA, J.—In this petition purporting to be one under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, but fundamentally one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India a challenge has been made to the order dated 20.11.2013 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Jaipur affirming the order dated 11.11.2013 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur (hereinafter 'the Tribunal') as the executing court) dismissing the petitioner-Objector's (hereinafter 'the objector') application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC against the execution of a certificate of possession issued by the Rent Tribunal, Jaipur in Eviction petition No.619/2010 on 28.2.2011 in a case titled Prabhudayal vs. Veerdev Sharma. 2. The background facts of the case are that the respondent-plaintiff (hereinafter 'the plaintiff') filed an eviction petition No.619/2010 against one Veerdev Sharma, now deceased and represented by his legal representatives impleaded in this petition as respondents-defendants (hereinafter 'the defendants'). Ground agitated in support thereof were bonafide and reasonable necessity of the plaintiff for the tenanted shop, as also subletting as the defendant was stated to have sub-let the tenanted shop to one Govind Saini. In spite of service of the petition on Veerdev Sharma, then alive, he did not appear before the Tribunal and exparte proceedings were drawn against him. Subsequently the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a compromise, wherein he admitted to the factum of plaintiff's bonafide and reasonable necessity, but stated that the tenanted shop in question had not been sub-let to Govind Saini who was only managing the shop as an employee. Based on the compromise application and admission of the defendant Veerdev Sharma of the plaintiff's bonafide and reasonable necessity, a certificate of possession was issued by the Tribunal on 28.2.2011 whereunder vacant possession of the tenanted shop was to be handed over to the plaintiff by 30.3.2011. 3. The vacant possession of the shop in question however was not handed over to the plaintiff by 30.3.2011. The plaintiff then moved an application for execution of the certificate of possession aforesaid. On 29.7.2011, the Nazir accompanied by the certificate holder's son went to the tenanted shop in issue and finding the objector Govind Saini in possession, informed him that it was to be vacated in terms of certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011. Thereupon an altercation ensued between the son of the holder of certificate of possession Prabhudayal and Govind Saini. On 29.7.2011, the Nazir accompanied by the certificate holder's son went to the tenanted shop in issue and finding the objector Govind Saini in possession, informed him that it was to be vacated in terms of certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011. Thereupon an altercation ensued between the son of the holder of certificate of possession Prabhudayal and Govind Saini. The Nazir then made his report to the executing Court and sought directions that the possession of shop in issue be recovered with the aid of the police. This was so directed by the executing Court on 2.8.2011. 4. The objector on his part moved an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC before the executing Court on 17.8.2011. It was stated the objector was in occupation and possession of the shop in question for the last 15 years independently in his own right under tenancy of one Pradeep Kumar under a writing/receipt of 1.10.1996 and that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant Veerdev Sharma had any concern with the said shop. It was further submitted that effective 7.2.2011 the objector had obtained electricity connection in his own name in the suit premises on the basis of his old possession even though upto January 2011 the electricity connection in the disputed shop was in the name of the defendant Veerdev Sharma. During the period of the electricity connection in the name of the Veerdev the bills of consumption of electricity at the shop in question were however, stated to have been paid by the objector. Original bills for electricity consumption were stated to have been taken by the Veerdev in January, 2011 on the pretext of billing dispute with the electricity supplier. In the aforesaid facts and defences set up against the execution of the certificate of possession, it was prayed that the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 in eviction petition No.619/2010 be declared to be non-effective against the objector and he not be dispossessed from the shop in question in execution thereof. It was alleged that the plaintiff had misused the judicial process to seek to dispossess the objector and had fraudulently obtained the certificate of possession based on a collusive compromise in eviction petition No.619/2010 before the Tribunal behind the back of the objector. It was alleged that the plaintiff had misused the judicial process to seek to dispossess the objector and had fraudulently obtained the certificate of possession based on a collusive compromise in eviction petition No.619/2010 before the Tribunal behind the back of the objector. It was thus prayed that the order passed by the Tribunal on 2.8.20111 for taking possession of the suit property under certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 with the aid of police force be quashed and set aside. 5. In reply to the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC filed by the objector, the plaintiff stated hat the very substance of the objector's defence based on a purported rent note dated 1.10.1996 executed allegedly by Pradeep Kumar was false. Pradeep Kumar had no right to the said shop and the objector had at no point of time been a tenant in the disputed shop. all the times prior to 30.3.2011 the tenancy of the suit shop was with the defendant Veerdev Sharma whose employee the objector was. It was emphatically denied that the eviction petition No.619/2010 before the Tribunal was collusively filed or that the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 fraudulently obtained. The impleadment of the objector in the eviction petition was not necessary either as a sub-tenant unauthorisedly inducted in the tenanted premises or for that matter as the tenant's employee. It was submitted that the factum of Veerdev's tenancy/occupation of the shop was established from the objector's admission in para No.11 of his application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC wherein it was stated that the electricity connection in the said shop was in the name of the defendant tenant Veerdev Sharma upto January, 2011. It was submitted that this fact by itself was sufficient to establish the tenancy of the suit shop with Veerdev Sharma and not with the objector through Pradeep Kumar Agarwal as claimed. It was submitted that eviction petition laid by the plaintiff against defendant Veerdev Sharma had come to be compromised in view of the fact that Veerdev Sharma at the relevant time was suffering from cancer and was willing to vacate the premises in issue having admitted the bonafide and reasonable necessity of the plaintiff. Thereafter Veerdev Sharma had got disconnected the electricity supply in his name to the suit shop and obtained refund of security deposit from the electricity Supplier, i.e. Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited Jaipur. Thereafter Veerdev Sharma had got disconnected the electricity supply in his name to the suit shop and obtained refund of security deposit from the electricity Supplier, i.e. Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited Jaipur. The allegations of collusion and fraud in obtaining the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 were denied absolutely as baseless. It was further submitted that even the electricity connection obtained by the objector in his name from the Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited was not on the basis of any legal/ lawful right such as a valid tenancy but on the basis of collusion with the office of electricity supply company preceded by a misstatement of his long possession over the suit shop. The plaintiff submitted that in the event the objector was indeed the lawful tenant in the disputed shop in terms of purported receipt/rent note dated 1.10.1996 allegedly executed by Pradeep Kumar, he would have at the time of obtaining the electricity connection in February, 2011 disclosed his tenancy, used the said rent note and not claimed the electricity connection in the shop in issue merely on the basis of old possession. It was submitted that the objector had no legal or lawful possession of the suit premises and the plaintiff was entitled to the immediate possession thereof in pursuance/execution of the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 passed by the Tribunal. 6. In additional pleas the plaintiff submitted that the suit property pertaining to the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 was a shop to the south of which the plaintiff owned another shop which was on rent with one Rajkumar Soni. In the tenanted shop defendant Veerdev Sharma used to do business and had obtained electricity connection during his tenancy in the name and style of his business Booster Pump Welding shop. From the same shop the defendant Veerdev Sharma also engaged in business in the name of M/s. Anil Engineering Wroks. The said shop was registered under the Shop and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 and in the application made for the purpose of registration the objector Govind Saini had been shown as an employee as of defendant Veerdev Sharma. 7. From the same shop the defendant Veerdev Sharma also engaged in business in the name of M/s. Anil Engineering Wroks. The said shop was registered under the Shop and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 and in the application made for the purpose of registration the objector Govind Saini had been shown as an employee as of defendant Veerdev Sharma. 7. On the matter coming up before the executing court on 29.11.2011, taking note of the facts on record in the exercise of its discretion the Court held that there was no need to frame issues on the pleadings of the parties before it and it would be just and appropriate to dispose of the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC filed by the objector on the basis of documents on record, pleadings and admissions of the parties. During pendency of the application before the executing Court the defendant Veerdev Sharma expired leaving behind his wife Sarita Devi and his children Surendra, Ramesh, Vinod and Dinesh. These legal representatives were taken on record by resorting to Order XXII Rule 4 CPC. 8. Subsequently an application was moved by the objector before the executing Court stating that the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 passed by the Tribunal in eviction petition No.619/2010 was issued without taking any evidence on the alleged compromise between the parties to the eviction petition and was thus null and void. It was stated that it was necessary to determine the issues on the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC take evidence thereon allowing he objector opportunity to prove documents in support of his objections to the execution of the certificate of possession. It was further submitted that the document filed by the plaintiff decree holder relating to the electricity connection in the disputed shop in opposing the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, were photo copies, originals of which were either with family of the deceased defendant judgment debtor Veerdev Sharma or with the Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited, and therefore for this purpose also it was necessary to take the evidence of the parties in the execution petition and call the witnesses and summon record from the JVVNL. The executing Court vide order dated 22.3.2013 adverted to its earlier order dated 29.11.2011, where it had held that in the facts of the case striking of issue was not necessary and the objections could be disposed of on the basis of documents on record and pleadings of the parties. Stating that the objections under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC were thus to be decided on the basis of documents on record, the executing Court found no occasion to revisit the issue agitated a second time over by the objector. The prayer of the objector was thus again rejected. 9. On 10.7.2013, the objector again moved an application before the executing Court stating that the documents filed by the plaintiff decree holder in opposing the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC were photo copies and not certified and original documents as were necessary to be considered by the Court at the time of hearing of the application and its consideration. Therefore the plaintiff decree holder be directed to submit the original copies of the documents of which photo copy had been filed. Noting that the objector's prayer for filing of original copies of documents was vague as it was not specified which originals of documents filed were required to be produced, the executing court dismissed the application on 3.8.2013. It was observed by the court that admissibility/inadmissibility of documents before it would be considered at the time of passing of the order on application moved by the objector under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. 10. A further application was moved by the objector requiring framing of issues and consideration of his objections on the basis of evidence of parties with opportunity of cross-examination. The executing Court vide order dated 29.11.2011 on consideration of said application recorded that from the evidence on case file before it, it was admitted that upto 7.1.2011 Veerdev Sharma had electricity connection in his own name in the suit shop. The executing court also noted that in the application by the objector before the Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited for electricity connection in the suit shop the tenancy under Pradeep Kumar as set up before the executing Court was not invoked but only the purported old possession of the objector. The executing court also noted that in the application by the objector before the Jaipur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Limited for electricity connection in the suit shop the tenancy under Pradeep Kumar as set up before the executing Court was not invoked but only the purported old possession of the objector. Holding that the facts of the case before it were very clear and categorical and more so that as no affidavit had been filed by Pradeep Kumar on whose receipt/writing dated 1.10.1996 tenancy of the suit shop was claimed by the objector, the executing Court again reiterated that the nature of the dispute before it did not warrant that issues be struck on the basis of pleadings. It was again held that the objections could be decided on the material before the executing Court placed by the objector on the one hand and the plaintiff decree holder on the other. 11. Finally the matter was heard by he executing court on he objector's application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC on 11.11.2013 and the objection were dismissed. Aggrieved of the order dated 11.11.2013 passed by the Rent Tribunal as the executing Court, appeal there against was filed before the Appellate Rent Tribunal. This was also dismissed vide order dated 20.11.2013. Hence this petition. 12. Mr. Surana, appearing for the objector has made following submissions. (1) The certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 passed by the Tribunal in eviction petition No.619/2010, Prabhu Dayal vs. Veerdev Sharma was collusive, fraudulently obtained behind the objector's back, without the satisfaction of the Tribunal with regard to bonafide and reasonable necessity of the plaintiff Prabhu Dayal and therefore not binding nor capable of execution by the plaintiff decree holder. (2) The Rent Tribunal as the executing court as also the Appellate Rent Tribunal erred in addressing the objector's application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC summarily without framing of issues on the pleadings of contesting parties. It has been submitted that issues should have been framed and evidence thereon allowed with the right of cross-examination of witnesses before the final adjudication of the objections. (3) The orders passed by the executing court as well as the Appellate Court are based on photo copies of documents not admissible in evidence as per law. Consequently, they are vitiated and liable to be quashed and set aside. (3) The orders passed by the executing court as well as the Appellate Court are based on photo copies of documents not admissible in evidence as per law. Consequently, they are vitiated and liable to be quashed and set aside. (4) Reliance placed by the executing Court on the affidavit of Pradeep Kumar denying execution of the receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 letting out suit premises to the objector was unjust and unfair as the said affidavit was taken on record by the executing court surreptitiously, copy thereof not given to the objector, nor he allowed any opportunity to cross-examine the deponent of the affidavit. It was emphatically submitted that while the executing Court in its order dated 22.3.2013 had decided not to frame issues on the pleadings of parties in view of the affidavit of Pradeep Kumar not having been filed, thereafter in spite of Pradeep Kumar's affidavit being filed, issues were not yet framed in an arbitrary manner. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 14. At the outset, it would be in place to note the limitations of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in interfering with concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. From an analysis of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the scope of the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the principle that emerge are that the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction would be available in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, for interference when the orders impugned generated issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction and orders impugned were vitiated by misdirection in law or perversity on facts leading to manifest injustice to the aggrieved party. In my considered opinion, in the facts of the case as obtaining before this Court, more of the aforesaid grounds are even remotely made out. And the petition would have been liable to be dismissed in limine. Yet as the matter was argued at length, it is also being addressed on merit. 15. Aside of jurisdictional limits of this Court adverted to herein above, in my considered opinion there is no force in the contention of Mr. And the petition would have been liable to be dismissed in limine. Yet as the matter was argued at length, it is also being addressed on merit. 15. Aside of jurisdictional limits of this Court adverted to herein above, in my considered opinion there is no force in the contention of Mr. Surana appearing for the objector that the objection filed under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC to the execution of the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 passed by the Tribunal ought to have been mandatorily and as of necessity addressed as if in a regular trial with the framing of issues and leading of evidence thereon with the right to cross-examination of witnesses. With the amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1976 right to file suits qua decrees of civil court has done away with the and all conceivable objections to the execution of a decree made subject to applications under Order XXI Rule 97-101 CPC. The intention of the amendment of 1976 to the CPC was in facilitating expeditiously and timely execution of decrees of civil court. In making the amendment of 1976 to the CPC, Parliament appears to have finally taken note of the observation of the Privy Counsel made as early as 1872 in the case of General Manager of the Rajasthan Durbhanga vs. Maharaja Comar Ramaput Singh (14 M.I.A. 605) that the difficulties of a litigant in India in fact arose on obtaining a decree of the Court. Thus Order XXI Rule 97-101 CPC is a part of a complete code embedded in CPC for execution of decrees of the courts lawfully obtained. Arduous wait of the decree holder for the fruits of a decree lawfully obtained against the machination of determination objectors/ resisters was thus sought to be minimized. Thus in the context of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Silver Line Forum (P) Ltd. vs. Rajeev Trust ( (1998) 3 SCC 723 ) has held that it is not always necessary that a detailed enquiry under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC must be held in respect every objection to the execution of a decree filed and that the matter lies within the discretion of the executing court-no doubt judicially exercised in the facts of each given case. It was held that "The Court can make adjudication on admitted facts or even the averments made by the resisters" unless if it otherwise deems necessary to direct the parties to adduce evidence for the determination of questions before it. 16. Consequently, in my considered opinion, there is no force in the contention of counsel for the objector that orders of the executing court and the appellate Court are vitiated solely on count of issues having not been framed on the pleadings of the objection petition and reply thereto and evidence thereon not having been called for including by way of right of cross-examination of witnesses of the respective parties. In terms of the enunciation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Silver Line Forum (supra) it was open for the executing court to decide the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC on the documents and the admitted facts and averments in the pleadings of the contesting parties. 17. The admitted facts on records of this case are that the objector had not been able to establish his prima facie case that he was in possession of the shop in question in his independent right as a tenant under the writing of 1.10.1996 purportedly signed by Pradeep Kumar. The receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 aforesaid was/is only a photocopy and the original thereof was not filed before the executing court. No affidavit of Pradeep Kumar in support of the said receipt/writing was placed on record of the executing court. In fact even no document of Pradeep Kumar's ownership/control of the disputed property was also placed to establish that the tenancy as claimed could have flown therefrom. Further, the receipt/writing dated 1.10.1996 relied upon by the objector was not signed by the scribe thereof purportedly one Hanuman Saini nor were the names of witnesses to the said writing followed up with their addresses. Even their affidavits were not filed to support the receipt/rent note dated 1.10.1996 allegedly signed by Pradeep Kumar. Most importantly the receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 refers to Pradeep Kumar being resident of Kolkata, when in 1996 the metropolis was universally known as Calcutta. The name of Calcutta was changed to Kolkota and notified only on 1.1.2001. Even their affidavits were not filed to support the receipt/rent note dated 1.10.1996 allegedly signed by Pradeep Kumar. Most importantly the receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 refers to Pradeep Kumar being resident of Kolkata, when in 1996 the metropolis was universally known as Calcutta. The name of Calcutta was changed to Kolkota and notified only on 1.1.2001. On these facts on record it was abundantly clear to the executing Court as also the first appellate Court that the photocopy of the writing/ receipt of 1.10.1996 purportedly signed by Pradeep Kumar was aside of being was unstamped and hence inadmissible on the above counts, a forged and fabricated document of no probative worth at all. The original document was apparently not filed, as rightly submitted by the counsel for the plaintiff decree holder before this Court, for fear of a FIR being lodged for forgery and use of a forged document as a genuine one by the objector. 18. Aside of above palpable falsity of the case as set up by the objector, it is noteworthy that while the objector claimed to be tenant in the disputed shop effective 1.10.1996, manufacturing section windows and doors, the electricity connection therein in the name of the objector was admittedly obtained only on or about 7.2.2011 near about the time of the issue of the certificate of possession on 28.2.2011 in the plaintiff's eviction petition No.619/2010. Admittedly from the objector's own averments in his application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC upto January, 2011 the electricity connection in the suit shop was in the name of defendant Veerdev Sharma, who admitted to the tenancy of the plaintiff Prabhu Dayal. The explanation of the objector to the aforesaid state of affairs specious if not absurd, was that albeit the electricity connection was in the name of Veerdev Sharma 1996 through January, 2011 the tenancy of the shop in question was of the objector beginning 1.10.1996. The situation set up being contrary to the normal course of human conduct Section 114 of the Evidence Act operated against the objector's far fetched version. Nothing on record at the instance of the objector even remotedly rebutted the presumption operative in law. The situation set up being contrary to the normal course of human conduct Section 114 of the Evidence Act operated against the objector's far fetched version. Nothing on record at the instance of the objector even remotedly rebutted the presumption operative in law. The objector did not set up any case before the executing court as to why and in what circumstances the objector allegedly was the tenant of the suit premises under Pradeep Kumar's alleged receipt/writing of 1.10.1996, while the electricity connection as in the name of Veerdev Sharma who he claimed was a stranger to him. 19. Further the registration of the disputed shop under the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 Act obtained by the defendant Veerdev Sharma indicated that the objector Govind Saini was his employee. It cannot be conceivably argued that showing the name of objector as his employee, Veerdev Sharma in the year 1992 while seeking registration under the Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 was setting into motion a conspiracy to facilitate the eviction petition No.619/2010 by the plaintiff. Imaginations cannot be allowed to run amuck in courts. It is relevant to note that Veerdev Sharma suffering from cancer died during pendency of the execution petition before the Tribunal and his legal representatives Sharda Yadav, Dinesh, Surendera, Ramesh, Vinod and Savitri Devi taken on record under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC had admitted to the factum of the compromise between the plaintiff and their father Veerdev Sharma leading to the certificate of possession issued by the Tribunal on 28.2.2011 based thereon. 20. In the overall circumstances of the case as detailed hereinabove, in my considered opinion the conclusions of the executing court as also the appellate Court in dismissing the objector's application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC cannot be said to be either perverse or misdirected in law. Contrarily they are firmly rooted in the evidence on record and the overall facts and circumstances of the case and were the only plausible outcome. 21. As far as the objections to the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 being fraudulently obtained are concerned, in my considered opinion the argument has only to be noticed to be rejected. Contrarily they are firmly rooted in the evidence on record and the overall facts and circumstances of the case and were the only plausible outcome. 21. As far as the objections to the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 being fraudulently obtained are concerned, in my considered opinion the argument has only to be noticed to be rejected. For, one the objector claiming his own independent right to the disputed shop on the strength of the purported receipt/writing of Pradeep Kumar executed on 1.10.1996 cannot be seen to agitate the alleged fraudulent nature of the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 as it would be of no relevance whatsoever to his case. As the objector was claiming an independent right to possession of the shop and not under the tenant Veerdev Sharma. Aside of above, in my considered opinion reliance by the objector on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Chandra Verma vs. Jagat Singh Singhi ( (1996) 8 SCC 47 ) is in apposite to the facts of the instant case. In the compromise application before the Tribunal leading to the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011, the defendant tenant Veerdev Sharma had adverted to and admitted to the bonafide and reasonable necessity of the plaintiff for the disputed shop. This admission supplied the ground and jurisdiction to the Rent Tribunal to issue the certificate of possession in favour of the plaintiff as the statutory ground under Section 9(i) of the Rent Control Act, 2001 was thus supplied for issuing a certificate of possession. The case before the Tribunal and now before this Court is therefore distinguishable from the case of Ram Chandra Verma (supra). 22. In the case of Hiralal Moolchand Doshi vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas ((1993) 2 SCC 458), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that where a compromise decree for eviction is passed by the trial Court conscious of the admission of the tenant making out a ground for eviction statutorily provided for, it cannot be said to be nullity. A decree of eviction based on such a compromise and admission would be a wholly executable decree held the Hon'ble Apex Court. A decree of eviction based on such a compromise and admission would be a wholly executable decree held the Hon'ble Apex Court. Reference was made to the judgment in the case of Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatram Ichharam ( (1974) 1 SCC 242 ), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held as under: "From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is, that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court, on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction though apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admissions, if true and clear, are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admissions in pleadings or judicial admissions, admissible under Section 58 of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver of proof. They by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties." 23. It was then held that such a decree is binding on the parties and executing Court has no option but to accept it and execute it, as it stands. Consequently, I find no force in the submissions of the counsel for the objector that the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 was a nullity and incapable of execution. 24. Thus not claiming under the judgment debtor under the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 i.e. Veerdev Sharma and after his death his LRs on record, it was not open for the objector to at all to challenge the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 as collusive, fraudulent or un-executable. The objections/resistance of the objector was/is based on his purported independent right under the alleged receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 with peculiar terms started to have been executed by Pradeep Kumar Agarwal. The objections/resistance of the objector was/is based on his purported independent right under the alleged receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 with peculiar terms started to have been executed by Pradeep Kumar Agarwal. The objections under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC thus have to stand or fall by the alleged lawful/legal possession under the photocopy of the receipt/writing of 1.10.1996. On this it has already been held earlier in this judgment, the objector has woefully failed. 25. The further argument most vociferously and repeatedly made on behalf of the objector by his counsel Mr. Surana was that the affidavit of Pradeep Kumar Agarwal had been taken on record by the executing Court surreptitiously, without a copy thereof to the objector and without any opportunity of cross-examination. This counsel submitted had vitiated the entire proceedings before the executing court considering the objections under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. I find no force in the submissions of the counsel. The burden of proof in law on the objector to prove his case as set up in the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. This he had failed to do so completely. His lynch pin being the photocopy of the receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 has been held to be wholly discredited for reason of being only a photocopy not the original, the scribe not having signed it, the witnesses not indicating their address, no affidavit of the scribe and the witnesses filed and most importantly it being a palpably fabricated and forged document using the city name Kolkata in 1996 when the metropolis of Calculta was only re-named Kalkata on 1.1.2001 by a West Bengal Government notification. In this state of evidence the onus never shifted to the plaintiff decree holder and the affidavit of Pradeep Kumar denying the receipt/writing of 1.10.1996 as being signed by him was no event for the evaluation of the objector's case of his independent tenancy of the disputed shop and possession based thereon. The focus of the counsel for the objector is thus wholly misdirected and of no avail. 26. Reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Janardhana Rao vs. Kannan ( (2004) 11 SCC 511 = RLW 2005(1) SC 77) is inapposite. The case turned on its own specific facts and is of n avail to the petitioner. 26. Reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Janardhana Rao vs. Kannan ( (2004) 11 SCC 511 = RLW 2005(1) SC 77) is inapposite. The case turned on its own specific facts and is of n avail to the petitioner. Similarly reference to the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anwarbi vs. Pramod D.A. Joshi ( (2000) 10 SCC 405 ) does not better the case of the petitioner. The fact of the matter in the present case is that one way or the other, the merits of the objector's case to obstruct the certificate of possession was considered by the executing court no matter at whose instance. The mere fact that the objector approached the executing Court under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC and not the decree holder is of little relevance. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal ( (1997) 3 SCC 694 ) also relied upon by counsel for the objector mere restates that the resister has a right to be heard, which right the objector has been allowed in the instant case by the courts below. In Sardar Hasanbhai Attar vs. Usman Papamiya Attar Shaikh ((2008) Civil Court Cases 446 (Bombay)) the Bombay High Court generally details the statutory provisions regarding the objector's right to be heard and his claim to property of which he is in possession adjudicated. It is nobody's case to the contrary nor has the courts below overlooked the said right of the objector. Reliance placed by the objector on Pholo Ram Sharma vs. Narinder Singh Randhawa (2008(1) Civil Court Cases 801 (P&H)) however is of benefit to the respondent decree holder, and buttresses the view of the courts below in this case that only if third party's objections are not totally frivolous, then alone should the executing court frame issues and permit parties to lead evidence to decide the objections. The sequitur thus is that if the objections of a resister to the execution of a decree are frivolous and vexatious, they can be adjudicated on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and facts on record before the executing Court. The sequitur thus is that if the objections of a resister to the execution of a decree are frivolous and vexatious, they can be adjudicated on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and facts on record before the executing Court. In the case under consideration, the objections of the resister under Order XXI rule 97 CPC were found by the executing Court, on the material before it, to be totally frivolous. Consequently it was held that in the facts obtaining and in the context of pleadings of parties there was no occasion to frame issues and take evidence thereon before finally adjudicating the objections. Finally, the case of Sarita Gupta vs. Sudhir Jaju (1996 Civil C.R. 311 (Raj.)), also relied upon by the counsel for the objector, related to the right of a bonafide purchaser to resist execution of a decree. The facts of the aforesaid case are totally at variance with the facts of the case under consideration before this Court. Reliance on other judgments by the objector before this court in his written submissions is casual and speculative as no reference has been made to the facts of the cases relied on or the ratio propounded therein relevant for the determination of the issues raised in the present petition. 27. The facts of the case indicate that not only a palpably false case was set up by the objector for obstructing the execution of the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 passed by the Tribunal in eviction petition No.619/2010 but also that the objector has resorted to every trick in the book for delaying the execution of the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 in issue by filing repeated applications before the executing Court for framing of issues and permission for leading of evidence thereon in spite of the initial order dated 29.11.2011 passed by the executing court. From the facts on record before the Tribunal it was not necessary to either frame issues or require the parties to lead evidence on the application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC. The application was rightly adjudicated on the basis of documents and pleadings on record. 28. The right to justice and a fair hearing by courts is a given and cannot be denied. A little indulgence to the parties to litigation for their convenience and in the interest of justice is also not a matter to be frowned upon. The application was rightly adjudicated on the basis of documents and pleadings on record. 28. The right to justice and a fair hearing by courts is a given and cannot be denied. A little indulgence to the parties to litigation for their convenience and in the interest of justice is also not a matter to be frowned upon. Yet this Court cannot countenance a complete break down of administration of justice by a mischievous litigant obstructing the judicial process for over two and half years by resorting to delaying tactics to deny the decree holder the fruits of decree and make justice a mere chimera–as delayed justice ends up being for many–testified to by an increasing number of applications for substitution of deceased litigants under Order XXII Rule 3 and 4 CPC. Search for justice for many in civil cases becomes an inter-generational journey. This court has repeatedly held hat access to courts has been made very liberal by the legislature with minimal Court fees fixed scores of years ago and not revised for decades for reasons of a desire that doors of justice should not be closed to the less fortunate. Yet easy access to courts is not an invitation to frivolous and profit oriented litigation, which to my mind is to profit from dragging matters in courts conscious of the courts' overcrowded dockets and paucity of time. And if at the end of it, the courts dismiss the baseless case or overrule the frivolous defence as the case may be yet leave with the benefits accrued in the interregnum. To my mind the only way to keep access to justice cheap for the citizen the yet efficient is to ensure that false and frivolous cases are visited by exemplary costs to as dissuade misuse of the judicial process. Clogged dockets of the court in large measure contributed by frivolous litigations are an obstruction to administration of justice consequent to which score of litigants continues to suffer serious injustice by being unable to have their cases adjudicated in time–even life time–by over burdened courts. 29. In my considered opinion, mere dismissal of the petition in the circumstances of this case would not suffice in the interest of administration of justice. 29. In my considered opinion, mere dismissal of the petition in the circumstances of this case would not suffice in the interest of administration of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of A. Shanmugam vs. Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu Madalaya Nandhavana Patipalanai Sangam ( (2012) 6 SCC 430 ) has held that experience reveals that a large number of a cases are filed on false claims or evasive pleas are introduced by the dfendan tto cause delay in the administration of justice and this can be sufficiently taken care of it the courts adopt realistic approach in granting restitution and visiting the petitioner with appropriate costs. Relying on the judgment in the case of Ramrameshwari Devi vs. Nirmala Devi ( (2011) 8 SCC 249 ) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "unless wrongdoers are denied profit or undue benefit from frivolous litigations, it would be difficult to control frivolous and uncalled for litigations. False averments of facts and untenable contentions are serious problems faced by courts and the other problem is that litigants deliberately create confusion by introducing irrelevant and minimally relevant facts and documents. The court cannot reject such claims, defences and pleas at the first look and requires some time at time years, before the court is able to see through, discern and reach to the truth." Noting that courts are usually short of time because of huge pendency of cases, it has been held that yet it is the duty of the court to take appropriate steps to uphold the truth and do justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of A. Shanmugam (supra) finally held as under: "43.4 Once the court discovers falsehood, concealment, distortion, obstruction or confusion in pleadings and documents, the court should in addition to full restitution impose appropriate costs. The court must ensure that there is no incentive of wrongdoer in the temple of justice. Truth is the foundation of justice and it has to be the common endeavour of all to uphold the truth and no one should be permitted to pollute the stream of justice. 43.5 It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralise any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process." In the aforesaid case the Hon'ble Supreme Court visited the petitioner - a mere watchman - with costs of Rs.50,000/-. 30. 43.5 It is the bounden obligation of the Court to neutralise any unjust and/or undeserved benefit or advantage obtained by abusing the judicial process." In the aforesaid case the Hon'ble Supreme Court visited the petitioner - a mere watchman - with costs of Rs.50,000/-. 30. Consequently, in view of a palpably false and dishonest defence taken by the objector to the execution of the certificate of possession dated 28.2.2011 in eviction petition No. 619/2010 titled as Prabhu Dayal vs. Veerdev Sharma and thereupon enjoying over two years litigious possession, this petition deserves dismissal with costs of Rs.50,000/-, of which Rs. 30,000/- be paid as costs to the plaintiff-decree holder. The remainder Rs.20,000/- be paid to the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur within a period of three months from the date of this order. 31. In case of non-payment of the cost within the period of three months, the plaintiff-decree holder and the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority shall be entitled to recover the amount of the cost from the petitioner as a recovery of land revenue. 32. The Deputy Registrar (Judicial) is directed to immediately send a copy of this order to the Rajasthan State Legal Services Authority Jaipur. The petition stands dismissed.