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2013 DIGILAW 230 (PNJ)

Korn Ferry International Private Limited v. Lalit Goel

2013-02-20

RANJIT SINGH

body2013
JUDGMENT Mr. Ranjit Singh, J.: - The petitioner has approached this Court against the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon allowing the revision filed by the respondents herein and setting aside the order summoning the respondents to face prosecution for offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC on the basis of Complaint No. 238 dated 15.04.2009. The allegation, as can be made out from the compliant, is that some agreement was entered into between the petitioner and the respondents for search of Chief Sales Officer. In this regard, some terms were agreed to. The allegation now made in the complaint is that the respondents have forged the original agreement and, accordingly, are guilty of offences as alleged against them. 2. There is serious dispute in this regard. The trial Court summoned the petitioner on the basis of evidence led before it. The revisional Court has interfered with the order summoning the respondents on more than one count. One of the reasons for which the revisional Court has set aside the order of summoning passed by the trial Magistrate is the plea advanced by the respondent that no such agreement was ever entered into and no such agreement had taken place. It was, accordingly, pleaded that no question of accused company to forge the agreement, Ex. P7 would arise. The agreement Ex. P2 was signed by Namita Mehta, Feroze Patel and Deepak Gupta on behalf of the complainant company. To allege forgery, the petitioner had produced photocopy of the agreement, Ex. P-7 which was found inadmissible. Namita Mehta, who alleged to have signed the agreement had died at the time of summoning the order. The revisional Court, accordingly, found that there, apparently, could not be any conspiracy as alleged by the complainant company. 3. If forgery of any agreement was to be alleged, it was appropriate and proper for the petitioner to produce the original agreement and the forged agreement as well and the photocopy of the agreement, which is stated to be forged is a secondary evidence. This secondary evidence was led before the trial Court without first serving notice to the respondent to produce the original thereof as per Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. If the petitioner had intended to lead the secondary evidence to make allegation of forgery, he was bound to follow the procedure under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. This secondary evidence was led before the trial Court without first serving notice to the respondent to produce the original thereof as per Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. If the petitioner had intended to lead the secondary evidence to make allegation of forgery, he was bound to follow the procedure under Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act. The case in which secondary evidence relating to document may be given is regulated by Section 65 of the Evidence Act. One of the grounds on which the secondary evidence can be given is that the original is shown or appears to be in the possession or power of the person against whom the document is sought to be proved, or of any person out of reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court or of any person legally bound to produce it. The secondary evidence is permitted in such cases when after notice as mentioned in Section 66, such person does not produce it. Section 66 of the Evidence Act provides a rule as to notice to produce a document. As per this Section, secondary evidence of the contents of the documents referred to in Section 65, clause (a) shall not be given unless the party proposing to give such secondary evidence has previously given to the party in whose possession or power the document is, such notice to produce it as is prescribed by law. Accordingly, before admitting the photocopy of the document, which was a secondary evidence, the Court was required to keep this in mind and apparently has admitted this evidence in violation of the statutory provision. The photocopy admittedly would be a secondary evidence and if the petitioner was intending to rely upon on the ground that the original forged agreement is not with the petitioner, he ought to have served notice under Section 65 of Indian Evidence Act to the opposite party to produce the same and on refusal, the Court could have permitted the photocopy into the evidence. 4. During the course of agreement, however, counsel for the respondents has also pointed out that there could not be any intention on their part to cheat. A sum of Rs. 23 lakhs was already paid by the respondents to the complainant but still no person upon their search could be engaged by the petitioner for the respondent. 4. During the course of agreement, however, counsel for the respondents has also pointed out that there could not be any intention on their part to cheat. A sum of Rs. 23 lakhs was already paid by the respondents to the complainant but still no person upon their search could be engaged by the petitioner for the respondent. Counsel, accordingly, contends that sum of Rs. 27 lakhs was due and the last instalment, accordingly, was not paid. Upon this, the counsel for the petitioner states that if it so then the petitioner may not pursue or seek criminal proceeding against the respondents. Once the liability is conceded, the petitioner would wish to invoke remedy to recover the remaining amount. 5. In view of above, no case for interference in the impugned order is made out. The present petition is, accordingly, dismissed. This will not be a bar for the petitioner to initiate any proceedings for the recovery of the amount, if any, due. The respondents would be at liberty to take any defence that is available to them. Needless to mention that the respondents would also be at liberty to have their remedies in accordance with law.