JUDGMENT :- 1. When the maintenance of public order is the paramount consideration and not the entitlement and title of the party to the disputed property, whether the order of the Executive Magistrate declaring the title of the party to the property and not dealing with actual physical possession is valid, is the issue to be considered. 2. The parties described as 'B party' (2 to 6) have filed the Criminal Revision in Crl.R.C.No.139 of 2011, and the party described as 'C party' (in the impugned order) has filed the Criminal Revision in Crl.R.C.No.257 of 2011, challenging the common order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Pollachi, in M.C.No.22A/2010, dated 13.12.2010, holding (a) 'B and C parties' have no right to claim any right over the petition mentioned property; (b) if there had been any shed put up by anybody, excepting Shizar Ahamed, Yunis Saleem, Siraj Ahamed ('A party' 1 to 3) (respondents 2 to 4 in Crl.R.C.No.257 of 2011), it has to be removed by the police authorities. 3. 3. Brief facts:- The land under dispute is located within the limits of Komangalam Police Station, Thippampatti Village, Pollachi Taluk, in R.S.Nos.150 and 152. Shizar Ahamed preferred a complaint alleging that an extent of 8.30 acres was purchased by his father Basheer Ahamed about fourty years back and that some third parties claiming rights over the property have trespassed into the property and has put up shed. This complaint was received by Komangalam Police and it was registered in CSR No.210/2010. When the police made enquiries, the 'B parties' agreed to get the shed removed and to agitate their rights before the Civil Court, but contrary to the promise they did not remove the shed. On 21.09.2010, one Shizar Ahamedpreferred a complaint alleging that Bose and 31 others, armed with deadly weapons and with an intention to commit riot, trespassed into the property and demanding money to vacate the existing shed, have chosen to put up another shed. This complaint was registered in CSR No.232 of 2010 and after enquiry, case was registered under Sections 147, 148, 447 and 506 (i) of the Indian Penal Code. 3.1. On 22.09.2010, Subramani, one among the 'B party' preferred a complaint alleging that while he was at his home, seven unidentified persons came in an Innova Car with deadly weapons and threatened him. This complaint was registered in PS CSR No.235 of 2010. 3.1. On 22.09.2010, Subramani, one among the 'B party' preferred a complaint alleging that while he was at his home, seven unidentified persons came in an Innova Car with deadly weapons and threatened him. This complaint was registered in PS CSR No.235 of 2010. The police made enquiries and submitted a report, stating that there is likelihood of breach of public tranquillity, in view of the dispute over the land between 'A and B parties'. On the basis of this report Komangalam Police registered a case under Section 145 Cr.P.C., in Crime No.281 of 2010 and the First Information Report was forwarded to Revenue Divisional Officer, Pollachi. 3.2. The parties were enquired on 25.10.2010, 01.11.2010 and 13.12.2010. The 'B Party' did not produce any documents. Some third parties, numbering 12, filed a petition for impleading them as 'C party' and they were also ordered to be impleaded. They also claimed right over the property as legal heir of one Palaniyappa Pillai, but as no supporting document was filed, they were directed to seek remedy before the Civil Court. 3.3. 'B party' were also directed to approach the Civil Court and they were also directed to remove the shed put up by them as their rights were not established. 3.4. Tracing the title of the 'A party' through the document filed by them, it was held that the properties under dispute belonged to 'A party'. The father of the 'A party' namely Basheer Ahamed had purchased the property on 09.06.1965 from his vendor, Sathasivam, who had purchased the property in public auction, which was conducted during execution of the decree passed in O.S.No.695 of 1955 (E.P.No.923 of 1960). Finding that 'A Register' and other revenue records stood in the name of 'A Party', the right to property was upheld in favour of the 'A party'. Challenging the same, these Criminal Revisions have been filed by the 'B party' and 'C party' respectively. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner (C party) is that the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer is liable to be set-aside, as the Revenue Divisional Officer has no authority to decide the title to the property and the order passed declaring the title of 'A party' over the disputed property is without jurisdiction. 4.1. The contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner (C party) is that the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer is liable to be set-aside, as the Revenue Divisional Officer has no authority to decide the title to the property and the order passed declaring the title of 'A party' over the disputed property is without jurisdiction. 4.1. Learned counsel representing the 'B party' submitted that 'B party' has filed a Civil Suit before the District Munsif Court, Pollachi, praying for, (a) declaration of title over 'B schedule' property and (b) declaration of title over 'C schedule' property by adverse possession and therefore, when the civil court has seized of the issue regarding title and the possession, there is no jurisdiction for the Revenue Divisional Officer to entertain the petition under Section 145 of the Cr.P.C., Yet another contention is that the Revenue Divisional Officer did not even pass any preliminary order as contemplated under Section 145 (1) of the Cr.P.C., and therefore, the final order passed is liable to be quashed. 5. As the common question of law and fact arises for determination, common order is being passed. 6. There is a clear finding in the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate that, (a) the disputed property belongs to the 'A party'; (b) 'B and C parties' have no right to make any claim over the disputed property; (c) if there had been any shed put up in the disputed property by anybody else, except by 'A party', it has to be removed. 7. As the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate to pass an order declaring / conferring title to the disputed land, it is necessary to look into the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. Section 145 Cr.P.C., is reproduced here-under for convenient reference:-"145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace. 7. As the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate to pass an order declaring / conferring title to the disputed land, it is necessary to look into the provisions of Section 145 Cr.P.C. Section 145 Cr.P.C., is reproduced here-under for convenient reference:-"145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is likely to cause breach of peace. (1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existsconcerning any land or water or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "land or water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "land or water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property. (3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by this Code for the service of a summons upon such person or persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or near the subject of dispute, (4) The Magistrate shall then, without, reference to the merits or the claims of any of the parties to a right to possessthe subject of dispute, peruse the statements so put in, hear the parties, receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible, decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub- section (1), in possession of the subject of dispute: Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and before the date of his order under sub- section (1), he may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub- section (1). (5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under subsection (1) shall be final. (6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub- section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to subsection (4), may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. (b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and published in the manner laid down in sub- section (3)........" 7.1. From the perusal of Section 145 Cr.P.C., it is evident that this Section confers power on the Executive Magistrate to intervene and pass, (a) temporary order, (b) in a dispute between the parties regarding possession of the land, (c) which is likely to cause a breach of peace. 7.2. There are two stages for the Executive Magistrate to pass an order; one under sub-section (1) at the preliminary stage and another one under sub-section (4) i.e., after enquiry, in the final stage. 7.3. Section 145 (1) Cr.P.C., provides for the procedure to be followed where the dispute concerning immovable property or water is likely to cause breach of peace. The Police Officer is expected to submit a report to the Executive Magistrate and if the Executive Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute which is likely to cause a breach of peace exist, then the Executive Magistrate shall initiate proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., Therefore, it is evident that it is the subjective satisfaction of the Magistrate as to the existence of likelihood of breach of peace, which confers jurisdiction and not the complaint of the Police Officer. In this case, the Police Officer is said to have registered the case, as per the provisions of Section 154 Cr.P.C., under Section 145 Cr.P.C., Therefore, the question of registering the First Information Report and forwarding it to the Executive Magistrate does not arise. The Police Officer is expected to submit a report as to the existence of the dispute which was likely to cause a breach of peace. 7.4. Section 145 Cr.P.C., contemplates (a) a dispute, (b) relating to land or water and (c) likely to cause breach of peace. The Police Officer is expected to submit a report as to the existence of the dispute which was likely to cause a breach of peace. 7.4. Section 145 Cr.P.C., contemplates (a) a dispute, (b) relating to land or water and (c) likely to cause breach of peace. If all the three ingredients exist, then the limited jurisdiction which is preventive in nature, with regard to apprehended breach of peace is conferred on the Executive Magistrate. Thus, the proceedings under Section 145 are quasi-judicial and quasi-administrative in nature, their object being to prevent breach of peace and to maintain tranquility. 8. The only jurisdiction vested upon the Executive Magistrate is to declare the party found in possession to be entitled to remain in possession (until evicted by due process of law). Maintenance of public order is the paramount consideration and not the entitlement and title of the party to the disputed property. In other words, the Magistrate duty is only to declare and maintain the possession of the party who is found on enquiry to be in actual possession. This question must be determined irrespective of title or the right to possession. 8.1. Deemed Possession:- Under Section 145 (4) of the Cr.P.C., if any party had been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before, the date on which the report of the police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate or after that date and before the date of his order under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may treat the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (1). 8.2. Fact of actual possession:- As discussed earlier, the Magistrate's only duty is to determine who is in actual possession and not who has the right to possession. The word "actual" is a word requiring underlining. It refers to the possession of the person who has his feet on the land irrespective of any right or title to possess it (Ambar Ali, 32 CW N 275, 280). The possession contemplated must be absolute, continuous and not occasional. 9. Contending that in view of the pending Civil Suit, proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., should not be allowed to continue, the decision reported in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 is relied upon:-"... Reliance has been placed by Mr. The possession contemplated must be absolute, continuous and not occasional. 9. Contending that in view of the pending Civil Suit, proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C., should not be allowed to continue, the decision reported in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370 is relied upon:-"... Reliance has been placed by Mr. Gupta on Mahar Jahan and Others v. State of Delhi and Others [ (2004) 13 SCC 421 ] wherein this Court was dealing with a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court noticed that a civil dispute was given the colour of a criminal case. As therein a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was pending, when a civil suit was also pending before a competent court of law, it was opined: "4. It is not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties that this very property which is the subject-matter of these criminal proceedings is also the subject-matter of the civil suit pending in the civil court. The question as to possession over the property or entitlement to possession would be determined by the civil court. The criminal proceedings have remained pending for about a decade. We do not find any propriety behind allowing these proceedings to continue in view of the parties having already approached the civil court. W hichever way proceedings under Section 145 CrPC may terminate, the order of the criminal court would always be subject to decision by the civil court. Inasmuch as the parties are already before the civil court, we deem it proper to let the civil suit be decided and therein appropriate interim order be passed taking care of the grievances of the parties by making such arrangement as may remain in operation during the hearing of the civil suit." 10. Contending that the order of the learned Executive Magistrate suffers from irregularity, for want of subjective satisfaction, having been arrived at, regarding the existence of threat to peace and also for want of passing a preliminary order under Section 145 (1) and therefore, it should be set-aside, the decision reported in Jagdish Gandhi and Anr. v. State and Anr. 153 (2008) DLT 64 is relied upon and the relevant paragraph reads as follows:-"The term ‘satisfied’ is of considerable expansiveness, which means free from anxiety, doubt, perplexity, or uncertainty. v. State and Anr. 153 (2008) DLT 64 is relied upon and the relevant paragraph reads as follows:-"The term ‘satisfied’ is of considerable expansiveness, which means free from anxiety, doubt, perplexity, or uncertainty. The satisfaction of the Magistrate must be clear and unambiguous. Nothing short of that can give him jurisdiction under Section 145 Cr. P.C. So is held in Laxman v. Bahim Khan, 1976 Crl.LJ 1492 and Lala Ram V R. R. Bainswal, 1981 Crl L J 981 ( P & H High Court). 14. Sub-section (1) of Section 145, Cr. P.C. requires that while making the impugned order in writing the Magistrate shall state ‘the grounds of his being so satisfied’. This impugned order is considered so basic that a failure to draw it up can vitiate all the subsequent proceedings. Similar view is taken in Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal, (1979) 4 SCC 665 . (See also Gabriol Thankayyan v. Narayanan Nadar, 1977 Crl L J 1870 Kerala High Court; and Banney v Ramesh Chandra 1983 Crl L J 18 (Allahabad High Court).” 11. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate reveals that there is no discussion as to the arrival of satisfaction regarding the existence of law and order problem and the consequent breach of peace. There is also no preliminary order under Section 145 (1). The order of the Executive Magistrate touches only the question of title which is unwarranted. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate is liable to be set-aside. 12. The final argument is that since the civil court has taken cognizance of the dispute regarding the title and possession, the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate cannot be allowed to stand. 12.1. No doubt the suit has been filed, but the suit has been allowed to be dismissed. Therefore, this contention cannot be entertained at this stage. 13. In the result, both the Criminal Revision Cases are allowed and the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate is set-aside and the learned Executive Magistrate shall proceed in accordance with law, in the light of the legal positions indicated above. It is open to the learned Executive Magistrate to pass appropriate orders in case the suit is restored and further relief is sought for, on that ground. Consequently, the connected MPs are closed.