JUDGMENT Hon’ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.—This is a plaintiffs’ appeal filed under Section 100 C.P.C. While hearing this appeal under Order XLI Rule 11 C.P.C. on 11.5.2009 this Court formulated the following two substantial questions of law which have arisen in this matter and need be adjudicated by this Court: “(1) Whether the decree of the trial Court could be reversed and the suit could be dismissed by lower appellate Court without setting aside each and every findings recorded by the trial Court with respect to each and every issues framed. (2) Whether the appeal could be allowed and suit could be decreed without framing the point of determination in the appeal as required under Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 2. Before answering the aforesaid questions, it would be prudent to have a brief factual matrix which has given rise to the present dispute. 3. The plaintiffs-appellants, Viswanath Lohar and his son Ram Akbal instituted Original Suit No. 182 of 1977 for removal of certain construction on the disputed land and also prayed for permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering in possession over the land in dispute, alleging that defendants have no concern with disputed land but after occupying the same, unauthorisedly, they have raised construction thereon and, therefore, the said construction be directed to be removed and defendants be restrained from interfering in possession of plaintiffs in respect to disputed land. 4. The defendants contested suit by filing their written statement alleging their own rights and claim over the disputed land. 5. The Trial Court (hereinafter referred to as the “TC”) formulated eight issues as under: “(1) Whether the plaintiff and defendant IInd set are owners and in possession of the land in suit and things situate thereon? If so its effect? (2) Whether the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 are transferees of the land in suit? (3) Whether the defendant Ist set are owner and in possession of the land in suit? If so its effect? (4) Whether the suit is barred by time? (5) Whether the suit is undervalued and CF paid is insufficient? (6) Whether the suit is barred by Section 34 S.R. Act? (7) Whether the suit is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court? (8) To what relief if any are the plaintiff entitled?” 6. If so its effect? (4) Whether the suit is barred by time? (5) Whether the suit is undervalued and CF paid is insufficient? (6) Whether the suit is barred by Section 34 S.R. Act? (7) Whether the suit is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court? (8) To what relief if any are the plaintiff entitled?” 6. Considering issues No. 1, 2 and 3 altogether, the TC recorded its finding holding plaintiffs to be the owner of property in dispute, and construction raised by defendants thereupon wholly illegal, and, therefore, upheld plaintiffs’ claim for removal of construction and for restoration of possession. The rest of issues were also decided in favour of plaintiffs and consequently Sri S.K. Singh, 9th Additional Minsif, Azamgarh (TC) vide judgment and decree dated 6.11.1986, decreed the suit. 7. Thereagainst defendant No. 1, Babu Ram, preferred Civil Appeal No. 587 of 1986, which was allowed by Sri Jawahar Lal Kaul, First Additional Civil Judge, Azamgarh (Lower Appellate Court) (hereinafter referred to as the “LAC”) vide judgment and decree dated 13.1.1988, and, the TC’s judgement was set aside, as a consequence whereof, the suit stood dismissed. Hence, this appeal. 8. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellants that LAC did not determine the question which ought to be decided in appeal and various findings recorded by TC have not been touched by it. Without considering and reversing the findings of TC it has recorded its own inferences which is in contravention of the requirement of Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. and, therefore, the judgment of LAC is wholly illegal and liable to be set aside. 9. The scope of Order XLI Rule 31 has been considered by Apex Court and this Court time and again. In S.V.R.Mudaliar (Dead) by Lrs. and others v. Rajabu F.Buhari (Mrs) (Dead) by Lrs. and others, AIR 1995 SC 1607 , the Court in paras 14 and 15 of the judgment has upheld contention that though the appellate Court is within its right to take a different view on the question of fact, but that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by trial Court in arriving at the findings in question. The Appellate Court before reversing a finding of fact has to bear in mind the reasons ascribed by Trial Court. The Appellate Court before reversing a finding of fact has to bear in mind the reasons ascribed by Trial Court. The Apex Court relied and followed earlier decision of Privy Council in Rani Hemant Kumari v. Maharaja Jagadhindra Nath, 10 CWN 630 and in para 15 of the judgment said: “There is no need to pursue the legal principle, as we have no doubt in our mind that before reversing a finding of fact, the appellate Court has to bear in mind the reasons ascribed by the trial Court. This view of ours finds support from what was stated by the Privy Council in Rani Hemant Kumari v. Maharaja Jagadhindra Nath, (1906) 10 Cal WN 630, wherein, while regarding the appellate judgment of the High Court of judicature at Fort William as “careful and able”, it was stated that it did not “come to close quarters with the judgment which it reviews, and indeed never discusses or even alludes to the reasoning of the Subordinate Judge.” 10. Following the above decision, Hon’ble B.L.Yadav, J in Smt. Sona Devi v. Nagina Singh and others, AIR 1997 Pat 67 , observed that whenever judgment of lower Appellate Court is a judgment of reversal, it is the primary duty of Appellate Court, while reversing the findings of Trial Court, to consider the reasons given by Trial Court and those reasons must also be reversed. Unless that is done, judgment of lower Appellate Court cannot be held to be consistent with the requirement of Order XLI, Rule 31, which is a mandatory provision. 11. The above view has also been followed recently in Jaideo Yadav v. Raghunath Yadav and another, 2009(3) PLJR 529 , wherein the Court said that Trial Court recorded its findings but lower Appellate Court had not reversed the said findings and rather on the basis of some findings of its own, title appeal was allowed by lower Appellate Court without appreciating findings of Trial Court on the concerned issue. The Court then said : “The law is well-settled in this regard that where the judgment of the lower appellate Court is a judgment of reversal it is primary duly of the appellate Court to consider the reasons given by the trial Court and those reasons must also be reversed.” 12. The Court then said : “The law is well-settled in this regard that where the judgment of the lower appellate Court is a judgment of reversal it is primary duly of the appellate Court to consider the reasons given by the trial Court and those reasons must also be reversed.” 12. This Court has also followed the same view in Doodhnath and another v. Doodhnath and another, AIR 2006 All 3 . 13. Now in the light of aforesaid exposition of law, this Court would proceed to find out, whether the LAC has observed statutory requirement of Order XLI Rule 31 C.P.C. 14. The record shows that plaintiffs founded their claim on a sale-deed dated 10.7.1974 executed by defendant No. 3, Sri Shiv Shanker Lohar in favour of plaintiff No. 1, Viswanath Lohar for a consideration of Rs. 1000/-. The boundary of property mentioned in sale-deed (Exhibit-1) was as under: North - Boundary Village Amilia South - House of Sri Ram Sahai West - Boundary Village Amilia East - Passage towards the house of Sri Ram Sahai. 15. In the written statement, filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2, they have disputed the very right of plaintiffs and also the right of defendant No. 3 over property in dispute and hence pleaded that the sale-deed, if any, executed by defendant No. 3 was wholly illegal and could not have conferred any right upon plaintiffs since defendant No. 3 himself has no right over property in dispute. They also pleaded that construction raised by them is over a property which has nothing to do with plaintiffs. 16. The plaint map in respect to disputed site, shown as “A B C D”, shows that house of defendant No. 1 is on the north-east side of disputed land but in between there is a passage and the disputed house is above northern boundary, i.e., ‘A B’, of the disputed premises while the plaintiffs’ house was almost opposite and on the western side of disputed land though extended towards north. 17. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 also placed a map alongwith their written statement wherein on the east south side of disputed premises, house of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was shown and on the western side, house of plaintiffs is at some distance and in between there is certain open portion. 17. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 also placed a map alongwith their written statement wherein on the east south side of disputed premises, house of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 was shown and on the western side, house of plaintiffs is at some distance and in between there is certain open portion. The passage has been shown from east-west and the southern side of disputed land as well as the house of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and that passage coming from east to west up to the boundary ‘B C’ of the disputed land turn towards south. 18. Apparently there was a dispute with respect to disputed site and, therefore, the TC appointed an Advocate Commissioner. The map prepared by him has been accepted and made part of decree, It is almost consistent to what has been pleaded by defendants No. 1 and 2 and the map placed on record alongwith their written statement than that of plaint map. 19. The TC in para 7 of the judgment asked a question from itself as to whom the land in dispute, over which disputed construction raised, belong. Thereafter it proceeded as if it was for the defendants to prove that said land belong to them, else plaintiffs are entitled for the relief sought by them. It was incumbent upon TC, first to identify the suit land and thereafter to record a finding based on evidence that suit land belong to plaintiffs, as claimed by them, and thereafter only an occasion would have come for defendants to prove otherwise, failing which the relief could have been granted to plaintiffs. 20. The approach of TC, in the case in hand, as is evident from its judgment, is quite strange and surprising inasmuch as it has proceeded as if a simultaneous onus lie upon defendants also to prove their case failing which an inference can be drawn in favour of plaintiffs entitling them grant of relief. This defect has been noticed by LAC. It is true that it has not separately formulated any question for its consideration but has referred to the issues formulated by TC and thereafter has proceeded to consider the issues raised before it. 21. This defect has been noticed by LAC. It is true that it has not separately formulated any question for its consideration but has referred to the issues formulated by TC and thereafter has proceeded to consider the issues raised before it. 21. In para 9 of the judgment, the LAC has formulated a question, whether the title of disputed land as claimed by plaintiffs has been acquired by them vide sale-deed dated 10.7.1974 from Sri Ram Naresh and Sri Ram Lakhan Shukla and thereafter it has considered the boundary mentioned in the said sale-deed, vis-a-vis, the site plaint of disputed premises and other evidence, and, recorded a finding of fact that it cannot be said that disputed land is the same, as is claimed to be the subject of transfer under sale-deed dated 10.7.1974. Once the plaintiffs have failed to prove the identity of suit land, it cannot be said that suit land belong to them (plaintiffs) and they have any right over the suit land. The LAC thereafter has not stopped at this stage but proceeding further, also considered the evidence led by defendants as also the Advocate Commissioner’s map (Paper No. 15 Ka 2), survey map (Paper No. 92 Ka 2) and therefrom has recorded a finding in favour of defendants. It thus cannot be said that LAC has not formulated any question for its determination and its judgment is inconsistent to what is required by Order XLI Rule 31. 22. Once the very issue going to the root of the matter, i.e., the identity of suit land has been decided by LAC against plaintiffs, holding that they failed to prove that the land which stood transferred to them vide sale-deed dated 10.7.1974 was the same which was in dispute, question of grant of any relief to plaintiffs does not arise at all. The TC in failing to consider this aspect of the matter by not taking into account the relevant evidence, has passed a decree which is wholly illegal, I do not find that the judgment in question warrants any interference since both the substantial questions formulated by this Court deserved to be returned in favour of defendants-respondents and are answered accordingly. 23. Now there is an incidental question also in this matter. During pendency of this appeal there was an interim order of status quo. 23. Now there is an incidental question also in this matter. During pendency of this appeal there was an interim order of status quo. It is said that in violation of aforesaid interim order, the defendants cut trees of Imli (Tamarind) and Neem (Margosa), lying in front of disputed construction, over the land in dispute, and removed the same, hence they are guilty of committing contempt of this Court and liable to be punished under Order 39 Rule 2A C.P.C. 24. The case set up by defendants-respondents was that in June, 2009, Imli (Tamarind) tree fell on the constructed house over disputed land of defendants causing serious damage to the roof of the house and, therefore, aforesaid tree which had fallen due to the storm was cut and removed. 25. This Court directed the Divisional Director, Social Forestry, Azamgarh to enquire into the matter and submit his report which has come vide letter dated 12.3.2013. It has reported falling of tree due to storm, on disputed construction, and its removal by defendants. In respect to Neem (Margosa) tree, the report says that it could not find any evidence at the site. It is thus evident that falling of tree of Imli (Tamarind) was not on account of any act of parties but it resulted due to act of God. That being so, it cannot be said that defendants have intentionally violated the interim order of status quo passed by this Court. 26. Moreover, if due to act of God the damage has caused to a residential building, the necessary repair etc. by the party who has suffered damage cannot be treated to be a deliberate defiance of an order of status quo passed by this Court. The defendants’ action was necessitated by act of God causing damage to their property and they were entitled to do the needful. A restraint order of this Court cannot be extended to the extent of rendering both the parties to observe its compliance to the extent of impossibility. Even a statute cannot be interpreted so as to ask the parties to do something which is impossible. Similarly, a reasonable construction has to be given to a judicial order so as not to condemn a party, for something for which it is not directly and intentionally responsible. Even a statute cannot be interpreted so as to ask the parties to do something which is impossible. Similarly, a reasonable construction has to be given to a judicial order so as not to condemn a party, for something for which it is not directly and intentionally responsible. It is the act of God which resulted in a serious damage to the building in dispute which apparently belong to defendants-respondents so long as the judgment of LAC is not set aside. Having suffered damage on account of act of God, i.e., falling of tree on the building causing serious damage to its rood etc., they have taken necessary repair work. 27. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case I am not inclined to accept the contention of plaintiffs-appellants that defendants-respondents are guilty of disobeying the interim order of this Court. The Applications No. 234652 of 2009 and 270176 of 2012, therefore, lack substance and are hereby rejected. 28. In view of the discussion made above and considering the fact that both the substantial questions of law have been returned in favour of defendants-respondents and against plaintiffs-appellants, this appeal, being devoid of merit, has to be dismissed, and, is ordered accordingly. The parties, however, shall bear their respective costs.