JUDGMENT Pritinker Diwaker, J. 1. This is a reference under Section 366 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for confirmation of death sentence as the Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur in Sessions Trial No. 60/2011 vide its judgment dated 4-5-2013 has held the accused guilty under Sections 302 and 364, IPC and sentenced him to undergo death sentence u/S. 302, IPC and imprisonment for life with fine of Rs. 5,000/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for six months u/S. 364, IPC. This judgment shall also dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 550/2013 preferred by accused/appellant. 2. In the present case there are three deceased namely Vijay Dhiver aged about 8 years, Ajay Dhiver aged about 6 years and Sakshi Dhiver aged about 4 years and all the three deceased are children of complainant Shivlal Dhiver (P.W. 18). As per the prosecution case the accused was working as labourer in the house of Shivlal Dhiver (P.W. 18). It is alleged that as wife of the accused namely Sumrit Bai eloped with younger brother of the complainant namely Shivnath Dhiver, accused Manoj, complainant Shivlal and Rameshwar (P.W. 11) went to Chandigarh in their search but they could not trace them and returned to their village. Further case of the prosecution is that on 11-2-2011 all the three deceased had gone to their school from where the accused took them to a nearby field and killed them by hitting against the ground and throttling. When the three deceased did not return to their house, they were searched and then missing report Ex. P-17 was lodged by father of the deceased Shivlal. This report was entered in Rojnamcha Sanha vide Ex. P-18C and FIR Ex. P-25 was registered against the accused for the offence under Sections 363 and 364 of IPC. Memorandum of the accused Ex. P-2 was recorded on 13-2-2011 wherein he has stated that after killing the three children he did their dead bodies in a field. Based on this memorandum, three dead bodies were recovered and body Panchnama of deceased Vijay, Ajay and Sakshi were made vide Ex. P-9, P-7 and P-11 respectively. Post-mortem examination on the body of deceased Vijay was conducted by Dr. A.M. Shrivastava (P.W. 13) vide Ex. P-9B whereas that of Ajay and Sakshi was conducted by Dr. A.K. Shrivastava (P.W. 21) vide Ex. P-7B and P-11B respectively. P-9, P-7 and P-11 respectively. Post-mortem examination on the body of deceased Vijay was conducted by Dr. A.M. Shrivastava (P.W. 13) vide Ex. P-9B whereas that of Ajay and Sakshi was conducted by Dr. A.K. Shrivastava (P.W. 21) vide Ex. P-7B and P-11B respectively. According to the doctors, cause of death was asphyxia due to throttling. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed on 14-3-2011 against the accused under Sections 363, 364, 302 and 201, IPC whereas the Court below framed charge against him under Sections 201, 302 and 364, IPC. 3. In order to establish guilt of the accused, prosecution has examined 24 witnesses in support of its case. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. in which he denied the charges levelled against him and pleaded his innocence and false implication in the case. 4. By the judgment impugned, the Court below has acquitted the accused of the charge under Section 201, IPC but convicted and sentenced him as mentioned in paragraph 1 of the judgment. Hence the present appeal. 5. Contention of Shri Tiwari, learned counsel for the accused is that there is no eye-witness to the incident and the accused has been convicted only on the basis of conjecture and surmises. He submits that there is no evidence that the accused abducted the three children of Shivlal Dhiwar. He submits that the children themselves had followed the accused and therefore it does not complete the chain of circumstances against him. According to him, even the evidence of last seen is not conclusive. He submits that the so-called telephonic conversation between accused and complainant (P.W. 18) & Rameshwar (P.W. 11) has also not been proved by the prosecution as required under the law. Lastly it has been argued that the accused is a young man of 30 years having two children and therefore in case this Court is of the view that he is liable to be convicted under Section 302, IPC, at least his sentence may be reduced to life imprisonment from that of death sentence. 6. On the other hand supporting the impugned judgment it has been argued by Shri Bhaduri, learned counsel for the State that the entire prosecution story is well established and witnesses PWs. 6. On the other hand supporting the impugned judgment it has been argued by Shri Bhaduri, learned counsel for the State that the entire prosecution story is well established and witnesses PWs. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 23 & 24 have categorically proved the same stating that after abducting the three innocent children aged about 8, 6 & 4 years the accused brutally committed their murder with ulterior motive of elopement of his wife with younger brother of their father. He further submits that the manner in which three innocent and helpless children were brutally killed by the accused, the sentence of capital punishment has rightly been awarded by the Court below. 7. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Pritam Dhiwar (P.W. 1) has stated that he knew the accused as he used to come Karhaiyapara to work as labourer. He has stated that on the date of incident at about 1 p.m. while he was standing near the village pond along with Suryapratap, saw the accused with three children, one girl and two boys wearing white shirt and green pant and carrying school bags with them. He has stated that one Sant Das informed him on cell Phone regarding the death of three children whose dead bodies were lying in the field. He has reiterated that on the date of incident he had seen two boys and one girl in company of accused. In cross-examination he remained very firm and nothing could be elicited from him. 9. Ashok Patel (P.W. 8) has stated that he knew the accused, three deceased children and their father Shivlal. According to him, on the date of incident while returning from Chauhanpara, he saw the accused along with the three deceased children of Shivlal dressed in school uniform carrying bags with them. He has stated that when he reached his house, Mungilal came to his house in search of those three children and on the second day he came to know that it is the accused who had killed them. In cross-examination this witness also remained very firm and nothing could be elicited from him. 10. He has stated that when he reached his house, Mungilal came to his house in search of those three children and on the second day he came to know that it is the accused who had killed them. In cross-examination this witness also remained very firm and nothing could be elicited from him. 10. Hafiz Ali (P.W. 2) has stated that on the date of incident when he was sitting in the house of Farukh Khan (P.W. 3), complainant Shivlal came there in search of his three children and asked them to help in the search. He has stated that in the evening Ashok Patel (P.W. 8) informed them that he had seen the accused taking three children towards the field and then they also went to the said field but could not trace them. On the second day he came to know that the accused had killed the three children of Shivlal. He has stated that Shivlal informed him that the accused might have abducted his children because he was suspecting that his brother Shivnath had taken away his wife with him. 11. Farukh Khan (P.W. 3) has made almost similar statement as has been made by Hafiz Ali (P.W. 2). He has stated that when Rameshwar Sahu (P.W. 11) contacted the accused on his mobile, the accused said, "How is he feeling now when his three children are missing". He has stated that as speaker of the mobile was on, he could hear the same. Pooja Tiwari (P.W. 4)--school teacher has stated that after school time at about 11.30 a.m. the three children had left the school and later she came to know through the principal that they did not reach their house and on the next days she came to know that they were murdered. Jilani Beg (P.W. 5)--Head master of the school has proved Ex. P-1, attendance sheet of the deceased. Krishna Kumar Yadav (P.W. 6) is a school teacher who has proved attendance register in relation to the three deceased children. Damodar Singh (P.W. 7) has stated that when the three children were being searched, suspicion was raised by complainant Shivlal that it is the accused who might have taken his children and on suspicion he lodged the report against him. He has stated that on the basis of memorandum of the accused Ex. Damodar Singh (P.W. 7) has stated that when the three children were being searched, suspicion was raised by complainant Shivlal that it is the accused who might have taken his children and on suspicion he lodged the report against him. He has stated that on the basis of memorandum of the accused Ex. P-2 dead bodies of the three deceased children were recovered from the field. He is a witness to inquest Ex. P-7, P-9 and P-11, Imrat Singh (P.W. 9)--a local villager has stated that on the date of incident he along with Shivlal and other villagers searched for the three children. He is also a witness to inquest notice Ex. P-6, P-8 & P-10 and inquest Ex. P-7 & P-9. Sweta Tiwari (P.W. 10)--the school teacher has made almost similar statement as has been made by Pooja Tiwari (P.W. 4). 12. Rameshwar (P.W. 11) is a local villager who knew the accused, complainant Shivlal and his three children. He has stated that on the date of incident when he was in his plot, at about 2 p.m. Imrat Singh (P.W. 9) came to him and inquired about the three children. Thereafter Shivlal also inquired him about his children and informed that he tried to contact the accused but his mobile was switched off and he also showed his suspicion on the accused. He has stated that the entire day they searched for the three children and on the second day at about 11 in the night he contacted the accused on cell Phone and inquired about them. It was told by the accused, (Vernacular matter omitted... Ed.). He has stated that at the time of conversation speaker of his cell Phone was on and after abusing him the accused switched off his mobile. On 13-2-2011 he came to know that the three children of Shivlal were killed by the accused. In cross-examination he has stated that the accused had suspicion that it is the brother of Shivlal who had taken his wife with him. He has stated that he along with Shivlal and the accused had gone to Mohali, Punjab in search of the wife of accused and after returning from Mohali, in his presence, the accused used to say that though Shivlal knew as to where his wife was but he was not disclosing the same and for that he had threatened Shivlal of dire consequences. According to him, he asked the accused not to threaten Shivlal as he was not at fault and advised him to ask the person who had taken his wife. Ashish Kumar Gupta (P.W. 12) took photographs of the body of the deceased vide Articles A, B & C. Ashok Kumar Madhukar (P.W. 13) has not supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. Bharat Lal Dewangan (P.W. 14) is the Patwari who prepared spot map Ex. P-12. Anil Sitlani (P.W. 15) is a seizure witness of Ex. P-14 by which mobile of the accused was seized. Bharat Lal Chandravanshi (P.W. 16)--the Constable took the dead bodies for postmortem. Krishna Kumar Koshle (P.W. 17)--Head Constable helped in the initial investigation. 13. Shivlal Dhiver (P.W. 18)--the complainant and father of the three deceased children has stated that his younger brother Shivnath was residing with him and the accused was working in his house. He has stated that wife of the accused Sumrit Bai and his younger brother had affair and about ten days prior to the date of incident they had left for Chandigarh. He has stated that on the second day he had a talk with the wife of accused on cell Phone who informed him that she would come back within ten days. Thereafter he handed over the mobile to the accused who also talked with his wife. In their search, he along with the accused and other villagers went to Chandigarh but they could not get them and even their mobile was switched off, therefore they came back to their village. He has stated that on the date of incident when his three children did not return from their school by 12 O'clock, he started searching them along with other family members and also went to their school and during search he was informed by Ashok (P.W. 8) that he had seen his children with the accused. He also took help of Farukh Khan (P.W. 2) for searching his children and then he lodged missing report Ex. P-17. According to him, the accused contacted him on his cell Phone and said, (Vernacular matter omitted... Ed.). He has stated that at the time of conversation speaker of his cell Phone was on. He also took help of Farukh Khan (P.W. 2) for searching his children and then he lodged missing report Ex. P-17. According to him, the accused contacted him on his cell Phone and said, (Vernacular matter omitted... Ed.). He has stated that at the time of conversation speaker of his cell Phone was on. He has stated that he searched for his children the entire day and on the second day station house officer has a talk with the accused on his cell Phone who informed that he was about 50-60 kms. away from the village and then the accused switched off his mobile. Thereafter accused was found in a liquor shop in drunken condition and he was brought to the police station. He has stated that he was under the impression that as the accused has been traced, he will get his children but during enquiry it was informed by the accused that he had killed his children by throttling and heating on the ground. There appears to be minor contradictions in the statement of this witness from that of his case diary statement but they are insignificant in nature. Santosh Kumar Yadav (P.W. 19)--Head Constable made entry in Rojnamcha Sanha vide Ex. P-18 while registering the missing report. Smt. Manisha Dhiver (P.W. 20) has stated that she is the first wife of Shivlal and deceased Ajay and Sakshi were her children whereas Kalpna is the second wife whose son was deceased Vijay. 14. Dr. A.K. Shrivastava (P.W. 21) conducted post-mortem examination on the body of deceased Ajay and Sakshi vide Ex. P. 7B and P-11B respectively and found following injuries: Deceased Ajay 1) One lacerated wound transverse in situation over left eye-brow size 3x1/2 x 1/4 cm. 2) One lacerated wound above right eye-medial side size 1/2 x 1/2 cm. 3) One abrasion below right lip 2 x 1/2 cm. split medial to right, blood clot and mud present. 4) Left side of neck 4 x 1/2 cm. blackish contusion mark and four crescentic abrasion marks present over left and right side of neck. Deceased Sakhi 1) Lacerated wound over central part of forehead size 6 x 1 cm. 2) Lacerated wound underneath the chin size 4 x 2 cm. 3) Three contusion marks on left cheek size 1 cm. blackish contusion mark and four crescentic abrasion marks present over left and right side of neck. Deceased Sakhi 1) Lacerated wound over central part of forehead size 6 x 1 cm. 2) Lacerated wound underneath the chin size 4 x 2 cm. 3) Three contusion marks on left cheek size 1 cm. 4) Left from front neck 4 crescentic abrasions and adjacent contusion of 1 cm in size blackish in colour. Same crescentic abrasion marks over right side 1 cm. Any from each other. Dr. A.M. Shrivastava (P.W. 23) conducted post-mortem examination on the body of deceased Vijay vide Ex. P-9B and found following injuries: 1) Triangular lacerated wound above left eye brow size 1/2 x 1/2 cm. Bone deep. 2) Left side of injury No. 1 abrasion 1 x 1/2 cm. blackish in colour and haemorrhage clots. 3) Beside above right eye 1 1/2 x 1/2 cm. blackish haemorrhage clot. 4) Fingers mark injuries left from front of neck. Four abrasions crescentic shaped 1 cm away from each other. According to them cause of death was asphyxia due to throttling. Lavkush Kashyap (P.W. 22) is a witness to memorandum of the accused Ex. P-2, inquest Exs. P-7, P-9 & P-11 and seizure Exs. P-3 to P-5. B. Kujur (P.W. 24) is the Investigating Officer who has duly supported the prosecution case. 15. Minute examination of the evidence makes it clear that on 11-2-2011 the accused abducted three minor children of complainant Shivlal (P.W. 18) and thereafter brutally committed their murder by hitting against the ground and throttling. When the three children were found missing, they were extensively searched and suspicion was raised by complainant Shivlal Dhiver (P.W. 18) that it is the accused who might have taken his children and based on suspicion, missing report Ex. P-17 was lodged by him. Investigation was made and when the accused was questioned, he admitted his guilt and described the manner in which he had brutally committed murder of the three minor children. On the basis of memorandum of the appellant Ex. P-2 dead bodies of the deceased were recovered from the field and this fact is evident from inquest Ex. P-7, P-9 & P-11. Sufficient evidence has been produced by the prosecution by examining number of important witnesses. On the basis of memorandum of the appellant Ex. P-2 dead bodies of the deceased were recovered from the field and this fact is evident from inquest Ex. P-7, P-9 & P-11. Sufficient evidence has been produced by the prosecution by examining number of important witnesses. The school teacher PW-4 has stated that on the date of incident the three children attended the school and after the school time they left for home. From the statement of Pritam Dhiwar (P.W. 1) it is clear that he knew the accused very well and on the date of incident he saw him along with three children wearing school uniform and carrying school bags with them out of which two were boys and one was girl and thereafter he was informed by one Sant Das about their death. Almost similar statement has been made by Ashok Patel (P.W. 8) who also saw three children in the company of the accused. As per Hafiz Ali (P.W. 2) complainant Shivlal Dhiwar had come to him in search of his three children and requested him to help in the search. According to him, in the evening he was informed by Ashok Patel (P.W. 8) that he had seen the accused taking three children towards the field. This witness has further stated that the complainant Shivlal showed his apprehension that the accused might have abducted his children because he (the accused) was suspecting that his brother Shivnath had taken away the wife of the accused. Farukh Khan (P.W. 3) has made almost similar statement as has been made by P.W. 2. He has further stated that when Rameshwar (P.W. 11) contacted the accused on his mobile, the accused said, "How is he feeling now when his three children are missing" and as during this talk, the speaker of cell phone was on, he could hear the same. Rameshwar (P.W. 11) about whom reference was given by Hafiz Ali (P.W. 2) and Farukh Khan (P.W. 3) has stated that Imrat Singh (P.W. 9) came to him and enquired about the three children and likewise Shivlal also enquired about them. He has stated that when he tried to contact the accused on his cell phone it was switched off and on the second day at about 11 in the night he could contact the accused from his cell phone and it was replied by him, (Vernacular matter omitted... Ed.). He has stated that when he tried to contact the accused on his cell phone it was switched off and on the second day at about 11 in the night he could contact the accused from his cell phone and it was replied by him, (Vernacular matter omitted... Ed.). This witness has also stated that at the time of conversation speaker of his cell phone was on and after abusing him the accused switched off his cell phone. Complainant Shivlal (P.W. 18) has duly supported the prosecution case and has stated that when his children did not return from the school, he extensively searched them and during search he was informed by Ashok Patel (P.W. 8) that he had seen his children in the company of the accused and then he lodged the missing report. Thereafter the accused contacted him on his cell phone and said, (Vernacular matter omitted... Ed.). Witnesses to memorandum and inquest namely Damodar Singh (P.W. 7) and Lavkush Kashyap (P.W. 22) have duly supported the prosecution case and there is no reason for this Court to disbelieve the same. 16. From the evidence it is clear that on 22-2-2011 when the three children of complainant Shivlal Dhiwar did not return from their school, they were extensively searched and during search it was come to light from Pritam Dhiwar (P.W. 1) and Ashok Patel (P.W. 8) that they had seen the accused taking three children towards the field who were in school uniform and carrying school bags with them. The evidence shows that father of the deceased (P.W. 18) also had suspicion at the accused because wife of the accused had eloped with his younger brother Shivnath for which the accused had threatened him. During search the accused told Rameshwar (P.W. 11) and Shivlal Dhiwar (P.W. 18) on their cell Phone, (Vernacular matter omitted... Ed.). On the basis of memorandum of the accused Ex. P-2 bodies of the deceased were recovered which is evident from inquest Ex. P-7, P-9 & P-11. Further, the accused has stated in his memorandum as to the manner in which he had brutally committed murder of the three helpless minor children, Thus taking into consideration cumulative effect of the entire evidence, this Court has no hesitation in holding the accused guilty of committing murder of three innocent tender aged children of complainant Shivlal Dhiwar (P.W. 18). Further, the accused has stated in his memorandum as to the manner in which he had brutally committed murder of the three helpless minor children, Thus taking into consideration cumulative effect of the entire evidence, this Court has no hesitation in holding the accused guilty of committing murder of three innocent tender aged children of complainant Shivlal Dhiwar (P.W. 18). Thus, conviction under Sections 302 and 364 of IPC recorded by the trial Court suffers from no illegality or infirmity and the same is liable to be affirmed. 17. Now the next point for consideration is the quantum of sentence. 18. The Court below has awarded death sentence to the accused/appellant. Now, we have to examine as to whether the trial Court was justified in awarding death sentence to the accused. Section 354(3) of Cr. P.C. postulates for assigning special reasons for awarding death sentence. 19. While dealing with the quantification of the sentence in the cases of like nature, the Supreme Court has observed in the matter of Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 257 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1357 ) that it is neither possible nor prudent to State any universal formula which would be applicable to all the cases of criminology where capital punishment has been prescribed. It shall always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The Supreme Court has stated various legal principles which would be precepts on exercise of judicial discretion in cases where the issue is whether the capital punishment should or should not be awarded. The law requires the Court to record special reasons for awarding such sentence. The Court, therefore, has to consider matters like nature of the offence, how and under what circumstances it was committed, the extent of brutality with which the offence was committed, the motive for the offence, any provocative or aggravating circumstances at the time of commission of the crime, the possibility of the convict being reformed or rehabilitated, adequacy of the sentence of life imprisonment and other attendant circumstances. These factors cannot be similar or identical in any two given cases. It has further been observed by the Apex Court that it is imperative for the Court to examine each case on its own facts, in light of the enunciated principles. These factors cannot be similar or identical in any two given cases. It has further been observed by the Apex Court that it is imperative for the Court to examine each case on its own facts, in light of the enunciated principles. It is only upon application of these principles to the facts of a given case that the Court can arrive at a final conclusion whether the case in hand is one of the "rarest of rare" cases and imposition of death penalty alone would serve the ends of justice. Further, the Court would also keep in mind that if such a punishment alone would serve the purpose of the judgment, in its being sufficiency punitive and purposefully preventive. 20. In order to ascertain whether the imposition of death sentence in the case in hand would be justified or not, it would be apposite to refer to some of the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme Court, which are adumbrated as under: In State of Maharashtra v. Goraksha Ambaji Adsul, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 437 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2689 ), the Supreme Court from paras 30 to 41 observed thus: 30. The principles governing the sentencing policy in our criminal jurisprudence have more or less been consistent, right from the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab 1980 SCC (Cri.) 580: ( AIR 1980 SC 898 ). Awarding punishment is certainly an onerous function in the dispensation of criminal justice. The Court is expected to keep in mind the facts and circumstances of a case, the principles of law governing award of sentence, the legislative intent of special or general statute raised in the case and the impact of awarding punishment. These are the nuances which need to be examined by the Court with discernment and in depth. 31. The legislative intent behind enacting Section 354(3), Cr. P.C. clearly demonstrates the concern of the legislature for taking away a human life and imposing death penalty upon the accused. Concern for the dignity of the human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentalities and that ought not to be done, save in the rarest of rare cases, unless the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. In exercise of its discretion, the Court would also take into consideration the mitigating circumstances and their resultant effects. 32. Concern for the dignity of the human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's instrumentalities and that ought not to be done, save in the rarest of rare cases, unless the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed. In exercise of its discretion, the Court would also take into consideration the mitigating circumstances and their resultant effects. 32. The language of Section 354(3) demonstrates the legislative concern and the conditions which need to be satisfied prior to imposition of death penalty. The words, 'in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence' unambiguously demonstrate the command of the legislature that such reasons have to be recorded for imposing the punishment of death sentence. This is how the concept of the rarest of rare cases has emerged in law. Viewed from that angle, both the legislative provisions and judicial pronouncements are at ad idem in law. The death penalty should be imposed in the rarest of rare cases and that too for special reasons to be recorded. To put it simply, a death sentence is not a rule but an exception. Even the exception must satisfy the prerequisites contemplated under Section 354(3), Cr. P.C. in light of the dictum of the Court in Bachan Singh. 33. The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Bachan Singh has been summarised in para 38 in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470 : ( AIR 1983 SC 957 ) and the following guidelines have been stated while considering the possibility of awarding sentence of death: (Machhi Singh case, SCC p.489). (i) The extreme penalty of death need not be inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme culpability. (ii) Before opting for the death penalty the circumstances of the "offender" also requires to be taken into consideration along with the circumstances of the "crime". (iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception....death sentence must be imposed only when life imprisonment appears to be an altogether inadequate punishment having regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime, and provided, and only provided, the option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be conscientiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all the relevant circumstances. (iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so the mitigation circumstances have to be accorded full weightage and a just balance has to be struck between the aggravating and the mitigating circumstances before the option is exercised. 34. The judgment in Bachan Singh, did not only state the above guidelines in some elaboration, but also specified the mitigating circumstances which could be considered by the Court while determining such serious issues and they are as follows (SCC p.750, para 206). 206...Mitigating circumstances.--In the exercise of its discretion in the above cases, the Court shall take into account the following circumstances: (1) That the offence was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. (2) The age of the accused. If the accused is young or old, he shall not be sentenced to death. (3) The probability that the accused would not commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute a continuing threat to society. (4) The probability that the accused can be reformed and rehabilitated. The State shall by evidence prove that the accused does not satisfy Conditions (3) and (4) above. (5) That in the facts and circumstances of the case the accused believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence. (6) That the accused acted under the duress or domination of another person. (7) That the condition of the accused showed that he was mentally defective and that the said defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. 35. Now, we may examine certain illustrations arising from the judicial pronouncements of this Court. 36. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. ( (1997) 1 SCC 416 : ( AIR 1997 SC 610 )), this Court took the view that custodial torture and consequential death in custody was an offence which fell in the category of the rarest of rare cases. While specifying the reasons in support of such decision, the Court awarded death penalty in that case. 37. In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 : (AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 612) this Court also spent out in paras 56 to 58 that nature, motive, impact of a crime, culpability, quality of evidence, socio-economic circumstances, impossibility of rehabilitation are the factors which the Court may take into consideration while dealing with such cases. In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 6 SCC 498 : (AIR 2010 SC (Supp) 612) this Court also spent out in paras 56 to 58 that nature, motive, impact of a crime, culpability, quality of evidence, socio-economic circumstances, impossibility of rehabilitation are the factors which the Court may take into consideration while dealing with such cases. In that case the friends of the victim had called him to see a movie and after seeing the movie, a ransom call was made, but with the feat of being caught, they murdered the victim. The Court felt that there was no evidence to show that the criminals were incapable of reforming themselves, that it was not a rarest of the rare case, and therefore, declined to award death sentence to the accused. 38. Interpersonal circumstances prevailing between the deceased and the accused was also held to be a relevant consideration in Vashram Narshibhai Rajpara v. State of Gujarat (2002) 9 SCC 168 : ( AIR 2002 SC 2211 ) where constant nagging by family was treated as the mitigating factor, if the accused is mentally unbalanced and as a result murders the family members. Similarly, the intensity of bitterness which prevailed and the escalation of simmering thoughts into a thirst for revenge and retaliation were also considered to be a relevant factor by this Court in different cases. 39. This Court in Satishbhushan Bariyar ( (2009) 6 SCC 498 ) also considered various doctrines, principles and factors which would be considered by the Courts while dealing with such cases. The Court discussed in some elaboration the applicability of the doctrine of rehabilitation and the doctrine of prudence. While considering the application of the doctrine of rehabilitation and the extent of weightage to be given to the mitigating circumstances, it noticed the nature of the evidence and the background of the accused. The conviction in that case was entirely based upon the statement of the approver and was a case purely of circumstantial evidence. Thus, applying the doctrine of prudence, it noticed the fact that the accused were unemployed, young men in search of job and they were not criminals. In execution of a plan proposed by the appellant and accepted by others, they kidnapped a friend of their. Thus, applying the doctrine of prudence, it noticed the fact that the accused were unemployed, young men in search of job and they were not criminals. In execution of a plan proposed by the appellant and accepted by others, they kidnapped a friend of their. The kidnapping was done with the motive of procuring ransom from his family but later they murdered him because of the fear of getting caught, and later cut the body into pieces and disposed it off at different places. One of the accused had turned approver and as already noticed, the conviction was primarily based upon the statement of the approver. 40. Basing its reasoning on the application of doctrine of prudence and the version put forward by the accused, the Court, while declining to award death penalty and only awarding life imprisonment, held as under: (Satishbhushan Bariyar case, SCC pp. 551 & 559-60, paras 135, 168-69 & 171-73). 135. Right to life, in its barest of connotation would imply right to mere survival. In this form, right to life is the most fundamental of all rights. Consequently, a punishment which aims at taking away life is the gravest punishment. Capital punishment imposes a limitation on the essential content of the fundamental right to life, eliminating it irretrievably. We realise the absolute nature of this right, in the sense that it is a source of all other rights. Other rights may be limited, and may even be withdrawn and then granted again, but their ultimate limit is to be found in the preservation of the right to life. Right to life is the essential content of all rights under the Constitution. If life is taken away, all other rights cease to exist. XXX 168. We must, however, add that in a case of this nature where the entire prosecution case revolves round the statement of an approver or is dependent upon the circumstantial evidence, the prudence doctrine should be invoked. For the aforementioned purpose, at the stage of sentencing evaluation of evidence would not be permissible; the Courts not only have to solely depend upon the findings arrived at for the purpose of recording a judgment of conviction, but also consider the matter keeping in view the evidences which have been brought on record on behalf of the parties and in particular the accused for imposition of a lesser punishment. A statement of approver in regard to the manner in which crime has been committed vis-a-vis the role played by the accused, on the one hand, and that of the approver, on the other, must be tested on the touchstone of the prudence doctrine. 169. The accused persons were not criminals. They were friends. The deceased was said to have been selected because his father was rich. The motive, if any, was to collect some money. They were not professional killers. They have no criminal history. All were unemployed and were searching for jobs. Further, if age of the accused was a relevant factor for the High Court for not imposing death penalty on accused 2 and 3, the same standard should have been applied to the case of the appellant also who was only two years older and still a young man in age. Accused 2 and 3 were as much a part of the crime as the appellant. Though it is true, that it was he who allegedly proposed the idea of kidnapping, but at the same time it must not be forgotten that the said plan was only executed when all the persons involved gave their consent thereto. XXX 171. Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that when the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or in the alternative with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons thereof. We do not think that the reasons assigned by the Courts below disclose any special reason to uphold the death penalty. The discretion granted to the Courts must be exercised very cautiously especially because of the irrevocable character of death penalty. Requirements of law to assign special reasons should not be construed to be an empty formality. 172. We have previously noted that the judicial principles for imposition of death penalty are far from being uniform. Without going into the merits and demerits of such discretion and subjectivity, we must nevertheless reiterate the basic principle, stated repeatedly by this Court, that life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an exception. 172. We have previously noted that the judicial principles for imposition of death penalty are far from being uniform. Without going into the merits and demerits of such discretion and subjectivity, we must nevertheless reiterate the basic principle, stated repeatedly by this Court, that life imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an exception. Each case must therefore be analysed and the appropriateness of punishment determined on a case-by-case basis with death sentence not to be awarded save in the "rarest of the rare" case where reform is not possible. Keeping in mind at least this principle we do not think that any of the factors in the present case discussed above warrants the award of the death penalty. There are no special reasons to record the death penalty and the mitigating factors in the present case, discussed previously, are, in our opinion, sufficient to place it out of the "rarest of rare" category. 173. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that this is not a case where death penalty should be imposed. The appellant, therefore, instead of being awarded death penalty, is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life. Subject to the modification in the sentence of the appellant (A-1) mentioned hereinbefore, both the appeals of the appellant as also that of the State are dismissed. 41. The above principle, as supported by case illustrations, clearly depicts the various precepts which would govern the exercise of judicial discretion by the Courts within the parameters spelt out under Section 354(3), Cr. P.C. Awarding of death sentence amounts to taking away the life of an individual, which is the most valuable right available, whether viewed from the constitutional point of view or from the human rights point of view. The condition of providing special reasons for awarding death penalty is not to be construed linguistically but it is to satisfy the basic features of a reasoning supporting and making award of death penalty unquestionable. The circumstances and the manner of committing the crime should be such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the Court to the extent that the only and inevitable conclusion should be awarding of death penalty. The circumstances and the manner of committing the crime should be such that it pricks the judicial conscience of the Court to the extent that the only and inevitable conclusion should be awarding of death penalty. In Ramnaresh ( AIR 2012 SC 1357 ) (supra) the Apex Court taking support from its earlier decisions running in paragraphs 61 to 67 and 72 to 74 rendered in the cases of similitude has held as under: 61. In Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab ( (1983) 3 SCC 470 : ( AIR 1983 SC 957 )) this Court stated certain relevant considerations like the manner of commission of murder, motive for commission of murder, and social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of crime and the personality of the victim of murder. These considerations further demonstrate that the matter has to be examined with reference to a particular case, for instance, murder of an innocent child who could not have or has not provided even an excuse, much less a provocation for murder. Similarly, murder of a helpless woman who might be relying on a person because of her age or infirmity, if murdered by that person, would be an indicator of breach of relationship or trust as the case may be. It would neither be proper nor probably permissible that the judicial approach of the Court in such matters treat one of the stated considerations or factors as determinative. The Court should examine all or majority of the relevant considerations to spell comprehensively the special reasons to be recorded in the order, as contemplated under Section 354(3) Cr. P.C. 62. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. ( (1994) 2 SCC 220 : (1995 AIR SCW 510)) while affirming the award of death sentence by the High Court, this Court noticed that (SCC p.239, para 14): 14. In recent years, the rising crime rate-particularly violent crime against women has made the criminal sentencing by the Courts a subject of concern. The Court reiterated the principle that it is not possible to lay down any cut and dry formula relating to imposition of sentence but the object of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the victim of the crime, as also the society, has the satisfaction that justice has been done to it. 63. The Court reiterated the principle that it is not possible to lay down any cut and dry formula relating to imposition of sentence but the object of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the victim of the crime, as also the society, has the satisfaction that justice has been done to it. 63. The Court held as follows: (Dhananjoy Chatterjee case, SCC p.239, para 15). 15. In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that Courts should impose punishment befitting the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The Courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment. 64. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee case, the Court was concerned with the case of a security guard who had been transferred at the complaint of a lady living in the flats with regard to teasing of her young girl child. The security guard went up to the flat of the lady, committed rape on her daughter and then murdered her brutally. The Court found it to be a fit case for imposition of capital punishment. 65. Again, in Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan ( (1996) 6 SCC 271 : ( AIR 1997 SC 18 )) this Court affirmed the death sentence awarded by the High Court primarily taking into consideration that there was no provocation and the manner in which the crime was committed was brutal. Noticing that the Court has to award a punishment which is just and fair by administering justice tampered with such mercy not only as the criminal may justly deserve but also to the rights of the victims of the crime to have the assailant appropriately punished and the society's reasonable expectation from the Court for the appropriate deterrent punishment conforming to the gravity of the offence and consistent with the public abhorrence for the heinous crime committed by the accused. 66. 66. The Court further held as under: (Surja Ram case, SCC p.279, para 18) 18. After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us that for deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and circumstances in which a crime has been committed are to be delicately balanced in a dispassionate manner. Such act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very aptly indicated in McGautha v. California ((28 L Ed 2d 711 : 402 US 183 (1971)) that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime of murder. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly assess various circumstances germane to the consideration of gravity of crime of murder, the discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only way in which such judgment may be equitably distinguished. 67. This Court in Prajeet Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar ( (2008) 4 SCC 434 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) (412)), B.A. Umesh v. High Court of Karnataka (2011) 3 SCC 85 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1000 ), State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram ( (2006) 12 SCC 254 : (AIR 2007 SC 144)) and Atbir v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi ( (2010) 9 SCC 1 ): ( AIR 2010 SC 3477 )) had confirmed the death sentence awarded by the High Courts for different reasons after applying the principles enunciated in one or more aforereferred judgments. 72. The above judgments provide us with the dicta of this Court relating to imposition of death penalty. Merely because a crime is heinous per se may not be a sufficient reason for the imposition of death penalty without reference to the other factors and attendant circumstances. 73. Most of the heinous crimes under IPC are punishable by death penalty or life imprisonment. That by itself does not suggest that in all such offences, penalty of death alone should be awarded. We must notice, even at the cost of repetition, that in such cases awarding of life imprisonment would be a rule, while "death" would be the exception. Most of the heinous crimes under IPC are punishable by death penalty or life imprisonment. That by itself does not suggest that in all such offences, penalty of death alone should be awarded. We must notice, even at the cost of repetition, that in such cases awarding of life imprisonment would be a rule, while "death" would be the exception. The term "rarest of rare" case which is the consistent determinative rule declared by this Court, itself suggests that it has to be an exceptional case. 74. The life of a particular individual cannot be taken away except according to the procedure established by law and that is the constitutional mandate. The law contemplates recording of special reasons and, therefore, the expression "special" has to be given a definite meaning and connotation. "Special reasons" in contradistinction to "reasons" simpliciter conveys the legislative mandate of putting a restriction on exercise of judicial discretion by placing the requirement of special reasons. 21. The legal position existing as on date right from Bachan Singh ( AIR 1980 SC 898 ) and thereafter, in Machhi Singh ( AIR 1983 SC 957 ) stands on two compartments--one being the "aggravating circumstances" while the other being the "mitigating circumstances" and that way the Court would consider the cumulative effect of both these aspects. Normally, it may not be very appropriate for the Court to decide the most significant aspect of sentencing policy with reference to one of the classes under any of the following heads while completely ignoring other classes under other heads. To balance the two is the primary duty of the Court. It will be appropriate for the Court to come to a final conclusion upon balancing the exercise regarding the sentencing policy which would help to administer the criminal justice system in an effective and meaningful way as contemplated under Section 354(3), Cr. P.C. What are the aggravating and mitigating circumstances to decide a particular case have been prescribed by the Apex Court as under: Aggravating circumstances (1) The offences relating to the commission of heinous crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity, kidnapping, etc. by the accused with a prior record of conviction for capital felony or offences committed by the person having a substantial history of serious assaults and criminal convictions. (2) The offence was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another serious offence. by the accused with a prior record of conviction for capital felony or offences committed by the person having a substantial history of serious assaults and criminal convictions. (2) The offence was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of another serious offence. (3) The offence was committed with the intention to create a fear psychosis in the public at large and was committed in a public place by a weapon or device which clearly could be hazardous to the life of more than one person. (4) The offence of murder was committed for ransom or like offences to receive money or monetary benefits. (5) Hired killings. (6) The offence was committed outrageously for want only while involving inhumane treatment and torture to the victim. (7) The offence was committed by a person while in lawful custody. (8) The murder or the offence was committed to prevent a person lawfully carrying out his duty like arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement of himself or another. For instance, murder is of a person who had acted in lawful discharge of his duty under Section 43, Cr.P.C. (9) When the crime is enormous in proportion like making an attempt of murder of the entire family or members of a particular community. (10) When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person relies upon the trust of relationship and social norms, like a child, helpless woman, a daughter or a niece staying with a father/uncle and is inflicted with the crime by such a trusted person. (11) When murder is committed for a motive which evidences total depravity and meanness. (12) When there is a cold-blooded murder without provocation. (13) The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the conscience of the society. Mitigating circumstances (1) The manner and circumstances in and under which the offence was committed, for example, extreme mental or emotional disturbance or extreme provocation in contradistinction to all these situations in normal course. (2) The age of the accused is a relevant consideration but not a determinative factor by itself. (3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in commission of the crime again and the probability of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated. (2) The age of the accused is a relevant consideration but not a determinative factor by itself. (3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in commission of the crime again and the probability of the accused being reformed and rehabilitated. (4) The condition of the accused shows that he was mentally defective and the defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the circumstances of his criminal conduct. (5) The circumstances which, in normal course of life, would render such a behaviour possible and could have the effect of giving rise to mental imbalance in that given situation like persistent harassment or, in fact, leading to such a peak of human behaviour that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused believed that he was morally justified in committing the offence. (6) Where the Court upon proper appreciation of evidence is of the view that the crime was not committed in a pre-ordained manner and that the death resulted in the course of commission of another crime and that there was a possibility of it being construed as consequences to the commission of the primary crime. (7) Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the testimony of a sole eye-witness though the prosecution has brought home the guilt of the accused. 22. In Ramnaresh ( AIR 2012 SC 1357 ) (supra) while determining the questions relatable to sentencing policy, the Apex Court has held that the Court has to follow certain principles and those principles are the loadstar besides the above considerations in imposition or otherwise of the death sentence. Principles (1) The Court has to apply the test to determine, if it was the "rarest of rare" case for imposition of a death sentence. (2) In the opinion of the Court, imposition of any other punishment i.e. life imprisonment would be completely inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice. (3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception. (4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant considerations. (5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner (extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime was committed and the circumstances leading to commission of such heinous crime. 23. (4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all relevant considerations. (5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner (extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime was committed and the circumstances leading to commission of such heinous crime. 23. In Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 220 : (1995 AIR SCW 510), the Supreme Court dealt with a case of rape and murder of a young girl of about 18 years. The Court opined that a real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life is required to be kept in mind by Courts while considering the confirmation of the sentence of death but a cold-blooded and pre-planned murder without any provocation, after committing rape of an innocent and defenceless young girl of 18 years exists in a rarest of rare cases which calls for no punishment other than capital punishment. Paras 14 and 15 of the judgment would indicate that the Supreme Court was more on crime test, not on criminal test, which are extracted below: 14. In recent years, the rising crime rate-particularly violent crime against women has made the criminal sentencing by the Courts a subject of concern. Today there are admitted disparities. Some criminals get very harsh sentences while many receive grossly different sentence for an essentially equivalent crime and a shockingly large number even go unpunished, thereby encouraging the criminal and in the ultimate making justice suffer by weakening the system's credibility. Of course, it is not possible to lay down any cut and dry formula relating to imposition of sentence but the object of sentencing should be to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the victim of crime as also the society has the satisfaction that justice has been done to it. In imposing sentences, in the absence of specific legislation, Judges must consider variety of factors and after considering all those factors and taking an over-all view of the situation, impose sentence which they consider to be an appropriate one. Aggravating factors cannot be ignored and similarly mitigating circumstances have also to be taken into consideration. 15. In imposing sentences, in the absence of specific legislation, Judges must consider variety of factors and after considering all those factors and taking an over-all view of the situation, impose sentence which they consider to be an appropriate one. Aggravating factors cannot be ignored and similarly mitigating circumstances have also to be taken into consideration. 15. In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which the Courts respond to the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice demands that Courts should impose punishment fitting to the crime so that the Courts reflect public abhorrence of the crime. The Courts must not only keep in view the rights of the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and the society at large while considering imposition of appropriate punishment. 24. In Laxman Naik v. State of Orissa, reported in (1994) 3 SCC 381 : ( AIR 1995 SC 1387 ), the Supreme Court again confirmed the death sentence on an accused for the offence of rape followed by murder of 7 year old girl by her own uncle. The Court opined that the accused seems to have acted in a beastly manner. After satisfying his lust, he thought that the victim might expose him for the commission of offence on her to her family members and others, the accused with a view to screen the evidence of the crime, put an end to the life of that innocent girl. The Court noticed how diabolically the accused had conceived his plan and brutally executed it in such a calculated cold blooded and brutal murder of a very tender age girl after committing rape on her which, according to the Court, undoubtedly falls in the rarest of rare case attracting no punishment other than capital punishment. 24A. In Molai v. State of M.P. ( (1999) 9 SCC 581 : ( AIR 2000 SC 177 )), the Supreme Court held as under: 36. We have very carefully considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. 24A. In Molai v. State of M.P. ( (1999) 9 SCC 581 : ( AIR 2000 SC 177 )), the Supreme Court held as under: 36. We have very carefully considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. We have also gone through various decisions of this Court relied upon by the parties in the Courts below as well as before us and in our opinion the present case squarely falls in the category of one of the rarest of rare cases, and if this be so, the Courts below have committed no error in awarding capital punishment to each of the accused. It cannot be overlooked that Naveen, a 16 year old girl, was preparing for her 10th examination at her house and suddenly both the accused took advantage of she being alone in the house and committed a most shameful act of rape. The accused did not stop there but they strangulated her by using her under-garment and thereafter took her to the septic tank along with the cycle and caused injuries with a sharp edged weapon. The accused did not even stop there but they exhibited the criminality in their conduct by throwing the dead body into the septic tank totally disregarding the respect for a human dead body. Learned counsel for the accused (appellants) could not point any mitigating circumstances from the record of the case to justify the reduction of sentence of either of the accused. In a case of this nature, in our considered view, the capital punishment to both the accused is the only proper punishment and we see no reason to take a different view than the one taken by the Courts below." 25. In Bantu v. State of U.P., reported in (2008) 11 SCC 113 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1367) where a minor girl of five years was raped and murdered, the Supreme Court confirmed the death sentence following the principles laid down in Bachan Singh and pointed out that when the victim of the murder is an innocent child or a helpless woman or old or inform person or a person vis-a-vis whom the murderer is in a dominating position, or a public figure generally loved and respected by the community, it is a vital factor justifying award of capital punishment. 26. 26. In Shivaji v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2008) 15 SCC 269 : ( AIR 2009 SC 56 ), where the accused, a married man having three children, was known to family of the deceased, committed murder of a girl of 9 years in a horrendous manner after ravishing her, he was awarded capital punishment after applying the "balancing test." 27. In the case of Rajendra Pralhadrao Wasnik v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 37 , the Supreme Court in paras 37 & 38 observed thus: 37. When the Court draws a balance-sheet of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of determining whether the extreme sentence of death should be imposed upon the accused or not, the scale of justice only tilts against the accused as there is nothing but aggravating circumstances evident from the record of the Court. In fact, one has to really struggle to find out if there were any mitigating circumstances favouring the accused. 38. Another aspect of the matter is that the minor child was helpless in the cruel hands of the accused. The accused was holding the child in a relationship of 'trust-belief and 'confidence', in which capacity he took the child from the house of RW. 2. In other words, the accused, by his conduct, has belied the human relationship of trust and worthiness. 28. Keeping in view the above legal position enunciated by the Supreme Court, it would be appropriate to consider and discuss the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the case in hand to adjudicate as to whether the present case falls in the category of rarest of rare ones or not. 29. In the present case, the accused committed murder of three innocent children of tender age when they were returning from the school, without there being any fault on their part. The act of the accused can simply be termed inhumane treatment and torture to the victims. Being a grown up and prudent man, it was the social and moral responsibility of the accused not to indulge in such nefarious activities of first abducting the children and then ending their lives but he did not think even once as to what wrong the innocent children had done. The defence has not adduced any evidence regarding any provocation etc. The defence has not adduced any evidence regarding any provocation etc. on the part of the accused which drove him to take such an animalistic step of putting the lives of three innocent children to an end. Even the medical evidence goes to show that several injuries were caused to the deceased children on various parts of their bodies including neck and forehead. The doctors conducting the post-mortem on the body of the deceased have categorically "stated that all the injuries sustained by the deceased children were ante-mortem in nature. Moreover, at the time of incident the accused was aged about 28 years and there is no evidence on record to show that he was suffering from any mental deformity. The act attributed to him where he put to an end the lives of three innocent children does not entitle him to any lenient or sympathetic consideration in awarding the sentence. The circumstances if considered in a composite compass go to show that the chances of his reformation and rehabilitation are next to nothing, and a meaningless assumption in other words. To conclude, the appeal falls, conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court are affirmed. The office reference is hereby allowed whereas the appeal preferred by the accused stands dismissed.