JUDGMENT M. Venugopal, J. 1. The Petitioners/A.1 and A.2 have focused the present Miscellaneous Petition praying to condone the delay of 902 days in preferring the Criminal Revision Petition SR (MD) No.18739 of 2012 as against the order dated 5/11/2009 in Cr.M.P.No.196 of 2008 in C.C.No.7 of 2001 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. 2. According to the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/A.1 and A.2, the First Petitioner/First Accused is a Company and the Second Petitioner/Second Accused has filed an affidavit in M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 stating that the Revision Petition has been filed against the order dated 5/11/2009 in Cr.M.P.No.196 of 2009 in C.C.No.7 of 2001 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai in dismissing the Discharge Petition filed under Section 245 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. 3. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused contends that the order of dismissal dated 5/11/2009 in Cr.M.P.No.196 of 2009 in C.C.No.7 of 2001 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai is an erroneous one and as such the Petitioners/Accused A.1 and A.2 are assailing the correctness of the orders passed by the trial Court before this Court in the Revision Petition. Furthermore, the Learned Counsel for the petitioners/Accused submits that the Criminal Revision Petition should have been filed by the Petitioners/accused by 5/2/2010, but due to various factors, the same could not be filed within time. 4. Advancing his arguments, it is the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioners/Accused that the Second Petitioner/Second Accused was incarcerated from 14/2/2006 till 10/1/2011 and at the time of his release, he was directed to remain at Kolkatta and this condition still continues till this date. Also, the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife has suffered due to various unfortunate circumstances and he was to be under a Psychiatrist's care, besides requiring the supervision of the Second Petitioner/Second Accused in connection with her health which often requires medical attention. That apart, the Second Petitioner/Second Accused was suffering from health issues including severe hyper tension and other ailments. Only after a period of 1 1/2 years, after his release from the prison, the Second Petitioner was able to organise himself and instructed his Counsel through his Staff represents which resulted in filing of the instant Criminal Revision Petition before this Court. Only after a period of 1 1/2 years, after his release from the prison, the Second Petitioner was able to organise himself and instructed his Counsel through his Staff represents which resulted in filing of the instant Criminal Revision Petition before this Court. In that process, there has occasioned a delay of 902 days in projecting the Criminal Revision Petition before this Court. The said delay of 902 days is neither willful nor wanton but to the reasons stated supra. 5. The Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused submits that the Second Petitioner in A.S.T.No.906 of 2010 (C.R.M.No.16226 of 2010) has been released on bail by the Honourable High Court of Calcutta, subject to the condition that he shall execute P.R.Bond in the sum of Rs.50 lakhs with one or two solvent sureties and further that he was directed not to leave India without the permission of the trial Court and was directed to reside at Kolkatta etc. 6. Continuing further, the Learned Counsel for the Petitioners/Accused informs this Court that the Second Petitioner/Second Accused came out on bail on 10/1/22011. The pith and substance of the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners/Accused is that the Petitioners/Accused A.1 and A.2 in Law, could not be denied the right of preferring the Criminal Revision Petition as against the impugned order dated 5/11/2009 in Cr.M.P.No.196 of 2008 in C.C.No.7 of 2001 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. Further, to the Petitioners/Accused, pray for an opportunity being provided to them to contest the main Criminal Revision Petition on merits. 7. The Respondent/Complainant has filed a detailed counter to M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 inter alia stating that the Petitioners/Accused 1 and 2 have preferred the instant Criminal Revision Petition with a delay of 902 days ascribing untenable reasons and that the Petitioners/A.1 and A.2 earlier filed a Discharge Petition before the trial Court in Cr.M.P.No.228 of 2002 on 10/5/2002 and also that A.3 to A.5 projected Cr.M.P.No.229 of 2002 (Discharge Petition) before the trial Court and A.6 and A.7 filed Cr.M.P.No.230 of 2002 (Discharge Petition) before the trial Court and all the Discharge Petitions were dismissed by the trial Court through the common order dated 24/7/2002. 8. 8. Apart from the above, the Petitioners/Accused and other Accused filed Revision Petition against the common order dated 24/7/2002 before this Court in Crl.R.C.No.10631 of 2012 and this Court directed the trial Court to consider whether the Community Certificate issued by the Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme is applicable to the Petitioners or not before framing the charge. Again, the Petitioners and other Accused filed Discharge Petitions before the trial Court in Cr.M.P.Nos.195 to 197 of 2008 and all of them were dismissed through a Common order dated 5/11/2009 passed by the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Madurai. 9. At this stage, the Learned Special Public Prosecutor for Customs submits that after the dismissal of the Crl.R.C.(MD) No.700 of 2009, the Petitioners have filed the present Criminal Revision Petition with a delay of 902 days and in fact, the Petitioners and the Petitioners in Crl.R.C.(MD) No.700 of 2009 stand on the same footing and on 6/1/2010, the Revision Petition filed by the Co-Accused was dismissed by this Court. Therefore, only with a view to procrastinate the pending proceeding before the trial Court, the Petitioners/Accused have projected the present Miscellaneous Petition. 10. Yet another submission of the Learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Respondent/Complainant is that the reason assigned by the Second Petitioner/Second Accused that he was under incarceration till 10/1/2011 is not a just/valid ground to condone the delay of 902 days in question. In this connection, the Learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Respondent/Complainant contends that even an individual who is in jail can very well approach this Court even during the period of his incarceration and in Law, there is no impediment or any bay in the Second Petitioner/Second Accused to approach this Court for necessary remedy. Also, when the Second Petitioner/Second Accused came out from the prison on 10/1/2011, he filed the present M.P.No.1 of 2012 only on 26/7/2012 viz., after 1 ½ years. In regard to the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife's health reason, the same is not supported by any documentary evidence. 11. In any event, the Learned Special Public Prosecutor for Customs appearing for the Respondent/Complainant submits that the discretion for condoning the delay has to be exercised by a Court of Law in a systematic manner informed by reason and the concept like 'liberal approach', 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to jettisoned the substantial Law of Limitation. 12. 11. In any event, the Learned Special Public Prosecutor for Customs appearing for the Respondent/Complainant submits that the discretion for condoning the delay has to be exercised by a Court of Law in a systematic manner informed by reason and the concept like 'liberal approach', 'substantial justice' cannot be employed to jettisoned the substantial Law of Limitation. 12. In support of the contention that in regard to the condonation of delay, matter of liberal approach etc., cannot be put into use, the Learned Special Public Prosecutor for the Respondent/Complainant relies on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court LANKA VENKATESWARLU (D) by L.Rs. Vs. STATE OF A.P {AIR 2011 SUPREME COURT – 1199}, wherein it is observed and laid down as follows:- “Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under S.5 of the Limitation Act, the Court do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. The concepts such as “liberal approach”,:justice-oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. Thus, where the High Court concluded that delay was caused by the inefficiency and ineptitude of the Government Pleaders, condonation of delay by High Court would be improper.” 13. It is to be borne in mind that the enquiry under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 speaks of two aspects:- (a) 'Sufficient Cause' for the delay and (b) The discretionary power of the Court to condone the same. 14. If a party allows the Limitation period to expire and takes a plea of 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the Petition/Application in issue at earlier point of time, it is incumbent on him to establish 'sufficient cause' thereby enabling a Court of Law to accept the same to its subjective satisfaction. It is the primordial duty of a litigant/party to place all necessary materials before the Court of Law in explaining the delay showing that there has been sufficient/good cause entitling him or it for the condonation of delay. It is the primordial duty of a litigant/party to place all necessary materials before the Court of Law in explaining the delay showing that there has been sufficient/good cause entitling him or it for the condonation of delay. If there is no inaction, want of bonafide or negligence on the part of the Litigant/Party in approaching the Court, the ends of Justice may require that the delay in question may be condoned to prevent an aberration of Justice. After a sufficient cause is exhibited/shown by a Party/Litigant, the scope of enquiry under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, while exercising the discretionary power by a Court is necessarily limited to such factors which in the subjective satisfaction of the Court are quite relevant one. In short, the considerations of 'Bonafides' or due diligence are always material and relevant when a Court of Law deals with applications. In this regard, a Court of Law is to take note of the combined ingredients of Section 5 and Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, as opined by this Court. It does not mean that every day's delay should be explained by adopting a pedantic approach. If the delay in question is explained, bona fide, not deliberate/unintentional, then it can be safely held that sufficient case is made out for condoning the delay in issue. The words 'sufficient cause' employed in Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 is wide and elastic enough to enable a Court of Law to apply the Law in a purposeful manner which secures the ends of Justice. 15. At this stage, this Court pertinently points out that Section 51 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been enacted with a view to enable the Court of Law to do substantial Justice to the parties by deciding/disposing of matters on merits. 16. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to cite the following decisions to prevent an aberration of justice. (a) In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANOTHER Vs. 16. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to cite the following decisions to prevent an aberration of justice. (a) In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANOTHER Vs. MST.KATIJI AND OTHERS {(1987) 2 SUPREME COURT CASES – 107}, wherein at page 108, it is interalia observed and laid down as follows:- “The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice – that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated downto all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. “Every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in in-justice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” (b) In the decision SONERAO SADASHIVRAO PATIL AND ANOTHER Vs. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.” (b) In the decision SONERAO SADASHIVRAO PATIL AND ANOTHER Vs. GODAWARIBAI LAXMANSINGH GAHIREWAR AND OTHERS (AIR 1999 BOMBAY – 235), it is observed and laid down as follows:- “The Courts is armed with power to condone the delay. The discretion is given to the Court to condone the delay and admit the appeal in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. If the spirit behind the empower ment of discretionary power on the Court is taken into consideration, it is beyond doubt clear that the Court is required to adopt liberal approach in the matter of interpretation of the phrase “sufficient cause”. This concept is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply law in a meaningful manner. The requirement of explanation of every day's delay does not mean that a pedantic approach should be taken. The Courts are required to adopt common sense approach and to take pragmatic approach while interpreting the concept of sufficient cause. Length of delay is not the matter, acceptability of explanation is the only criterion. The Court has to take into account whether there is acceptable explanation or pardonable explanation.” (c) In UNION OF INDIA Vs. BRIJ LAL PRABHU DAYAL AND OTHERS (AIR 1999 RAJASTHAN – 216), it is held hereunder:- “Section 5 itself, adopts a pragmatic approach, inasmuch as it allows the condonation of delay if sufficient cause for delay is shown by party who fails to performs the act within the period prescribed by the Statute. The condition for condonation of delay is the presence of a sufficient cause which prevented the party from doing the act in question within prescribed time. In other words, Section 5 of Limitation Act insists on the presence of “sufficient cause” for the delay and therefore, the party seeking condonation of delay must show that in fact there was a sufficient cause for the delay. If the party fails to show sufficient cause and relies merely on the general principles, for the purpose of condonation of delay, the Court may not find itself in a position to condone the delay for want of sufficient justification. If the party fails to show sufficient cause and relies merely on the general principles, for the purpose of condonation of delay, the Court may not find itself in a position to condone the delay for want of sufficient justification. The reason being that the knowledge of the sufficient cause is available to the party which moves the application for condonation of delay. Such knowledge is not available to the Court. The Court must be informed about the cause for delay by giving relevant facts. The party cannot expect that the Court will condone the delay without there being sufficient cause for it or to presume that there must have been some sufficient cause for delay. No such presumption is permissible under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the party, seeking condonation of delay must place before the Court the relevant facts on the basis of which the Court may infer whether there was sufficient cause for delay. If the party which moves an application under Section 5 does not give facts to constitute “sufficient cause”, the application would be liable to be rejected whether it is an application by a private person or by the State, the reason being that in the absence of the facts, the Court cannot draw the presumption that the delay in filing the appeal must necessarily have been occasioned by some undisclosed sufficient cause. Where a party places before the Court sufficient facts to show that there was a sufficient cause for delay, the Court may adopt a pragmatic approach, taking into consideration the realities of life, including the difficulties were faced or were likely to have been faced by the party in doing the act in question and in appropriate case, the Court may condone the delay on the basis of that there was a sufficient reason for condonation of delay.” 17. It is to be noted that section 397 to 401 of Cr.P.C., deals with Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. But the said revisional powers of the High Court although are wide in nature, yet they are purely discretionary and ought to be exercised in rare cases to prevent miscarriage of Justice, when there is glaring defect in a procedure of point of Law, resulting in a failure of Justice. But the said revisional powers of the High Court although are wide in nature, yet they are purely discretionary and ought to be exercised in rare cases to prevent miscarriage of Justice, when there is glaring defect in a procedure of point of Law, resulting in a failure of Justice. Filing of a Revision Petition before the competent forum, as per Criminal Procedure Code is a procedural facility given to a Party/Litigant, in the considered opinion of this Court. 18. When a Court of Law deals with a Petition/Application for condonation of delay, the acceptability of instigation projected by a party is a relevant factor to be taken note of and the length and breadth of delay is not material. 19. In the instant case on hand, the Petitioners, especially the Second Petitioner/Accused has come out with a specific case that he was incarcerated from 14/2/2006 till January 10, 2011 and further, by virtue of the bail order passed by the High court of Calcutta in A.S.T.No.906 of 10 (C.R.M.No.16226 of 2010), he has been directed not to leave India without permission of the trial Court and to reside at Calcutta after coming out on bail. 20. Further, the Second Petitioner has also mentioned in paragraph 5 of the affidavit in M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 that his wife was under Psychiatrist's care and also she requires his constant supervision in connection with her health which often requires medical attention. In this connection, in regard to the plea taken on behalf of the Respondent/Complainant that the Second Petitioner/Second Accused has not filed any supporting documentary evidence to establish about the ill-health of his wife, this Court points out that on behalf of the Petitioners, a typed set of papers have been filed to show that the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife has been prescribed with medicines etc., for her ill-health treatment and as seen from Symed Hospital's Prescription dated 7/3/2012 and also from the Director of the said Hospital, Xerox Copy of the Letter dated 8/3/2012 has been produced to show that the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife has been diagnosed as Major Depressive Disorder and BENZODIAZEPINE dependence. Also, some xerox copies of the prescriptions issued in favour of the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife has been produced in the typed set of papers on the side of the Petitioners dated 13/7/2011, 21/7/2011 and 31/8/2011 from the Consultant Psychiatrist's. From these materials, it is quite evident the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife has been under treatment for her ill-health. Even, the Discharge Summary dated 23/8/2011 in respect of the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife, Mrs.Radha Dalmia shows that she has been diagnosed with 'DYSTHYMIC DISORDER BENZODIAZEPINE DEPENDENCE'. As such, the plea taken on behalf of the Respondent/Complainant that there is no material to support the ill-health of the Second Petitioner/Second Accused wife is devoid of any substance. It cannot be denied that the Second Petitioner/Second Accused even though he has come out on bail on 10/1/2011, has chosen to file the present M.P.(MD) No.1 of 2012 only on 26/7/2012 after a delay of nearly 1 ½ years. 21. Really speaking, the Law of Limitation makes no distinction between prisoners and other persons. The imprisonment of a party may constitute a sufficient cause for excusing delay in preferring an appeal or making an application within the period of Limitation, as per decision MAHARAJ NARAIN Vs. Mt.BANOJI {1904 PUNJ.Re.No.21: 1904 PUNJ LR No.145. Of course, it is not imprisonment in jail is always a sufficient ground. But it all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 22. Mt.BANOJI {1904 PUNJ.Re.No.21: 1904 PUNJ LR No.145. Of course, it is not imprisonment in jail is always a sufficient ground. But it all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 22. Be that as it may, on a careful consideration of respective contentions and taking it into account of the fact that the Second Petitioner/Second Accused was incarcerated from 14/2/2006 till 10/1/2011 and further, he was directed to reside at Calcutta after coming out on bail as per condition imposed by the High Court of Calcutta as stated earlier and further that his supervision was required in connection with his wife's health care etc., this Court on being subjectively satisfied as to the reasons ascribed by the Petitioners for the delay of 902 days, by taking a lenient liberal view and also adopting a Justice Oriented Approach allows this Petition to advance the cause of Justice by directing the Petitioners to pay a sum of Rs.3,500/- (Rupees Three Thousand and Five Hundred only) to the Legal Aid Services Committee attached to Madurai Bench of Madras High Court on or before 11/2/2012, failing which it is made clear that the petition will stand dismissed automatically without any further reference to this Court.