Judgment : Z.A. Haq, J.: 1. Heard Mr. Charpe, learned Advocate for the petitioner, Mr. Jagdale, learned Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 and Mr. Ghodeswar, learned AGP for respondent no.3. 2. Rule. Rule is made returnable forthwith. 3. Writ Petition is filed by the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, body Corporate constituted under the provisions of the Road Transport Act, challenging the order passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur, in Complaint (ULP) No. 262/2006 on 6th September, 2011 by which the Industrial Court has declared that the Corporation is engaged in unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “MRTU & PULP Act”) by not providing alternate employment to respondent no.1. The Industrial Court has directed the petitioner to pay wages to respondent no.1 for the period 2nd August 2002 till the date of attaining the age of superannuation, further imposing costs of Rs. 2000/- on the petitioner. 4. The relevant facts are as follows:- Respondent no.1 was working as driver in the employment of the petitioner from 1979. During the course of the employment, respondent no.1 was referred to Medical Officer for visual acuity test and the Medical Officer declared unfit to drive the vehicle and, therefore, the petitioner issued the order dated 8th February 2002 terminating the services of respondent no.1 with effect from 15th January 2002 with retrospective effect. It was the case of respondent no.1 that the petitioner did not offer him alternate job in spite of the specific stipulation to the effect in the settlement between the petitioner and the employees. Respondent no.1 had submitted an application requesting for appointment of his son- Respondent no.2 on compassionate ground. The petitioner had asked respondent to get the medical certificate from the Medical Board, Nagpur to the effect that he was totally unfit for discharging any sort of duty. The petitioner had not given any letter to the Medical Board to examine the respondent no.1 and, therefore, he could not get himself examined by the Medical Board. In this factual background, respondent nos. 1 and 2 filed application before the Industrial Court under Item 9 of Schedule IV of MRTU & PULP Act. 5. The petitioner had not given any letter to the Medical Board to examine the respondent no.1 and, therefore, he could not get himself examined by the Medical Board. In this factual background, respondent nos. 1 and 2 filed application before the Industrial Court under Item 9 of Schedule IV of MRTU & PULP Act. 5. The petitioner opposed the claim, as made by respondents 1 and 2, on the ground that respondent no.2 was not employee of the petitioner, therefore, complaint on his behalf was not maintainable. The petitioner admitted that respondent no.1 was removed from the service on account of his visual acuity and it is submitted that respondent no.1 had not applied for the alternate employment and, therefore, there was no question of providing him alternate employment. Respondent no.1 submitted that he had not submitted the certificate of the Medical Board showing that he was unfit for discharging any sort of duty, therefore, employment could not have been given to respondent no.2. 6. Learned Member of the Industrial Court proceeded with the matter and concluded that respondent no.2 is not entitled to claim the job in place of his father. The learned Member concluded that the petitioner has committed unfair labour practice under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the MRTU & PULP Act and that respondent no.1 is entitled to get wages from 8th February 2002 till the age of attaining of superannuation for the post of driver. 7. Learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order suffers from patent irregularity and illegality and is not sustainable in law. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that respondent no.1 had accepted the termination order and wanted to secure job for his son on compassionate ground and it is only when the petitioner refused to accept his request for giving compassionate appointment to his son that the respondent no.1 has filed complaint after about three years of the termination order. It is the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the conduct of respondent no.1 estops him from claiming reliefs as prayed for him and the Industrial Court could not have granted the relief to respondent no.1 overlooking these aspects. It is the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the conduct of respondent no.1 estops him from claiming reliefs as prayed for him and the Industrial Court could not have granted the relief to respondent no.1 overlooking these aspects. It is the submission on behalf of the petitioner that in any case respondent no.1 has not worked for the period for which the back wages are granted and the impugned order to that effect is contrary to the principle “no work no wages” and, therefore, unsustainable in law. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has relied on the judgment reported in 2013 (1)ALL MR 290 (Prakash Vinayak Naik Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation) and has submitted that the conclusions of the Industrial Court on the basis of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Persons with Disabilities Act 1995” are misconceived. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has submitted that the facts in the above referred judgment are identical to the facts of the present case and, therefore, the impugned order has to be quashed. 8. Mr. Jagdale, learned Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 has submitted that the petitioner has not only acted contrary to clause 46 of the Settlement between the petitioner and the employees but also has violated the mandate of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief from this Court specially in exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The learned Advocate for respondents 1 and 2 has submitted that the Industrial Court has considered the matter in the right perspective and has recorded proper findings, and it does not require any interference by this Court. 9. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and have examined the record with the assistance of learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 10. The Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 has been enacted to give effect to the Proclamation on the Full Participation and Equity of People with Disabilities in the Asian and the pacific Region. I have considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and have examined the record with the assistance of learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 10. The Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 has been enacted to give effect to the Proclamation on the Full Participation and Equity of People with Disabilities in the Asian and the pacific Region. The statement of objects and reasons of the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 states that the meeting to launch the Asian and Pacific Decade of the Disabled Persons 1993-2002 was convened by the Economic and Social Commission for Asian and Pacific Region, and held at Beijing on 1st to 5th December, 1992 and it adopted the Proclamation on the Full Participation and Equality of People with Disabilities in the Asia and the Pacific region. It states that India is a signatory to the said proclamation and therefore, it was necessary to enact a suitable legislation to provide for the following:- (i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention for disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities; (ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities; (iii) to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of development benefits, vis-a-vis non-disabled persons; (iv) to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities; (v) to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalisation of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and (vi) to make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream. 11. Though the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 has been enacted and is enforced since 1st January 1996 it has been consistently noticed by the Courts that there has been constant attempt by the employers to deprive the persons with disabilities, from the benefits of the Act. Looking to the blatant violation of the mandate of the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 for the period of 17 years, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the matter in the case of Union of India & anr. Vs. National Federation of the Blind & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 9096 of 2013 and has observed as follows:- “49. Employment is a key factor in the empowerment and inclusion of people with disabilities. Vs. National Federation of the Blind & Ors. in Civil Appeal No. 9096 of 2013 and has observed as follows:- “49. Employment is a key factor in the empowerment and inclusion of people with disabilities. It is an alarming reality that the disabled people are out of job not because their disability comes in the way of their functioning rather it is social and practical barriers that prevent them from joining the workforce. As a result, many disabled people live in poverty and in deplorable conditions. They are denied the right to make a useful contribution to their own lives and to the lives of their families and community.” 12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has issued directions in paragraph 54 of the judgment as follows:- “54. In our opinion, in order to ensure proper implementation of the reservation policy for the disabled and to protect their rights, it is necessary to issue the following directions : (i) We hereby direct the appellant herein to issue an appropriate order modifying the OM dated 29.12.2005 and the subsequent OMs consistent with this Court’s Order within three months from the date of passing of this judgment. (ii) We hereby direct the “appropriate Government” to compute the number of vacancies available in all the “establishments” and further identify the posts for disabled persons within a period of three months from today and implement the same without default. (iii) The appellant herein shall issue instructions to all the departments/public sector undertakings, Government companies declaring that the nonobservance of the scheme of reservation for persons with disabilities should be considered as an act of non-obedience and Nodal Officer in department/ public sector undertakings/ Government companies, responsible for the proper and strict implementation of reservation for persons with disabilities, be departmentally proceeded against for the default.” 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in 2013 (8) Scale 171 (Geetaben Ratilal Patel Vs. District Primary Education Officer) emphasized on the rigor of the mandate of the provisions of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 and relying on the proviso to Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act 1995 directed the employer to get opinion of a Government Doctor and to assign appropriate duty to the employee suffering with disabilities. In the case of Geetaben Ratilal Patel Vs. In the case of Geetaben Ratilal Patel Vs. District Primary Education Officer (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has again considered the rigor of the mandate of the provisions of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act ,1995 and has recorded in paragraph 18 as follows:- “Therefore, even it is presumed that the appellant became insane, as held by the Inquiry Officer, mentally illness being one of the disabilities under Section 2(i) of the Act, 1995, under Section 47 it was not open to the respondents to dispense with, or reduce in rank of the appellant, who acquired a disability during his service. If the appellant, after acquiring disability was not suitable for the post he was holding, should have been shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. Further, if it was not possible to adjust the appellant against any post, the respondents ought to have kept the appellant on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or, until the appellant attained the age of superannuation whichever was earlier.” 14. Similarly, the Division Bench of this Court at the Principal Seat is also required to consider the issues relating to the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 in Writ Petition No.3294/2010 (Mrs.Nilima Ananat Surve Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others) and Public Interest Litigation No 70 of 2002 (ILS Legal and Centre and ors Vs. The State of Maharashtra and others) and Public Interest Litigation No.139 of 2006 and in paragraph 11 of the order, it recorded as follows:- “11. The Health Department of State of Maharashtra shall issue instructions to all the Medical Boards and Superintendents of the Public Hospitals that when a candidate, selected for a post which is reserved for a physically challenged person, appears for medical examination, he cannot be declared unfit or unsuitable for the post by the concerned Medical Board or Superintendent of the Public Hospital on the ground that he is medically unfit because of that particular disability.” 15. Section 47 of the Persons With Disabilities Act, 1995 reads as under:- “Section 47. Section 47 of the Persons With Disabilities Act, 1995 reads as under:- “Section 47. Non-discrimination in Government employments -(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier”. 16. The mandate of Section 47 of the Persons Disabilities Act, 1995 casts an obligation on the employer to provide an alternate employment to the employee, who acquired disability during his service, in some other post with same pay scale and service benefits. It lays down that if the employer finds that the employee after acquiring the disability is not suitable for the post he was holding then the employee should be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. In the present case, the petitioner-employer has directly terminated the services of respondent no.1 on the ground of his physical disability. It is not in dispute that respondent no.1 acquired disabilities during the course of his employment. Thus, the petitioner-employer has violated the mandate of proviso to Section 47(1) of the the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995. 17. The second proviso to Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 lays down that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, which is earlier. 17. The second proviso to Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 lays down that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, which is earlier. It is clear that provisions of Section 47 of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 does not only casts an obligation on the employer to provide alternate employment but the second provision to Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 makes it clear that the employee, who has acquired disabilities during the service cannot be removed from the service on the ground of unfitness and the employer is under an obligation to accommodate him on supernumerary post till the suitable post is available or till he attains the age of superannuation. Therefore, the petitioner-employer could not have terminated the services of respondent no.1 overlooking the mandate of the provisions of Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995. 18. The learned Member of the Industrial Court has dealt with the factual aspects and rightly recorded finding in favour of respondent no.1. 19. The petitioner has submitted that respondent no.1 had accepted the termination order and sought compassionate appointment of his son and it is only when the petitioner did not give compassionate appointment to his son that the respondent no.1 has made complaint and, therefore, the complaint should not have been entertained by the Industrial Court, is misconceived. The petitioner-employer could not have wriggled out of the mandate of the provisions of Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and could not have shirked its liabilities to provide an alternate employment to respondent no.1 and, therefore, in my view, the findings of the Industrial Court are in accordance with the mandate of the provisions of Section 47 (1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995. 20. Reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on the judgment given in the case of Prakash Vinayak Naik Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is also not proper. In that case, the employee was terminated and the employee's son made representation dated 10th October 2002 and 26th September 2005 seeking compassionate appointment and these representations were rejected on 7th March 2006. Reliance placed on behalf of the petitioner on the judgment given in the case of Prakash Vinayak Naik Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) is also not proper. In that case, the employee was terminated and the employee's son made representation dated 10th October 2002 and 26th September 2005 seeking compassionate appointment and these representations were rejected on 7th March 2006. Shri Prakash Vinayak Naik (employee) had filed writ petition in August 2009 challenging the termination of his services which was effected in 2005. In that petition, the reasons given for the delay was that his son had filed writ petition which was rejected on 29th June 2006 and the review petition was also dismissed on 12th February 2008. Special Leave Petition was filed which was dismissed on 30th March 2009 and after this writ petition was filed by the employee. Further more, it is recorded in the above referred judgment that Shri Prakash Vinayak Naik (employee) had attained the age of superannuation on 30th June 2007 and the writ petition was filed practically after two years from the date of his retirement. It is in this factual background that the High Court refused to consider the grievance of Shri Prakash Naik in the above referred judgment. The facts of the above referred judgment are totally different from the present case. In the present case respondent no.1 was aged about 54 years when the complaint was filed before the Industrial Court and respondent no.1 had not made grievance against the petitioner after being unsuccessful in the Courts seeking compassionate appointment for his son as was the fact in the case of Shri Prakash Naik. The judgment given in the case of Shri Prakash Naik is not of any assistance to the petitioner. Therefore, the impugned order has to be upheld and the writ petition has to be dismissed. 21. The facts on the record show that the petitioner-employer has not only deprived respondent no.1 from his legitimate claim but the petitioner-employer has no regards to the mandate of the provisions of Section 47(1) of the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 and law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court. The petitioner-employer is a body corporate and is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, it has to act as a Model Employer. The petitioner-employer is a body corporate and is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, it has to act as a Model Employer. The conduct of the petitioner-employer is highly deprecable and, therefore, in my view the exemplary costs of Rs. 20,000/- have to be imposed on the petitioner-employer so that similar persons with physical disabilities are not deprived of their legitimate claim and the rights conferred by the provisions of Persons Disabilities Act, 1995 in future. In view of the above, the writ petition is dismissed with costs of Rs. 20,000/-. The costs be paid by the petitioner-employer to respondent no.1 within one month from today.