Judgment : P. Devadass, J. The Appeal: 1. This writ appeal has been directed as against the order of the Writ Court, dated 1.2.2012 in W.P.(MD) No.187 of 2011, whereunder the Court had directed the State/first Appellant to pay Rs.10,00,000/-as compensation to the respondents/writ petitioners for the loss of life of their son Irulaiya in a bomb explosion in a State owned Transport Corporation bus. Brief facts: 2. During the third week of May, 2009, there was news that Velu Pillai Prbakaran, L.T.T.E. Supremo has been killed in army action in Sri Lanka. There were agitations in various parts of the State. Under these circumstances, on 20.5.2009, son of the writ petitioners travelled in the State Transport Corporation bus TN-33-N-2155. At about 2 p.m., near the Panchayat Office in Thiruppuvanam in Sivagangai District, certain persons have hurled petrol bombs into the bus. In the explosion, three persons sustained injuries. One of them is Irulaiya. They were rushed to the Government Hospital. In connection with this untoward incident, the police registered a case in Crime No.216 of 2009 under Section 3(1) of TNPPDL Act. On 23.5.2009, Irulaiya succumbed to the injuries. Thus, Sections 323, 324 and 302 IPC were also added. In the course of investigation, Siruthai Selvam @ Selvakumar, Jeyaraj and Kani, members of 'Viduthalai Siruthaigal Party' were nabbed. On completion of investigation, police filed Final Report against them in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Manamadurai. The learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the case in P.R.C.No.13 of 2010. On committal, the learned Sessions Judge, Sivagangai took cognizance of the case in S.C.No.3 of 2011. 3. Alleging failure on the part of the police in protecting the life of their son, the parents of the deceased have filed the writ petition seeking compensation. At the relevant time, the deceased was 26 years old. He is their only son. He studied upto S.S.L.C. He was a coolie. 4. The Court held that there was negligence on the part of the police, thus, the State is liable and ordered payment of Rs.10,00,000/- as compensation to the writ petitioners and also gave liberty to the State to recover the amount from the accused. Contentions: State 5. Mr.M.Govindan, learned SpecialGovernment Pleader for the appellants contended that on that day police provided adequate protection. No failure on their part. The culprits were booked. Case has been filed. Contentions: State 5. Mr.M.Govindan, learned SpecialGovernment Pleader for the appellants contended that on that day police provided adequate protection. No failure on their part. The culprits were booked. Case has been filed. The death was due to the unlawful activities of some third parties. Government cannot be blamed for that. 6. The learned Special Government Pleader also contended that seeking compensation is a matter of civil liability arising out of breach of contract or commission of a tortious act. For that, a writ petition under Article 226, Constitution of India will not lie. Only a Civil Suit for compensation will lie. Further, disputed questions of facts cannot be decided in writ proceedings. 7. The learned Special Government Pleader further contended that the defence of sovereign immunity is available to the State. Further, the method adopted by the Court in determining the compensation is incorrect. It wrongly took the multiplier 18' instead of 13'. The deceased died as a bachelor. The deduction from his income should have been 50%. However, the Writ Court deducted only 1/3. In this respect, the learned Special Government Pleader cited SARLA VERMA AND OTHERS vs. DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER [2009 (6) SCC 121]. Contention : Parents 8. Mr.K.Kumaravel, learned counsel for the respondents/writ petitioners contended that Article 21, Constitution of India guarantees life and liberty to everyone. It is a Fundamental Right. It has to be guarded by the State. When State fails to guard it, there is violation of Fundamental Right. For such violation, compensation can be sought for against the State in a writ petition under Article 226, Constitution of India. For such a claim, defence of sovereign immunity is not available to the State. It is a clear case of failure of State officials. No question of disputed facts arise. The learned counsel also cited P.P.M. THANGAIAH NADAR FIRM Vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL ANDU AND OTHERS [ 2006 (5) CTC 97 (FB)]. The learned counsel also submitted that the Court has adopted a pragmatic approach and assessed the compensation. 9. We have anxiously considered the rival submissions, perused the Consideration: materials on record, the impugned order of the Writ Court, the decisions cited and various decisions on the point. Suit or Writ Petition: 10. Article 226, Constitution of India is a means to enforce Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III, Constitution of India through the High Courts. 9. We have anxiously considered the rival submissions, perused the Consideration: materials on record, the impugned order of the Writ Court, the decisions cited and various decisions on the point. Suit or Writ Petition: 10. Article 226, Constitution of India is a means to enforce Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Part III, Constitution of India through the High Courts. It is a Public Law remedy. For redressal of private wrongs, suits are to be filed in the regular Civil Courts. It is a Private Law remedy. 11. In the case before us, the parents of deceased Irulaiya have filed Writ Petition under Article 226, Constitution of India seeking compensation for the loss of life of their son. It is for vindication of Fundamental Right under Article 21, Constitution of India. Article 21, Constitution of India guarantees life and liberty to everyone. The State is enjoined to protect the life and liberties of the Citizens. Violation of it is violation of this Fundamental Right. The soul of the Indian Constitution, in fact, rests in this Article. This is the germ out of which Civil Liberties and Human Rights largely emerged and is being shaped in our Country. When such Fundamental Rights are violated by the State machinery, its officials and instrumentalities, the Constitutional Courts have granted compensation. 12. The notable decisions on this aspect of law are RUDUL SAH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR [ 1983 (3) SCR 508 : AIR 1983 SC 1086 ]; SEBASTIAN M. HOMGRAY Vs. UNION OF INDIA [1884 (1) SCC 339 : 1984 (1) SCR 904 : AIR 1984 SC 571 ; SEBASTIAN M. HONGRAY Vs. UNION OF INDIA [1984 (3) SCC 82 : 1984 (3) SCR 544 : AIR 1984 SC 1026 ]; BHIM SINGH Vs. STATE OF J & K., [1984 (SUPP) SCC 504 : 1985 (4) SCC 677 : AIR 1986 SC 494 ]; SAHELI, A WOMEN'S RESOURCES CENTRE Vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, DELHI POLICE HEADQUARTERS [ 1990 (1) SCC 422 : AIR 1990 SC 513 ]; STAE OF MAHARASHTRA Vs. RAVIKANT S.PATIL [ 1991 (2) SCC 373 : 1991 AIR SCW 871] and SMT.NILABATI BEHERA @ LALITA BEHERA Vs. STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS [ AIR 1993 SC 1960 ]. 13. On the above lines is the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court rendered in R.GANDHI Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ AIR 1989 MAD. RAVIKANT S.PATIL [ 1991 (2) SCC 373 : 1991 AIR SCW 871] and SMT.NILABATI BEHERA @ LALITA BEHERA Vs. STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS [ AIR 1993 SC 1960 ]. 13. On the above lines is the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court rendered in R.GANDHI Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ AIR 1989 MAD. 205 ], wherein, in the wake of assassination of Smt.Indira Gandhi when large scale properties of Sikh Community in Coimbatore were damaged by hooligans, a Senior Advocate of this Court filed Public Interest Litigation seeking compensation for the failure of the State in not protecting the properties of this minority community and the Court having found negligence on the part of the police directed payment of compensation to the affected. 14. In INDER PURI GENERAL STORES AND OTHERS Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER [AIR 1992 J & K., 11], following R.GANDHI (supra), the Jammu and Kashmir High Court held as under:- "5. ...... As and when life and property, as discussed herein above, is taken away by any individual or organisation, a duty is cast upon the State representing the will of people to compensate the victim by granting adequate compensation. The monarchial rule has to be distinguished from democratic set up and the State cannot shirk in its responsibility to protect the life, liberty and property of the citizens. On their failure to protect the life, liberty and property of the citizens, State is under a constitutional obligation to compensate the victim adequately. The argument of the learned Advocate General that the State was under no obligation to compensate the victims of communal riots, is without any basis and contradictory in terms in view of the actions already taken in that behalf. If it was not the responsibility of the State to provide compensation, what was the necessity of passing orders for providing ex gratia grant and lump sum amounts as compensation for the losses suffered. The State represents the will of the lapses of the Rulers, a right accrues to them for award of compensation. As and when the life and liberty of any person is taken away, a presumption arises of the failure of the State machinery to protect the life and property of the individuals involved. 6. The State represents the will of the lapses of the Rulers, a right accrues to them for award of compensation. As and when the life and liberty of any person is taken away, a presumption arises of the failure of the State machinery to protect the life and property of the individuals involved. 6. It cannot be denied that the maintenance of law and order is the duty of a responsible Government who could not abdicate this function and allow the life and liberty of the citizens in jeopardy." 15. In K.V.JOSEPH AND OTHERS Vs. STATE OF KERALA AND OTHERS [1999 ACJ 225], the Kerala High Court held that when the fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution is so nakedly violated because of the inaction on the part of the police and of the State machinery, necessarily such a citizen is entitled for compensation from the State. 16. In J.K. TRADERS Vs. STATE OF A.P. & OTHERS [2001 (1) CLT 225], a learned Single Judge of the Andhra Pradesh High Court after referring to R.GANDHI (supra) and several Apex Court's decisions, summarised the position of law as under: "30. A survey of the entire judgments of the Supreme Court as well as the other High Courts, on the question of award of compensation for violation of the fundamental rights, the following principles can be deduced :- (1) Constitutional mandate enjoins upon the State to protect the person and property of every citizen and if it fails to discharge its duty, the State is liable to pay the damages to the victims. (2) The failures or inactions on the part of the State which led to the violation of the fundamental right more especially under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India should have been direct nexus to the damage caused/suffered. (3) The State cannot claim defence of sovereign immunity in the guise of the discharge of the sovereign functions in the constitutional remedy. It does not clothe the State with right to violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III subject to certain restrictions. (4) The State while undertaking commercial activity cannot plead the sovereign immunity, in case of tortuous acts done by the employees of the State. It is only vicariously liable. It does not clothe the State with right to violate the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III subject to certain restrictions. (4) The State while undertaking commercial activity cannot plead the sovereign immunity, in case of tortuous acts done by the employees of the State. It is only vicariously liable. (5) The Supreme Court or the High Court are entitled to render compensatory justice by awarding reasonable monetary compensation under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, for the injury mental, physical, fiscal suffered by the individual for violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. But, however, it must be conclusively established that the State failed to take any positive action in protecting the fundamental rights of the citizens. (6) It is not necessary that the victim should approach the Civil Court by invoking common law remedy for claiming damages for violation of the fundamental rights. The option is left to the victim to claim the damages by invoking either the constitutional remedy or civil remedy. Since the constitutional remedy is a public law remedy, the actual victim need not approach the Court. The relief can also be awarded either by exercise of suo motu power or in a public interest litigation case. (7) The quantum of compensation varies from case to case depending upon the nature of loss suffered by the victim. There cannot be any straitjacket formula for awarding the compensation under Article 226 of the Constitution of India." 17. In THE CHAIRMAN, RAILWAY BOARD & OTHERS Vs. MRS.CHANDRIMA DAS & OTHERS [ 2000 (2) SCC 465 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "11. Having regard to what has been stated above, the contention that Smt. Hanuffa Khatoon should have approached the civil court for damages and the matter should not have been considered in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. Where public functionaries are involved and the matter relates to the violation of Fundamental Rights or the enforcement of public duties, the remedy would still be available under the Public Law notwithstanding that a suit could be filed for damages under Private Law." 18. Thus, the argument of the State that it is a civil liability and the petitioners have to go to a Civil Court by way of a Suit cannot be sustained. Sovereign immunity: 19. There was an archaic doctrine in English Law. Thus, the argument of the State that it is a civil liability and the petitioners have to go to a Civil Court by way of a Suit cannot be sustained. Sovereign immunity: 19. There was an archaic doctrine in English Law. It is, 'King can do no wrong', 'King cannot be sued in his own Courts'. This is sovereign immunity. If the King or his agents commits a wrongful act, they cannot be sued in Courts. So, the King has been above the Law. This barred claims being filed against the State by the affected persons from seeking compensation for State wrongs. Realising this being unrealistic, England had scrapped this doctrine by passing the Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. Thus, the Country of its origin itself has given up the doctrine. However, it was racked up by the State in this case. 20. The doctrine of sovereign immunity never been adopted in India as an answer to the claims made as against the tortious act committed by the servants of the State. The Indian Constitutional Courts resisted importation of such part of the English common Law into this Country. 21. In 1962, in STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. VIDYAWATI [ AIR 1962 SC 933 ], the Apex Court refused to recognise this relic of the British Legal and Constitutional history and in the matter of redressal for public wrong, the Court placed State and its instrumentalities and agencies on par with private individuals on the premises that if the State engaged itself in any avocation/activities, analogous to a private individual, the State is also liable like a private individual for the tortious acts committed by its servants. 22. While considering the question of defence of sovereign immunity, the Hon'ble Apex Court in N. NAGENDRA RAO & CO. Vs. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [ 1994 (6) SCC 205 ], observed:- "25. But there the immunity ends. No civilised system can permit an executive to play with the people of its country and claim that it is entitled to act in any manner as it is sovereign. The concept of public interest has changed with structural change in the society. No legal or political system today can place the State above law as it is unjust and unfair for a citizen to be deprived of his property illegally by negligent act of officers of the State without any remedy. The concept of public interest has changed with structural change in the society. No legal or political system today can place the State above law as it is unjust and unfair for a citizen to be deprived of his property illegally by negligent act of officers of the State without any remedy. From sincerity, efficiency and dignity of State as a juristic person, propounded in nineteenth century as sound sociological basis for State immunity the circle has gone round and the emphasis now is more on liberty, equality and the rule of law. The modern social thinking of progressive societies and the judicial approach is to do away with archaic State protection and place the State or the Government on a par with any other juristic legal entity. Any watertight compartmentalization of the functions of the State as "sovereign and non-sovereign" or "governmental and non-governmental" is not sound. It is contrary to modern jurisprudential thinking. The need of the State to have extraordinary powers cannot be doubted. But with the conceptual change of statutory power being statutory duty for sake of society and the people the claim of a common man or ordinary citizen cannot be thrown out merely because it was done by an officer of the State even though it was against law and negligent. Needs of the State, duty of its officials and right of the citizens are required to be reconciled so that the rule of law in a Welfare State is not shaken. ...." 23. In CONSUMER EDUCATION AND RESEARCH CENTRE AND OTHERS Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS [ AIR 1995 SC 922 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "31. ... It is, therefore, settled law that in public law claim for compensation is a remedy available under Article 32 or 226 for the enforcement and protection of fundamental and human rights. The defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights. There is no question of defence being available for constitutional remedy. ... It is, therefore, settled law that in public law claim for compensation is a remedy available under Article 32 or 226 for the enforcement and protection of fundamental and human rights. The defence of sovereign immunity is inapplicable and alien to the concept of guarantee of fundamental rights. There is no question of defence being available for constitutional remedy. It is a practical and inexpensive mode of redress available for the contravention made by the State, its servants, its instrumentalities, a company or a person in the purported exercise of their powers and enforcement of the rights claimed either under the statutes or licence issued under the statute or for the enforcement of any right or duty under the Constitution or the law." 24. A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in the decision reported in VIBIN P.V. Vs. STATE OF KERALA & OTHERS [AIR 2013 KERALA 67] following the Hon'ble Apex Court decisions reported in RUDAL SAH Vs. STATE OF BIHAR [ 1983 (4) SCC 141 : AIR 1983 SC 1086 ]; NILABATI BEHRA Vs. STATE OF ORISSA [ 1993 (2) SCC 746 : AIR 1993 SC 1960 ]; D.K. BASU Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [ 1997 (1) SCC 416 : AIR 1997 SC 610 ] and CHAIRMAN, RAILWAY BOARD AND OTHERS Vs. CHANDRIMA DAS (MRS) & OTHERS [ 2000 (2) SCC 465 : AIR 200 SC 988] held that notwithstanding right to remedies under Civil suits or Criminal proceedings, High Court can grant compensation in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution under Public Law to victims who suffered infringement of their right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under Constitution and existence of alternate remedy would not bar jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226, Constitution of India. 25. Thus, the defence of sovereign immunity cannot be pleaded by the appellants as an answer to the claim of compensation made by the respondents/writ petitioners for the loss of life of their son on account of inaction of the State. State Liability: 26. The State is liable to pay compensation to the Citizens and others, when they were affected by the wrongs committed by the public officials acting in breach of public duty, constitutional mandates, abridging or abrogating of Civil Liberties, Human Rights and makes the very existence of human being at peril. State Liability: 26. The State is liable to pay compensation to the Citizens and others, when they were affected by the wrongs committed by the public officials acting in breach of public duty, constitutional mandates, abridging or abrogating of Civil Liberties, Human Rights and makes the very existence of human being at peril. It is considered a "Strict Liability", liability irrespective of blameworthiness, it is absolute. (See RYLANDS Vs. FLETCHER [1868 LR (3) HL 330]. 27. In SMT.NILABATI BEHERA @ LALITA BEHERA [ AIR 1993 SC 1960 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court held as under: "33. The public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in proceedings under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting "compensation" in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under he public law by way of penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of public duty of not protecting the fundamental rights of the citizen. The compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law." 28. In D.K.BASU Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL [ 1997 (1) SCC 416 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "45. . . . The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot give much solace to the family of the victim civil action for damages is a long-drawn and a cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for redressal by the court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at times perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of the deceased victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the family." 29. In P.P.M. THANGAIAH NADAR FIRM Vs. STATE [ 2006 (5) CTC 97 (FB)] dealing with compensation for State's inaction, a Full Bench of this Court held that compensation is payable when a fundamental right is affected on account of any negligent act or dereliction of duty of the public servants. 30. It was argued by the learned Special Government Pleader that the death of the petitioners' son was due to the unlawful activities of some third parties and for that the State cannot be blamed. 31. In this connection, it is relevant to note the following observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court made in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS [ 2004 (8) SCC 610 ], when it dealt with the issue of compensation to the victims of Godhra carnage: "25. 31. In this connection, it is relevant to note the following observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court made in NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION Vs. STATE OF GUJARAT AND OTHERS [ 2004 (8) SCC 610 ], when it dealt with the issue of compensation to the victims of Godhra carnage: "25. Thus a conspectus of the decisions of several High Courts and even those of the Supreme Court makes it clear that it is the Constitutional obligation of the State to protect the life, liberty and property of a person and where the State, that is to say its machinery without any justification fails in such duty resulting in loss to a person the State cannot avoid its responsibility by taking refuge under a plea that the damage was done by the rioteers and not by State's machinery." 32. A Division Bench of this Court in the decision reported in THE REGISTRAR (ADMINISTRATION) Vs. THE SECTRETAY TO GOVERNMENT & OTHERS [2011 (1) CWC 786], directed the State to pay compensation to the legal heirs of an Advocate, who died due to the delay in extending medical care. 33. Thus, the above argument of the State is devoid of any merit. Disputed Questions: 34. It is true that disputed questions cannot be adjudicated/examined in writ petitions. It all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Merely because the claim has been contradicted a Constitutional Court cannot plead inability and drive the seeker of Justice to seek Justice elsewhere – file a regular Suit in a Civil Court. The facts in this case i.e., the death of the Writ Petitioners' son, due to injuries sustained in the bomb explosion, his age, etc. are not in dispute. 35. In TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITY BOARD Vs. SUMATHI AND OTHERS [ AIR 2000 SC 1603 ], the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "9. In view of the clear proposition of law laid by this Court in Chairman, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. (Gridco) Vs. Smt.Sukamani Das, 1999 AIR SCW 3383: AIR 1999 SC 3412 when disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortuous liability remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. However it cannot be understood as laying a law that in every case of tortious liability recourse must be had to a suit. Smt.Sukamani Das, 1999 AIR SCW 3383: AIR 1999 SC 3412 when disputed question of fact arises and there is clear denial of any tortuous liability remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution may not be proper. However it cannot be understood as laying a law that in every case of tortious liability recourse must be had to a suit. When there is negligence on the face of it and infringement of Article 21 is there it cannot be said that there will be any bar to proceed under Article 226 of the Constitution. Right of life is one of the basic human rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. In U.P. State Co-operative Land Development Bank Ltd., Vs. Chandra Bhan Dubey, 1999 (1) CTC 467 : 1999 (1) SCC 741 : 1999 AIR SCW 364 : AIR 1999 SC 753 , this Court after examining various decisions of the courts on the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution observed that the language of Article 226 of the Constitution does not admit of any limitation on the powers of the High Court for the exercise of jurisdiction thereunder though by various decisions of this Court with varying and divergent views, it has been held that jurisdiction under Article 226 can be exercised only when a body or authority, the decision of which is complained, was exercising its power in the discharge of public duty and that writ is a public law remedy." 36. In this connection, it is relevant to note the following observations of P.P.M. THANGAIAH NADAR FIRM (supra), the Full Bench observed as under:- "38. ... Where, however, it is established that the officers of the State ordained with duty of maintaining law and order have failed to protect the life, liberty and property of person and such failure amounts to dereliction of duty, the State would be liable to pay compensation to the victim. Such liability can be enforced through Public Law remedy or Common Law remedy. Where, necessary facts to establish culpable negligence on the part of the officials are available, the High Court under Article 226 can issue appropriate direction. Where, however, the main aspect relating to culpable negligence of the officer is seriously disputed, filing of suit may be more appropriate remedy. Where, necessary facts to establish culpable negligence on the part of the officials are available, the High Court under Article 226 can issue appropriate direction. Where, however, the main aspect relating to culpable negligence of the officer is seriously disputed, filing of suit may be more appropriate remedy. No hard and fast rule can be laid down on these aspects and obviously the availability of remedy under Article 226 would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ...." The Case before us: 37. In the wake of death of L.T.T.E. Supremo, Prabakaran, during May 2009, there was surcharged atmosphere in our State. The District of Sivaganga has not been spared from this turmoil. On 20.5.2009, petitioners' son Irulaiya travelled as a passenger in the State owned Transport Corporation bus. Three persons thrown petrol bombs into the bus. In the bomb explosion, respondents' son was seriously wounded and subsequently, on 23.5.2009 he breathed his last at the Hospital. In his counter, the fifth appellant/Inspector of Police did not deny the occurrence and his death. It is an intelligence failure in not preventing the miscreant in taking the law in their hands. A close scrutiny of the materials on record shows that there was complete intelligence failure. Had proper intelligence was gathered and precautionary measures were taken, this unfortunate incident would not have occurred and the Petitioners would not have lost the precious life of their only son. Petitioners' son has lost his life, which has been guaranteed under Article 21, Constitution of India, because of the callousness and negligence of the police. For this, undoubtedly, the State is absolutely liable to the petitioners. 38. The petitioners have to be compensated for the untimely demise of their son due to the negligence of the police. They must be given fair and reasonable compensation. 39. The Petitioners' son was born on 15.5.1998. Thus, at the time of his death, he was 26 years old. He studied upto S.S.L.C. He was a dailywageearner. It was claimed that he earned Rs.500/-per day. They must be given fair and reasonable compensation. 39. The Petitioners' son was born on 15.5.1998. Thus, at the time of his death, he was 26 years old. He studied upto S.S.L.C. He was a dailywageearner. It was claimed that he earned Rs.500/-per day. However, the Court took it Rs.300/- per day, for 25 days in a month, calculated it accordingly at Rs.7,500/-, took the multiplier 16', calculated the amount at Rs.14,40,000/-and deducted 1/3 from it towards his pleasure and other expenses and thus, arrived at Rs.9,60,000/-and added 8% interest p.a. from 23.5.2009 plus Rs.5,000/- towards funeral and transportation expenses, Rs.35,000/-towards litigation expenses and thus, totally made it Rs.10,00,000/-. 40. There is no mathematical formula or a fixed method or a procedure for assessing compensation for violation of Fundamental Rights of Citizens. However, assessment has to be made to arrive at a reasonable compensation. In this respect, the Constitutional Courts also have taken a cue from the assessment of compensation made under the Motor Vehicles Act. That has also been done in this case. 41. As per SARLA VERMA AND OTHERS Vs. DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION AND ANOTHER [2009 (6) SCC 121] , for persons in the age group of 26-30 years, the multiplier is 17'. As per Second Schedule to Quantum: M.V. Act, it is 18'. The Court has taken only 16'. Considering the young age of the deceased, Rs.300/- per day is not excessive. 42. The Court has deducted 1/3 from the income of the deceased towards his pleasure and other expenses. He died as a bachelor. Although SARLA VERMA (supra) advocated deduction of 50% in case the deceased was a bachelor, it had also held that when the deceased had left a large family, a lesser deduction can also be made. In this case, the deceased is the only son of the petitioners. They are aged also. They had no other source of income except their only son. Now, he is no more. They have lost their sole breadwinner. In the facts and circumstances of the case, deduction of 1/3 is appropriate. 43. The Court granted Rs.5,000/-towards funeral and transportation expenses. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in RAJESH AND OTHERS Vs. RAJBIR SINGH AND OTHERS [2013 (3) CTC 883 held that for funeral expenses at least Rs.25,000/- is to be given. Thus, instead of Rs.5,000/-, Rs.25,000/- shall be given. 43. The Court granted Rs.5,000/-towards funeral and transportation expenses. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in RAJESH AND OTHERS Vs. RAJBIR SINGH AND OTHERS [2013 (3) CTC 883 held that for funeral expenses at least Rs.25,000/- is to be given. Thus, instead of Rs.5,000/-, Rs.25,000/- shall be given. Towards Transportation expenses Rs.5,000/- is ordered. Rs.35,000/-towards litigation expenses is on the higher side. We reduce it to Rs.10,000/-. 8% interest p.a. has been granted only on Rs.9,60,000/-. But, it should have been granted for the entire compensation amount, namely, Rs.10,00,000/-. 44. In the result, this Writ Appeal fails and accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. No costs. The first appellant shall pay the respondents/writ petitioners Rs.10,00,000/- with 8% interest p.a. from 23.5.2009 till payment and thereafter the State is entitled to recover the entire amount from the accused in S.C.No.3 of 2011 on the file of the Sessions Court, Sivagangai. It is made clear that the first appellant shall pay the entire amount within 4 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this Judgment. Consequently, the connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed.