JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner/defendant Nand Kishore, in the instant writ application, has challenged the order dated 12.7.2013 passed by the learned Trial Court rejecting the application under Order 14, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as 'the C.P.C.', for short) filed by the petitioner/defendant while allowing the application under Order 7, Rule 14 (3) C.P.C. subject to payment of cost of Rs. 250/-. 2. Briefly, the material facts and particulars necessary for appreciation of the controversy raised in the instant writ application are, that the respondents/ plaintiffs instituted a suit for declaration, injunction and cancellation of the sale deed pleading that the suit property was purchased by the respondent/plaintiff Ramchand Lalchandani, from the respondents/plaintiffs number 1 to 15, through an agreement for sale dated 12.5.2008. According to the pleaded facts in the plaint, the suit property was handed over into the possession of the respondent/plaintiff number 16; and the petitioner/defendant threatened of forceful possession on the suit property since he purchased it through a registered sale deed dated 30.1.2009; executed by respondents number 18 to 25 (defendants number 2 to 9). However, this fact was repelled for the reason that the respondents number 18 to 25, had no right to sell the property in dispute. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner/defendant further submitted that on 12.7.2013; the respondents/plaintiffs moved an application under Order 7, Rule 14 (3) C.P.C., for taking on record certain documents i.e. agreement dated 12.5.2008, power of attorney dated 12.5.2008 and Will dated 12.5.2008. The petitioner/defendant also moved an application on 29.3.2013 under Order 14, Rule 2 C.P.C., for deciding issues number 1 and 5, before recording of the evidence. The application under Order 7, Rule 14 (3) C.P.C. was resisted since all the three documents related to transfer of title and were not duly registered, hence,I inadmissible in evidence. The learned Trial Court having considered the pleadedl facts of the two applications and replies thereof as well as after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties passed the impugned order dated 12.7.2013 as indicated above, which is impugned in the instant writ application. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner/defendant has assailed the impugned order for being illegal and with jurisdictional error for non-registrationl of the documents as per the mandate of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act,190.8. 4. The learned Counsel for the petitioner/defendant has assailed the impugned order for being illegal and with jurisdictional error for non-registrationl of the documents as per the mandate of Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act,190.8. He has further assailed the order allowing the application under Order 71, Rule 14 (3) C.P.C., on account of an erroneous interpretation of proviso to Sectional 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. The order impugned is also questioned in the light of the provisions of Section 2(14) of the Indian Stamps Act, 1899. 5. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs supporting the impugned order dated 12.7.2013, submitted that the petitioner/defendant filed the written statement to the suit and issues were settled on 5.12.2012. The affidavits in lieu of examination-in-chief were placed on record before the learned Trial Court on 10.1.2013 and thereafter, the petitioner/defendant had been seeking time for cross-examination, prolonging the trial of the suit and as consequence on 20.9.2013 he was saddled with a cost of Rs. 1,000/-. The learned Counsel further argued that the instant writ application, is a gross misuse of process of the Court for the reason that issues number 1 to 5 cannot be decided ail preliminary issues since the issues are neither related to jurisdiction of the Counsel nor with regard to any bar contained in any law for the time being in force, and therefore, the learned Trial Court committed no error or illegality, calling for an;! interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and with their assistant perused the material available on record and also considered the impugned order dated 12.7.2013 passed by the learned Trial Court. 7. Before proceeding further with the matter for consideration of the rial submissions raised on behalf of the parties, it will be gainful to consider till provisions of Order 14, Rule 2 C.P.C., which reads thus:- "Order 14 - SETTLEMENT OF ISSUES AND DETERMINATION OF SUIT I ON ISSUES OF LAW OR ON ISSUES AGREED UPON: 2. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues: (1) Notwithstanding that I a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, I subject to provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. Court to pronounce judgment on all issues: (1) Notwithstanding that I a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall, I subject to provisions of sub-rule (2), pronounce judgment on all issues. (2) Where issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the I Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of I on an issue of law only, it may try that issue first if that issue related to- (a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or (b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the other issues until after that issue has been determined, and may deal with the suit in accordance with the decision on that issue." 8. From a bare perusal of the provisions as extracted herein above, it is evident that it is open for the Court to try and decide the issues of law as preliminary issues provided that issues related to jurisdiction of the Court or bar created by any law for the time being in force. In the instant case at hand, issue number 5 has been framed to the effect as to whether the agreement or sale dated 12.5.2008 has no legal consequence or transfer of the possession being an unregistered document? Issue number 1 is to the effect as to whether the possession of the suit property has been handed over as per the terms and conditions of the agreement or sale dated 12.5.2008? Issue number 2 has been framed to the effect as to whether respondent/plaintiff number 16 has raised any construction by demolishing the old construction after having acquired the ownership rights in view of the agreement or sale? Issue number 3 has been framed to the effect as to whether respondents/defendants number 2 to 9 were divested of the property by Mahadevmal in the year 1965 and issue number 4 has been framed to the effect as to whether respondents/defendants number 2 to 9 executed the sale deed dated 30.1.2009 in favour of defendant number 1 without any right and title? 9. 9. Thus, it is apparent on the face of record that the issues neither pertain to the jurisdiction of the Court nor the issues are subject to any bar created by any law for the time being in force, as contemplated under Order 14, Rule 2 C.P.C. Under Order 14, Rule 2 C.P.C. where issues of both fact and law arise in the same suit, normally all the issues in a suit are to be tried by a Court because even the issues of law may depend upon the decision of issues of facts. Further, relevancy, admissibility and reliability of a document, are different from each other and permission to produce document, cannot preclude the Court to consider the relevancy, admissibility and reliability of those document at a proper stage. 10. It is relevant to note that by Amendment Act 46 of 1999, provisions of Order 18, Rule 17A of the C.P.C., have been omitted w.e.f. 1.7.2002. The Amendment Act 22 of 2002 inserted sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 Order 7 w.e.f. 1.7.2002, which reads thus:- "A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit." 11. In order to appreciate the distinction it will be useful to consider the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14 of the C.P.C. before the amendment by Act 46 of 1999, which stood thus:- "Rule 14 - Production of document on which plaintiff sues - (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document in his possession or power, he shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented, and shall at the same time deliver the document or a copy thereof to be filed with the plaint. (2)List of other documents - Where he relies on any other documents (whether in his possession or power or not) as evidence in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list to be added or annexed to the plaint." 12. By the aforesaid amending Act as well as before amendment by Act 22 of 2002, the same stood thus:- "14. By the aforesaid amending Act as well as before amendment by Act 22 of 2002, the same stood thus:- "14. Production of document on which plaintiff sues or relies - (1) Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon document in his possession or power in support of his claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a copy thereof, to be filled with the plaint. (2) Where any such document is not in possession or power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state in whose possession or power it is. (3) A document which ought to be produced in Court by the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. (4) Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced for the cross-examination of the plaintiffs witnesses, or handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory." 13. A bare perusal of the scheme would make it clear that there was no insertion of sub-rule (3) of Rule 14 Order 7 or substitution of sub-rule (3) by the Amendment Act 22 of 2002 as indicated above. The distinction could be noted under Rule 17A Order 18 of the C.P.C. to meet out a situation where the documents, were either not presented along with the plaint or not entered in the list annexed with the suit, which were to be tendered by the plaintiff in evidence later-on. Thus, it is evident that the Legislature in its wisdom by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 omitted the provisions of Rule 17A Order 18 of C.P.C. Therefore, the plaintiff would be entitled to tender the document in evidence even if he failed to tender them along with plaint or on account of omission of the entry in the list for tendering evidence at the hearing of the suit. Hence, the leave of Court that was to be obtained under Order 18, Rule 17A of C.P.C., is now to be obtained under Order 7, Rule 14 (3) of C.P.C. 14. Hence, the leave of Court that was to be obtained under Order 18, Rule 17A of C.P.C., is now to be obtained under Order 7, Rule 14 (3) of C.P.C. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the judgment delivered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ramesh Chandra & Ors. v. Additional District Judge & Ors., 2010(1) WLC 48 : 2009 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1575 . In that case, reliance was placed on the opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple & Am., I (2003) 8 SCC 752 wherein their Lordships observed that objection regarding I admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes : (i) an I objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in I evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the I document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. The objection to its admissibility is not excluded to I be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision whereas in the later case the objection cannot be allowed to be raised at any subsequent stage as to marking of the document as an exhibit. Their Lordships held that crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular, and the omission to object becomes fatal only on account of his failure to object. A prompt objection does not prejudice the party H tendering the evidence, for two reasons&, firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly, in the event of finding of the Court on the mode of proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. 15. 15. Having considered the rival submissions made on behalf of the learned Counsel for the parties and taking into consideration the material available on record, in my opinion, the impugned order dated 12.7.2013 passed by the learned Trial Court appears to be corrected. 16. The scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited and narrow. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent pronouncement in case of Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, 2010 AIR SCW 6387 : 2010 (2) DNJ (SC) 781 held thus:- "62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 the Constitution, interfere with the orders of Tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. in cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court, in this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waiyam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (j) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of Tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manfest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgment by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (I) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (I) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of inteference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a half and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. 63. In the facts of the present case we find that the petition has been entertained as a writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant amongst private parties. 64. It is well settled that a writ petition is a remedy in public law which may be filed by any person but the main respondent should be either Government, Governmental agencies or a State or instrumentalities of a State within the meaning of Article 12. Private individuals cannot be equated with State or instrumentalities of the State. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 17. All the respondents in a writ petition cannot be private parties. But private parties acting in collusion with State can be respondents in a writ petition. Under the phraseology of Article 226, High Court can issue writ to any person, but the person against whom writ will be issued must have some statutory or public duty to perform." 17. For the reasons and discussions hereinabove the writ application preferred on behalf of the petitioner/defendant, lacks merit and deserves to be dismissed. However, the petitioner/defendant will be at liberty to raise all the grounds at the stage of final hearing of the civil suit. 18. In the result, the writ application is hereby dismissed. 19. In view of the final adjudication on the writ application, the stay application stands closed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.Petition dismissed. *******