Judgment : PARESH UPADHYAY, J. – Heard Mr. S. I. Nanavati learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Saurabh Mehta, for the petitioner and Mr. T. R. Mishra, learned Advocate for the respondent-Union. 2. Challenge in this petition is made to the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad dated 13-1-2005 in Reference (I.T.) No. 325 of 1999. By the said award, the Tribunal has allowed the demand of the respondent-Union of getting leave encashment at the time of retirement of an employee, to the extent of 300 days earned leave. The Tribunal has further directed the petitioner-employer to give said benefit to its employees with effect from 1-1-1998. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that the service conditions of the employees are governed by the service rules of the petitioner authority, wherein there is no such provision of leave encashment of earned leave at the time of retirement, and the Tribunal, has by the impugned order, passed the order which is inconsistent with the Rules of the petitioner. It is further contended that, in effect, the Tribunal has amended the rules, which is impermissible in law, and therefore, the impugned award which is even otherwise stayed by this Court, since the preliminary hearing, be quashed and set aside. Learned Counsel for the petitioner during the course of hearing had also placed on record, copy of the staff rules in support of his contention. 4.1. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondent, Mr. T. R. Mishra vehemently contended that what is granted by the Tribunal was legal and proper and this Court may not interfere. Attention of the Court is also drawn to the order of the Government dated 19-2-1998 whereby the ceiling of accumulation of earned leave, which was 240 days was increased to 300 days. It is also pointed out that by the said resolution the ceiling of encashment was also revised by the Government from 240 days to 300 days. It is further contended that, the pay-scale applicable to the employees of petitioner organization were on the lines of the Government, from time to time and in view of the order of the Government as referred above, the ceiling of leave encashment from 240 days to 300 days should automatically be applicable to the members of the respondent-Union as well. It is further contended that, the pay-scale applicable to the employees of petitioner organization were on the lines of the Government, from time to time and in view of the order of the Government as referred above, the ceiling of leave encashment from 240 days to 300 days should automatically be applicable to the members of the respondent-Union as well. It is further contented that the interpretation of service condition as given by the Industrial Tribunal should not be interfered with by this Court, since as per settled position of law, the provisions are to be read and construed in beneficial way to the workers. 4.2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the following decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in support of his contention : (i) Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 188 . (ii) Tejinder Singh v. M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 51 . (iii) Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. The 2nd Punjab Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 329 . (iv) Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Brijnandan Pandey, AIR 1957 SC 1 (v) Co-operative Central Bank Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad, AIR 1970 SC 245 . 5.1. Having heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and having gone through the record, I find that there is no provision in the Rules of the petitioner organisation, that at the time of retirement, any employee will receive encashment of earned leave, which may be at his credit in his leave account. Only because the pay-scales or increase in dearness allowance, of the employees of the petitioner organization, is at par with the Government, itself would be no ground to claim that, since in case of Government employees there is provision of leave encashment, the same provision should be there in petitioner organization as well. 5.2. Further, the thrust of argument of learned Counsel for the respondent is the Government Resolution dated 19-2-1998, whereby the Government had revised the ceiling of leave which could be accumulated at the credit of any employee, from 240 days to 300 days. By the said Government resolution, it was also decided that existing ceiling of encashment of earned leave at the time of retirement will be increased from 240 days to 300 days. By the said Government resolution, it was also decided that existing ceiling of encashment of earned leave at the time of retirement will be increased from 240 days to 300 days. This resolution cannot be read as mandate to petitioner organization also, to start paying encashment of leave at the time of retirement of an employee, which was not there at all in the service Rules. Learned Counsel for the respondent could not dispute that, in the petitioner organization there was no provision of leave encashment at all. Therefore, if the issue is, to what extent encashment should be paid, then Government Resolution dated 19-2-1998 may come to the rescue of the respondent, however, as recorded above, it is undisputed that when there is no provision in service condition to grant encashment to any employee at the time of his retirement, this resolution cannot be read to be a mandate to have such provision. Under these circumstances, the very basis of claim of respondent-Union is untenable. True, it is that at one stage, the petitioner authorities had, in principle moved to have that arrangement, but before it got status of amendment in service condition, the same was dropped by the authorities. The authorities even thought of moving the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, however subsequently the Registrar replied by saying that it was for the petitioner to take decision on its own. All these factors together, cannot take the case of the respondent-Union any further, since there was no provision in the service conditions to that effect and the Tribunal cannot be permitted to command the petitioner to have such provision in service conditions, under the guise of liberal interpretation or benevolent reading of the provisions for the employees. 5.3. So far reliance placed by learned Advocate for the respondent on the authorities cited above is concerned, it needs to be recorded that there cannot be any dispute with regard to the proposition of law enunciated therein, but none of the authorities deal with the fact situation like the present one, and therefore, these decisions will not take the case of the respondent any further. 5.4. Considering the totality, I find that the impugned award of the Industrial Tribunal cannot be allowed to stand in the eyes of law. 5.4. Considering the totality, I find that the impugned award of the Industrial Tribunal cannot be allowed to stand in the eyes of law. Be it noted that during the pendency of this petition, the impugned award has remained unsuspended and the same needs to be confirmed. 6. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is allowed. The impugned award of the Industrial Tribunal, Ahmedabad dated 13-1-2005 in Reference (I.T.) No. 325 of 1999 is quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.