JUDGMENT 1. This writ petition is filed by the petitioner seeking to appoint him for the post of Sales Person in the Primary Agricultural society and Agricultural Cooperative Society under priority quota of physically handicapped pursuant to the advertisement No.1/2012, dated 01.11.2012. 2. By a notification, dated 01.11.2012, the District Recruitment Bureau, Nagapattinam District called for applications for the post of Sales Person and packers in various cooperative societies. The number of posts for which advertisement was called for were worked out to 104 and that the institutions for which advertisement was made including cooperative marketing society, agricultural cooperative sales society, primary cooperative stores, primary agricultural cooperative credit society and other societies. The posts so advertised were also subjected to communal roster as set out in the advertisement. But in the said advertisement, nothing is provided in respect of any quota for disabled candidates. The contention of the petitioner was that under Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 3% reservation has to be made for disabled persons. The petitioner claimed that he has got 60% physical disablement and have also got an identity card. 3. It is not clear as to how such a writ petition is maintainable. The posts which are to be filled up are in respect of cooperative societies, which is not an "establishment" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Disabilities Act. The cooperative society is not a corporation established under the Central or State Act. It is neither a body controlled or aided by the Government. It is also not a local authority as well as a Government company in terms of Section 617 of the Companies Act. It is only in case where an establishment is covered by the provisions of the Act, the question of applying Section 33 of the Disabilities Act will arise. Even in respect of Section 33, it is preceded by Section 32, by which the appropriate Government will have to identify the post in an "establishment" which can be reserved for persons with disability. Section 33 will apply only to an appointment made by the Government in respect of every establishment. 4. Even in respect of Section 33, it is preceded by Section 32, by which the appropriate Government will have to identify the post in an "establishment" which can be reserved for persons with disability. Section 33 will apply only to an appointment made by the Government in respect of every establishment. 4. The Supreme Court while dealing with cooperative societies has held that they are not an instrumentality to the State and the Government cannot have general power under Article 162 to give directions, vide its judgment in A. Umarani v. Registrar, Coop. Societies reported in (2004) 7 SCC 112 . In paragraphs 22,23 and 60, it was observed as follows : "22.Section 182 of the 1983 Act reads as under: “182. Power of Government to give directions.—(1) The Government may, in the public interest, by order, direct the Registrar to make an inquiry or to take appropriate proceedings under this Act, in any case specified in the order, and the Registrar shall report to the Government the result of the inquiry made or the proceedings taken by him within a period of six months from the date of such order or such further period as the Government may permit. (2) In any case, in which a direction has been given under sub-section (1), the Government may, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, call for and examine the record of the proceedings of the Registrar and pass such orders in the case as they may think fit: Provided that before passing any order under this sub-section the person likely to be affected by such order shall be given an opportunity of making his representation.” 23. A bare perusal of the aforementioned provision would clearly go to show that the impugned government order could not have been issued by the State in terms thereof as the same can be taken recourse to only for the purposes mentioned therein and not for any other. It is not a case where the Government directed the Registrar to make an enquiry against a person in the public interest. Article 162 of the Constitution of India provides for extension of executive power to the matters with respect of which the legislature of the State has power to make laws. It is not a case where the Government directed the Registrar to make an enquiry against a person in the public interest. Article 162 of the Constitution of India provides for extension of executive power to the matters with respect of which the legislature of the State has power to make laws. Article 162 of the Constitution by no stretch of imagination is attracted as the source of the power of the State to pass an appropriate order must be traced to the provisions of the Act itself. If the State had no power to issue the said GOMs No. 86 dated 12-3-2001, the same must be held to be a nullity. 60. Although we do not intend to express any opinion as to whether the cooperative society is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India but it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the writ petition will be maintainable when the action of the cooperative society is violative of mandatory statutory provisions. In this case except the nodal centre functions and supervision of the cooperative society, the State has no administrative control over its day-to-day affairs. The State has not created any post nor could it do so on its own. The State has not borne any part of the financial burden. It was, therefore, impermissible for the State to direct regularisation of the services of the employees of the cooperative societies. Such an order cannot be upheld also on the ground that the employees allegedly served the cooperative societies for a long time. 5. When once a cooperative society for which the present recruitment is taking place is held to be not a State or an instrumentality of the State, then the provisions of the Disabilities Act will not apply to such an establishment which are not covered by Section 2(k) of the Act. The said issue came to be considered by the Supreme Court vide judgment in Dalco Engineering Private Limited v. Satish Prabhakar Padhye reported in (2010) 4 SCC 378 and in paragraphs 31, 32 and 35, it was observed as follows : "31. We agree that the socio-economic legislations should be interpreted liberally. It is also true that courts should adopt different yardsticks and measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes, as compared to penal statutes and taxing statutes. But a caveat. We agree that the socio-economic legislations should be interpreted liberally. It is also true that courts should adopt different yardsticks and measures for interpreting socio-economic statutes, as compared to penal statutes and taxing statutes. But a caveat. The courts cannot obviously expand the application of a provision in a socioeconomic legislation by judicial interpretation, to levels unintended by the legislature, or in a manner which militates against the provisions of the statute itself or against any constitutional limitations. In this case, there is a clear indication in the statute that the benefit is intended to be restricted to a particular class of employees, that is employees of enumerated establishments (which fall within the scope of “State” under Article 12). Express limitations placed by the socio-economic statute cannot be ignored, so as to include in its application, those who are clearly excluded by such statute itself. 32. We should not lose sight of the fact that the words “corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act” is a term used in several enactments, intended to convey a standard meaning. It is not a term which has any special significance or meaning in the context of the Disabilities Act or any other socio-economic legislations. It is a term used in various enactments, to refer to statutory corporations as contrasted from non-statutory companies. Any interpretation of the said term, to include private sector, will not only amount to overruling the clear enunciation in Dhanoa which has held the field for nearly three decades, but more importantly lead to the erasure of the distinction maintained in the Constitution between statutory corporations which are “State” and non-statutory bodies and corporations for the purposes of enforcement of fundamental rights. The interpretation put forth by the employee would make employees of all companies, public servants, amenable to punishment under the provisions of the Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act; and would also result in all nonstatutory companies and private sector companies being included in the definition of “State” thereby requiring them to comply with the requirements of non-discrimination, equality in employment, reservations, etc. 35. As the appellant in CA No. 1886 of 2007 and the third respondent in CA No. 1858 of 2007, are not establishments within the meaning of that expression in Section 2(k) of the Act, Section 47 of the Act will not apply." 6. 35. As the appellant in CA No. 1886 of 2007 and the third respondent in CA No. 1858 of 2007, are not establishments within the meaning of that expression in Section 2(k) of the Act, Section 47 of the Act will not apply." 6. In the light of the above, there is no case made out by the petitioner. The writ petition will stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed.