Hon'ble SIRADHANA, J.—In the instant writ application, the petitioners/defendants have challenged the legality and validity of the order dated 4th December, 1996 passed by the learned trial Court on an Application No.27/1995 seeking mandatory interim Temporary Injunction and order dated 17th March, 2012 passed by the appellate Court on and an appeal preferred against the order dated 4th December, 1996. 2. Briefly, the essential material facts necessary for adjudication of the controversy raised are, that the petitioners/plaintiffs instituted a civil suit in representative capacity on 25th July, 1995 for declaration and Permanent Injunction claiming right of way on the property in dispute. The application for mandatory interim Temporary Injunction was responded by the respondents/ defendants. On 29th July, 1995, the learned trial Court appointed Court Commissioner to inspect the site and submit a report. It is also urged that on an inspection of the site made earlier in the year 1993, the entire way was shown to be open without any obstruction. 3. The learned trial Court taking into consideration the pleaded facts and after hearing the counsel for the parties declined the prayer for mandatory interim Temporary Injunction, however, issued an injunction to maintain status quo, in accordance with the status as per the report of the Court Commissioner dated 29.7.1995. The petitioners-plaintiffs assailed the impugned order dated 4.12.1996 before the appellate Court, as is evident from the order dated 18.5.2001; which was subjected to further challenge by way of a writ application before this Court and in consequence, the matter was remanded for decision afresh, setting aside the order dated 18.5.2001, by this Court on 12.12.2003. The learned appellate Court on a re-consideration of the matter passed the impugned order dated 17.3.2012, upholding the order dated 4.12.1996 passed by the learned trial Court, which is again under challenge in the instant writ application. 4. The counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs reiterating the pleaded facts argued that the learned trial Court and the appellate Court, committed apparent illegality on the face of record in not taking into consideration the provisions of Section 91 and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, for grant of mandatory interim Temporary Injunction. 4. The counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs reiterating the pleaded facts argued that the learned trial Court and the appellate Court, committed apparent illegality on the face of record in not taking into consideration the provisions of Section 91 and Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, for grant of mandatory interim Temporary Injunction. Moreover, the dispute relates to right of public way, but the Courts below by misreading and misconstruing the report of the Court Commissioner dated 29th July, 1995; fell in gross error of law and fact, while declining the relief of mandatory interim Temporary Injunction. The learned counsel urged that the learned Courts below have erred in not appreciating the prima facie case in favour of the petitioners as well as the irreparable loss, and balance of convenience which is heavily loaded in favour of the petitioners. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners/plaintiffs and perused the material available on record. 6. It is not in dispute that the learned trial Court appointed a Court Commissioner to inspect the site and submit a report, which was submitted on 29th July, 1995. The learned trial Court while deciding the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, considered the rival claims in the light of the pleaded facts as well as in view of the material available on record and arrived at a finding and conclusion, that the contesting parties could not substantiate the rival claim staked and assertions made, by furnishing any convincing, substantial and reliable evidence. However, in order to balance the competing claims, pending the final adjudication of the matter, the learned trial Court made an order to maintain status quo, in accordance with the report of the site, furnished by the Court Commissioner dated 29th July, 1995 and not to make any change in the nature of the property in dispute by raising any kind of obstructions or constructions. The learned appellate Court has also examined the issue and after a detailed discussion of the factual matrix, in the light of the pleaded facts and material present on record as well as the nature of the rival claims; in order to preserve the property in dispute and so also to prevent multiplicity of litigation, upheld the order dated 4th December, 1996 passed by the learned trial Court. 7. 7. The learned Trial Court considered all the relevant factors of the matter and thereafter, passed limited interim order to maintain status-quo, in accordance with the report of the site furnished by the Court Commissioner dated 29th July, 1995. The case at hand is not one where a mandatory interim temporary injunction, as prayed for by the petitioners was justified. The learned Trial Court taking into consideration the pleaded facts and material available on record, passed a reasoned order, and, by no stretch of imagination it could be construed that the Trial Court exercised the discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or perverse manner, or ignored the settled principles of law regarding grant or refusal of interlocutory injunction. It is settled law that the reliefs of interlocutory temporary injunction are granted generally to preserve or restore the status-quo of the last not known contested status, which proceeded the pending controversy until the final adjudication. Since grant of injunction to a party, who fails or would fail to establish his right at the trial, may cause a grave inconvenience or irreparable loss to the party against whom the injunction was granted. So also not granting of it to a party who succeeds or would succeed, may equally cause great injustice or irreparable loss and therefore, Courts have evolved the three guiding principles i.e., (a) a strong case for trial in favour of the plaintiff and the standard shall be higher than a prima facie that is normally required for a prohibitory injunction, (b) to prevent irreparable loss or serious injury, which may not be compensated in terms of money at the stage of final adjudication, and (c) balance of convenience heavily loaded in favour of the one seeking such a relief. Moreover, grant or refusal of an interim interlocutory injunction is essentially an equitable relief and shall ultimately rest in the sound judicial discretion of the Court to be exercised in the light of the peculair facts, circumstances and material available on record in a given case. 8. In the case of Kishore Kumar Khaitan & Anr. vs. Praveen Kumar Singh : (2006) 3 SCC 312 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterating the principles with reference to the interim mandatory injunction held thus:- “6. An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. 8. In the case of Kishore Kumar Khaitan & Anr. vs. Praveen Kumar Singh : (2006) 3 SCC 312 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterating the principles with reference to the interim mandatory injunction held thus:- “6. An interim mandatory injunction is not a remedy that is easily granted. It is an order that is passed only in circumstances which are clear and the prima facie materials clearly justify a finding that the status quo has been altered by one of the parties to the litigation and the interests of justice demanded that the status quo ante be restored by way of an interim mandatory injunction. Keeping this principle in mind, it is necessary to see whether in the case on hand, the Addl. District Judge was justified in passing the interim order of injunction.” 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the facts, circumstances and materials available on record and also perused the impugned orders. A bare perusal of the impugned order dated 4th December, 1996; upheld by the appellate Court, would reveal that the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court exercised the discretion vested in a proper and just manner, and have not committed any error manifest and apparent on the face of record. 10. There is no element of any grave injustice or gross failure of justice occasioned or ignorance/disregard of the provisions of law, so as to call for interference by this Court under supervisory jurisdiction. 11. In the case of Abdul Razak (Dead) through LRs & Anr. vs. Mangesh Rajaram Wagle & Ors. : (2010) 2 SCC 432 = 2010(1) RLW 954 (SC), the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned the High Court to keep in view the limitations of certiorari/ supervisory jurisdiction while deciding the writ petitions filed under Article 226 or petitions/applications filed under Article 227 of the Constitution. After a survey of several pronouncements earlier as well as or an analysis of Articles 226 & 227, in case of Abdul Razak (supra), their Lordships held thus:- “22. If respondent Nos. After a survey of several pronouncements earlier as well as or an analysis of Articles 226 & 227, in case of Abdul Razak (supra), their Lordships held thus:- “22. If respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had invoked the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226, then the learned Single Judge ought to have considered whether the trial Court committed a jurisdictional error by refusing to strike off the additional written statement filed by the appellants or it was a case of failure on the part of the trial Court to exercise the power vested in it under Order VI Rule 16 CPC or the order under challenge was vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record or there was violation of the rules of natural justice. In either case, the learned Single Judge was also required to consider whether there has been substantial failure of justice or manifest injustice has been caused to respondent Nos. 1 and 2 on account of the trial Court's refusal to strike off the additional written statement. These are the parameters laid down by this Court in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan AIR 1964 SC 477 . 23. If the petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, then the learned Single Judge should have taken note of the often quoted judgment in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai (2003) 6 SCC 675 , in which a two-Judge Bench, after threadbare analysis of Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution and considering large number of judicial precedents on the subject, recorded the following conclusions: "(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1-7-2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction -- by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction -- by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred thereagainst and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case." 12. Applying the principles aforesaid on the facts and circumstances of the case at hand, it is not at all justified to interfere with an order under the certiorari/supervisory jurisdiction, unless the Court below assumed jurisdiction, which it does not have or has failed to exercise the jurisdiction, which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is exercised in a manner not permitted by the law, resulting into failure of the justice or grave injustice. A patent error which can be perceived without any lengthy or complicated arguments or a long drawn process of reasoning, is another ground where such jurisdiction could be invoked. The Hon'ble Apex Court of the land in a recent pronouncement in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil : (2010) 8 SCC 329 , again examined the nature power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. Their Lordships observed that the power to issue writs had undergone a sea change since the commencement of the Constitution from 26th January, 1950. Now, the writs can be issued by the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution and by the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. According to their Lordships, neither writ petition can be moved under Article 227 of the Constitution nor can a writ be issued under Article 227 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after a survey of various earlier judgments with reference to exercise and nature of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution; concluded that the two Articles stand substantially on different footing. While the power conferred to issue writs under Article 226 of the Constitution has been treated to be one during the course of original proceedings whereas the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is neither original nor appellate. Thus, the powers conferred under Article 226 and 227 have been held to be separate and distinct and operate in different fields. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) has been considered and explained thus:- “48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. Jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex-debito justicia or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a Letters Patent Appeal or an intra Court Appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 62. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by High Court under these two Articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of Superintendence on the High Courts under Article227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, on the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of its power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh (supra) and the principles in Waryam Singh (supra) have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh (supra), followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, 'within the bounds of their authority'. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0261/1997: (1997) 3 SCC 261 and therefore abridgement by a Constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this Article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this Article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 13. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case at hand, I find that the writ petition projects a challenge to the order passed by the Civil Court dated 9th October, 2013 involving a dispute between two private parties. It hardly needs to be reiterated that writ petition is a remedy in a public law against either a State or an instrumentality of a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution and therefore, private parties cannot be equated with the 'State' or the instrumentality of the 'State'. Their Lordships in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty (supra) have sounded a note of caution while entertaining the petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution in view of law declared in case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. : (2003) 6 SCC 675 , holding that even the petition Article 227 of the Constitution cannot be called a writ application. Their Lordships further explaining the scope of exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of amendment of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, held thus:- “66. We may also observe that in some High Courts there is tendency of entertaining petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution by terming them as writ petitions. This is sought to be justified on an erroneous appreciation of the ratio in Surya Dev (supra) and in view of the recent amendment to Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999. It is urged that as a result of the amendment, scope of Section115 of CPC has been curtailed. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. In our view, even if the scope of Section 115 CPC is curtailed that has not resulted in expanding High Court's power of superintendence. It is too well known to be reiterated that in exercising its jurisdiction, High Court must follow the regime of law. 67. As a result of frequent interference by Hon'ble High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution with pending civil and at times criminal cases, the disposal of cases by the civil and criminal courts gets further impeded and thus causing serious problems in the administration of justice. This Court hopes and trusts that in exercising its power either under Article 226 or 227, Hon'ble High Court will follow the time honoured principles discussed above. Those principles have been formulated by this Court for ends of justice and the High Courts as the highest Courts of justice within their jurisdiction will adhere to them strictly.” 14. For the reasons and discussions herein above, the writ application is without any substance and therefore, deserves to be dismissed. 15. Ordered accordingly. 16. In view of the final adjudication on the writ application, the stay application stands closed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.