JUDGMENT 1. This second appeal is focused by the plaintiff, inveighing the judgment and decree dated 14.08.2012 passed by the learned II Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in A.S.No.8 of 2011 in confirming the judgment and decree dated 04.10.2010 passed by the XIV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in O.S.No.8765 of 2008. 2. The parties, for the sake of convenience, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. The epitome and the long and short of the germane facts absolutely necessary for the disposal of this second appeal would run thus: a] The plaintiff Kadalarasi, claiming to be the managing partner of "Samayal Rani Homely foods" filed the suit setting out various averments, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus: The plaintiff took on lease the suit property described in the schedule of the plaint from D1 during the year 2002 as a tenant and started the business there along with 12 other partners on 21.02.2003 under the name and style "Samayal Rani Homely Foods", which is a women self help group. Rental advance of Rs.1,30,000/-was paid by the plaintiff to D1 and also an undertaking was given to pay a sum of Rs.1,000/- per month towards rent. D2 and D3 are claiming to be the purchasers of the suit property in a public auction. Wherefore, D1 directed the plaintiff to pay the rent to them. D2 accepted the advance amount paid to D1 and they started receiving the rents from the plaintiff up to October 2008 in person; but they do not give any receipt. Subsequently D2 and D3 refused to receive the rent. Wherefore, the cheque No.884503 dated 22.11.2008 drawn on Indian Overseas Bank, Thiruvottiyur Branch in favour of D2 was sent by the plaintiff along with the covering letter. However, D2 did not encash the said cheque; but D2 and D3 are threatening to evict the plaintiff forcibly. Subsequently D2 and D3 refused to receive the rent. Wherefore, the cheque No.884503 dated 22.11.2008 drawn on Indian Overseas Bank, Thiruvottiyur Branch in favour of D2 was sent by the plaintiff along with the covering letter. However, D2 did not encash the said cheque; but D2 and D3 are threatening to evict the plaintiff forcibly. Hence the suit seeking the following prayer: To pass a judgment and decree as against the defendants - - for a permanent injunction restraining defendant and their men, agent, servants or any other person acting under them from in any manner interfering in to the uninterrupted peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property of the plaintiff concern the "Samayal Rani Homely Foods" by trespassing into the suit property and evicting the plaintiff from the suit scheduled property without any authority and due process of law and for costs. (extracted as such) b] Per contra, D2 and D3 filed the written statement, the gist and kernel of them would run thus: D2 and D3 purchased the suit property on 11.06.2007 in the auction conducted by the creditor bank concerned under the SARFAESI Act and accordingly they took possession of it. The allegations as found set out in the plaint are all false and frivolous. In fact, the plaintiff entered the suit property by breaking open the window leaving the entrance door under lock and key. The plaintiff is not at all the tenant under the defendants. Accordingly, they prayed for the dismissal of the suit. c] Issues were set down for trial, during which, on the plaintiffs' side, the said Kadalarasi examined herself as P.W.1 and Exs.A1 to A10 were marked. On the defendants' side D3 examined himself as D.W.1 and Exs.B1 to B5 were marked. d] Ultimately, the trial court dismissed the suit; as against which, the plaintiff preferred the appeal for nothing but to be dismissed by the first appellate court confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. e] Challenging and impugning the judgments and decrees of both the courts below, the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal on various grounds and also suggesting the following substantial questions of law: 1. The appellant court without adhering to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 25 as to not framing issues is fatal and perusal of the issues framed by the appellate court is somewhat astounding and astonishing. 2. The appellant court without adhering to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 25 as to not framing issues is fatal and perusal of the issues framed by the appellate court is somewhat astounding and astonishing. 2. Whether the court below in view of the first respondent and appellant are kith and kin and the first respondent who is rather suppressed the right of appellant to remain in possession under Section 108 of the T.P. Act, the tenancy attornment is a must, therefore the court below failed to consider the oft repeated jargon possession is nine point of law? 3. Having the trial court upheld the possession of the suit property stating that the appellant failed to establish her right as tenant without taken in to surrounding circumstances and ought to have considered the salient point of possession remained with appellant but given unwarranted findings not borne out by the record. Also Order 21 Rule 36 of CPC is applicable. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. 5. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2012(8) SCC 148 [Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another]. 6. Keeping in mind the dictum as found evinced in it, I ventured to analyse the records to find out as to whether any substantial question of law is involved in this matter. 7. Indubitably and indisputably, incontrovertibly and unassailably, the suit property was brought for sale in public auction under the SARFAESI Act wherein admittedly D2 and D3 happened to be the successful bidders and the sale certificate was issued in their favour by the authority concerned and in pursuance of the same, possession was taken by D2 and D3. In the wake of this incontrovertible evidence as found exemplified in the form of Exs.B1 to B4, the plaintiff would unsatisfactorily and unconvincingly venture to plead that she happened to be a tenant under D1; as against her proceedings were taken and the suit property was auctioned. Both the courts below gave a finding of fact to the effect that absolutely there is no iota or shred, shard or miniscule, pint or jot of evidence to proclaim and convey that the plaintiff entered into the suit property during the year 2002 and started enjoying it as a tenant. Both the courts below gave a finding of fact to the effect that absolutely there is no iota or shred, shard or miniscule, pint or jot of evidence to proclaim and convey that the plaintiff entered into the suit property during the year 2002 and started enjoying it as a tenant. It is a pure question of fact and both the courts below after analysing the evidence arrived at such a conclusion and I could see no perversity or illegality in such a finding. 8. The core question arises as to whether the plaintiff claiming to be the tenant under D1, the debtor of the bank was entitled to file such a suit quite antithetical to the embargo as contained in Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act. 9. I would like to refer to the following decisions in this regard. (extracted as such) (i) Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 2007(2) CTC 193 -SREE LAKSHMI PRODUCTS REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER S.LAKSHMI PRABHA V. STATE BANK OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY BRANCH MANAGER, COIMBATORE. Certain excerpts from it would run thus: "9. On a plain reading of the observations made in Transcore case it is clear that the bank/FI is entitled to take actual possession of the secured assets from the borrower or from any other person in terms of section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. Any transfer of secured assets after taking possession of the same by the bank/FI shall vest in the transferee all rights in relation to the secured assets as if the transfer has been made by the owner of such secured assets. Any party aggrieved by such dispossession will have to take recourse to approaching the DRT under Section 17(4) of the SARFAESI Act. If the party is dispossessed, not in accordance with the provisions of the Act, then the DRT is entitled to put the clock back by restoring the status quo ante. By virtue of Section 17(4) read with Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, if in a given case the measures undertaken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) come in conflict with the provisions of any State law, then notwithstanding to such conflict, the provisions of Section 13(4) shall override the local law. By virtue of Section 17(4) read with Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act, if in a given case the measures undertaken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) come in conflict with the provisions of any State law, then notwithstanding to such conflict, the provisions of Section 13(4) shall override the local law. Section 13(13) of the SARFAESI Act operates as an attachment/injunction restraining the borrower from disposing of the secured assets and therefore, any tenancy created after such notice would be null and void. Any tenancy created by the mortgager after the mortgage in contravention of Section 65-A would not be binding on the bank/FI, and in any event such tenancy rights shall stand determined once action under Section 13(4) has been taken by the bank/FI. When the petitioner is claiming a tenancy prior to the creation of mortgage and such tenancy is disputed by the bank the remedy of the petitioner is to approach DRT by way of an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to establish its rights." (ii) Division Bench Judgment of this Court reported in 2011(2) CTC 474 - INDIAN BANK V. 1.NIPPON ENTERPRISES SOUTH, REPRESENTED BY ITS PARTNER AND OTHERS (iii) Judgment of this Court reported in 2012 (6) CTC 153 - K.R. RADHAKRISHNAN V. K & N TRADE, REP. BY MANAGING PARTNER L.KANNAN AND OTHERS (iv) Unreported Division Bench judgment of this Court dated 24.1.2013 passed in W.P.No.4913 of 2012 (ASHAKINA BEGUM V. 1.T.M.VARATHARAJAN AND OTHERS. A mere running of the eye over those precedents would unambiguously and unequivocally highlight and spotlight the fact that whatever grievance the so called tenant under D1, the debtor of the Bank, might have, she could only approach the authorities under the SARFAESI Act, which had ample powers to protect her if at all she had any genuine legal right. In this case, she has chosen to simply file a suit holus bolus without any rhyme or reason and that was why both the courts below appropriately and appositely dismissed the suit, warranting no interference in this second appeal. 10. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also would proceed to argue that the Tribunals under the Act are not civil Courts having inherent powers and they cannot go beyond the powers conferred by the special Act. 11. 10. The learned counsel for the plaintiff also would proceed to argue that the Tribunals under the Act are not civil Courts having inherent powers and they cannot go beyond the powers conferred by the special Act. 11. In respect of that argument, I would like to recollect and call up the following maxims: (a) Verba generalia genaraliter sunt intelligenda -General words are to be understood generally. (b) Verba ita sunt intelligenda, ut res magis valeat quam pereat -Words are to be so understood that the matter may have effect rather than fail. 12. Those sister maxims would unambiguously and unequivocally indicate and mandate the fact that a statute has to be interpreted in such a manner so as to make it meaningful and the interpretation should not render any of the provisions otiose. 13. I would like to cite suo motu the decision of the Honourable Apex Court reported in (2004) SUPREME COURT CASES 311 - MARDIA CHEMICALS LTD AND OTHERS AND OTHER CASES. 14. The Honourable Apex Court upheld the vires of the said SARFAESI Act and in fact the Courts repeatedly held that the provisions of the Act should be implemented in full force and there should not be any compromise with it. If it is taken that persons like the plaintiff who are virtually having the intention to cause obstruction, are not to be applicants before the Tribunals under the SARFAESI Act, then that would amount to rendering the salient provisions of the SARFAESI Act otiose. 15. All told, I could see no question of law, much less substantial question of law is involved in this matter. Accordingly, this second appeal is dismissed. However there shall be no order as to costs.