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2013 DIGILAW 236 (GUJ)

STATE OF GUJARAT v. CHANDUBHAI DESAIBHAI

2013-04-24

HARSHA DEVANI

body2013
JUDGMENT : 1. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners – the State of Gujarat have challenged the order dated 16.06.2009 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”) in Revision Application No.TEN/BA/381/ 2005, whereby the Tribunal has set aside the order dated 30.04.2005 passed by the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Vadodara in Tenancy/Appeal/Case No.37/2004 as well as the order dated 25.07.1980 passed by the Mamlatdar & Agriculture Lands Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Mamlatdar & ALT”) in Tenancy Case No.3050. 2. The facts of the case stated briefly are that the land bearing survey No.177/1, admeasuring Hectares 0-16-19 square metres of Mouje Manjalpur, Taluka & District Vadodara (hereinafter referred to as “the subject land”) were of the ownership of one Manjibhai Nathabhai and Bhaijibhai Nathabhai. By a registered sale deed dated 30.06.1958, the predecessor-in-title of the respondents No.1 to 3 purchased the said lands pursuant to which, mutation entry No.776 came to be posted in the village form No.6. Subsequently, the competent authority confirmed the mutation entry with an endorsement “It is a fragment; however, 7/12 reveals that there is a tenant. Issue notice under section 135(d), preparing the papers, fine of Rs.1/-approved.” It appears that thereafter, the record of rights team obtained information from the Manjalpur village record in the context of the amended provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Tenancy Act”) and was of the view that the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act were applicable to survey No.177/1 and accordingly, proceedings came to be initiated under the said provisions, which culminated into an order dated 25.07.1980 passed by the Mamlatdar & Agricultural Lands Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “the Mamlatdar & ALT”) in Tenancy Case No.3050, whereby it was held that the respondent No.4 – Mohanbhai Kalabhai was a tenant under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act and was, therefore, entitled to get back the possession. However, since he was not willing to take back the possession, it was ordered that the land be vested in the State Government and be disposed of under section 32P of the Tenancy Act. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, the respondents No.1 to 3 filed an appeal before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Vadodara being Tenancy Appeal No.37/2004. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT, the respondents No.1 to 3 filed an appeal before the Deputy Collector, Land Reforms, Vadodara being Tenancy Appeal No.37/2004. The Deputy Collector dismissed the said appeal by an order dated 30.04.2005 mainly on the ground of delay and confirmed the order dated 25.07.1980 passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT. Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed a revision application before the Tribunal, which allowed the revision application and set aside the orders passed by the Deputy Collector as well as the Mamlatdar & ALT, which has given rise to the present petition at the instance of the State of Gujarat. 4. Assailing the impugned order passed by the Tribunal, Ms. Nisha Thakore, learned Assistant Government Pleader, submitted that the respondent No.4 – Mohanbhai Kalabhai was a tenant on 15.06.1955, viz., the appointed date and the sale deed in favour of the ancestors of the respondents No.1 to 3 came to be executed in 1958. Under the Tenancy Act, the appointed date is 15.06.1955, whereas the specified date is 03.03.1973. It was submitted that section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act would be applicable in a case where a tenant has been dispossessed during the period from “the appointed date” to “the specified date” and as such, the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act would clearly be attracted in the present case. Referring to the impugned order passed by the Mamlatdar, it was pointed out that in the record of rights the name of Mohanbhai Kalabhai was running as a tenant for the period between 1951-52 to 1955-56 and that the tenant was also shown to be a protected tenant. Therefore, as on the appointed date, the tenant was in possession of the subject land. The tenant having been dispossessed within the specified period, the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act would be clearly attracted. However, as the tenant was not willing to take back possession of the subject land, the same had rightly been vested in the State Government and had been made available for disposal under section 32P of the Tenancy Act. However, as the tenant was not willing to take back possession of the subject land, the same had rightly been vested in the State Government and had been made available for disposal under section 32P of the Tenancy Act. It was submitted that the mutation entries in the record of rights have a presumptive value and as such, the Mamlatdar was justified in placing reliance upon the same, as against the say of the tenant – Mohanbhai Kalabhai, who has made such statement in collusion with the landlord. It was submitted that the surrender of tenancy rights by the tenant was contrary to the provisions of the Tenancy Act and as such, the proceedings under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act had rightly been initiated. It was argued that once the name of Mohanbhai Kalabhai appeared in the revenue record as protected tenant as on the appointed date, in the absence of any material to the contrary having been brought on record, the only question which was required to be considered by the authorities was as to whether the tenant was dispossessed legally. It was submitted that surrender in favour of the landlord was not made pursuant to any valid order of the Mamlatdar under section 15(2) of the Tenancy Act and as such, the tenancy of the tenant does not get terminated by any private arrangement between the parties. It was, accordingly, urged that the impugned order which is based upon the statement of the tenant to the effect that he was never a tenant of the subject land, which statement is contrary to the record of the case, is therefore, required to be quashed and set aside. It was also contended that the order of the Mamlatdar had been challenged after a delay of twenty four years, and therefore, also, the Tribunal was not justified in condoning such an inordinate delay and deciding the matter on merits. On this ground alone, the impugned order is required to be set aside. 5. Vehemently opposing the petition, Mr. M. C. Bhatt, learned counsel with Mr. M. P. Prajapati, learned advocate for the contesting respondents submitted that the Tribunal has rightly held that the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act are not applicable in the facts of the present case. 5. Vehemently opposing the petition, Mr. M. C. Bhatt, learned counsel with Mr. M. P. Prajapati, learned advocate for the contesting respondents submitted that the Tribunal has rightly held that the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act are not applicable in the facts of the present case. It was contended that section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act ex-facie applies in the cases wherein the possession of the land either continues with the landlord or his successor-in-interest. It was submitted that the explanation to section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act defines “successor-in-interest” to mean a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. It was submitted that the present respondents have purchased the subject lands under a registered sale deed dated 30.06.1958. Thus, neither the original landlord nor the successor-in-title was in possession of the subject land on the specified date, viz., 03.03.1973 and as such, the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act would not be applicable in the facts of the present case. It was further submitted that section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act applies to the cases, wherein the possession is taken over by the landlord from the tenant otherwise than following the procedure prescribed under the Tenancy Act. But in cases where there is no tenancy, the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act would not be attracted. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this court in the case of Chhotabhai H. Parmar Through His Heirs Rambhai v. Mahendrabhai G. Patel, 1997 (3) GLR 2210 . 6. Referring to the statement of Mohanbhai Kalabhai Parmar, as re-produced in the order of the Mamlatdar, it was pointed out that the alleged tenant Mohanbhai Kalabhai Parmar has made a specific statement that he had never cultivated the subject land and was never in possession thereof. Moreover, the Mamlatdar had not initiated proceedings under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act at the instance of the so-called tenant and in the proceedings under section 32P of the Tenancy Act, the tenant, in terms, had stated that he had never cultivated the subject land and was never in possession thereof. In these circumstances, the question of declaration of the sale to be ineffective does not arise. In these circumstances, the question of declaration of the sale to be ineffective does not arise. It was, accordingly, urged that the Tribunal was wholly justified in setting aside the orders passed by the Deputy Collector as well as the Mamlatdar & ALT and that there is no warrant for interference by this court. 7. This court has considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties and has perused the record of the case as available before the court. 8. The record of the case reveals that the subject land was originally owned by Manjibhai Nathabhai and Bhaijibhai Nathabhai. By virtue of a registered sale deed on 30.06.1958, the subject land came to be sold to the ancestors of the respondents No.1 to 3. It appears that pursuant thereto, mutation entry No.776 came to be posted in the Village Form No.6, however, the same came to be certified only after regularizing the sale and imposing a fine of Rs.1/-. It appears that much later, after the Amending Act came into force, pursuant to inspection carried out by record of rights team, the Mamlatdar & ALT, suo motu, initiated proceedings under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act. 9. A perusal of the order dated 25.07.1980 made by the Mamlatdar & ALT under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act reveals that on behalf of the respondents No.1 to 3, Chandubhai Desaibhai Rajput had given a reply to the effect that the subject land was never gifted or mortgaged and that the same was only used for agricultural purposes and that he was not aware that Mohanbhai Kalabhai was ever cultivating the said lands. On the other hand, the alleged tenant Mohanbhai Kalabhai had deposed to the effect that he was not cultivating survey No.177/1 either at the relevant time or at any time prior thereto, and that though his name may have been reflected in the record of rights for the period 1951-52 to 1955-56, he was not aware as to how his name had been entered in the revenue record and that he had never cultivated the said land. He has further stated that he had never made any application for getting his name entered as a tenant and that he does not want the land and that he has no objection even if the land is vested in the Government. 10. He has further stated that he had never made any application for getting his name entered as a tenant and that he does not want the land and that he has no objection even if the land is vested in the Government. 10. The Mamlatdar held that though the tenant had stated that he had never cultivated the subject land, in the village 7/12 record, his name was running for the period from 1951-52 to 1960-61 in the second rights column as a tenant in Type-4. The Mamlatdar observed that the Government record has presumptive proof and that no evidence has been led by the land owners that the tenant was not cultivating the subject land. Hence, on the basis of the revenue record, the Mamlatdar held that it is proved that Mohanbhai Kalabhai was a tenant in respect of the subject lands as on 15.06.1955. The Mamlatdar has further observed that since the name of Mohanbhai Kalabhai was running in the record of rights and in the second rights column in the village form No.7/12 as a protected tenant, he was entitled to obtain the subject land under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act. From the statements of the landlords as well as from the 7/12 extracts, the Mamlatdar & ALT found that the subject land is being used only for agricultural purposes and observed that the land owner Chandubhai had stated that he had not mortgaged or gifted the subject land in favour of any person and that the same is held by him. On the basis of the aforesaid findings recorded by him, the Mamlatdar observed that the subject land was not used for any purposes other than agricultural purpose and that the same were never transferred; the tenant was in possession of the subject land on 15.06.1955 and was, therefore, entitled to get back the possession thereof under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act. However, the tenant was not willing to take back the possession and as such, it was ordered that the subject land be vested in the State Government and be disposed of under section 32P of the said Act. 11. The aforesaid order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT came to be challenged before the Deputy Collector after a considerable delay in the year 2004. 11. The aforesaid order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT came to be challenged before the Deputy Collector after a considerable delay in the year 2004. The Deputy Collector, by an order dated 30.04.2005, made reference to the facts of the present case and then, observed that the appeal had been filed after a delay of twenty four years and as such, there was a breach of the provisions of the Limitation Act. It was observed that pursuant to the order passed in 1980, the possession of the subject land was not taken over by the State Government, which was not proper. It was, accordingly, ordered that pursuant to the order dated 25.07.1980, the subject land was required to be disposed of under section 32P of the Tenancy Act. 12. The Tribunal, in the impugned order, has observed that the Deputy Collector had dismissed the appeal on the ground that the same was barred by limitation without stating any grounds as to why the explanation put forth by the respondents No.1 to 3 was not acceptable and without examining the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT on merits. It was observed that on behalf of the respondents No.1 to 3, it was contended that they had not been informed about the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT and that they became aware of the said order only when they obtained copies of the revenue record. Thus, the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT had not been served upon them. After examining the record of the case, the Tribunal has found that there is no reference to any notice having been issued to the said respondents while recording mutation entry No.2140 in the record of rights. Moreover, at the time when the proceedings were conducted before the Mamlatdar, the other heirs of Desaibhai had not been issued any notice and that only one heir, namely, Chandubhai Desaibhai had been served with the notice of the said proceedings. Thus, the remaining heirs were neither served with any notice of the proceedings nor with the earlier order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT. Thus, the Tribunal, after appreciating the material on record, has found as a matter of fact that there is no evidence to the effect that any letter or communication had been sent to the respondents No.1 to 3 at their addresses. Thus, the Tribunal, after appreciating the material on record, has found as a matter of fact that there is no evidence to the effect that any letter or communication had been sent to the respondents No.1 to 3 at their addresses. The Tribunal was accordingly of the view that the order of the Mamlatdar & ALT had not been communicated to the respondents No.1 to 3 and, therefore, accepted their say that they had not been informed about the order passed by the Mamlatdar and hence, limitation would commence only from the date of knowledge. It is in the light of the aforesaid factual background that the Tribunal held that the order passed by the Deputy Collector rejecting the appeal on the ground of limitation was not proper and legal. 13. On the merits of the case, the Tribunal has observed that according to the Mamlatdar & ALT, though Mohanbhai Kalabhai was a tenant at the relevant time, he was not ready and willing to take back the possession of the subject land and therefore, the land was vested in the State Government. The Tribunal was of the view that, prior to passing of the order under section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act, it was necessary to establish that Mohanbhai Kalabhai was firstly a tenant of the subject land. Before the Mamlatdar & ALT, Mohanbhai Kalabhai had categorically stated that he was not cultivating the subject land and that prior thereto also, he had never cultivated it and if his name was recorded in the record of rights, he was not aware of the same. He has also categorically stated that he had not cultivated the subject land at any point of time and that he had not made any application for deletion of his name as a tenant. According to the Tribunal, from the deposition of Mohanbhai Kalabhai, it could not be said to have been proved that he was a tenant in respect of the subject land. Moreover, the tenant had never made any application for getting back the possession of the subject land and was also denying that he was ever a tenant. It was further observed that in the record of rights, the name of the purchaser, Desaibhai Manabhai was running from 1956-57 till 1972-73. Moreover, the tenant had never made any application for getting back the possession of the subject land and was also denying that he was ever a tenant. It was further observed that in the record of rights, the name of the purchaser, Desaibhai Manabhai was running from 1956-57 till 1972-73. Thus, on 01.04.1957, Mohanbhai Kalabhai was not in possession of the subject land and as such, could not be stated to be a deemed purchaser. Thus, the finding of the Mamlatdar & ALT that the tenant was entitled to purchase the subject land, was not proper. The Tribunal has further observed that for the purpose of attracting the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act, the landlord should be the owner of the subject land as on 03.03.1973, whereas in the facts of the present case, the original landlord Manjibhai Nathabhai had sold the land to Desaibhai Manabhai by a registered sale deed dated 30.06.1958. Thus, prior to 03.03.1973, the subject land had been sold by the original owner in favour of another person and, therefore, the provisions of section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act would not be attracted. In the light of the aforesaid findings recorded by it, the Tribunal has allowed the revision and set aside the orders passed by the Deputy Collector and the Mamlatdar & ALT. 14. Before adverting to the merits of the case, reference may be made to the relevant statutory provisions. Section 32 of the Tenancy Act bears the marginal note “Tenants deemed to have purchased land on tillers day”. 14. Before adverting to the merits of the case, reference may be made to the relevant statutory provisions. Section 32 of the Tenancy Act bears the marginal note “Tenants deemed to have purchased land on tillers day”. Sub-section (1B) thereof, to the extent the same is relevant for the present purpose, reads thus : “(1B) Where a tenant who was in possession of land on the appointed day and who, on account of his being dispossessed of such land or any part thereof by the landlord at any time before the specified date otherwise than in the manner provided in section 29 or any other provision of this Act, is not in possession of such land or any part thereof and such land or part thereof is in the possession of the landlord or his successor-in-interest on the said date and such land or part thereof is not put to a non-agricultural use on or before the said date, then the Mamlatdar shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the said section 29 or any other provision of this Act either suo motu or on an application of the tenant made within the prescribed period, hold an inquiry and direct that such land or as the case may be, part thereof shall be taken from the possession of the landlord or, as the case may be, his successor in interest, and shall be restored to the tenant; and thereafter, the provisions of this section and sections 32A to 32R (both inclusive) shall, so far as they may be applicable, apply thereto, subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased such land or part thereof on the date on which such land or, as the case may be, part thereof is restored to him: Provided that the tenant shall be entitled to restoration of land or part thereof, as the case may be, under this sub-section only if he gives an undertaking in writing within such period as may be prescribed to cultivate it personally and of so much thereof as together with the other land held by him as owner or tenant shall not exceed the ceiling area” Provided further that - [i] if the tenant fails to give such undertaking within such prescribed period, or if the tenant, after giving such undertaking, refuses to accept the tenancy or possession of the lands, the land the possession of which the landlord or, as the case may be, his successor-in-interests is not entitled to retain under this sub-section; or [ii] if the tenant gives such undertaking and accepts such tenancy or possession of the land, such portion of the land referred to in clause (i) to the restoration of which the tenant would not be entitled under the first proviso, shall vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances, and shall be disposed of in the manner provided in sub-section (2) of section 32P. Explanation – In this sub-section “successor in interest” means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death.” 15. On analysis sub-section (1B) of section 32 of the Tenancy Act, can be broken up into the following ingredients: (i) The tenant should be in possession of the land on the appointed day. (ii) He should have been dispossessed of such land or any part thereof by the landlord. (iii) Such dispossession should be at any time before the specified date. (iv) He should have been dispossessed otherwise than in the manner provided in section 29 or any other provision of this Act. (v) On account of such dispossession, he should not be in possession of such land or any part thereof. (vi) Such land or part thereof should be in the possession of the landlord or his successor-in-interest on the said date. (vii) Such land or part thereof should not have been put to a non-agricultural use on or before the said date. If the above conditions are satisfied, then, notwithstanding anything contained in the said section 29 or any other provision of this Act, the Mamlatdar, either suo motu or on an application of the tenant made within the prescribed period, is required to hold an inquiry and direct that such land or as the case may be, part thereof shall be taken from the possession of the landlord or, as the case may be, his successor in interest, and shall be restored to the tenant. Thereafter, the provisions of section 32 and sections 32A to 32R (both inclusive) would so far as they may be applicable, apply thereto, subject to the modification that the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased such land or part thereof on the date on which such land or, as the case may be, part thereof is restored to him: 16. Thus, before holding that a tenant is entitled to restoration of possession of the land, certain conditions precedent, are required to be satisfied. Thus, before holding that a tenant is entitled to restoration of possession of the land, certain conditions precedent, are required to be satisfied. Firstly, the tenant should have been in possession on the appointed day, that is, 15.06.1955; secondly, he should have been dispossessed by the landlord at any time before the specified date, that is, 03.03.1973; thirdly, such dispossession should be otherwise than in the manner provided in section 29 or any other provision of the Tenancy Act; fourthly, such land should be in the possession of the landlord or his successor-in-interest on the said date; and fifthly, such land should not be put to nonagricultural use on or before the said date. It is upon the above conditions being satisfied that the Mamlatdar can resort to the provisions of sub-section (1B) of the Tenancy Act, either suo motu or on an application made by the Tenant within the prescribed period and make inquiry, upon conclusion of which he may take possession from the landlord or his successor in interest and restore the same to the tenant. 17. The facts of the present case have to be examined in the above statutory background. For the purpose of falling with in the ambit of sub-section (1B) of section 32 of the Tenancy Act, the first condition which is required to be satisfied is that on the appointed day, viz., 15.06.1955 the tenant was in possession of the subject land. In this regard, as noticed hereinabove, before the Mamlatdar, the tenant had deposed that he, at the relevant time, was not cultivating the subject lands, nor had he at any point of time cultivated the said lands. However, the record of rights reflects the name of the respondent No.4 as a tenant in respect of the subject land for the period from 1951-52 to 1956-57. The Mamlatdar has chosen to place reliance upon the revenue record as against the oral evidence of the tenant and had held that he was in possession on the appointed date. However, the record of rights reflects the name of the respondent No.4 as a tenant in respect of the subject land for the period from 1951-52 to 1956-57. The Mamlatdar has chosen to place reliance upon the revenue record as against the oral evidence of the tenant and had held that he was in possession on the appointed date. For the purpose of examining as to whether the stand taken by the Mamlatdar is correct, it may be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil and another, (1977) 2 SCC 49 , wherein the court, while dealing with the presumption with regard to the correctness of entries made in the record of rights, has held that there is no abstract principle that whatever will appear in the record of rights will be presumed to be correct when it is shown by evidence that the entries are not correct. In the facts of the said case, the court held that no presumption could arise for the reason, firstly, that the oral evidence nullified the entries in the record of rights as showing a state of affairs opposed to the real state of affairs and, secondly, that no notice was ever given to the respondent with regard to mutation proceedings. Adverting to the facts of the present case, though the record of rights reflects the name of the respondent No.4 as a tenant in respect of the subject land for the period from 1951-52 to 1956-57, the tenant himself has deposed before the Mamlatdar & ALT that he has never cultivated the subject land and that even at any point of time prior thereto, he had never cultivated the subject land. He has also stated that he was not aware as to how his name had been reflected in the record of rights. In these circumstances, when the alleged tenant himself had deposed before the Mamlatdar that he was never a tenant in respect of the subject land, the presumption as regards the correctness of the mutation entry clearly stood rebutted by the oral evidence adduced by the said tenant. In these circumstances, when the alleged tenant himself had deposed before the Mamlatdar that he was never a tenant in respect of the subject land, the presumption as regards the correctness of the mutation entry clearly stood rebutted by the oral evidence adduced by the said tenant. Under the circumstances, in the light of the principle laid down in the above decision, the finding recorded by the Mamlatdar that the tenant was in possession of the subject land on the appointed day is clearly erroneous. Thus, the first condition precedent is clearly not satisfied. 18. The next condition that is required to be satisfied is that the tenant should have been dispossessed by the landlord at anytime before the specified date, viz. 03.03.1973. As noticed earlier, the tenant has deposed that he was never in possession of the subject land. If the tenant was not in possession of the subject land at any point of time, as a necessary corollary, the question of his being dispossessed does not arise. Therefore, the second requirement is also not satisfied. For the same reason, the third condition would also not stand satisfied. The fourth condition, viz., that the tenant should not be in possession of the land can be said to be satisfied. 19. The fifth condition which is required to be satisfied is that such land should be in possession of the landlord or his successor in interest on the specified date. In this regard, the facts reveal that if at all Mohanbhai Kalabhai was a tenant, he was a tenant of the original owners, viz., Manjibhai Nathabhai and Bhaijibhai Nathabhai. The original landlords, by virtue of a registered sale deed dated 30.06.1958, sold the subject lands to the ancestors of the respondents No.1 to 3 and handed over the possession to them. Thus, on the specified date, viz., 03.03.1973 the landlord was not in possession of the subject land. However, what sub-section (1B) of section 32 of the Tenancy Act contemplates is that neither the landlord nor his successor-in-interest should be in possession of the land on the specified date. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the respondents No 1 to 3 who are purchasers of the subject land from the original landlord can be said to be successors-in-interest of the landlord so as to fall within the ambit of the said provision. 20. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the respondents No 1 to 3 who are purchasers of the subject land from the original landlord can be said to be successors-in-interest of the landlord so as to fall within the ambit of the said provision. 20. The expression “successor in interest” has been defined under the explanation to section 32(1B) of the Tenancy Act, to mean a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. The expression “successor in interest” as defined under the Explanation to sub-section (1B) of section 32 came up for consideration before this High Court in the case of Chhotabhai H. Parmar Through His Heirs Rambhai v. Mahendrabhai G. Patel (supra), wherein it has been held thus: “Explanation: In this sub-section "successor in interest” means a person who acquires the interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death.” The respondent has admittedly got right, title and interest in the land in question under the registered gift deed dated 9-7-1956. It is not the case of the petitioner and it could not have been in the presence of the fact that right, title and interest have been acquired by the respondent vide registered gift deed that the respondent acquired interest by testamentary disposition or devolution on death. In view of this fact, the petitioner's application under section 32(1)B of the Act, 1948 has rightly been rejected by the first authority and that judgment has correctly been affirmed by the appellate authority and the revisional authority. In the case of Laxmikant Revachand Bhojwani v. Pratapsingh Mohansingh Pardeshi reported in 1995(6) SCC 576 , the Supreme Court held that the High Court under Article 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct the all sort of species of hardship or wrong decision. It must be restricted to case of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law, and where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner has been dispossessed on 27th September, 1956, and on the specified date neither the landlord nor his successor in interest was in possession. The transfer of the land has been made in favour of the respondent by registered gift deed. In the present case, admittedly the petitioner has been dispossessed on 27th September, 1956, and on the specified date neither the landlord nor his successor in interest was in possession. The transfer of the land has been made in favour of the respondent by registered gift deed. In view of this fact, it cannot be said that any grave injustice would be done to the petitioner unless the High Court interferes in the matter.” 21. Thus, a person who acquires right in the land otherwise than by testamentary disposition or devolution on death is not a successor in interest. In the present case, the ancestors of the respondents No.1 to 3 purchased the subject land under a registered sale deed dated 30.06.1958 and were in possession of the subject land on the basis of such deed. Thus, applying the above decision to the facts of the present case, the respondents No.1 to 3 cannot be said to be successors in interest of the landlord as envisaged in the Explanation to sub-section (1B) of section 32 of the Act. The condition precedent that the landlord or his successor in interest should be in possession of the land on the specified date, is therefore, not satisfied. Examining the question from another angle, subsection (1B) specifically lays down a condition precedent to the effect that the land or part thereof should be in possession of the landlord or his successor-in-interest on the specified date. If all persons who have acquired such land from the landlord, irrespective of the manner in which such title was acquired, were to be covered by the expression “successor in interest”there would be no reason to put such a condition in the first place, inasmuch as, if such a view were to be adopted any person who acquires such land would be a successor in interest, which would render the said requirement nugatory. 22. Insofar as the delay in challenging the order passed by the Mamlatdar & ALT before the Deputy Collector is concerned, from the findings recorded by the Tribunal as referred to hereinabove, it is apparent that the Tribunal has given sufficient and cogent reasons as to why such delay was required to be condoned. This court is in complete agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal and does not find any reason to take a different view. 23. This court is in complete agreement with the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal and does not find any reason to take a different view. 23. In the light of the above discussion, it is apparent that except for the fourth condition, viz., the tenant should not be in possession of the land, none of the other conditions precedent for exercise of powers under sub-section (1B) of section 32 of the Tenancy Act exist in the present case. To reiterate, the tenant was not in possession of the subject land on the appointed date; the tenant was not dispossessed at any time before the specified date; the subject land was not in the possession of the landlord or his successor in interest on the specified date. The Mamlatdar and ALT was, therefore, not justified in holding that the respondent No.4 was in possession of the subject land on the appointed day and was dispossessed prior to the specified date and was, therefore, entitled to restoration of the possession thereof. 24. For the foregoing reasons, this court does not find any legal infirmity in the impugned order of the Tribunal so as to warrant interference. The petition, therefore, fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. Notice is discharged.