JUDGMENT Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, J. (Oral):- Feeling aggrieved against the impugned notice dated 26.11.2010 (Annexure P-4) and the house tax bill dated 6.2.2013 (Annexure P-1), petitioner has approached this Court, by way of instant writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of certiorari, for quashing the impugned notice and house tax bill. 2. Facts first. It is the pleaded case of the petitioner that earlier house tax bills used to be issued against the petitioner by the respondent- Municipal Council, which the petitioner used to pay within 15 days and had been availing the rebate. In the year 1994, an amendment was carried out in ‘The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 (for short ‘the Act’) which was set aside by this Court. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide its judgment dated 1.8.2007 upheld the validity of the Amending Act No.11 of 1994. Thereafter, respondent-Municipal Council had been raising the demand of house tax and petitioner had been paying the same within a period of 15 days availing the rebate. 3. The impugned notice dated 26.11.2010 (Annexure P-4) was issued by the respondent-Municipal Council, vide which the annual value of the property of petitioner was sought to be revised. The petitioner filed his objections dated 17.6.2011 (Annexure P-5) and thereafter written submissions were also submitted on 31.1.2013 on behalf of the petitioner. Consequently, the impugned order dated 6.2.2013 (Annexure P-1) came to be issued to the petitioner demanding the house tax together for three years, i.e. 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13. Thus, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition without availing the remedy of statutory appeal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned demand of house tax raised by the respondent-Municipal Council vide impugned house tax bill dated 6.2.2013 (Annexure P-1) was without jurisdiction. He further submits that although there was a statutory appeal available against the impugned order, yet it was not necessary for the petitioner to avail the remedy of statutory appeal at the first instance, before approaching this Court. He next contended that in view of the peculiar facts of the case, petitioner was entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court even without approaching the appellate authority because the remedy of appeal will not be as efficacious and speedy as the remedy of writ petition. He next contended that in view of the peculiar facts of the case, petitioner was entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court even without approaching the appellate authority because the remedy of appeal will not be as efficacious and speedy as the remedy of writ petition. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Executive Engineer and another v. M/s. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, [2012(1) Law Herald (SC) 205] : 2012(3) CCC 68 and Municipal Committee, Patiala v. Model Town Residents Association and others, [2007(3) Law Herald (SC) 2429 : 2007(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2368 (SC)] : 2007(3) Apex Court Judgments 001 (SC), besides and the Division Bench judgments of this Court in M/s Makin Paper Mills v. State of Punjab and others, 2007(2) RCR (Civil) 207 and Kaviraj Khazan Chand v. The New Delhi Municipality, 1960 PLR 97. Finally, he prays for setting aside the impugned notice and house tax bill by allowing the present writ petition. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that since the petitioner has got equally efficacious alternative remedy of statutory appeal, which has not been availed before filing the present writ petition, no interference is warranted at the hands of this Court, while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter. 6. It is an undisputed fact on record that show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner as far as back as on 26.11.2010 (Annexure P-4). It is the own pleaded case of the petitioner that pursuant to the showcause notice (Annexure P-4), objections were filed on behalf of the petitioner, vide Annexure P-5 dated 7.6.2011. It is also a matter of record that the impugned show-cause notice was neither challenged by the petitioner in any court of law, alleging the same to be without jurisdiction nor the house tax was paid during the pendency of its decision. Thus, the house tax kept on accumulating against the petitioner for the years 2010- 11, 2011-12 and 2012-13. It is also a matter of record that the impugned show-cause notice was neither challenged by the petitioner in any court of law, alleging the same to be without jurisdiction nor the house tax was paid during the pendency of its decision. Thus, the house tax kept on accumulating against the petitioner for the years 2010- 11, 2011-12 and 2012-13. Thus, this conduct on the part of the petitioner shows that petitioner was not proceeding on a bonafide approach and was trying to evade its tax liability. Having said that, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that petitioner is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court without first availing the equally efficacious alternative remedy of statutory appeal. 7. It is neither pleaded nor argued case on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned house tax bill has been issued all of a sudden. Petitioner was well aware about the show-cause notice dated 26.11.2010 (Annexure P-4) to which the objections were also filed on behalf of the petitioner, vide Annexure P-5 dated 17.6.2011. However, after submitting the objections dated 17.6.2011 (Annexure P-5), one payment is stated to have been made by the petitioner, vide cheque dated 21.4.2011 as stated in para 14(C) of the petition, which was admittedly before submitting its objections dated 17.6.2011 (Annexure P-5). During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the petitioner could not substantiate his arguments as to how the remedy of statutory appeal was not efficacious. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to maintain the present writ petition at this stage before approaching the appellate authority, at the first instance. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to raise an apprehension that petitioner may not get an appropriate relief at the hands of the appellate authority. However, there is no basis for such apprehension. It is undisputed on record that Section 84 of the Act provides an appeal against the impugned assessment of house tax. Learned counsel could not give any reason much less cogent reasons thereof as to why the petitioner was not ready to avail the remedy of appeal provided under the Act. 9. So far as the judgments relied upon by the petitioner are concerned, there is no dispute about the law laid down therein, but the same are of no help to the petitioner being distinguishable on facts. 9. So far as the judgments relied upon by the petitioner are concerned, there is no dispute about the law laid down therein, but the same are of no help to the petitioner being distinguishable on facts. It is the settled principle of law that peculiar facts of each case are to be examined, considered and appreciated first, before applying any codified or judgemade law thereto. Further, sometimes difference of one circumstance or additional fact can make the world of difference, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Padmausundra Rao and another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, 2002 (3) SCC 533 . In Municipal Committee, Patiala’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has upheld the constitutional validity of the Punjab Amendment Act No.11 of 1994, carrying out the amendments in the Punjab Municipal Act. Thus, this judgment does not apply to the facts of the present case as the issue involved is different. 10. In the case of The Executive Engineer’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 53 of the judgment held that it is a settled canon of law that High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, where statutory alternative remedy is available. However, it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that in a given fact situation, the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction, can entertain the writ despite availability of an alternative remedy. 11. However, in the present case, learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to make out any such extraordinary case for entertaining the present writ petition, in spite of the fact that the petitioner has not availed the equally efficacious alternative remedy before approaching this Court. Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court in Makin Paper Mills’s case (supra), was deciding a case under the Punjab Value Added Tax Act observed in paras 7 and 9 (3) of the judgment that in an appropriate case, the writ court may examine the exercise of power and interfere, if exercise of power is found to be arbitrary, malafide and without nexus with attempt at evasion. It is not the situation in the present case. The municipal authority had issued notice to the petitioner way back in October 2010, vide Annexure P-4 which was duly replied by the petitioner. It is not the situation in the present case. The municipal authority had issued notice to the petitioner way back in October 2010, vide Annexure P-4 which was duly replied by the petitioner. The authorities have acted under the Act and this Court is prima facie of the view that the action of the municipal authorities cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. Further, since The New Delhi Municipality’s case (supra) was also based on different set of facts, the same is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand. 12. On the other hand, the view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and others, [2011(1) Law Herald (SC) 364] : 2010(8) SCC 110 and Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1999 (4) SCC 382 besides a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s J.M.P. Manufacturing Company v. Union of India, 1997(3) PLR 386. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to a plethora of judgments on this point, made the following observations in para 18 of United Bank of India’s case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, “While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters.” 13. Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court in M/s J.M.P. Manufacturing Company’s case (supra) while referring to the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, observed in para 6 of the judgment, as under:- “The principle laid down in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 Supreme Court 603, has been reiterated in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar, West Bengal v. Dunlop India Ltd., AIR 1985 Supreme Court 330. The Supreme Court lamented on the practice of the High Courts to entertain writs and to pass orders of stay against the recovery of taxes and observed:- “Article 226 is not meant to short-circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill-suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Article 226 of the Constitution. But then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by-pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. The Supreme Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. This practice needs to be strongly discouraged.” 14. The Supreme Court can take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. This practice needs to be strongly discouraged.” 14. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that remedy of statutory appeal has been provided under Section 84 of the Act, which has not been availed by the petitioner before filing the present writ petition. Further, the given fact situation of the case discussed here-in-above, would make it clear that petitioner was very much aware of the proceedings, which were going on before the competent authority for the last more than 2½ years. During this period, petitioner did not challenge the show-cause notice (Annexure P-4), alleging it to be the result of an action without jurisdiction. Further, the conduct of the petitioner prima facie shows that it is an attempt to avoid its tax liability. 15. Respectfully following the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in United Bank of India’s case (supra), Whirlpool Corporation’s case (supra) and a Division Bench judgment of this Court in M/s J.M.P. Manufacturing Company’s case (supra), referred to above, it is held that the present one is not a fit case warranting interference at the hands of this Court, entertaining the present writ petition without relegating the petitioner to the equally efficacious alternative remedy of appeal. 16. No other argument was raised. 17. Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the present writ petition is misconceived, bereft of any merit and without any substance, thus it must fail. No case for interference has been made out. However, it goes without saying that petitioner would be entitled to avail the alternative remedy of appeal, in accordance with law. 18. Resultantly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed.