Judgment : 1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With consent of learned counsel for both sides, heard finally. 2. An application under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the Act”) filed in the District Court, Latur by present respondent No. 2 was held maintainable being within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. Therefore, the original respondent No. 1 has preferred the present Civil Revision Application. 3. Present petitioner i.e. original Respondent No. 1 is an industry situated at Raichur, District Raichur in the State of Karnataka. It filed application under section 11 of the Act in the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, which was decided by the Designate of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka. It was the case of the petitioner that a dispute existed regarding payment of Rs. 20,25,213.54 paise from the respondent No. 2 i.e. Indira Sahakari Sut Girani Ltd., Latur. In the circumstances, in view of section 6 (1) of the Interest on Delayed Payments To Small Scale And Ancillary Industries Undertakings Act, 1993 (for short, “the IDP Act”), the parties can be referred to the Industrial Facilitation Council for acting as an Arbitrator – the present respondent No. 1. 4. The present respondent No. 2 contested the application. It submitted that there is no agreement to refer the dispute to the Arbitration. There is also no relationship of supplier and buyer between the parties. The Chief Justice Designate, relying on the ratio in “Konkan Railway Corporation Limited Vs. Mehul Construction Company” AIR 2000 S.C. 2821 and “Konkan Railway Corporation Limited Vs. Rani Construction Private Limited”, AIR 2002 S.C. 778 , as were holding the field at the relevant time, held that under section 11 of the Act, the Chief Justice of the High Court or His/Her Designate is not required to examine any question, except as to existence of arbitration agreement. Therefore, observing that it would be open to the respondent i.e. present respondent No. 2 to place necessary material before the Arbitral Tribunal to show that the claim is not maintainable and not arbitrable, the parties were referred to present respondent No. 1 – Industrial Felicitation Council at Bangalore. 5. The respondent No. 1 Council entered into the arbitration. Therefore, observing that it would be open to the respondent i.e. present respondent No. 2 to place necessary material before the Arbitral Tribunal to show that the claim is not maintainable and not arbitrable, the parties were referred to present respondent No. 1 – Industrial Felicitation Council at Bangalore. 5. The respondent No. 1 Council entered into the arbitration. The case of the present respondent No. 2 that there is no contract between the parties and that it had a contract with selling agent Mr. S.R. Mundada of Solapur, was pressed into service. The copy of the award shows that the Arbitral Tribunal i.e. respondent No. 1 Council sent notices to said agent Mr. Mundada, which could not be served and ultimately, concluded that the respondent No. 2 shall pay the sum with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 6. Aggrieved by the said award, the respondent No. 2 has filed application under section 34 of the Act in the District Court at Latur. The issue of territorial jurisdiction was raised before the District Court. The learned Principal District Judge held that the Court has jurisdiction. Therefore, the present Revision Application. 7. Mr. S.P. Urgunde, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the application under section 11 of the Act was filed in the High Court of Karnataka. The respondent No. 1 Council at Bangalore has passed the award. Therefore, in view of provisions of section 42 of the Act, the District Court at Latur would have no jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 34 of the Act. He relies on the ratio in the cases of “Khaleel Ahmed Dakhani Vs. Hatti Gold Mines Co. Ltd.” (2000) 3 S.C.C. 755 and “Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd.) Vs. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Co. Ltd.” (2006) 11 S.C.C. 521 . 8. On the other hand, Mr. Amit S. Deshpande, learned counsel for respondent No.2, submits that the application under section 11 of the Act or the place of arbitration are irrelevant. The alleged cause of action has arisen at Latur, since the cotton bales were delivered at Latur and payment was made from Latur. He relies on the ratio in the following four authorities : (i) Ion Exchange (India) Ltd. Vs. Paramount Ltd. 2006 (4) Bom CR 545 (ii) Rodemadan India Ltd. Vs. International Trade Expo Centre Ltd. AIR 2006 S.C. 3456 (iii) ITI Ltd., Naini, Allahabad Vs. He relies on the ratio in the following four authorities : (i) Ion Exchange (India) Ltd. Vs. Paramount Ltd. 2006 (4) Bom CR 545 (ii) Rodemadan India Ltd. Vs. International Trade Expo Centre Ltd. AIR 2006 S.C. 3456 (iii) ITI Ltd., Naini, Allahabad Vs. District Judge, Allahabad AIR 1998 Allahabad 313 (iv) Etizen Bulk A/S Vs. Ashapura Minechem Ltd. (Notice of Motion No. 3975/2009 in Arbitration Petition No. 561/2009 Bombay High Court. 9. Upon hearing both sides, in my view, the order of learned Principal District Judge, Latur needs no interference, for the reasons to follow : REASONS 10. Section 42 of the Act provides as under:- “42. Jurisdiction. - Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a Court, that Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that Court and in no other Court.” 11. The provision would show that if earlier any application is made to a Court, then the said Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement. 12. The definition of the “Court”, as found in Section 2 (1) (e) of the Act reads thus : “Court” means the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes.” 13. It is thus clear that an application under section 11 of the Act made either with the Chief Justice of the High Court of His/Her Designate, would not be an application in a “Court”. The “Court”, according to the provisions of the Act, is a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. There cannot be any different opinion that the High Court of Karnataka is not having any original civil jurisdiction. The “Court”, according to the provisions of the Act, is a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. There cannot be any different opinion that the High Court of Karnataka is not having any original civil jurisdiction. In the circumstances, it is clear that prior to the filing of the present application under section 34 of the Act, there was no any prior application under the Act to any “Court”. 14. In “Khaleel Ahmed Dakhani Vs. Hatti Gold Mines Co. Ltd.” (cited supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, arbitration clause between the parties therein provided for a jurisdiction only with a Court at Bangalore. An application under section 34 challenging the award was filed in the Court of Principal City Civil Judge, Bangalore. While the said application was pending, application under section 36 of the Act for execution of the award was filed in the Court of Principal District Judge, Raichur. In those circumstances, it was held that the Principal District Judge, Raichur should not have entertained the application. The facts thus would make it clear that as the application under section 34 was already moved in the Court of Principal City Civil Judge, Bangalore, subsequent application to any other Court was barred by the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. The authority, therefore, has no application in the facts of the present case. 15. In the case of “Jindal Vijayanagar Steel (JSW Steel Ltd.) Vs. Jindal Praxair Oxygen Co. Ltd.” (cited supra), relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Bombay High Court as a Chartered High Court exercising its ordinary original civil jurisdiction under its Letters Patent, held that since the respondent in the petition under section 9 of the Act, after entering into an agreement to refer the dispute to the arbitration, has changed its registered address to Mumbai, it being the Court as defined by section 2 (1) (e) of the Act, would have jurisdiction to consider the same. In those circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that change in the registered address of the respondent, after the parties entered into arbitration agreement, would not clothe the Court with jurisdiction. In those circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that change in the registered address of the respondent, after the parties entered into arbitration agreement, would not clothe the Court with jurisdiction. The other contentions about the applicability of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure to the High Court as a Court of original civil jurisdiction, were also considered. 16. In the present case, what we find is that there is no previous application to any “Court” prior to the filing of the present application under section 34 of the Act. The Chief Justice of High Court dealing with the application under section 11 of the Act is not a “Court”, as defined in the Act. The pleadings of the respondent No. 2 in his petition would show that the contract of supply of cotton bales was entered into between it and Shrikant R. Mundada from Solapur. Admittedly, the bales were supplied at Latur. It is not the case of any of the parties that the agreement of supply of bales was entered into at Raichur. In view of all these facts, the ratio laid down in the authorities, relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, as detailed supra, would be applicable in the facts of the present case. In the result, the following order: 17. The Civil Revision Application is dismissed, without any order as to costs. Rule discharged accordingly.