JUDGMENT :- 1. During the year 2004, the petitioner was working as a Police Constable attached to “Veraiyur Police Station” in Thiruvannamalai District. It is alleged that on 07.07.2004 at about 05.00 p.m., in connection with a case registered on the file of Veraiyur Police Station, the petitioner and yet another constable by name Mr.Karunakaran, took one Poongan – the husband of the 4th respondent herein to the police station and caused simple injuries on him. The said Poongan died subsequently due to some other ailment. Alleging that the petitioner had caused human rights violation to Poongan by illegally detaining and causing physical violence to him and further alleging that because of the said injuries caused by the petitioner, Mr.Poongan died, a complaint was made before the Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission by the 4th respondent herein. The petitioner denied the said allegations. However, by order dated 03.08.2006 in SHRC No.7347 of 2004, the State Human Rights Commission found that the death of Mr.Poongan was due to some other ailment for which the petitioner was not responsible, however, the commission held that the petitioner had violated human rights of Poongan by illegally detaining and causing injuries and accordingly made the following recommendation:-“1. For the human rights violation committed by R.1 Abdul Sathar, H.C.301, he is liable to compensate a sum of Rs.50,000/-[Rupees Fifty Thousand only] to the complaint Poovarasu and her minor children and the Government of Tamil Nadu is directed to pay the compensation at the first instance and to recover the same from out of the salary to be paid to Respondent-1. 2. Out of the said sum of Rs.50,000/- , Rs.20,000/- shall be paid to the complaint Poovarasu, wife of Poongan , the deceased and Rs.15,000/- each in the name of the two female children be kept in fixed deposit in a nationalized bank and Poovarasu, the mother of the two children, is entitled to draw the interest towards their maintenance and education till they attain majority. 3. Respondent No.2 Karunakaran , H.C.804 is not liable.” Challenging the same, the petitioner is now before this court with this writ petition. 2. During the course of the arguments, the question regarding the maintainability of this writ petition came up based on the judgment of this Court in Rajesh Das, I.P.S., v. Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission, 2010 (5) CTC 589 . 2. During the course of the arguments, the question regarding the maintainability of this writ petition came up based on the judgment of this Court in Rajesh Das, I.P.S., v. Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission, 2010 (5) CTC 589 . In that case, I had occasion to consider a similar challenge made to an order made by State Human Rights Commission. After having considered a number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in paragraph 41 of the judgment, I have summed up the legal principles as follows:- “(i) What is made under Section 18 of the Protection of Human Rights Act by the State Human Rights Commission is only a recommendation and it is neither an order nor an adjudication. (ii) Such a recommendation made by the State Human Rights Commission is not binding on the parties to the proceeding, including the Government. (iii) But, the Government has an obligation to consider the recommendation of the Commission and to act upon the same to take forward the objects of the Human Rights Act, the International Covenants and Conventions in the back drop of fundamental rights guaranteed under the Indian Constitution within a reasonable time. (iv) In the event of the Government tentatively deciding to accept the recommendation of the State Human Rights Commission holding any public servant guilty of human rights violation, the Government shall furnish a copy of the report of the Commission to the public servant concerned calling upon him to make his explanation, if any, and then pass an appropriate order either accepting or rejecting the recommendation of the Commission. (v) Until the final order is passed by the Government on the recommendation of the Commission, neither the complainant(s) nor the respondent (s) in the human rights cases can challenge the recommendation of the commission as it would be premature except in exceptional circumstances. (vi) On the recommendation of the Human Rights Commission, if the Government decides to launch prosecution, the Government have to order for investigation by police which will culminate in a final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (vii) On the recommendation of the Human Rights Commission, if the Government decides to pay compensation to the victims of human rights violation, the Government may do so. (vii) On the recommendation of the Human Rights Commission, if the Government decides to pay compensation to the victims of human rights violation, the Government may do so. But, if the Government proposes to recover the said amount from the public servant concerned, it can do so only by initiating appropriate disciplinary proceeding against him under the relevant service rules, if it so empowers the Government.” 3. The judgment in Rajesh Das case [supra] was delivered by me on 27.08.2010. Subsequently, more or less similar issues came up for consideration in T.Vijayakumar vs. Madhavi and State Human Rights Commission, Tamil Nadu [W.P.(MD) No.12316 of 2010 dated 29.09.2010]. The judgment in Rajesh Das, I.P.S., was brought to the notice of the learned single Judge. But, the learned Judge was not persuaded to accept the principles stated in Rajesh Das case. In T.Vijayakumar case, in the judgment dated 29.09.2010, in paragraph 15 to 18, the views taken in Rajesh Das case have been deal with as follows:-“15. But, however a learned judge of this court in Rajesh Das, I.P.S. Vs. Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission reported in 2010 (5) CTC 589 has held in paragraph 41 as follows:- 41. To sum up:- (i) ... .... ... ... (ii)... ... ... ... (iii) ... .... ... ... (iv)... ... ... ... (v) ... .... ... ... (vi)... ... ... ... 16. This court is not inclined to agree with the said observation since the said judgment did not refer to the previous decisions of the Supreme Court or of this Court on the very same issue. In the present case, there is no necessity to hear the delinquent officer concerned before accepting the SHRC's report as the Government is bound to give effect to the SHRC's recommendations. In case of any difficulty, the SHRC itself can move this court for enforcement of its order under Section 18(2) for the grant of appropriate direction. Even otherwise, if the SHRC's recommendation is accepted by the State Government, the aggrieved individual will have no locus standi to attack both the Government Order as well as the recommendations of the Commission which was agreed by the appropriate Government. Even otherwise, if the SHRC's recommendation is accepted by the State Government, the aggrieved individual will have no locus standi to attack both the Government Order as well as the recommendations of the Commission which was agreed by the appropriate Government. By virtue of Section 28(2), the State Government is bound to place the report of the Commission before the State legislature along with the Memorandum of action taken or proposed to be taken on the recommendation of the Commission. In case of non acceptance of its recommendation, it has to give reasons. 17. In the present case, there is no other power with the State Government to repudiate the report of the Commission. On the other hand, the State Government had accepted the recommendation of the SHRC. Therefore, it had become binding. The learned Judge in the Rajesh Das's case (cited supra) in paragraph 41 (iv) did not refer to Section 28(2) of the Human Rights Act nor there was any reference to the other decisions under the said Act. Likewise, the findings in paragraph 41(vii), there need not be any disciplinary action to be initiated afresh since the relevant service rule itself provides for the recovery from the pay of the Government servant for the loss sustained by the State. It is not a case of recovery of money due to any penalty imposed on a Government servant, wherein Rule 3(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules may come into operation. On the other hand, the State Human Rights Commission had quantified the compensation and mulcted a vicarious liability on the State. The State had accepted its liability and had also ordered to recover the amount as held by the Supreme Court in D.K.Basu case (cited supra). 18. If Rajesh Das's case (cited supra) is accepted, then it will become a paradise of remedies for the delinquent Government servant not once, but three times. First before the Commission, second before the State Government which had accepted the Commission's report and third before any amount were to be recovered pursuant to acceptance of report of the Commission by the State Government. On the other hand, neither the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 nor the relevant service rule contemplated such multiple opportunities that too for a person who had violated law with impugnity. On the other hand, neither the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993 nor the relevant service rule contemplated such multiple opportunities that too for a person who had violated law with impugnity. Such undue sympathies or liberal approach on this issue will only further embolden a delinquent Government servant to commit further human right violations with impugnity. The concept of natural justice is not immune from restrictions nor it is an inscrutable concept. It has to be applied to fact situation. It is not clear as to how the petitioner can be said to be aggrieved about the Government order and the consequent recovery when he had the full opportunity of placing his case before the SHRC which is a statutory body mandated to protect the human rights of its citizens. 19. In view of the above, the contentions raised by the petitioner are misconceived. Accordingly, the writ petition will stand dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions stand closed.” 4. A cursory reading of the above two judgments would go to show that they are in conflict with each other on many issues. In T.Vijayakumar case, it has been held that there is no necessity for the Government to hear the delinquent officer before the report of the State Human Rights Commission is accepted by the Government, whereas, in Rajesh Das case, I have held that the Government shall furnish a copy of the report of the Commission to the public servant concerned calling upon him to make his explanation, if any, and then pass an appropriate order either accepting or rejecting the recommendation of the Commission. 5. Nextly, in T.Vijayakumar case it has been held that if the Commission's recommendation is accepted by the State Government, the aggrieved individual will have no locus standi to attack both the Government Order as well as the recommendations of the Commission which was agreed by the appropriate Government, whereas, in Rajesh Das case, I have held that the recommendation of the commission cannot be challenged by the aggrieved as any such challenge would be premature, but, the order accepting the recommendation of the commission can be challenged by way of writ petition. 6. 6. In T.Vijayakumar case, it has been further held that the Government cannot repudiate the report of the commission, whereas, in Rajesh Das case, I have held that the Government for reasons to be recorded may reject the recommendation. 7. In T.Vijayakumar case it has been held that the report is binding on the parties including the Government, whereas, in Rajesh Das Case I have held that the recommendation of the commission is not binding on the parties. It has been further held in T.Vijayakumar case that the principles stated in paragraph 41 (iv) to (vii) in Rajesh Das case are not agreeable. The learned Judge has further made a remark for not agreeing with the principles stated in Rajesh Das case in the following words:-“16. This court is not inclined to agree with the said observation since the said judgment did not refer to the previous decisions of the Supreme Court or of this Court on the very same issue.” But, with respect, I have to state, I have gone through the judgments referred to in T.Vijayakumar case. Admittedly, D.K.Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 ; Sebastian M.Hongray v. Union of India, 1984 AIR 1026 ; Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, AIR 1986 SC 494 ; Nilabati Behera v. State, 1993 AIR 1960 are all judgments relating to the powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to order for compensation. I don't doubt the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to order for payment of compensation, when this court is satisfied that there has been violation of human rights. But, the power of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be equated to the power of State Human Rights Commission under Section 18 of The Protection of Human Rights Act. In T.VIjayakumar case, the judgments of this Court in D.Unguswamy and another Vs. The Secretary to Government, Home Department, 2007 (1) TCJ 450and also A.Sundaram and two others Vs. National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi, 2010 (1) TLNJ 364 (Criminal)and a Division Bench judgement of this Court in T.Loganathan Vs. State Human Rights Commission, Tamil Nadu and anotherreported in 2007 (7) MLJ 1067 have also been referred to.I have carefully gone through these judgments. National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi, 2010 (1) TLNJ 364 (Criminal)and a Division Bench judgement of this Court in T.Loganathan Vs. State Human Rights Commission, Tamil Nadu and anotherreported in 2007 (7) MLJ 1067 have also been referred to.I have carefully gone through these judgments. In none of these judgments, this court had occasion to deal with the issues which have been dealt with in Rajesh Das case. In Rajesh Das case, I have given reasons in detail for my conclusions, which have been summed up, in paragraph 41 of the judgement. A renowned Professor of Law Dr.K.N.Chandrasekaran Pillai, the Former Director, National Judicial Academy, in his Article “Human Rights Commission – Need for relook” after referring to Rajesh Das Case, has mentioned that the Human Rights Commission is only a fact finding Commission just like any other fact finding body. In Rajesh Das case, I have referred to one of the salient features of the Act as mentioned in the Statement of Objects of the Act which reads as follows:-“3. The Commission will be a fact finding body with powers to conduct enquiry into the complaints of violation of human rights.” With this I stop, for I am conscious of the popular saying that “the judgment should speak and not the judge”. Therefore, I do not venture to justify my conclusions in Rajesh Das case by elaborating my reasons. 8. At any rate, as I have already pointed out, the conclusions arrived at in T.Vijayakumar case are in direct conflict with the conclusions in Rajesh Das case. In this regard I may state that when the views expressed in Rajesh Das case were not agreeable to the subsequent Bench of co-ordinate jurisdiction, in my considered view, it would have been in fitness of things for the subsequent Bench to express the views of disagreement and to refer the matter to a Division Bench for an authoritative decision on the issues. But, the Bench was not pleased to do so. As I have already stated, it has been observed in T.Vijayakumar case that Rajesh Das case did not take note of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court. But, as I have already pointed out, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court referred to in T.Vijayakumar case have not dealt with the issues which have been decided in Rajesh Kumar case. But, as I have already pointed out, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court referred to in T.Vijayakumar case have not dealt with the issues which have been decided in Rajesh Kumar case. Now, with these conflicting judgments holding the field, what shall be appropriate for me at this stage? 9. In this regard, I may refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr.Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. :Jagdish, 2001 (2) SCC 247 wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to deal with a similar situation. In that judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus: “It is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. Judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs.” In paragraph 33 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows:-“As the learned Single Judge was not in agreement with the view expressed in Devilal's case, it would have been proper, to maintain judicial discipline, to refer the matter to a larger Bench rather than to take a different view. We note it with regret and distress that the said course was not followed. It is well settled that if a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction disagrees with another Bench of coordinate jurisdiction whether on the basis of "different arguments" or otherwise, on a question of law, it is appropriate that the matter be referred to a larger Bench for resolution of the issue rather than to leave two conflicting judgments to operate creating confusion.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. Similarly, in Safiya Bee v.Mohd. Vajahath Hussain alias Fasi, 2011 (2) SCC 94 ,the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 27 to 30 has held as follows:-“27. However, even assuming that the decision in W.P. No. 35561 of 1998 did not operate as res judicata, we are constrained to observe that even if the learned Judges who decided W.P. No. 304 of 2001 did not agree with the view taken by a Co-ordinate Bench of equal strength in the earlier W.P. No. 35561 of 1998 regarding the interpretation of Section 2(c) of the Act and its application to the petition schedule property, judicial discipline and practice required them to refer the issue to a larger Bench. The learned Judges were not right in overruling the statement of the law by a Coordinate Bench of equal strength. The learned Judges were not right in overruling the statement of the law by a Coordinate Bench of equal strength. It is an accepted rule or principle that the statement of the law by a Bench is considered binding on a Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. In case of doubt or disagreement about the decision of the earlier Bench, the well accepted and desirable practice is that the later Bench would refer the case to a larger Bench. 28. In Union of India and Anr. v. Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754 , (paras 27 and 28), a Constitution Bench of this Court held: 27. What then should be the position in regard to the effect of the law pronounced by a Division Bench in relation to a case realising the same point subsequently before a Division Bench of a smaller number of Judges? There is no constitutional or statutory prescription in the matter, and the point is governed entirely by the practice in India of the courts sanctified by repeated affirmation over a century of time. It cannot be doubted that in order to promote consistency and certainty in the law laid down by a superior Court, the ideal condition would be that the entire Court should sit in all cases to decide questions of law, and for that reason the Supreme Court of the United States does so. But having regard to the volume of work demanding the attention of the Court, it has been found necessary in India as a general rule of practice and convenience that the Court should sit in Divisions, each Division being constituted of Judges whose number may be determined by the exigencies of judicial need, by the nature of the case including any statutory mandate relative thereto, and by such other considerations which the Chief Justice, in whom such authority devolves by convention, may find most appropriate. It is in order to guard against the possibility of inconsistent decisions on points of law by different Division Benches that the rule has been evolved, in order to promote consistency and certainty in the development of the law and its contemporary status, that the statement of the law by a Division Bench is considered binding on a Division Bench of the same or lesser number of Judges. This principle has been followed in India by several generations of Judges. This principle has been followed in India by several generations of Judges. We may refer to a few of the recent cases on the point. In John Martin v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 836 , a Division Bench of three Judges found it right to follow the law declared in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 3 SCC 198 , decided by a Division Bench of five Judges, in preference to Bhut Nath Mate v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 SCC 645 decided by a Division Bench of two Judges. Again in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp. SCC 1, Beg J held that the Constitution Bench of five Judges was bound by the Constitution Bench of thirteen Judges in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 . In Ganapati Sitaram Balvalkar v. Waman Shripad Mage, (1981) 4 SCC 143 , this Court expressly stated that the view taken on a point of law by a Division Bench of four Judges of this Court was binding on a Division Bench of three Judges of the Court. And in Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365 , this Court specifically observed that where the view expressed by two different Division Benches of this Court could not be reconciled, the pronouncement of a Division Bench of a larger number of Judges had to be preferred over the decision of a Division Bench of a smaller number of Judges. This Court also laid down in Acharya Maharajshri Narandra prasadji Anand prasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 11 that even where the strength of two differing Division Benches consisted of the same number of Judges, it was not open to one Division Bench to decide the correctness or otherwise of the views of the other. This Court also laid down in Acharya Maharajshri Narandra prasadji Anand prasadji Maharaj v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 11 that even where the strength of two differing Division Benches consisted of the same number of Judges, it was not open to one Division Bench to decide the correctness or otherwise of the views of the other. The principle was reaffirmed in Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369 which noted that a Division Bench of two Judges of this Court in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana , (1981) 1 SCC 11 had differed from the view taken by an earlier Division Bench of two Judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 on the point whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be defeated by invoking the defence of executive necessity, and holding that to do so was wholly unacceptable reference was made to the well accepted and desirable practice of the later bench referring the case to a larger Bench when the learned Judges found that the situation called for such reference. 28. We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court.” 29. In Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 , (para 12), a Constitution Bench of this Court summed up the legal position in the following terms: (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of co-equal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of co-equal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) The above said rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) In spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. 30. The above principles and norms stated with reference to the Supreme Court are equally relevant and applicable to the High Court also.” 11. In the light of the views expressed in the above judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, having noticed the contrary views taken in T.Vijayakumar's case, if I choose to again reiterate my views expressed in Rajesh Das case, it may amount to aberration on my part to maintain the judicial discipline and decorum. At the same time, it is not proper to allow the uncertainty to perpetuate. At the same time, it is not proper to allow the uncertainty to perpetuate. Therefore, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited above and as per the long standing judicial practice, I am inclined to refer the matter to a Division Bench to resolve the conflict between the views expressed in Rajesh Das, I.P.S., v. Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission, 2010 (5) CTC 589 and T.Vijayakumar v. Madhavi and State Human Rights Commission, Tamil Nadu [W.P.(MD) No.12316 of 2010 dated 29.09.2010]. 12. In view of the above, I direct the Registry to place the papers before My Lord, the Hon'ble The Acting Chief Justice to consider to constitute a Division Bench to answer the following questions:- (1) Whether the principles stated in para 41 of Rajesh Das, I.P.S., v. Tamil Nadu State Human Rights Commission, 2010 (5) CTC 589 case are good in law. Or (2) Whether the principles stated in T.Vijayakumar v. Madhavi and State Human Rights Commission, Tamil Nadu [W.P.(MD) No.12316 of 2010 dated 29.09.2010] in paragraphs 16 to 19 are good in law.