Research › Search › Judgment

Delhi High Court · body

2013 DIGILAW 2375 (DEL)

Suraj Prakash v. Ram Phal Yadav

2013-12-09

MANMOHAN SINGH

body2013
JUDGMENT : Manmohan Singh, J. 1. The present revision petition is filed by the petitioner under Section 25B (8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) against the order dated 5th July, 2011 passed by ARC (Central), Delhi, dismissing the leave to defend application of the petitioners in respect of the shop bearing No. 8649, Gali No. 14 B, Shidi Pura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the tenanted premises”). 2. Brief facts for the purpose of adjudication of the present petition are that the respondent filed the eviction petition against the petitioners stating that he bonafidely requires the tenanted premises mainly, for his son, Nagendra Yadav, who has completed LL.B., to use it as a lawyer?s chamber. It was stated that besides the said son, respondent had three sons who were married and had children. It was stated that the respondent and all his family members are residing in the upper floor of the said property and that they had no separate space for lawyer?s chamber. It was also stated that the tenanted premises was used as an authorized ration shop by the tenant, i.e. husband of petitioner No.1 and father of the petitioner Nos. 2-3, and after his death, the same is lying locked. 3. In the leave to defend application, it was stated that though the respondent is the landlord, he is not the owner of tenanted premises. It was also averred that besides the tenanted premises, the respondent was the owner and in possession of shop Nos. 8646, 8647 and 8650, of which the shop Nos. 8647 and 8650 were lying closed. It was also averred that the respondent had let out various other rooms on rent for commercial activities. It was contended that the first and second floors of the property Nos. 8645 to 8650 were under the occupation of the respondent, being used by him for residential purposes and his son Nagendra Yadav was also using various portion thereof for his commercial purposes. It was also contended that besides these the respondent had a number of other properties, numbers of which were given in the leave to defend application. It was contended that it was after the refusal for payment of higher rent to the respondent that the respondent had stopped accepting the monthly rent from the petitioner. 4. It was also contended that besides these the respondent had a number of other properties, numbers of which were given in the leave to defend application. It was contended that it was after the refusal for payment of higher rent to the respondent that the respondent had stopped accepting the monthly rent from the petitioner. 4. The respondent in the reply to the leave to defend application denied the allegation that he is not the owner of the tenanted premises. It was stated that while shop No. 8646 was in occupation of one of his sons who was carrying on business therein; municipal No. 8647 was a staircase from ground floor to the upper floors, being used for residential purposes by the respondent and his family; shop No. 8650 was in tenancy of one Sh. Chaman Lal. The ownership of the other properties as alleged in the leave to defend application was denied. 5. The learned Trial Court with respect to the issue of ownership observed that even though the ownership was disputed, the relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties was not disputed. And that as per the settled law, landlord was not required to prove absolute ownership in respect of tenanted premises but was only required to show that he was more than tenant. 6. On the issue of alternative accommodation and bonafide requirement, after considering the contentions of both the parties, learned Trial Court opined that there was no other alternative accommodation with the respondent as alleged by the petitioners. Shop Nos. 8648 and 8650 were in tenancy of different tenants, shop No.8646 was in occupation of one of the sons of the respondent, there was no shop bearing No. 8647 as this was the stair case used to go the upper floors. Admittedly, upper floors of municipal Nos. 8645 to 8650 were used for residential purposes and the same could not be used for commercial purposes. The fact that Nagendra Yadav, son of the respondent had starting practising law was not disputed and that the allegation that he is running his business in the name and style of M/s Ramson Indus at property No.8646 had no substance since no document to support the said contention was filed on record. 7. With these observations, the impugned eviction order was passed and aggrieved thereof, the petitioner filed the present petition. 8. 7. With these observations, the impugned eviction order was passed and aggrieved thereof, the petitioner filed the present petition. 8. The issue before this Court is, whether said findings call for any interference by this Court in revisionary jurisdiction in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case or not. It is settled law and it has been held from time to time by various courts that the revision under Section 25B(8) of the Act cannot be regarded as a first appeal nor can it be as restricted as the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. The High Court would have jurisdiction to interfere if it is of the opinion that there has been a gross illegality or material irregularity which has been committed or the Controller has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or has not exercised the jurisdiction vested in him. In other words, this Court has only to see whether the learned Rent Controller has committed any jurisdictional error and has passed the order on the basis of material available before it. A finding of fact arrived at by the Controller would not be interfered with by the High Court unless it can be shown that finding has been arrived at by misreading or omitting relevant evidence and this has resulted in gross injustice being caused. If none of the aforesaid circumstances exist the High Court would not be entitled to interfere with the order of the Controller in exercise of its jurisdiction under proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act. 9. The High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of „whether it is according to law?. For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity would have reached on the material available before him. 10. The Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., reported in AIR (1999) SC 100 held as under:- “6...…The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. 10. The Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., reported in AIR (1999) SC 100 held as under:- “6...…The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court is supervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the Rent Controller conforms to law when he passes the order. The satisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of the case must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of the Rent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words, the High Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether any illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a finding on the materials available.” 11. It is the case of the respondent that he became owner of the tenanted premises by inheritance through a partition suit No.367/1970, titled as Ram Phal Yadav vs. Smt.Kishan Devi and Anr., before this Court. The property stands mutated in his name in the municipal record. 12. The petitioner in the application for leave to defend raised the following objections: a) The respondent/owner herein has an alternative accommodation available bearing No.8646 and 8647: i) The property No.8646 is in use and occupation of another son namely Shri Rajender Yadav of the respondent who has been carrying on his business therein since 2001 under the name and style of M/s Ramsons Industries. Supporting documents e.g. sales tax registration are sufficient to rebut and availability of accommodation. ii) Municipal No.8647 is the number given to the stair case which leads from ground floor to upper floor and does not include any accommodation at ground floor. The existence of staircase is supported by a site plan which was originally filed/prepared in the aforesaid partition suit in 1970, certified copy of which issued by High Court copying agency. b) The respondent/owner herein is in possession of a shop bearing No.8650 in the suit property which can be used by the lawyer son. i) This Municipal No.8650 was originally occupied by one Shri Chaman Lal as tenant. b) The respondent/owner herein is in possession of a shop bearing No.8650 in the suit property which can be used by the lawyer son. i) This Municipal No.8650 was originally occupied by one Shri Chaman Lal as tenant. ii) The respondent/owner upon retirement on superannuation as Assistant Director in Ministry of Finance on 31st October, 2006 and in order to lead a peaceful and gainful life chose to file an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act in which an eviction order dated 5th July, 2011 was passed by Sh.Lalit Kumar, ARC, on the basis of compromise between the parties, on 5th July, 2011. 13. This Court by order dated 14th May, 2012 asked the respondent to file an affidavit about the status of possession of the said premises No.8796 and also premises No.8650 in view of statement made by the petitioner in Court. The respondent filed the affidavit dated 4th August, 2012 in compliance of the said order of this Court. Respondent had filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Act against Sh.Barkat Ram deceased and others, for the fulfillment of need of his another son namely Shri Surender Yadav and in which an eviction order dated 14th February, 2012 was passed by Sh.Pritam Singh, ARC, in favour of the respondent herein and against the said tenant. Sh.Krishan Gopal & others tenant/J.D. thereafter filed a revision petition in this Court bearing RC Rev. No.324 of 2012 which is still pending disposal. 14. The fact of the matter is that the respondent wants tenanted premises for his fourth son Sh. Nagendra Yadav who has passed LLB. examination and started his practice and wants to operate his office under the guidance of his other family members who are advocates. The main stress made by the respondent is that it is very convenient for his son to run his office from the tenanted premises. The factum of his becoming advocate and practicing is not denied by the petitioners and his requirement appears to be genuine. Thus, impugned order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller is legally correct and cannot be interfered with. There is no merit in the petition. The same is hereby dismissed. The interim order as granted on 1st December, 2012 stands vacated. Pending application also stands disposed of. 15. Thus, impugned order passed by the Addl. Rent Controller is legally correct and cannot be interfered with. There is no merit in the petition. The same is hereby dismissed. The interim order as granted on 1st December, 2012 stands vacated. Pending application also stands disposed of. 15. The petitioners are granted six months time to vacate the tenanted premises i.e. shop bearing No. 8649, Gali No. 14 B, Shidi Pura, Karol Bagh, New Delhi. During this period the petitioners shall not sub-let or create third party interest in any manner in the tenanted premises and handover the peaceful possession thereof to the respondent. 16. The present petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.