JUDGMENT :- Heard. 2. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of parties. 3. The petitioner/original accused facing accusation for commission of offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in Summary Criminal Case No.485 of 2011 of the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pauni, assails the order dated 14.01.2013 in said case rejecting application Exh.40 made by him for grant of time for cross-examination of the complainant. 4. Mr. Gupte, learned counsel for the petitioner assails the order on the ground that on the relevant day, the examination-in-chief of the respondent-complainant was recorded inasmuch as on the said date the trial Court marked the documents tendered by the respondent/complainant in support of the matters stated by him in the affidavit filed i.e. the affidavit in lieu of his examination-in-chief in the said case. It is submitted that on the said date the counsel of the petitioner being not present, he had applied for time. The trial Court rejected it by observing that reasonable time was already given. 5. Mr. Gupte submitted that it is settled legal position that question of grant of time is required to be decided on the situation prevailing at the stage at which it was sought and merely because on the earlier dates time was sought and/or given to the petitioner, would not be a sound ground for rejecting his application. It is submitted that the order passed by the trial Court is blissfully cryptic and does not unfold the reasons behind rejecting the application. 6. The said submissions were vehemently countered by Mr. R.J. Mirza, learned counsel for the respondent by submitting that Roznama of the proceedings submitted by the petitioner reveals that the petitioner has taken time on earlier occasions. Mr. Mirza, submitted that though he is not disputing the proposition that question of grant of time is to be decided qua the situation circumstance prevailing on the relevant stage, still the law does not stipulate that events happened earlier can be altogether ignored. 7. Mr. Mirza further submitted that the bare glance at the provisions contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act and more particularly the provision pertaining to the offences and its prosecution i.e. offences made triable summarily, clearly reveals that the Legislature intended expeditious completion of such prosecution. Mr. 7. Mr. Mirza further submitted that the bare glance at the provisions contained in the Negotiable Instruments Act and more particularly the provision pertaining to the offences and its prosecution i.e. offences made triable summarily, clearly reveals that the Legislature intended expeditious completion of such prosecution. Mr. Mirza submitted that making such a provision was mainly for achieving one of the main objects of the Act of there existing free circulation/flow of capital/money in the market/society as the case would be, the Act intends to prohibit lingering of the prosecution for indefinite period for an offence under the Act, without there existing a reason for it. It is submitted that having regard to the said aspect and the conduct of the petitioner in lingering the proceeding by seeking time inasmuch as for seven occasions for trivial grounds, no fault can be found with order passed by the trial Court. It is submitted that the petitioner having taken the decision not to cross-examine the respondent-complainant and/or to make the proper arrangement for his cross-examination, he must suffer for consequences ensuing out of his act. 8. After giving thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced by both the parties and perusal of the record, it undoubtedly reveals of there being substance in submission canvassed of the petitioner having earlier sought the time inasmuch as on seven occasions. Thus the learned counsel for respondent was very much right in submitting that apparently the order passed by the trial Court cannot be faulted. 9. However, having due regard to the fact that the criminal prosecutions are for the purpose of discovery of truth and party to the trial must receive a fair and equal opportunity to place its case before the Court, it leads to the conclusion that the effect of the order passed by the trial Court for the default committed by the petitioner was a drastic. Such a conclusion is obvious after taking into consideration the nature and importance of the evidence of the complainant in such a prosecution. 10. Having regard to it and having due regard to the cardinal principles of the law that the parties at the trial must get an adequate opportunity to place its case before the Court and effect of the order passed by the trial Court being drastic, the petition deserves to be allowed by passing an appropriate order regarding the default committed by the petitioner. 11. Resultantly, the petition is allowed. The order dated 14.01.2013 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Pauni is hereby quashed and set aside subject to the petitioner depositing costs of Rs.7500/- before the trial Court within seven days from today. In the event of such a compliance, the application for adjournment made by the petitioner on the relevant date stands allowed. The trial Court thereafter to proceed with the case in accordance with the law and shall dispose of the said case as expeditiously as possible and in any event within a period of six months from today. 12. Rule made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No costs. Petition allowed.