JUDGMENT : Dev Darshan Sood, J. 1. Both these petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment as the same point of law has been urged. The factual matrix is different which will be considered separately. CWP No. 4048 of 2009 This writ petition has been preferred by the Employees Provident Fund Commissioner praying therein that the order passed by the Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, (Annexure P-9) dated 10th September, 2009 be quashed and set aside. 2. The learned Tribunal notes that after admission of the appeal the case was adjourned twice for filing of reply, but no reply was filed by the respondents. The appellant Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'Corporation') had filed an application u/s 151 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC') praying for refund of the amount deposited by it against the order challenged in appeal. The application pleaded that the Corporation was facing financial difficulties due to lack of business and it had become difficult to meet its day to day financial commitments. The Corporation had taken loans to meet its daily liabilities and that the Commissioner while passing the order did not appreciate the legitimate reasons assigned by the appellant for delayed remittance of provident funds dues etc. This request was turned down by the Commissioner holding that financial stringency is not a ground for waiver or reduction of damages under the Act and the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 and the Scheme framed there under. Penalty had been levied in accordance with Section 14B of the Act. The Tribunal proceeds:- .........However, there are catena of cases by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and various High Courts which says that it is not necessary for the Respondent to levy damages in each and every case but the damages be levied only in cases where there is intentional lapses in remittance of PF dues in time. In number of decisions by the High Courts it is observed that due consideration should be given to the reasons assigned by the Employer/Appellant for delayed remittance of dues. The poor financial condition of the employer resulting in delayed remittance of dues is one of the ground which requires due consideration by the authorities while levying damages............ 3. In number of decisions by the High Courts it is observed that due consideration should be given to the reasons assigned by the Employer/Appellant for delayed remittance of dues. The poor financial condition of the employer resulting in delayed remittance of dues is one of the ground which requires due consideration by the authorities while levying damages............ 3. The order thereafter proceeds that the Inquiry Officer had failed to appreciate the precarious financial condition of the appellant Corporation for delayed remittance of dues while levying damages. In these circumstances, prima facie the order does not appear to be free from "infirmities" Keeping in view these circumstances and the fact situation that the appellant Corporation was facing a financial crunch in meeting its financial commitments, it was considered that out of the amount of Rs. 41,52,308/-, which was deposited by the appellant Corporation, 50% be refunded and the remaining 50% be retained in safe custody till disposal of the appeal pending before the Tribunal. 4. All that I can say about this order is that the learned Tribunal should and ought to have died the relevant case law rather than just mentioning it in a cursory manner in passing. It is not the established practice in statutory adjudication that reference is made to a fact situation determined by a judicial authority without citing the precedent. The High Court and the Supreme Court are Courts of records whose judgments are reported. 5. Proceeding with the case further CMPMO No. 492 of 2011 has been preferred by the Corporation challenging the final order passed by the appellate Tribunal in the same appeal which was the subject matter of CWP No. 4048 of 2009. 6. In the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India preferred by the Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the 'Corporation'), it was accepted that the provisions of the Employees Provident Funds, Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') applies to the petitioner, but delay has been caused for not depositing the contribution due to the financial crunch faced by the Corporation and that the order of the authority (Commissioner) does not reveal or indicate that the damage and interest levied is commensurate with the actual loss suffered by the beneficiaries and that it is not in accordance with the circulation of the department dated 25.9.1990. Section 14-B of the Act rather authorises the levy of damages etc. but does not vest powers in the authority to levy such damages unless actual loss has been proved as commensurate with the loss. I note that in the application, which was preferred by the Corporation before the Commissioner (Annexure P-3), it was stated in the grounds of appeal urged for adjudication of the Tribunal: (1) There was more than a reasonable cause for the delay in deposit of ONLY the employer's share, it being pertinent to mention here that there was no default in deposit of the employee's share. During the period in consideration HPTDS Ltd. was facing genuine financial hardship. The cash flow of the Corporation was adversely affected due to drop in tourist traffic because of: (a) The earthquake in Gujarat on 26.1.2001 had caused heavy loss of human life and property, as such the tourist from Gujarat did not come during the season of this year. (b) The Elections in 5 states were scheduled on 15.5.2001 and the tourists from Bengal, Tamilnadu, Kerala, Assam etc. restrained from traveling. (c) Due to Terrorist Attack on World Trade Centre in USA on 11th September, 2001, the foreign tourists did not prefer to travel India. (d) Due to Godhra Incident and riots in Gujarat during the year 2002 the tourist from Gujarat and adjoining States did not visit Himachal Pradesh during this year. (e) Stoppage of LTC facilities to the employees by the Govt. has also resulted into lesser tourist traffic to the State. (f) Terrorist Attack on Parliament House on 13th December, 2002 and INDO-PAK Boarder Tension has also resulted in lesser tourist traffic in the State. (g) The 9/11 episode also had a dampening effect on the tourist trade. The financial position of the employers got crippled in a great extent and the corporation had tremendous difficulty in meeting its day to day expenses. The Corporation was not able to cope up with the inflationary trend. The fixed overheads and establishment costs increased manifold times whereas the revenue could not be increased to the desired levels because of the aforementioned reasons. The bottom-line was effected and the Corporation came into red. There were instances where the salary of the employees, which is at priority number one for any organization, was not paid in time. The fixed overheads and establishment costs increased manifold times whereas the revenue could not be increased to the desired levels because of the aforementioned reasons. The bottom-line was effected and the Corporation came into red. There were instances where the salary of the employees, which is at priority number one for any organization, was not paid in time. To substantiate our assertion we enclose: (a) Date wise data of bank balances for the due dates, which itself reflects that the Corporation was in debt and had no means to pay the employers share at the first instance. (b) Table depicting instances where there has been delay in disbursement of salary. (c) Table showing the recurring losses and the erosion of net worth. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the orders. 8. In M/s. Hindustan Times Limited Vs. Union of India and Others, (1998) 2 SCC 242 , the Supreme Court holds: 7. At the outset, we may say that the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi ought to have given reasons at least briefly, while dismissing the writ petition in limine. As stated in Fauja Singh v. Jaspal Kaur, (1996) 4 SCC 461 , on the plainest consideration of justice, the High Court should have given reasons. The absence of reasons has deprived the Supreme Court from knowing the circumstances which weighed with the High Court to dismiss the matter in limine, it was an unsatisfactory method of disposal. The necessity to provide reasons, howsoever brief in support of the High Courts' conclusions is too obvious to be reiterated. Obligation to give reasons introduces clarity and excludes or at any rate minimises the chances of arbitrariness and the higher forum can test the correctness of those reasons. It becomes difficult for this Court in all such cases to remit the matters to the High Court inasmuch as by the time cases reach this Court, several years would have passed. 8. In an article 'On Writing Judgments', Justice Michael Kirby of Australia [(1990) (Vol. 64. Australian Law Journal p.691)] has approached the problem from the point of view of the litigant, the legal profession, the subordinate Courts/Tribunals, the brother Judges and the Judges' own conscience. To the litigant, the duty of the Judge is to uphold his own integrity and let the losing party knew why he lost the case. 64. Australian Law Journal p.691)] has approached the problem from the point of view of the litigant, the legal profession, the subordinate Courts/Tribunals, the brother Judges and the Judges' own conscience. To the litigant, the duty of the Judge is to uphold his own integrity and let the losing party knew why he lost the case. The legal profession is entitled to have it demonstrated that the Judge had the correct principles in mind, had properly applied them and is entitled to examine the body of the judgment for the learning and precedent that they provide and for the reassurance of the quality of the judiciary which is still the centre-piece of our administration of justice. It does not take long for the profession to come to know, including through the written pages of published judgments, the lazy Judge, the Judge prone to errors of fact etc. The reputational considerations are important for the exercise of appellate rights, for the Judges' own self-discipline, for attempts at improvement and the maintenance of the integrity and quality of our judiciary. From the point of view of other Judges, the benefit that accrues to the lower hierarchy of Judges and Tribunals is of utmost importance. Justice Asprey of Australia has even said in Pettit v. Dankley, (1971) 1 NSWLR 376 (CA) that the failure of a Court to give reasons is an encroachment upon the right of appeal given to a litigant. In our view, the satisfaction which a reasoned judgment gives to the losing party or his lawyer is the test of a good judgment. Disposal of cases is no doubt important but quality of the judgment is equally, if not more, important. There is no point in shifting the burden to the higher Court either to support the judgment by reasons or to consider the evidence or law for the first time to see if the judgment needs a reversal. 9. Section 14-B as amended by Act 40/73 w.e.f. 1-11-1973, confers power on the concerned authority to recover damages. Where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the Trust Fund the concerned authority may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages, not exceeding the amount of arrears as may be specified in the Scheme. Section 14-B as amended by Act 40/73 w.e.f. 1-11-1973, confers power on the concerned authority to recover damages. Where an employer makes default in the payment of any contribution to the Trust Fund the concerned authority may recover from the employer by way of penalty such damages, not exceeding the amount of arrears as may be specified in the Scheme. The Section itself, after the 1973 amendment, now provides that before levying and recovering damages, the employer shall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The Scheme referred to in S. 14-B is the Employees' Provident (Fund) Scheme, 1952, so far as provident fund contributions are concerned. 10. Under clause 29 of the said Scheme the contribution payable by the employer shall be equal to the contribution payable by the employee. Under clause 32(3). any sum deducted by an employer from the wages of an employee under this scheme shall be deemed to have been entrusted to him for the purpose of paying the contribution in respect of which it was deducted. Therefore, the Scheme creates a fiction of entrustment. 11. Clause 38 deals with the mode of payment and says that the employer shall, before paying the member his wages in respect of any period or part of a period for which contributions are payable, deduct the employees' contribution from his wages which together with his own contribution as well as an administrative charge, shall be paid within 15 days of the close of every month into the Fund by separate bank drafts or cheques, provided that if the payment is made by a cheque, it should be drawn only on the local bank of the place in which deposits are made. This is obviously meant for early clearance and for payment into the fund. 12. Clause 52 requires investment of the monies belonging to the Employees' Provident Fund. Clause 60 requires interest to be credited to the member's account. The computation of damages shows that the department permits a 'grace period' of 5 days and it is only thereafter that the damages are computed. Section 11 of the Act deals with 'penalties'. 12. Clause 52 requires investment of the monies belonging to the Employees' Provident Fund. Clause 60 requires interest to be credited to the member's account. The computation of damages shows that the department permits a 'grace period' of 5 days and it is only thereafter that the damages are computed. Section 11 of the Act deals with 'penalties'. Further u/s 405, Explanation-I of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, if a person, being an employer, deducts the employee's contribution from the wages payable to the employees for crediting to a provident fund or family pension fund established by any law for the time being in force, the said amount shall be deemed to have been en-trusted with the amount of the contribution so deducted by him and in default, the person could be liable for criminal breach of trust. 13. It appears that, soon after 1952 delays in remitting the contributions under the Act became chronic and the arrears payable to the Trust Fund increased from time to time. This was because initially the maximum damages awardable was only 25% of the arrears and no interest is payable. Therefore, by an Amendment in 1973 the damages were increased from 25% to a maximum of 100%. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill which became Act 40/73 stated that the arrears in 1959-60 were Rs. 3.65 crores; in March 1967, they were Rs. 5,96 crores, then by March 1970, they rose to 14.6 crores and by March 1971 to Rs. 20.65 crores. It was stated there that the employers were using these monies "in their business". The National Commission on Labour recommended stringent measures in its 116th Report which was endorsed by the Estimates Committee, resulting in the 1973 Act. 14. In The Commissioner of Coal Mines Provident Fund, Dhanbad and Others Vs. J.P. Lalla and Sons, (1976) 1 SCC 964 interpreting Section 10-F of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Scheme Act, 1948, it was stated by this Court that by the use of the words 'may levy damages', in case of default in payment of contribution, and the words 'as it may think fit to impose', it was clear that the determination was not based on the inflexible application of a rigid formula and that by these words the authorities were to apply their mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. As a duty was judicially imposed on the authority, principles of natural justice were implied. In Organo Chemical Industries and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, ), where the vires of the Act were upheld, this Court laid down that while passing orders u/s 14-B, the authority was acting in a 'quasi-judicial' capacity and was bound to give reasons for its orders. The levy was not necessarily proportionate to the loss incurred by the employee inasmuch as it was partly compensatory and partly penal. 15. Organo Chemical Industries and Another Vs. Union of India and Others, (1979) 4 SCC 573 itself was one where there were delays in payment of the contributions and the explanations given were rejected. The order of the Commissioner rejecting the explanation of the employer was not interfered with by the Supreme Court. There the default related to the period from March to October 1975 and again from December 1975 to November 1976. The show cause notice was issued on 7-6-1977 and in response, the appellants stated that the remittal was delayed "due to difficulties beyond their control and...... there were disputes between partners of the firm, there was a power-cut of 60%..........w.e.f. May 6, 1974 and there were huge amounts of loan payable to the Haryana Financial Corporation". However, the Regional Provident Commissioner by his orders dated 16-8-1977 rejected all these contentions and held that the obligation to pay these contributions into the fund was unqualified. The explanations of the employer were not acceptable. The default could not be linked with the financial problems facing the establishment. It was stated by the Commissioner that the 50% of the employee's contributions was trust money with employer for deposit in the statutory fund. The delay in the deposit on his part of the contributions amounted to breach of trust............ He also found that the appellants in that case were habitual defaulters and that the maximum damages fixed under the Act was to be levied. When the matter came to this Court, A.P. Sen, J. observed that the default was willful inasmuch as the appellants, have been utilising the amounts deducted from the wages of their employees, including their own contributions, as well as administrative charges, in running their business Krishna Iyer, J. in his concurrent judgment, characterised such uses as amounting to 'embezzlement'. 16. When the matter came to this Court, A.P. Sen, J. observed that the default was willful inasmuch as the appellants, have been utilising the amounts deducted from the wages of their employees, including their own contributions, as well as administrative charges, in running their business Krishna Iyer, J. in his concurrent judgment, characterised such uses as amounting to 'embezzlement'. 16. As to the manner in which the concerned authority could arrive at the 'damages', A.P. Sen, J. stated that the authority usually takes into consideration,-as was done in that case-the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved. The damages were to be compensatory and penal as well and hence principles of estimation of damages under the law of Contract or Torts were not applicable. (p.691-693) (Emphasis supplied) 9. The Court thereafter proceeds to consider the provisions of the Act: 21. The reason is that while in the above cases decided by this Court the exercise of powers by the authority at a very belated stage was likely to result in the deprivation of property which rightly and lawfully belonged to the person concerned, the position u/s 14-B of the Act of an employer is totally different. The employer who has defaulted in making over the contributions to the Trust Fund had, on the other hand, the use of monies which did not belong to him at all. Such a situation cannot be compared to the above line of cases which involve prolonged suspense in regard to deprivation of property. In fact, in cases u/s 14-B if the Regional Provident Commissioner had made computations earlier and sent a demand immediately after the amounts fell due, the defaulter would not have been able to use these monies for his own purposes or for his business. In our opinion, it does not lie in the mouth of such a person to say that by reason of delay in the exercise of powers u/s 14-B, he has suffered loss. In our opinion, it does not lie in the mouth of such a person to say that by reason of delay in the exercise of powers u/s 14-B, he has suffered loss. On the other hand, the defaulter has obviously had the benefit of the 'boon of delay' which "is so dear to debtors", as pointed out by the Privy Council in AIR 1932 165 (Privy Council) In that case, it was observed that equitable considerations were out of place in matters of limitation and the strict grammatical construction alone was the guide, Sir Dinshaw Mulla stated: Nor in such a case as this is the judgment-debtor prejudiced. He may indeed obtain the boon of delay, which is so dear to debtors and if he is virtuously inclined there is nothing to prevent his paying what he owes into Court. The position of the employer in case of default u/s 14-B is no different. 28. From the aforesaid decisions, the following principles can be summarised. The authority u/s 14-B has to apply his mind to the facts of the case and the reply to the show cause notice and pass a reasoned order after following principles of natural justice and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard; the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of default and the default on the part of the employer based on plea of power cut, financial problems relating to other indebtedness or the delay in realisation of amounts paid by the cheques or drafts, cannot be justifiable grounds for the employer to escape liability; there is no period of limitation prescribed by the legislature for initiating action for recovery of damages u/s 14-B. The fact that proceedings are initiated or demand for damages is made after several years cannot by itself be a ground for drawing an inference of waiver or that the employer was lulled into a belief that no proceedings u/s 14-B would be taken; mere delay in initiating action u/s 14-B cannot amount to prejudice inasmuch as the delay on the part of the department, would have only allowed the employer to use the monies for his own purposes or for his business especially when there is no additional provision for charging interest. However, the employer can claim prejudice if there is proof that between the period of default and the date of initiation of action u/s 14-B, he has changed his position to his detriment to such an extent that if the recovery is made after a large number of years, the prejudice to him is of an "irretrievable" nature; he might also claim prejudice upon proof of loss of all the relevant records and/or non-availability of the personnel who were, several years back in charge of these payments and provided he further establishes that there is no other way he can reconstruct the record or produce evidence; or there are other similar grounds which could lead to 'irretrievable" prejudice; further, in such cases of "irretrievable" prejudice, the defaulter must take the necessary pleas in defence in the reply to the show cause notice and must satisfy the concerned authority with acceptable material; if those pleas are rejected, he cannot raise them in the High Court unless there is a clear pleading in the writ petition to that effect. (pp. 694-696) 10. In sequence to the facts on record the Supreme Court concluded that since the grounds seeking imposition of levy of penalty was not proved/established, the SLP was dismissed. 11. This judgment is relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner to urge that the grounds pleaded, urged and proved before the Commissioner were clear and unequivocal when he stated that it was because of financial crunch that the petitioner was unable to meet its commitments and that the order passed by the Commissioner as also affirmed by the Tribunal was not based on sound reasoning on the invocation of the principle applicable for levy of damages. 12. Learned Counsel for the respondent relies upon decision of the Supreme Court in Organo Chemical Industries and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others (supra) holding: 11. The bogie of absence of guidelines in the provision and consequential possibility of the authority running berserk or acting hubristically does not frighten. Of course, the more bereft of explicit guidelines a statutory power is, the more searching must be the judicial invigilation to discover hidden injustice and masked mala fides. Even so, let us examine the ground that, absent detailed guidelines, the law is void. What is not explicit may still be implicit. Of course, the more bereft of explicit guidelines a statutory power is, the more searching must be the judicial invigilation to discover hidden injustice and masked mala fides. Even so, let us examine the ground that, absent detailed guidelines, the law is void. What is not explicit may still be implicit. What is not articulated at length may be spun out from a single phrase. What is not transparent in particularised provisions may be immanent in the preamble, scheme, purpose of subject-matter of the Act. What is real is not only the gross but also the subtle, if I may strike a deeper note. Such a perspective dispels the submission that Section 14-B is bad as uncircumscribed and overbroad. 13. What do we mean by 'damages'? The expression 'damages' is neither vague nor over-wide. It has more than one signification but the precise import in a given context is not difficult to discern. A plurality of variants steaming out of a core concept is seen in such words as actual damages, civil damages, compensatory damages, consequential damages, contingent damages, continuing damages, double damages, excessive damages, exemplary damages, general damages, irreparable damages, pecuniary damages, prospective damages, special damages, speculative damages, substantial damages, unliquidated damages. But the essentials are (a) detriment to one by the wrong-doing of another (b) reparation awarded to the injured through legal remedies and (c) its quantum being determined by the dual components of pecuniary compensation for the loss suffered and often, not always, a punitive addition as a deterrent-cum-denunciation by the law. For instance, 'exemplary damages' are damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff over and above what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice, fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degradation, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish defendant for his evil behaviour or to make an example of him, for which reasons they are also called "punitive" or "punitory" damages or "vindictive" damages, and (vulgarly) 'smart-money'. (See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition pp. (See Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition pp. 467/468), It is sufficient for our present purpose to state that the power conferred to award damages is delimited by the content and contour of the concept itself and if the Court finds the Commissioner traveling beyond, the blow will fall. Section 14-B is good for these reasons: 38. The contention that Section 14-B confers unguided and uncontrolled discretion upon the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose such damages 'as he may think fit' is therefore, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted. Nor can it be accepted that there are no guidelines provided for fixing the quantum of damages. The power of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner to impose damages u/s 14-B is a quasi-judicial function. It must be exercised after notice to the defaulter and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. The discretion to award damages could be exercised within the limits fixed by the Statute. Having regard to the punitive nature of the power exercisable u/s 14-B and the consequences that ensue therefrom, an order u/s 14-B must be a 'speaking order' containing the reasons in support of it. The guidelines are provided in the Act and its various provisions, particularly in the word 'damages' the liability for which in Section 14-B arises on the 'making of default. While fixing the amount of damages, the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner usually takes into consideration, as he has done here, various factors viz. the number of defaults, the period of delay, the frequency of defaults and the amounts involved. The word 'damages' in Section 14-B lays down sufficient guidelines for him to levy damages. (pp. 1807 and 1814) 13. In particular, learned Counsel, by reference to these decisions, submits that:- 18. I am clearly of the view that 'damages', as imposed by Section 14-B, includes a punitive sum quantified according to the circumstances of the case. In 'exemplary damages' this aggravating element is prominent. Constitutionally speaking, such a penal levy included in damages is perfectly within the area of implied powers and the legislature may, while enforcing collections, legitimately and reasonably provide for recovery of additional sums in the shape of penalty so as to see that avoidance is obviated. In 'exemplary damages' this aggravating element is prominent. Constitutionally speaking, such a penal levy included in damages is perfectly within the area of implied powers and the legislature may, while enforcing collections, legitimately and reasonably provide for recovery of additional sums in the shape of penalty so as to see that avoidance is obviated. Such a penal levy can take the form of damages because the reparation for the injury suffered by the default is more than the narrow computation of interest on the contribution. (p.1809) This decision has already been considered by the Supreme Court in M/s. Hindustan Times' case supra. 14. He also relies upon the decision of the Division Bench of Orissa High Court in Esskey Machinery (P) Ltd. Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, (1999) 1 LLJ 1001 holding: 12. Ultimately it was prayed by the learned Counsel for petitioner that direction should be given for waiver of damages. Para 32-B of the Scheme quoted above deals with reduction or waiver of damages under certain terms and conditions. The Central Board is authorized to direct for reduction or waiver of damages. Let the petitioner move the Central Board, if so advised, by the end of March, 1998 for reduction or waiver of damages. Within that period an amount of 50% of demand raised shall be deposited with the opposite party without prejudice to the petitioner's application for waiver on its own merits. Till the end of March, 1998, no coercive action shall be taken. (p.2262) He urges that financial stringency is no ground for exemption from paying penalty as leviable. 15. Adverting to the orders passed by the learned Tribunal, what I find is that the Tribunal places reliance upon decisions of the Supreme Court in M/s. Hindustan Times Ltd. and Organo Chemical Industries cases supra. The Tribunal has only extracted one part of directions issued by the Supreme Court which are in detail providing not only for a consideration of a show cause notice issued to the employer but also the adequacy of the reasons furnished which cannot be read in isolation as the learned Tribunal has proceeded to do so. The Tribunal has only extracted one part of directions issued by the Supreme Court which are in detail providing not only for a consideration of a show cause notice issued to the employer but also the adequacy of the reasons furnished which cannot be read in isolation as the learned Tribunal has proceeded to do so. It is in these circumstances that that the case requires to be remanded to the Tribunal for decision afresh in accordance with the directions issued by the Supreme Court and then to consider the reasons furnished by the Corporation as to whether it constituted bona-fide grounds acceptable in law. The Tribunal will, at the same time, consider the case in terms of the judgment of M/s. Hindustan Times supra and the manner in which the Commissioner considers the reply to the show cause notice as also the reasons furnished by the Corporation. Civil Writ Petition is dismissed. CMPMO No. 492 of 2011 16. The case is remanded to the learned Tribunal for decision afresh in accordance with law, more especially, the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which binds its discretion in the manner as stated therein. 17. Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 5th March, 2013. A direction is issued to the Tribunal to conclude the proceedings within a period of four months from the date when the parties first put in appearance.