JUDGMENT : 1. In the above-captioned first four petitions, quashing of criminal complaint No. 7/1 titled Ajit Singh Tokas v. Raj deep Sardesai & Ors. and the summoning order of 7th March, 2010 is sought on merits whereas in the above-captioned last two petitions, quashing of criminal complaint No. 179/2011 titled Ravi Prakash v. IBN-7 and Ors. and the summoning order of 6th February, 2012 is also sought on merits. 2. In the above-referred two complaints i.e. criminal complaints No. 7/1 and 179/2011 preferred by Ajit Singh Tokas and Ravi Prakash Sharma respectively, petitioners are from concerned T.V. News Channel and Cobra Post, Unit of TV News Channel, who had conducted the sting operation, have been summoned for the offence of defamation. 3. With the consent of both the sides, the above-captioned six petitions were heard together as the challenge to the afore-noted two complaints is on identical grounds and by this common order, these petitions are being disposed of together. 4. While entertaining these petitions, petitioners’ personal appearance before trial court was dispensed with but the proceedings arising out of these two complaints were allowed to continue. 5. At the hearing, it was disclosed that in criminal complaint No. 7/1 titled Ajit Singh Tokas v. Rajdeep Sardesai & Ors., the matter is listed on 16th December, 2013 before trial court for orders on the framing Notice under Section 251 of Cr. P.C. and in criminal complaint No. 179/2011 titled Ravi Prakash v. IBN-7 and Ors., respondent-complainant is to be cross-examined on 14th February, 2014. 6. During the course of hearing, it was vehemently urged on behalf of petitioners that what is the role of petitioners has not been disclosed in the complaints in question and it is not the case of respondent-complainant that the sting operation conducted and telecasted by petitioners was inaccurate and manipulated. It was pointed out by learned counsel for petitioners that Lokayukta in his report has found substance in the sting operation conducted by petitioners-Cobra Post and an advisory had been issued to respondent-complainant-Ajit Singh Tokas and it has been recommended that a reprimand be issued to respondent-complainant-Ravi Prakash Sharma, Councillor. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for petitioners upon decisions in Shobhana Bhartia & Ors. v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. 144 (2007) DLT 519; Vivek Goenka v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) & Anr. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for petitioners upon decisions in Shobhana Bhartia & Ors. v. NCT of Delhi & Anr. 144 (2007) DLT 519; Vivek Goenka v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) & Anr. 2009 (109) DRJ 309 and Tej Kishan Sadhu v. State & Anr. 201 (2013) DLT 359 to contend that where complaint made does not make out a case of defamation, then summoning order has to be quashed and from the two complaints in question, the offence of defamation is not prima facie made out and so, these complaints and the proceedings arising out of them, deserve to be quashed. 7. Learned counsel for respondents-complainants supported the impugned order and had submitted that there are allegations against petitioners, who are collectively responsible for defaming complainant-respondents and the whole issue without trial, ought not to be pre-judged while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. as petitioners are prima facie guilty of the offence of defamation. To contend so, reliance was placed upon decisions in Sewakarma Sobhani v. R.K. Karanjia, Chief Editor, Weekly Blitz and Others (1981) 3 SCC 208 ; Jaffrey J. Diermeier & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2010 (3) JCC 2093 : (2010) 6 SCC 243 ; MA. Rumugam v. Kittu Alias Krishnamoorthy (2009) 1 SCC 101 ; MM Damani v. S.K. Sinha & Ors. 2001 (2) JCC 12: (2001) 5 SCC 156 and BalrajKhanna & Ors. v. Moti Rayt 7 (1971) DLT 335. 8. After hearing both the sides and on perusal of the complaints in question, impugned orders, the material on record and the decisions cited, I find that the question of sting operation being defamatory or not, is not subjudice in proceedings pending relating to Lokayukta’s report of 22nd March, 2012 (Annexure P-3) in Crl. M.C.2398/12. In aforesaid Lokayukta’s report, it has been clarified that if there is any grievance regarding complainants herein being defamed by the telecast, then they can avail of remedy available in law. The aspect of advisory being issued to respondent- Ajit Singh tokas and complainant-respondent-Ravi Prakash Sharma being reprimanded by the Lokayukta, cannot be made the basis to quash the complaints in question because the recommendation of Lokayukta to the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi has not been accepted. In any case, this is an aspect ought to be dealt with at the appropriate stage of trial. 9. In any case, this is an aspect ought to be dealt with at the appropriate stage of trial. 9. Regarding their being no averments qua petitioners or principle of vicarious liability being not attracted, I find that in the face of averments made in paragraphs No. 6, 14, 28 and 38 in criminal complaint No. 7/1 titled Ajit Singh Tokas v. Rajdeep Sardesai & Ors. and the averments made in paragraphs No. 4, 14, 19, 25, and 33 in criminal complaint No. 179/2011 titled Ravi Prakash v. IBN-7 and Ors., it cannot be prima facie said that no case for summoning petitioners as accused is made out. 10. Veracity or truthfulness of the sting operation cannot be pre-judged in proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. and is required to be established at trial as it is open to petitioners to show before trial court that they fall in any of the exceptions to Section 499 of IPC. Such a view is being prima facie taken because petitioners themselves have described themselves to be TV-18 (Broadcast Ltd.) formerly known as M/s. IBN-18 Broadcast Ltd. and because petitioners have not disclosed as to who was the person, who had permitted the telecast of the sting operation, which is alleged to be defamatory. However, during the course of hearing, it had become abundantly clear and is beyond any dispute that petitioner No. 3-Kshipra Jatana, EVP and Head Legal of TV 18 Broadcast Ltd., has nothing to do with the offence in question, therefore, continuance of proceedings against her is unwarranted and the proceedings arising out of criminal complaint No. 7/1 qua her are quashed. Regarding remaining petitioners, proceedings arising out of complaint in question qua them do not deserve to be quashed as respondent-complainant ought to be provided an opportunity to get the averments made in these complaints tested at trial. It is so said in view of the dictum of Apex Court in Jeffrey J. Diermeier (supra), which is as under:-- “37. It is trite that where to the charge of defamation under Section 500 IPC the accused invokes the aid of Tenth Exception to Section 499 IPC, “good faith” and “public good” have both to be established by him. It is so said in view of the dictum of Apex Court in Jeffrey J. Diermeier (supra), which is as under:-- “37. It is trite that where to the charge of defamation under Section 500 IPC the accused invokes the aid of Tenth Exception to Section 499 IPC, “good faith” and “public good” have both to be established by him. The mere plea that the accused believed that what he had stated was in “good faith” is not sufficient to accept his defence and he must justify the same by adducing evidence. However, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt. 38. It is well settled that the degree and the character of proof which an accused is expected to furnish in support of his plea cannot be equated with the degree of proof expected from the prosecution in a criminal trial. The moment the accused succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability, onus which lies on him in this behalf stands discharged. Therefore, it is neither feasible nor possible to lay down a rigid test for deciding whether an accused person acted in “good faith” and for “public good” under the said Exception. 39. The question has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case, having regard to the nature of imputation made; the circumstances on which it came to be made and the status of the person who makes the imputation as also the status of the person against whom the imputation is allegedly made. These and a host of other considerations would be relevant and required to be considered for deciding the appellants’ plea of “good faith” and “public interest”. Unfortunately, all these are questions of fact and matters for evidence, 40. In the instant case, the stage for recording of evidence had not been reached and, therefore, in the absence of any evidence on record, we find it difficult to return a finding whether or not the appellants have satisfied the requirements of “good faith” and “public good” so as to fall within the ambit of the Tenth Exception to Section 499 IPC. Similarly, it will neither be possible nor appropriate for this Court to comment on the allegations levelled by Respondent 2 and record a final opinion whether these allegations do constitute defamation. Similarly, it will neither be possible nor appropriate for this Court to comment on the allegations levelled by Respondent 2 and record a final opinion whether these allegations do constitute defamation. Reading the complaint as a whole, we find it difficult to hold that a case for quashing of the complaint under Section 482 of the Code has been made out. At this juncture, we say no more lest it may cause prejudice to either of the parties.” 11. By applying the afore-noted dictum of Apex Court in Jeffrey J. Diermeier (supra) to the facts of the instant case, the above-captioned six petitions are disposed of with liberty to petitioners [except petitioner No. 3- Kshipra Jatana against who proceedings have been quashed by this order] to raise the pleas taken herein before trial court at the appropriate stage. 12. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, petitioners are permitted to appear before trial court through their counsel, who do not seek adjournment, with liberty to trial court to obtain the presence of petitioners as and when required. Needless to say, any observation made in this order shall have no bearing on merits of this case at trial.